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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/README.skills.md
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| [scaffolding-oracle-to-postgres-migration-test-project](../skills/scaffolding-oracle-to-postgres-migration-test-project/SKILL.md) | Scaffolds an xUnit integration test project for validating Oracle-to-PostgreSQL database migration behavior in .NET solutions. Creates the test project, transaction-rollback base class, and seed data manager. Use when setting up test infrastructure before writing migration integration tests, or when a test project is needed for Oracle-to-PostgreSQL validation. | None |
| [scoutqa-test](../skills/scoutqa-test/SKILL.md) | This skill should be used when the user asks to "test this website", "run exploratory testing", "check for accessibility issues", "verify the login flow works", "find bugs on this page", or requests automated QA testing. Triggers on web application testing scenarios including smoke tests, accessibility audits, e-commerce flows, and user flow validation using ScoutQA CLI. Use this skill proactively after implementing web application features to verify they work correctly. | None |
| [secret-scanning](../skills/secret-scanning/SKILL.md) | Guide for configuring and managing GitHub secret scanning, push protection, custom patterns, and secret alert remediation. For pre-commit secret scanning in AI coding agents via the GitHub MCP Server, this skill references the Advanced Security plugin (`advanced-security@copilot-plugins`). Use this skill when enabling secret scanning, setting up push protection, defining custom patterns, triaging alerts, resolving blocked pushes, or when an agent needs to scan code for secrets before committing. | `references/alerts-and-remediation.md`<br />`references/custom-patterns.md`<br />`references/push-protection.md` |
| [security-review](../skills/security-review/SKILL.md) | AI-powered codebase security scanner that reasons about code like a security researcher — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss. Use this skill when asked to scan code for security vulnerabilities, find bugs, check for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, insecure dependencies, access control issues, or any request like "is my code secure?", "review for security issues", "audit this codebase", or "check for vulnerabilities". Covers injection flaws, authentication and access control bugs, secrets exposure, weak cryptography, insecure dependencies, and business logic issues across JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust. | `references/language-patterns.md`<br />`references/report-format.md`<br />`references/secret-patterns.md`<br />`references/vuln-categories.md`<br />`references/vulnerable-packages.md` |
| [semantic-kernel](../skills/semantic-kernel/SKILL.md) | Create, update, refactor, explain, or review Semantic Kernel solutions using shared guidance plus language-specific references for .NET and Python. | `references/dotnet.md`<br />`references/python.md` |
| [shuffle-json-data](../skills/shuffle-json-data/SKILL.md) | Shuffle repetitive JSON objects safely by validating schema consistency before randomising entries. | None |
| [snowflake-semanticview](../skills/snowflake-semanticview/SKILL.md) | Create, alter, and validate Snowflake semantic views using Snowflake CLI (snow). Use when asked to build or troubleshoot semantic views/semantic layer definitions with CREATE/ALTER SEMANTIC VIEW, to validate semantic-view DDL against Snowflake via CLI, or to guide Snowflake CLI installation and connection setup. | None |
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168 changes: 168 additions & 0 deletions skills/security-review/SKILL.md
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---
name: security-review
description: 'AI-powered codebase security scanner that reasons about code like a security researcher — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss. Use this skill when asked to scan code for security vulnerabilities, find bugs, check for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, insecure dependencies, access control issues, or any request like "is my code secure?", "review for security issues", "audit this codebase", or "check for vulnerabilities". Covers injection flaws, authentication and access control bugs, secrets exposure, weak cryptography, insecure dependencies, and business logic issues across JavaScript, TypeScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust.'
---

# Security Review

An AI-powered security scanner that reasons about your codebase the way a human security
researcher would — tracing data flows, understanding component interactions, and catching
vulnerabilities that pattern-matching tools miss.

## When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when the request involves:

- Scanning a codebase or file for security vulnerabilities
- Running a security review or vulnerability check
- Checking for SQL injection, XSS, command injection, or other injection flaws
- Finding exposed API keys, hardcoded secrets, or credentials in code
- Auditing dependencies for known CVEs
- Reviewing authentication, authorization, or access control logic
- Detecting insecure cryptography or weak randomness
- Performing a data flow analysis to trace user input to dangerous sinks
- Any request phrasing like "is my code secure?", "scan this file", or "check my repo for vulnerabilities"
- Running `/security-review` or `/security-review <path>`

## How This Skill Works

Unlike traditional static analysis tools that match patterns, this skill:
1. **Reads code like a security researcher** — understanding context, intent, and data flow
2. **Traces across files** — following how user input moves through your application
3. **Self-verifies findings** — re-examines each result to filter false positives
4. **Assigns severity ratings** — CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO
5. **Proposes targeted patches** — every finding includes a concrete fix
6. **Requires human approval** — nothing is auto-applied; you always review first

## Execution Workflow

Follow these steps **in order** every time:

### Step 1 — Scope Resolution
Determine what to scan:
- If a path was provided (`/security-review src/auth/`), scan only that scope
- If no path given, scan the **entire project** starting from the root
- Identify the language(s) and framework(s) in use (check package.json, requirements.txt,
go.mod, Cargo.toml, pom.xml, Gemfile, composer.json, etc.)
- Read `references/language-patterns.md` to load language-specific vulnerability patterns

### Step 2 — Dependency Audit
Before scanning source code, audit dependencies first (fast wins):
- **Node.js**: Check `package.json` + `package-lock.json` for known vulnerable packages
- **Python**: Check `requirements.txt` / `pyproject.toml` / `Pipfile`
- **Java**: Check `pom.xml` / `build.gradle`
- **Ruby**: Check `Gemfile.lock`
- **Rust**: Check `Cargo.toml`
- **Go**: Check `go.sum`
- Flag packages with known CVEs, deprecated crypto libs, or suspiciously old pinned versions
- Read `references/vulnerable-packages.md` for a curated watchlist

### Step 3 — Secrets & Exposure Scan
Scan ALL files (including config, env, CI/CD, Dockerfiles, IaC) for:
- Hardcoded API keys, tokens, passwords, private keys
- `.env` files accidentally committed
- Secrets in comments or debug logs
- Cloud credentials (AWS, GCP, Azure, Stripe, Twilio, etc.)
- Database connection strings with credentials embedded
- Read `references/secret-patterns.md` for regex patterns and entropy heuristics to apply

### Step 4 — Vulnerability Deep Scan
This is the core scan. Reason about the code — don't just pattern-match.
Read `references/vuln-categories.md` for full details on each category.

**Injection Flaws**
- SQL Injection: raw queries with string interpolation, ORM misuse, second-order SQLi
- XSS: unescaped output, dangerouslySetInnerHTML, innerHTML, template injection
- Command Injection: exec/spawn/system with user input
- LDAP, XPath, Header, Log injection

**Authentication & Access Control**
- Missing authentication on sensitive endpoints
- Broken object-level authorization (BOLA/IDOR)
- JWT weaknesses (alg:none, weak secrets, no expiry validation)
- Session fixation, missing CSRF protection
- Privilege escalation paths
- Mass assignment / parameter pollution

**Data Handling**
- Sensitive data in logs, error messages, or API responses
- Missing encryption at rest or in transit
- Insecure deserialization
- Path traversal / directory traversal
- XXE (XML External Entity) processing
- SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)

**Cryptography**
- Use of MD5, SHA1, DES for security purposes
- Hardcoded IVs or salts
- Weak random number generation (Math.random() for tokens)
- Missing TLS certificate validation

**Business Logic**
- Race conditions (TOCTOU)
- Integer overflow in financial calculations
- Missing rate limiting on sensitive endpoints
- Predictable resource identifiers

### Step 5 — Cross-File Data Flow Analysis
After the per-file scan, perform a **holistic review**:
- Trace user-controlled input from entry points (HTTP params, headers, body, file uploads)
all the way to sinks (DB queries, exec calls, HTML output, file writes)
- Identify vulnerabilities that only appear when looking at multiple files together
- Check for insecure trust boundaries between services or modules

### Step 6 — Self-Verification Pass
For EACH finding:
1. Re-read the relevant code with fresh eyes
2. Ask: "Is this actually exploitable, or is there sanitization I missed?"
3. Check if a framework or middleware already handles this upstream
4. Downgrade or discard findings that aren't genuine vulnerabilities
5. Assign final severity: CRITICAL / HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW / INFO

### Step 7 — Generate Security Report
Output the full report in the format defined in `references/report-format.md`.

### Step 8 — Propose Patches
For every CRITICAL and HIGH finding, generate a concrete patch:
- Show the vulnerable code (before)
- Show the fixed code (after)
- Explain what changed and why
- Preserve the original code style, variable names, and structure
- Add a comment explaining the fix inline

Explicitly state: **"Review each patch before applying. Nothing has been changed yet."**

## Severity Guide

| Severity | Meaning | Example |
|----------|---------|---------|
| 🔴 CRITICAL | Immediate exploitation risk, data breach likely | SQLi, RCE, auth bypass |
| 🟠 HIGH | Serious vulnerability, exploit path exists | XSS, IDOR, hardcoded secrets |
| 🟡 MEDIUM | Exploitable with conditions or chaining | CSRF, open redirect, weak crypto |
| 🔵 LOW | Best practice violation, low direct risk | Verbose errors, missing headers |
| ⚪ INFO | Observation worth noting, not a vulnerability | Outdated dependency (no CVE) |

## Output Rules

- **Always** produce a findings summary table first (counts by severity)
- **Never** auto-apply any patch — present patches for human review only
- **Always** include a confidence rating per finding (High / Medium / Low)
- **Group findings** by category, not by file
- **Be specific** — include file path, line number, and the exact vulnerable code snippet
- **Explain the risk** in plain English — what could an attacker do with this?
- If the codebase is clean, say so clearly: "No vulnerabilities found" with what was scanned

## Reference Files

For detailed detection guidance, load the following reference files as needed:

- `references/vuln-categories.md` — Deep reference for every vulnerability category with detection signals, safe patterns, and escalation checkers
- Search patterns: `SQL injection`, `XSS`, `command injection`, `SSRF`, `BOLA`, `IDOR`, `JWT`, `CSRF`, `secrets`, `cryptography`, `race condition`, `path traversal`
- `references/secret-patterns.md` — Regex patterns, entropy-based detection, and CI/CD secret risks
- Search patterns: `API key`, `token`, `private key`, `connection string`, `entropy`, `.env`, `GitHub Actions`, `Docker`, `Terraform`
- `references/language-patterns.md` — Framework-specific vulnerability patterns for JavaScript, Python, Java, PHP, Go, Ruby, and Rust
- Search patterns: `Express`, `React`, `Next.js`, `Django`, `Flask`, `FastAPI`, `Spring Boot`, `PHP`, `Go`, `Rails`, `Rust`
- `references/vulnerable-packages.md` — Curated CVE watchlist for npm, pip, Maven, Rubygems, Cargo, and Go modules
- Search patterns: `lodash`, `axios`, `jsonwebtoken`, `Pillow`, `log4j`, `nokogiri`, `CVE`
- `references/report-format.md` — Structured output template for security reports with finding cards, dependency audit, secrets scan, and patch proposal formatting
- Search patterns: `report`, `format`, `template`, `finding`, `patch`, `summary`, `confidence`
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# Language-Specific Vulnerability Patterns

Load the relevant section during Step 1 (Scope Resolution) after identifying languages.

---

## JavaScript / TypeScript (Node.js, React, Next.js, Express)

### Critical imports to flag
```js
eval() // arbitrary code execution
Function('return ...') // same as eval
child_process.exec() // command injection if user input reaches it
fs.readFile/writeFile // path traversal if user controls path
```

### Express.js specific
```js
// Missing helmet (security headers)
const app = express()
// Should have: app.use(helmet())

// Body size limits missing (DoS)
app.use(express.json())
// Should have: app.use(express.json({ limit: '10kb' }))

// CORS misconfiguration
app.use(cors({ origin: '*' })) // too permissive
app.use(cors({ origin: req.headers.origin })) // reflects any origin

// Trust proxy without validation
app.set('trust proxy', true) // only safe behind known proxy
```

### React specific
```jsx
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userContent }} /> // XSS
<a href={userUrl}>link</a> // javascript: URL injection
```

### Next.js specific
```js
// Server Actions without auth
export async function deleteUser(id) { // missing: auth check
await db.users.delete(id)
}

// API Routes missing method validation
export default function handler(req, res) {
// Should check: if (req.method !== 'POST') return res.status(405)
doSensitiveAction()
}
```

---

## Python (Django, Flask, FastAPI)

### Django specific
```python
# Raw SQL
User.objects.raw(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '{name}'") # SQLi

# Missing CSRF
@csrf_exempt # Only OK for APIs with token auth

# Debug mode in production
DEBUG = True # in settings.py — exposes stack traces

# SECRET_KEY
SECRET_KEY = 'django-insecure-...' # must be changed for production

# ALLOWED_HOSTS
ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*'] # too permissive
```

### Flask specific
```python
# Debug mode
app.run(debug=True) # never in production

# Secret key
app.secret_key = 'dev' # weak

# eval/exec with user input
eval(request.args.get('expr'))

# render_template_string with user input (SSTI)
render_template_string(f"Hello {name}") # Server-Side Template Injection
```

### FastAPI specific
```python
# Missing auth dependency
@app.delete("/users/{user_id}") # No Depends(get_current_user)
async def delete_user(user_id: int):
...

# Arbitrary file read
@app.get("/files/{filename}")
async def read_file(filename: str):
return FileResponse(f"uploads/{filename}") # path traversal
```

---

## Java (Spring Boot)

### Spring Boot specific
```java
// SQL Injection
String query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'";
jdbcTemplate.query(query, ...);

// XXE
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
// Missing: dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true)

// Deserialization
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(inputStream);
Object obj = ois.readObject(); // only safe with allowlist

// Spring Security — permitAll on sensitive endpoint
.antMatchers("/admin/**").permitAll()

// Actuator endpoints exposed
management.endpoints.web.exposure.include=* # in application.properties
```

---

## PHP

```php
// Direct user input in queries
$result = mysql_query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " . $_GET['id']);

// File inclusion
include($_GET['page'] . ".php"); // local/remote file inclusion

// eval
eval($_POST['code']);

// extract() with user input
extract($_POST); // overwrites any variable

// Loose comparison
if ($password == "admin") {} // use === instead

// Unserialize
unserialize($_COOKIE['data']); // remote code execution
```

---

## Go

```go
// Command injection
exec.Command("sh", "-c", userInput)

// SQL injection
db.Query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'")

// Path traversal
filePath := filepath.Join("/uploads/", userInput) // sanitize userInput first

// Insecure TLS
http.Transport{TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true}}

// Goroutine leak / missing context cancellation
go func() {
// No done channel or context
for { ... }
}()
```

---

## Ruby on Rails

```ruby
# SQL injection (safe alternatives use placeholders)
User.where("name = '#{params[:name]}'") # VULNERABLE
User.where("name = ?", params[:name]) # SAFE

# Mass assignment without strong params
@user.update(params[:user]) # should be params.require(:user).permit(...)

# eval / send with user input
eval(params[:code])
send(params[:method]) # arbitrary method call

# Redirect to user-supplied URL (open redirect)
redirect_to params[:url]

# YAML.load (allows arbitrary object creation)
YAML.load(user_input) # use YAML.safe_load instead
```

---

## Rust

```rust
// Unsafe blocks — flag for manual review
unsafe {
// Reason for unsafety should be documented
}

// Integer overflow (debug builds panic, release silently wraps)
let result = a + b; // use checked_add/saturating_add for financial math

// Unwrap/expect in production code (panics on None/Err)
let value = option.unwrap(); // prefer ? or match

// Deserializing arbitrary types
serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&user_input) // generally safe
// But: bincode::deserialize from untrusted input — can be exploited
```
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