- LOC: ~9,350
- Languages: Ada, Idris2, Zig, Nickel
- Existing ABI proofs:
src/abi/*.idr(template-level) - Dangerous patterns: None detected
dns_records.adb/ads,dns_records_extended.adb/ads— DNS record creation and modificationdns_update.adb/ads— DNS update protocol- Prove: generated DNS records conform to RFC specifications (RFC 1035, etc.)
- Prove: DNS updates are idempotent or safely retryable
- Secure authentication for DNS updates
- Prove: authentication tokens are never transmitted in cleartext
- Prove: authentication failure results in no DNS modifications
- Firewall rule manipulation during DNS fluctuation
- Prove: firewall rules always return to a safe state after fluctuation
- Timed DNS fluctuation
- Prove: scheduler never produces overlapping fluctuation windows
- SDP (Software-Defined Perimeter) control
- Prove: SDP state is consistent with DNS state after fluctuation
- SPARK (natural fit — Ada code can be annotated with SPARK contracts)
- Idris2 for ABI layer
HIGH — Network security tool manipulating DNS records and firewall rules. Incorrect fluctuation could cause service outages or security exposures. SPARK annotations on the Ada code would be the most effective approach.