|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +name: agent-owasp-compliance |
| 3 | +description: | |
| 4 | + Check any AI agent codebase against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 risks. |
| 5 | + Use this skill when: |
| 6 | + - Evaluating an agent system's security posture before production deployment |
| 7 | + - Running a compliance check against OWASP ASI 2026 standards |
| 8 | + - Mapping existing security controls to the 10 agentic risks |
| 9 | + - Generating a compliance report for security review or audit |
| 10 | + - Comparing agent framework security features against the standard |
| 11 | + - Any request like "is my agent OWASP compliant?", "check ASI compliance", or "agentic security audit" |
| 12 | +--- |
| 13 | + |
| 14 | +# Agent OWASP ASI Compliance Check |
| 15 | + |
| 16 | +Evaluate AI agent systems against the OWASP Agentic Security Initiative (ASI) Top 10 — the industry standard for agent security posture. |
| 17 | + |
| 18 | +## Overview |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +The OWASP ASI Top 10 defines the critical security risks specific to autonomous AI agents — not LLMs, not chatbots, but agents that call tools, access systems, and act on behalf of users. This skill checks whether your agent implementation addresses each risk. |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +``` |
| 23 | +Codebase → Scan for each ASI control: |
| 24 | + ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection |
| 25 | + ASI-02: Tool Use Governance |
| 26 | + ASI-03: Agency Boundaries |
| 27 | + ASI-04: Escalation Controls |
| 28 | + ASI-05: Trust Boundary Enforcement |
| 29 | + ASI-06: Logging & Audit |
| 30 | + ASI-07: Identity Management |
| 31 | + ASI-08: Policy Integrity |
| 32 | + ASI-09: Supply Chain Verification |
| 33 | + ASI-10: Behavioral Monitoring |
| 34 | +→ Generate Compliance Report (X/10 covered) |
| 35 | +``` |
| 36 | + |
| 37 | +## The 10 Risks |
| 38 | + |
| 39 | +| Risk | Name | What to Look For | |
| 40 | +|------|------|-----------------| |
| 41 | +| ASI-01 | Prompt Injection | Input validation before tool calls, not just LLM output filtering | |
| 42 | +| ASI-02 | Insecure Tool Use | Tool allowlists, argument validation, no raw shell execution | |
| 43 | +| ASI-03 | Excessive Agency | Capability boundaries, scope limits, principle of least privilege | |
| 44 | +| ASI-04 | Unauthorized Escalation | Privilege checks before sensitive operations, no self-promotion | |
| 45 | +| ASI-05 | Trust Boundary Violation | Trust verification between agents, signed credentials, no blind trust | |
| 46 | +| ASI-06 | Insufficient Logging | Structured audit trail for all tool calls, tamper-evident logs | |
| 47 | +| ASI-07 | Insecure Identity | Cryptographic agent identity, not just string names | |
| 48 | +| ASI-08 | Policy Bypass | Deterministic policy enforcement, no LLM-based permission checks | |
| 49 | +| ASI-09 | Supply Chain Integrity | Signed plugins/tools, integrity verification, dependency auditing | |
| 50 | +| ASI-10 | Behavioral Anomaly | Drift detection, circuit breakers, kill switch capability | |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +--- |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | +## Check ASI-01: Prompt Injection Protection |
| 55 | + |
| 56 | +Look for input validation that runs **before** tool execution, not after LLM generation. |
| 57 | + |
| 58 | +```python |
| 59 | +def check_asi_01(project_path: str) -> dict: |
| 60 | + """ASI-01: Is user input validated before reaching tool execution?""" |
| 61 | + signals = { |
| 62 | + "positive": [ |
| 63 | + "input_validation", "validate_input", "sanitize", |
| 64 | + "classify_intent", "prompt_injection", "threat_detect", |
| 65 | + "PolicyEvaluator", "PolicyEngine", "check_content", |
| 66 | + ], |
| 67 | + "negative": [ |
| 68 | + "eval(", "exec(", "subprocess.run(.*shell=True", |
| 69 | + "os.system(", "input()", # raw input passed to tools |
| 70 | + ] |
| 71 | + } |
| 72 | + # Search codebase for these patterns |
| 73 | + # Positive signals = controls exist |
| 74 | + # Negative signals = potential vulnerabilities |
| 75 | + return { |
| 76 | + "risk": "ASI-01", |
| 77 | + "name": "Prompt Injection", |
| 78 | + "status": "pass" if positive_found and not negative_found else "fail", |
| 79 | + "controls_found": positive_matches, |
| 80 | + "vulnerabilities": negative_matches, |
| 81 | + "recommendation": "Add input validation before tool execution, not just output filtering" |
| 82 | + } |
| 83 | +``` |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | +**What passing looks like:** |
| 86 | +```python |
| 87 | +# GOOD: Validate before tool execution |
| 88 | +result = policy_engine.evaluate(user_input) |
| 89 | +if result.action == "deny": |
| 90 | + return "Request blocked by policy" |
| 91 | +tool_result = await execute_tool(validated_input) |
| 92 | +``` |
| 93 | + |
| 94 | +**What failing looks like:** |
| 95 | +```python |
| 96 | +# BAD: User input goes directly to tool |
| 97 | +tool_result = await execute_tool(user_input) # No validation |
| 98 | +``` |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +--- |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | +## Check ASI-02: Insecure Tool Use |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +Verify tools have allowlists, argument validation, and no unrestricted execution. |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +**What to search for:** |
| 107 | +- Tool registration with explicit allowlists (not open-ended) |
| 108 | +- Argument validation before tool execution |
| 109 | +- No `subprocess.run(shell=True)` with user-controlled input |
| 110 | +- No `eval()` or `exec()` on agent-generated code without sandbox |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | +**Passing example:** |
| 113 | +```python |
| 114 | +ALLOWED_TOOLS = {"search", "read_file", "create_ticket"} |
| 115 | + |
| 116 | +def execute_tool(name: str, args: dict): |
| 117 | + if name not in ALLOWED_TOOLS: |
| 118 | + raise PermissionError(f"Tool '{name}' not in allowlist") |
| 119 | + # validate args... |
| 120 | + return tools[name](**validated_args) |
| 121 | +``` |
| 122 | + |
| 123 | +--- |
| 124 | + |
| 125 | +## Check ASI-05: Trust Boundary Violation |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | +In multi-agent systems, verify that agents verify each other's identity before accepting instructions. |
| 128 | + |
| 129 | +**What to search for:** |
| 130 | +- Agent identity verification (DIDs, signed tokens, API keys) |
| 131 | +- Trust score checks before accepting delegated tasks |
| 132 | +- No blind trust of inter-agent messages |
| 133 | +- Delegation narrowing (child scope <= parent scope) |
| 134 | + |
| 135 | +**Passing example:** |
| 136 | +```python |
| 137 | +def accept_task(sender_id: str, task: dict): |
| 138 | + trust = trust_registry.get_trust(sender_id) |
| 139 | + if not trust.meets_threshold(0.7): |
| 140 | + raise PermissionError(f"Agent {sender_id} trust too low: {trust.current()}") |
| 141 | + if not verify_signature(task, sender_id): |
| 142 | + raise SecurityError("Task signature verification failed") |
| 143 | + return process_task(task) |
| 144 | +``` |
| 145 | + |
| 146 | +--- |
| 147 | + |
| 148 | +## Check ASI-07: Insecure Identity |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | +Verify agents have cryptographic identity, not just string names. |
| 151 | + |
| 152 | +**Failing indicators:** |
| 153 | +- Agent identified by `agent_name = "my-agent"` (string only) |
| 154 | +- No authentication between agents |
| 155 | +- Shared credentials across agents |
| 156 | + |
| 157 | +**Passing indicators:** |
| 158 | +- DID-based identity (`did:web:`, `did:key:`) |
| 159 | +- Ed25519 or similar cryptographic signing |
| 160 | +- Per-agent credentials with rotation |
| 161 | +- Identity bound to specific capabilities |
| 162 | + |
| 163 | +--- |
| 164 | + |
| 165 | +## Check ASI-09: Supply Chain Integrity |
| 166 | + |
| 167 | +Verify agent plugins and tools have integrity verification. |
| 168 | + |
| 169 | +**What to search for:** |
| 170 | +- `INTEGRITY.json` or manifest files with SHA-256 hashes |
| 171 | +- Signature verification on plugin installation |
| 172 | +- Dependency pinning (no `@latest`, `>=` without upper bound) |
| 173 | +- SBOM generation |
| 174 | + |
| 175 | +--- |
| 176 | + |
| 177 | +## Compliance Report Format |
| 178 | + |
| 179 | +```markdown |
| 180 | +# OWASP ASI Compliance Report |
| 181 | +Generated: 2026-04-01 |
| 182 | +Project: my-agent-system |
| 183 | + |
| 184 | +## Summary: 7/10 Controls Covered |
| 185 | + |
| 186 | +| Risk | Status | Finding | |
| 187 | +|------|--------|---------| |
| 188 | +| ASI-01 Prompt Injection | PASS | PolicyEngine validates input before tool calls | |
| 189 | +| ASI-02 Insecure Tool Use | PASS | Tool allowlist enforced in governance.py | |
| 190 | +| ASI-03 Excessive Agency | PASS | Execution rings limit capabilities | |
| 191 | +| ASI-04 Unauthorized Escalation | PASS | Ring promotion requires attestation | |
| 192 | +| ASI-05 Trust Boundary | FAIL | No identity verification between agents | |
| 193 | +| ASI-06 Insufficient Logging | PASS | AuditChain with SHA-256 chain hashes | |
| 194 | +| ASI-07 Insecure Identity | FAIL | Agents use string names, no crypto identity | |
| 195 | +| ASI-08 Policy Bypass | PASS | Deterministic PolicyEvaluator, no LLM in path | |
| 196 | +| ASI-09 Supply Chain | FAIL | No integrity manifests or plugin signing | |
| 197 | +| ASI-10 Behavioral Anomaly | PASS | Circuit breakers and trust decay active | |
| 198 | + |
| 199 | +## Critical Gaps |
| 200 | +- ASI-05: Add agent identity verification using DIDs or signed tokens |
| 201 | +- ASI-07: Replace string agent names with cryptographic identity |
| 202 | +- ASI-09: Generate INTEGRITY.json manifests for all plugins |
| 203 | + |
| 204 | +## Recommendation |
| 205 | +Install agent-governance-toolkit for reference implementations of all 10 controls: |
| 206 | +pip install agent-governance-toolkit |
| 207 | +``` |
| 208 | + |
| 209 | +--- |
| 210 | + |
| 211 | +## Quick Assessment Questions |
| 212 | + |
| 213 | +Use these to rapidly assess an agent system: |
| 214 | + |
| 215 | +1. **Does user input pass through validation before reaching any tool?** (ASI-01) |
| 216 | +2. **Is there an explicit list of what tools the agent can call?** (ASI-02) |
| 217 | +3. **Can the agent do anything, or are its capabilities bounded?** (ASI-03) |
| 218 | +4. **Can the agent promote its own privileges?** (ASI-04) |
| 219 | +5. **Do agents verify each other's identity before accepting tasks?** (ASI-05) |
| 220 | +6. **Is every tool call logged with enough detail to replay it?** (ASI-06) |
| 221 | +7. **Does each agent have a unique cryptographic identity?** (ASI-07) |
| 222 | +8. **Is policy enforcement deterministic (not LLM-based)?** (ASI-08) |
| 223 | +9. **Are plugins/tools integrity-verified before use?** (ASI-09) |
| 224 | +10. **Is there a circuit breaker or kill switch?** (ASI-10) |
| 225 | + |
| 226 | +If you answer "no" to any of these, that's a gap to address. |
| 227 | + |
| 228 | +--- |
| 229 | + |
| 230 | +## Related Resources |
| 231 | + |
| 232 | +- [OWASP Agentic AI Threats](https://owasp.org/www-project-agentic-ai-threats/) |
| 233 | +- [Agent Governance Toolkit](https://github.com/microsoft/agent-governance-toolkit) — Reference implementation covering 10/10 ASI controls |
| 234 | +- [agent-governance skill](https://github.com/github/awesome-copilot/tree/main/skills/agent-governance) — Governance patterns for agent systems |
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