Merge branch 'pr-91' into copilot/fix-draft-flag

Author: Copilot

content/library/application-security/recommendations/actions-security/index.md

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 ---
 # SPDX-FileCopyrightText: GitHub and The Project Authors
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
-draft: false # Set to false when ready to publish
+draft: true # Set to false when ready to publish
 title: 'Securing GitHub Actions Workflows'
 publishDate: 2024-08-16
 params:
-  authors: [{ name: 'Greg Mohler', handle: 'callmegreg' }, { name: 'Kitty Chiu', handle: 'kittychiu' }]
+  authors: [{ name: 'Greg Mohler', handle: 'callmegreg' }, { name: 'Kitty Chiu', handle: 'kittychiu' }, { name: 'Thomas Sjögren', handle: 'konstruktoid' }]
 
 # Classifications of the framework to drive key concepts, design principles, and architectural best practices
 pillars:
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ To secure GitHub Actions workflows, consider the following strategies:
 10. **Use `head.sha` instead of `head.ref`**: Where possible, reference by commit SHA instead of a user-provided branch name or tag (ref), especially in sensitive contexts (such as `run` steps). If require, use environment variable to store `head.ref` and reference it to prevent injection attack.
 11. **Use caution with public repositories**: Anyone can suggest changes to public repositories. Review workflow triggers, and never use self-hosted runners with public repositories.
 12. **Restrict allowed actions**: Use the [*Allow enterprise, and select non-enterprise, actions and reusable workflows*](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/enforcing-policies/enforcing-policies-for-your-enterprise/enforcing-policies-for-github-actions-in-your-enterprise#controlling-access-to-public-actions-and-reusable-workflows) setting  to control which actions can run.
+13. **Segregate runners**: Use runner groups and labels to separate high-privilege runners (with access to secrets, sensitive resources or host access) from low-privilege runners.
 
 ## Assumptions and preconditions
 
@@ -126,6 +127,7 @@ Repository rulesets provide a strong defensive layer that complements workflow-l
 - [Require status checks to pass before merging](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets#require-status-checks-to-pass-before-merging): Ensure automated validation checks pass before merging.
 - [Require code scanning results](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets#require-code-scanning-results): Identify security vulnerabilities before merge.
 - [Require signed commits](https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets#require-signed-commits): Ensure all commits are signed to prove who authored them and that they haven't been modified.
+- [Require workflows to pass before merging](https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets#require-workflows-to-pass-before-merging): Ensure organizational or enterprise-level requirements for workflows are met before merging. This could be a workflow that checks for required labels, validates commit messages, or performs other organizational policy checks.
 - Restrict bypass permissions: Limit bypass capabilities to emergencies and monitor via audit logs.
 
 ### Implement least privilege for workflow permissions
@@ -257,6 +259,18 @@ The [allowed actions and reusable workflows setting](https://docs.github.com/en/
 
 Consider defining the list of allowed actions using policy as code (e.g., via Terraform or the REST API) to establish a request/approval process, track changes for audit purposes, and improve visibility into which actions are allowed.
 
+### Segregate runners
+
+Use [runner groups](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/concepts/runners/runner-groups) and [labels](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/manage-runners/self-hosted-runners/apply-labels) to separate high-privilege runners from low-privilege runners. High-privilege runners may have access to sensitive resources or direct host access, while low-privilege runners should not.
+
+This separation provides more granular control over [which repositories can access different runners](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/manage-runners/self-hosted-runners/manage-access#changing-which-repositories-can-access-a-runner-group) and which [jobs can access specific runners](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/how-tos/write-workflows/choose-where-workflows-run/choose-the-runner-for-a-job). It also reduces the risk that a compromised or misconfigured workflow could gain access to sensitive resources.
+
+For example, you could create:
+
+- A runner group for container image build runners, limited to only the repositories that require those privileges.
+- A runner group for runners with access to restricted networks.
+- A separate low-privilege runner group for tasks such as linting and static analysis, with no access to secrets or sensitive resources.
+
 ## Additional solution detail and trade-offs to consider
 
 ### Pinning actions based on a version tag