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server.js
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356 lines (320 loc) · 10.4 KB
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'use strict';
/**
* CLI Proxy HTTP server
*
* Listens on port 11000 and provides two endpoints:
* GET /health - Health check (returns 200 JSON)
* POST /exec - Execute a gh CLI command and return stdout/stderr/exitCode
*
* Security:
* - Args are exec'd directly via execFile (no shell, no injection)
* - Per-command timeout (default 30s)
* - Max output size limit to prevent memory exhaustion
* - Meta-commands (auth, config, extension) are always denied
*
* The gh CLI running inside this container has GH_HOST set to the DIFC proxy
* (localhost:18443 via TCP tunnel), so it never sees GH_TOKEN directly.
* Write control is handled by the DIFC guard policy, not by this server.
*/
const http = require('http');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { execFile } = require('child_process');
const CLI_PROXY_PORT = parseInt(process.env.AWF_CLI_PROXY_PORT || '11000', 10);
const COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS = parseInt(process.env.AWF_CLI_PROXY_TIMEOUT_MS || '30000', 10);
const MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES = parseInt(process.env.AWF_CLI_PROXY_MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES || String(10 * 1024 * 1024), 10);
// --- Structured logging to /var/log/cli-proxy/access.log ---
const LOG_DIR = process.env.AWF_CLI_PROXY_LOG_DIR || '/var/log/cli-proxy';
const LOG_FILE = path.join(LOG_DIR, 'access.log');
let logStream = null;
try {
if (fs.existsSync(LOG_DIR)) {
logStream = fs.createWriteStream(LOG_FILE, { flags: 'a' });
}
} catch {
// Non-fatal: logging to file is best-effort
}
/**
* Write a structured JSON log entry to the access log file and stderr.
* Each line is a self-contained JSON object for easy parsing.
*/
function accessLog(entry) {
const record = { ts: new Date().toISOString(), ...entry };
const line = JSON.stringify(record);
if (logStream) {
logStream.write(line + '\n');
}
// Also emit to stderr so docker logs captures it
console.error(line);
}
/**
* Meta-commands that are always denied.
* These modify gh itself rather than GitHub resources.
*/
const ALWAYS_DENIED_SUBCOMMANDS = new Set([
'alias',
'auth',
'config',
'extension',
]);
/**
* Validates the gh CLI arguments.
* Write control is handled by the DIFC guard policy — this server only
* blocks meta-commands that modify gh CLI itself.
*
* @param {string[]} args - The argument array (excluding 'gh' itself)
* @returns {{ valid: boolean, error?: string }}
*/
function validateArgs(args) {
if (!Array.isArray(args)) {
return { valid: false, error: 'args must be an array' };
}
for (const arg of args) {
if (typeof arg !== 'string') {
return { valid: false, error: 'All args must be strings' };
}
}
// Find the subcommand by scanning through args, skipping flags and their values.
let subcommand = null;
let i = 0;
while (i < args.length) {
const arg = args[i];
if (arg.startsWith('-')) {
if (!arg.includes('=') && i + 1 < args.length && !args[i + 1].startsWith('-')) {
// Flag with a separate value (e.g., --repo owner/repo): skip both
i += 2;
} else {
// Boolean flag or --flag=value form: skip just the flag
i += 1;
}
} else {
subcommand = arg;
break;
}
}
// No subcommand means flags-only invocation (e.g., --version, --help) — allow
if (!subcommand) {
return { valid: true };
}
// Always deny meta-commands
if (ALWAYS_DENIED_SUBCOMMANDS.has(subcommand)) {
return { valid: false, error: `Subcommand '${subcommand}' is not permitted` };
}
return { valid: true };
}
/**
* Maximum size for the /exec request body (1 MB).
* Prevents memory exhaustion from oversized POST bodies.
*/
const MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES = parseInt(process.env.AWF_CLI_PROXY_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES || String(1024 * 1024), 10);
/**
* Read the full request body as a Buffer, rejecting bodies over MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES.
*
* @param {import('http').IncomingMessage} req
* @param {import('http').ServerResponse} res
* @returns {Promise<Buffer|null>} Buffer on success, null if size limit exceeded (response already sent)
*/
function readBody(req, res) {
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const chunks = [];
let totalBytes = 0;
req.on('data', chunk => {
totalBytes += chunk.length;
if (totalBytes > MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES) {
req.destroy();
sendError(res, 413, `Request body exceeds maximum size of ${MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES} bytes`);
resolve(null);
return;
}
chunks.push(chunk);
});
req.on('end', () => {
if (totalBytes <= MAX_REQUEST_BODY_BYTES) {
resolve(Buffer.concat(chunks));
}
});
req.on('error', reject);
});
}
/**
* Send a JSON error response.
*
* @param {import('http').ServerResponse} res
* @param {number} statusCode
* @param {string} message
*/
function sendError(res, statusCode, message) {
const body = JSON.stringify({ error: message });
res.writeHead(statusCode, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
});
res.end(body);
}
/**
* Handle GET /health
*/
function handleHealth(res) {
const body = JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', service: 'cli-proxy' });
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(body),
});
res.end(body);
}
/**
* Handle POST /exec
*
* Expected request body (JSON):
* {
* "args": ["pr", "list", "--repo", "owner/repo", "--json", "number,title"],
* "cwd": "/home/runner/work/repo/repo", // optional
* "stdin": null, // optional, base64-encoded or null
* "env": { "GH_REPO": "owner/repo" } // optional extra env vars
* }
*
* Response body (JSON):
* {
* "stdout": "...",
* "stderr": "...",
* "exitCode": 0
* }
*/
async function handleExec(req, res) {
const startTime = Date.now();
let body;
try {
const raw = await readBody(req, res);
// null means readBody already sent a 413 error response
if (raw === null) return;
body = JSON.parse(raw.toString('utf8'));
} catch {
accessLog({ event: 'exec_error', error: 'Invalid JSON body' });
return sendError(res, 400, 'Invalid JSON body');
}
const { args, cwd, stdin, env: extraEnv } = body;
// Validate args
const validation = validateArgs(args);
if (!validation.valid) {
accessLog({ event: 'exec_denied', args, error: validation.error });
return sendError(res, 403, validation.error);
}
accessLog({ event: 'exec_start', args, cwd: cwd || null });
// Build environment for the subprocess
// Inherit server environment (includes GH_HOST, NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS, GH_REPO, etc.)
const childEnv = Object.assign({}, process.env);
if (extraEnv && typeof extraEnv === 'object') {
// Only allow safe string env overrides; never allow overriding GH_HOST or GH_TOKEN
const PROTECTED_KEYS = new Set(['GH_HOST', 'GH_TOKEN', 'GITHUB_TOKEN', 'NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS', 'SSL_CERT_FILE']);
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(extraEnv)) {
if (typeof key === 'string' && typeof value === 'string' && !PROTECTED_KEYS.has(key)) {
childEnv[key] = value;
}
}
}
// Execute gh directly (no shell — prevents injection attacks)
// Always use the server's own cwd — the agent sends its container workspace
// path which doesn't exist inside the cli-proxy container.
let stdout = '';
let stderr = '';
let exitCode = 0;
try {
const result = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const child = execFile('gh', args, {
cwd: process.cwd(),
env: childEnv,
timeout: COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,
maxBuffer: MAX_OUTPUT_BYTES,
encoding: 'utf8',
}, (err, childStdout, childStderr) => {
if (err && err.code === undefined && err.signal) {
// Killed by timeout or signal
reject(err);
return;
}
resolve({
stdout: childStdout || '',
stderr: childStderr || '',
exitCode: err ? (err.code || 1) : 0,
});
});
// Feed stdin if provided (base64-encoded)
if (stdin) {
try {
const stdinBuf = Buffer.from(stdin, 'base64');
child.stdin.write(stdinBuf);
} catch {
// Ignore stdin errors
}
}
if (child.stdin) {
child.stdin.end();
}
});
stdout = result.stdout;
stderr = result.stderr;
exitCode = result.exitCode;
} catch (err) {
// Only expose a safe message, not a full stack trace
const errMsg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Command execution failed';
stderr = errMsg;
exitCode = 1;
}
const responseBody = JSON.stringify({ stdout, stderr, exitCode });
const durationMs = Date.now() - startTime;
accessLog({
event: 'exec_done',
args,
exitCode,
durationMs,
stdoutBytes: stdout.length,
stderrBytes: stderr.length,
// Include truncated stderr for debugging failures (redact tokens)
...(exitCode !== 0 && stderr ? { stderrPreview: stderr.slice(0, 500) } : {}),
});
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Content-Length': Buffer.byteLength(responseBody),
});
res.end(responseBody);
}
/**
* Main HTTP request handler.
*/
async function requestHandler(req, res) {
if (req.method === 'GET' && req.url === '/health') {
return handleHealth(res);
}
if (req.method === 'POST' && req.url === '/exec') {
return handleExec(req, res);
}
return sendError(res, 404, `Not found: ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
}
// Only start the server when run directly (not when imported for testing)
if (require.main === module) {
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
requestHandler(req, res).catch(err => {
accessLog({ event: 'unhandled_error', error: err.message });
if (!res.headersSent) {
sendError(res, 500, 'Internal server error');
}
});
});
server.listen(CLI_PROXY_PORT, '0.0.0.0', () => {
accessLog({
event: 'server_start',
port: CLI_PROXY_PORT,
timeoutMs: COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS,
ghHost: process.env.GH_HOST || '(not set)',
caCert: process.env.NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS || '(not set)',
hasGhToken: !!process.env.GH_TOKEN,
});
console.log(`[cli-proxy] HTTP server listening on port ${CLI_PROXY_PORT}`);
});
server.on('error', err => {
accessLog({ event: 'server_error', error: err.message });
console.error('[cli-proxy] Server error:', err);
process.exit(1);
});
}
module.exports = { validateArgs, ALWAYS_DENIED_SUBCOMMANDS };