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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/README.hooks.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ See [CONTRIBUTING.md](../CONTRIBUTING.md#adding-hooks) for guidelines on how to
| [Secrets Scanner](../hooks/secrets-scanner/README.md) | Scans files modified during a Copilot coding agent session for leaked secrets, credentials, and sensitive data | sessionEnd | `hooks.json`<br />`scan-secrets.sh` |
| [Session Auto-Commit](../hooks/session-auto-commit/README.md) | Automatically commits and pushes changes when a Copilot coding agent session ends | sessionEnd | `auto-commit.sh`<br />`hooks.json` |
| [Session Logger](../hooks/session-logger/README.md) | Logs all Copilot coding agent session activity for audit and analysis | sessionStart, sessionEnd, userPromptSubmitted | `hooks.json`<br />`log-prompt.sh`<br />`log-session-end.sh`<br />`log-session-start.sh` |
| [Tool Guardian](../hooks/tool-guardian/README.md) | Blocks dangerous tool operations (destructive file ops, force pushes, DB drops) before the Copilot coding agent executes them | preToolUse | `guard-tool.sh`<br />`hooks.json` |
183 changes: 183 additions & 0 deletions hooks/tool-guardian/README.md
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---
name: 'Tool Guardian'
description: 'Blocks dangerous tool operations (destructive file ops, force pushes, DB drops) before the Copilot coding agent executes them'
tags: ['security', 'safety', 'preToolUse', 'guardrails']
---

# Tool Guardian Hook

Blocks dangerous tool operations before a GitHub Copilot coding agent executes them, acting as a safety net against destructive commands, force pushes, database drops, and other high-risk actions.

## Overview

AI coding agents can autonomously execute shell commands, file operations, and database queries. Without guardrails, a misinterpreted instruction could lead to irreversible damage. This hook intercepts every tool invocation at the `preToolUse` event and scans it against ~20 threat patterns across 6 categories:

- **Destructive file ops**: `rm -rf /`, deleting `.env` or `.git`
- **Destructive git ops**: `git push --force` to main/master, `git reset --hard`
- **Database destruction**: `DROP TABLE`, `DROP DATABASE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DELETE FROM` without `WHERE`
- **Permission abuse**: `chmod 777`, recursive world-writable permissions
- **Network exfiltration**: `curl | bash`, `wget | sh`, uploading files via `curl --data @`
- **System danger**: `sudo`, `npm publish`

## Features

- **Two guard modes**: `block` (exit non-zero to prevent execution) or `warn` (log only)
- **Safer alternatives**: Every blocked pattern includes a suggestion for a safer command
- **Allowlist support**: Skip specific patterns via `TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST`
- **Structured logging**: JSON Lines output for integration with monitoring tools
- **Fast execution**: 10-second timeout; no external network calls
- **Zero dependencies**: Uses only standard Unix tools (`grep`, `sed`); optional `jq` for input parsing

## Installation

1. Copy the hook folder to your repository:

```bash
cp -r hooks/tool-guardian .github/hooks/
```

2. Ensure the script is executable:

```bash
chmod +x .github/hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
```

3. Create the logs directory and add it to `.gitignore`:

```bash
mkdir -p logs/copilot/tool-guardian
echo "logs/" >> .gitignore
```

4. Commit the hook configuration to your repository's default branch.

## Configuration

The hook is configured in `hooks.json` to run on the `preToolUse` event:

```json
{
"version": 1,
"hooks": {
"preToolUse": [
{
"type": "command",
"bash": ".github/hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh",
"cwd": ".",
"env": {
"GUARD_MODE": "block"
},
"timeoutSec": 10
}
]
}
}
```

### Environment Variables

| Variable | Values | Default | Description |
|----------|--------|---------|-------------|
| `GUARD_MODE` | `warn`, `block` | `block` | `warn` logs threats only; `block` exits non-zero to prevent tool execution |
| `SKIP_TOOL_GUARD` | `true` | unset | Disable the guardian entirely |
| `TOOL_GUARD_LOG_DIR` | path | `logs/copilot/tool-guardian` | Directory where guard logs are written |
| `TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST` | comma-separated | unset | Patterns to skip (e.g., `git push --force,npm publish`) |

## How It Works

1. Before the Copilot coding agent executes a tool, the hook receives the tool invocation as JSON on stdin
2. Extracts `toolName` and `toolInput` fields (via `jq` if available, regex fallback otherwise)
3. Checks the combined text against the allowlist — if matched, skips all scanning
4. Scans combined text against ~20 regex threat patterns across 6 severity categories
5. Reports findings with category, severity, matched text, and a safer alternative
6. Writes a structured JSON log entry for audit purposes
7. In `block` mode, exits non-zero to prevent the tool from executing
8. In `warn` mode, logs the threat and allows execution to proceed

## Threat Categories

| Category | Severity | Key Patterns | Suggestion |
|----------|----------|-------------|------------|
| `destructive_file_ops` | critical | `rm -rf /`, `rm -rf ~`, `rm -rf .`, delete `.env`/`.git` | Use targeted paths or `mv` to back up |
| `destructive_git_ops` | critical/high | `git push --force` to main/master, `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fd` | Use `--force-with-lease`, `git stash`, dry-run |
| `database_destruction` | critical/high | `DROP TABLE`, `DROP DATABASE`, `TRUNCATE`, `DELETE FROM` without WHERE | Use migrations, backups, add WHERE clause |
| `permission_abuse` | high | `chmod 777`, `chmod -R 777` | Use `755` for dirs, `644` for files |
| `network_exfiltration` | critical/high | `curl \| bash`, `wget \| sh`, `curl --data @file` | Download first, review, then execute |
| `system_danger` | high | `sudo`, `npm publish` | Use least privilege; `--dry-run` first |

## Examples

### Safe command (exit 0)

```bash
echo '{"toolName":"bash","toolInput":"git status"}' | bash hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
```

### Blocked command (exit 1)

```bash
echo '{"toolName":"bash","toolInput":"git push --force origin main"}' | \
GUARD_MODE=block bash hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
```

```
🛡️ Tool Guardian: 1 threat(s) detected in 'bash' invocation

CATEGORY SEVERITY MATCH SUGGESTION
-------- -------- ----- ----------
destructive_git_ops critical git push --force origin main Use 'git push --force-with-lease' or push to a feature branch

🚫 Operation blocked: resolve the threats above or adjust TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST.
Set GUARD_MODE=warn to log without blocking.
```

### Warn mode (exit 0, threat logged)

```bash
echo '{"toolName":"bash","toolInput":"rm -rf /"}' | \
GUARD_MODE=warn bash hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
```

### Allowlisted command (exit 0)

```bash
echo '{"toolName":"bash","toolInput":"git push --force origin main"}' | \
TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST="git push --force" bash hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
```

## Log Format

Guard events are written to `logs/copilot/tool-guardian/guard.log` in JSON Lines format:

```json
{"timestamp":"2026-03-16T10:30:00Z","event":"threats_detected","mode":"block","tool":"bash","threat_count":1,"threats":[{"category":"destructive_git_ops","severity":"critical","match":"git push --force origin main","suggestion":"Use 'git push --force-with-lease' or push to a feature branch"}]}
```

```json
{"timestamp":"2026-03-16T10:30:00Z","event":"guard_passed","mode":"block","tool":"bash"}
```

```json
{"timestamp":"2026-03-16T10:30:00Z","event":"guard_skipped","reason":"allowlisted","tool":"bash"}
```

## Customization

- **Add custom patterns**: Edit the `PATTERNS` array in `guard-tool.sh` to add project-specific threat patterns
- **Adjust severity**: Change severity levels for patterns that need different treatment
- **Allowlist known commands**: Use `TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST` for commands that are safe in your context
- **Change log location**: Set `TOOL_GUARD_LOG_DIR` to route logs to your preferred directory

## Disabling

To temporarily disable the guardian:

- Set `SKIP_TOOL_GUARD=true` in the hook environment
- Or remove the `preToolUse` entry from `hooks.json`

## Limitations

- Pattern-based detection; does not perform semantic analysis of command intent
- May produce false positives for commands that match patterns in safe contexts (use the allowlist to suppress these)
- Scans the text representation of tool input; cannot detect obfuscated or encoded commands
- Requires tool invocations to be passed as JSON on stdin with `toolName` and `toolInput` fields
202 changes: 202 additions & 0 deletions hooks/tool-guardian/guard-tool.sh
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#!/bin/bash

# Tool Guardian Hook
# Blocks dangerous tool operations (destructive file ops, force pushes, DB drops,
# etc.) before the Copilot coding agent executes them.
#
# Environment variables:
# GUARD_MODE - "warn" (log only) or "block" (exit non-zero on threats) (default: block)
# SKIP_TOOL_GUARD - "true" to disable entirely (default: unset)
# TOOL_GUARD_LOG_DIR - Directory for guard logs (default: logs/copilot/tool-guardian)
# TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST - Comma-separated patterns to skip (default: unset)

set -euo pipefail

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Early exit if disabled
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
if [[ "${SKIP_TOOL_GUARD:-}" == "true" ]]; then
exit 0
fi

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Read tool invocation from stdin (JSON with toolName + toolInput)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
INPUT=$(cat)

MODE="${GUARD_MODE:-block}"
LOG_DIR="${TOOL_GUARD_LOG_DIR:-logs/copilot/tool-guardian}"
TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")

mkdir -p "$LOG_DIR"
LOG_FILE="$LOG_DIR/guard.log"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Extract tool name and input text
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOOL_NAME=""
TOOL_INPUT=""

if command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
TOOL_NAME=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.toolName // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
TOOL_INPUT=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | jq -r '.toolInput // empty' 2>/dev/null || echo "")
fi

# Fallback: extract with grep/sed if jq unavailable or fields empty
if [[ -z "$TOOL_NAME" ]]; then
TOOL_NAME=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | grep -oE '"toolName"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/.*"toolName"\s*:\s*"//;s/"//')
fi
if [[ -z "$TOOL_INPUT" ]]; then
TOOL_INPUT=$(printf '%s' "$INPUT" | grep -oE '"toolInput"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"' | head -1 | sed 's/.*"toolInput"\s*:\s*"//;s/"//')
fi

# Combine for pattern matching
COMBINED="${TOOL_NAME} ${TOOL_INPUT}"

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Parse allowlist
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALLOWLIST=()
if [[ -n "${TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST:-}" ]]; then
IFS=',' read -ra ALLOWLIST <<< "$TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST"
fi

is_allowlisted() {
local text="$1"
for pattern in "${ALLOWLIST[@]}"; do
pattern=$(printf '%s' "$pattern" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//;s/[[:space:]]*$//')
[[ -z "$pattern" ]] && continue
if [[ "$text" == *"$pattern"* ]]; then
return 0
fi
done
return 1
}

# Check allowlist early — if the combined text matches, skip all scanning
if [[ ${#ALLOWLIST[@]} -gt 0 ]] && is_allowlisted "$COMBINED"; then
printf '{"timestamp":"%s","event":"guard_skipped","reason":"allowlisted","tool":"%s"}\n' \
"$TIMESTAMP" "$TOOL_NAME" >> "$LOG_FILE"
exit 0
fi

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Threat patterns (6 categories, ~20 patterns)
#
# Each entry: "CATEGORY:::SEVERITY:::REGEX:::SUGGESTION"
# Uses ::: as delimiter to avoid conflicts with regex pipe characters
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PATTERNS=(
# Destructive file operations
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::rm -rf /:::Use targeted 'rm' on specific paths instead of root"
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::rm -rf ~:::Use targeted 'rm' on specific paths instead of home directory"
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::rm -rf \.:::Use targeted 'rm' on specific files instead of current directory"
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::rm -rf \.\.:::Never remove parent directories recursively"
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::(rm|del|unlink).*\.env:::Use 'mv' to back up .env files before removing"
"destructive_file_ops:::critical:::(rm|del|unlink).*\.git[^i]:::Never delete .git directory — use 'git' commands to manage repo state"

# Destructive git operations
"destructive_git_ops:::critical:::git push --force.*(main|master):::Use 'git push --force-with-lease' or push to a feature branch"
"destructive_git_ops:::critical:::git push -f.*(main|master):::Use 'git push --force-with-lease' or push to a feature branch"
"destructive_git_ops:::high:::git reset --hard:::Use 'git stash' to preserve changes, or 'git reset --soft'"
"destructive_git_ops:::high:::git clean -fd:::Use 'git clean -n' (dry run) first to preview what will be deleted"

# Database destruction
"database_destruction:::critical:::DROP TABLE:::Use 'ALTER TABLE' or create a migration with rollback support"
"database_destruction:::critical:::DROP DATABASE:::Create a backup first; consider revoking DROP privileges"
"database_destruction:::critical:::TRUNCATE:::Use 'DELETE FROM ... WHERE' with a condition for safer data removal"
"database_destruction:::high:::DELETE FROM [a-zA-Z_]+ *;:::Add a WHERE clause to 'DELETE FROM' to avoid deleting all rows"

# Permission abuse
"permission_abuse:::high:::chmod 777:::Use 'chmod 755' for directories or 'chmod 644' for files"
"permission_abuse:::high:::chmod -R 777:::Use specific permissions ('chmod -R 755') and limit scope"

# Network exfiltration
"network_exfiltration:::critical:::curl.*\|.*bash:::Download the script first, review it, then execute"
"network_exfiltration:::critical:::wget.*\|.*sh:::Download the script first, review it, then execute"
"network_exfiltration:::high:::curl.*--data.*@:::Review what data is being sent before using 'curl --data @file'"

# System danger
"system_danger:::high:::sudo :::Avoid 'sudo' — run commands with the least privilege needed"
"system_danger:::high:::npm publish:::Use 'npm publish --dry-run' first to verify package contents"
)

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Escape a string for safe JSON embedding
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
json_escape() {
printf '%s' "$1" | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g; s/ /\\t/g'
}

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Scan combined text against threat patterns
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
THREATS=()
THREAT_COUNT=0

for entry in "${PATTERNS[@]}"; do
category="${entry%%:::*}"
rest="${entry#*:::}"
severity="${rest%%:::*}"
rest="${rest#*:::}"
regex="${rest%%:::*}"
suggestion="${rest#*:::}"

if printf '%s\n' "$COMBINED" | grep -qiE "$regex" 2>/dev/null; then
local_match=$(printf '%s\n' "$COMBINED" | grep -oiE "$regex" 2>/dev/null | head -1)
THREATS+=("${category} ${severity} ${local_match} ${suggestion}")
THREAT_COUNT=$((THREAT_COUNT + 1))
fi
done

# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Output and logging
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
if [[ $THREAT_COUNT -gt 0 ]]; then
echo ""
echo "🛡️ Tool Guardian: $THREAT_COUNT threat(s) detected in '$TOOL_NAME' invocation"
echo ""
printf " %-24s %-10s %-40s %s\n" "CATEGORY" "SEVERITY" "MATCH" "SUGGESTION"
printf " %-24s %-10s %-40s %s\n" "--------" "--------" "-----" "----------"

# Build JSON findings array
FINDINGS_JSON="["
FIRST=true
for threat in "${THREATS[@]}"; do
IFS=$'\t' read -r category severity match suggestion <<< "$threat"

# Truncate match for display
display_match="$match"
if [[ ${#match} -gt 38 ]]; then
display_match="${match:0:35}..."
fi
printf " %-24s %-10s %-40s %s\n" "$category" "$severity" "$display_match" "$suggestion"

if [[ "$FIRST" != "true" ]]; then
FINDINGS_JSON+=","
fi
FIRST=false
FINDINGS_JSON+="{\"category\":\"$(json_escape "$category")\",\"severity\":\"$(json_escape "$severity")\",\"match\":\"$(json_escape "$match")\",\"suggestion\":\"$(json_escape "$suggestion")\"}"
done
FINDINGS_JSON+="]"

echo ""

# Write structured log entry
printf '{"timestamp":"%s","event":"threats_detected","mode":"%s","tool":"%s","threat_count":%d,"threats":%s}\n' \
"$TIMESTAMP" "$MODE" "$(json_escape "$TOOL_NAME")" "$THREAT_COUNT" "$FINDINGS_JSON" >> "$LOG_FILE"

if [[ "$MODE" == "block" ]]; then
echo "🚫 Operation blocked: resolve the threats above or adjust TOOL_GUARD_ALLOWLIST."
echo " Set GUARD_MODE=warn to log without blocking."
exit 1
else
echo "⚠️ Threats logged in warn mode. Set GUARD_MODE=block to prevent dangerous operations."
fi
else
# Log clean result
printf '{"timestamp":"%s","event":"guard_passed","mode":"%s","tool":"%s"}\n' \
"$TIMESTAMP" "$MODE" "$(json_escape "$TOOL_NAME")" >> "$LOG_FILE"
fi

exit 0
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