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hyperpolymathclaude
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docs: silence gitleaks false-positive on GPG fingerprint
gitleaks 8.24.3's `generic-api-key` rule matches any 40-char hex string against an entropy threshold. The campaign manifest recorded my public PGP signing-key fingerprint as `git-signing-key = "..."`, which (correctly per the rule) looks like a 40-char hex API key. Public key fingerprints are NOT secrets — they're meant to be published — but the scanner has no way to tell that apart from a secret. Replaced the inline value with a comment explaining the situation and pointing readers at `git log --show-signature` to recover the fingerprint from any commit if they need to verify. The `all-prs-gpg-signed = true` flag above remains the load-bearing assertion for tooling. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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docs/audits/launcher-standard-review-2026-05-26.a2ml

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@@ -236,4 +236,10 @@ review-method = "manual top-to-bottom read of launcher/ + docs/UX-standards/laun
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review-duration = "single session ~3 hours"
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all-prs-gpg-signed = true
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all-prs-independent-off-main = true
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git-signing-key = "9639451754496E51D6B537CAD119017EBF695AB1"
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# Signing-key fingerprint deliberately not recorded inline: gitleaks
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# misclassifies the 40-char hex as a generic-api-key. Public PGP
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# fingerprints are NOT secrets, but the scanner cannot distinguish
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# them from API keys of the same shape. The all-prs-gpg-signed flag
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# above is the load-bearing assertion; the fingerprint is recoverable
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# from `git log --show-signature` if anyone needs to verify against a
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# specific key.

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