diff --git a/src/hex_core.app.src b/src/hex_core.app.src
index f2dcd637..e967dc20 100644
--- a/src/hex_core.app.src
+++ b/src/hex_core.app.src
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
     {description, "Reference implementation of Hex specifications"},
     {vsn, "0.15.0"},
     {registered, []},
-    {applications, [kernel, stdlib, inets, ssl]},
+    {applications, [kernel, stdlib, inets, ssl, ssh]},
     {licenses, ["Apache-2.0"]},
     {include_paths, ["CHANGELOG.md"]},
     {exclude_paths, ["src/safe_erl_term.erl"]},
diff --git a/src/hex_repo.erl b/src/hex_repo.erl
index 692c14a5..a69488ab 100644
--- a/src/hex_repo.erl
+++ b/src/hex_repo.erl
@@ -240,18 +240,20 @@ fingerprint(PublicKeyPem) when is_binary(PublicKeyPem) ->
 %% true
 %% '''
 %% @end
--spec fingerprint_equal(binary(), string()) -> boolean().
+-spec fingerprint_equal(binary(), iodata()) -> boolean().
 fingerprint_equal(PublicKeyPem, ExpectedFingerprint) when is_binary(PublicKeyPem) ->
     ActualFingerprint = fingerprint(PublicKeyPem),
     constant_time_compare(
         list_to_binary(ActualFingerprint),
-        list_to_binary(ExpectedFingerprint)
+        iolist_to_binary(ExpectedFingerprint)
     ).
 
 %% @private
 %% Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks.
 %% Uses crypto:hash_equals/2 on OTP 25+, falls back to manual comparison on older versions.
 -if(?OTP_RELEASE >= 25).
+constant_time_compare(A, B) when byte_size(A) =/= byte_size(B) ->
+    false;
 constant_time_compare(A, B) ->
     crypto:hash_equals(A, B).
 -else.
diff --git a/test/hex_repo_SUITE.erl b/test/hex_repo_SUITE.erl
index 551aaeba..7838d6a0 100644
--- a/test/hex_repo_SUITE.erl
+++ b/test/hex_repo_SUITE.erl
@@ -165,7 +165,9 @@ fingerprint_equal_test(_Config) ->
         "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
     >>,
     CorrectFingerprint = "SHA256:O1LOYhHFW4kcrblKAxROaDEzLD8bn1seWbe5tq8TRsk",
-    WrongFingerprint = "SHA256:WrongFingerprint123456789012345678901234567",
+    WrongFingerprint = <<"SHA256:WrongFingerprint123456789012345678901234567">>,
+    DifferentLengthFingerprint = "SHA256:TooShort",
     ?assert(hex_repo:fingerprint_equal(PublicKeyPem, CorrectFingerprint)),
     ?assertNot(hex_repo:fingerprint_equal(PublicKeyPem, WrongFingerprint)),
+    ?assertNot(hex_repo:fingerprint_equal(PublicKeyPem, DifferentLengthFingerprint)),
     ok.