diff --git a/.github/workflows/governance-reusable.yml b/.github/workflows/governance-reusable.yml
index c07ba46c..b154a129 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/governance-reusable.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/governance-reusable.yml
@@ -44,6 +44,16 @@ jobs:
             || git clone --depth 200 https://github.com/hyperpolymath/standards.git "$HOME/standards"
 
       - name: Run staleness check
+        env:
+          # The gate confirms a pin server-side before ever accusing it of being
+          # forged, and before accepting a deny-list negative from a clone it
+          # cannot trust. Unauthenticated that is 60 requests/hour per runner IP;
+          # exhausting it makes the gate degrade to ::warning (loudly — it never
+          # silently passes, see check-workflow-staleness.sh). A token removes
+          # the cliff entirely. Note this only reaches a consumer once it re-pins
+          # past this commit: the script comes from standards HEAD, but the job
+          # definition comes from whatever SHA the consumer pins.
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
         run: |
           bash "$HOME/standards/scripts/check-workflow-staleness.sh" .
 
diff --git a/docs/decisions/ADR-003-workflow-pin-staleness-window.adoc b/docs/decisions/ADR-003-workflow-pin-staleness-window.adoc
index 0f4ad6dc..cff897e9 100644
--- a/docs/decisions/ADR-003-workflow-pin-staleness-window.adoc
+++ b/docs/decisions/ADR-003-workflow-pin-staleness-window.adoc
@@ -223,3 +223,23 @@ Cost is zero API calls on the happy path — the server is consulted only when
 the gate is about to accuse. The deny-list gets the same fallback, so a
 degraded runner cannot silently skip it: "could not check" is reported as
 SKIPPED, never as passed.
+
+==== Rate limiting, and why it is not a hole
+
+The staleness job is given no token, so the compare call is unauthenticated: 60
+requests/hour per runner IP. Exhausting it makes the gate emit `::warning` and
+pass — verified by accident while testing, which is exactly the intended
+fail-open, and it is *loud*: two warnings naming the pin, never a silent pass.
+
+Three things keep this from mattering:
+
+. The common path never calls the API. A pin that is genuinely deny-listed is
+  caught by a local *positive*, which is trusted without the network — so the
+  294 `d7c22711` denials do not depend on it at all.
+. The API is consulted only when the gate is about to accuse, or when a
+  negative comes from a clone it cannot trust.
+. `governance-reusable.yml` now passes `GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}` to
+  the step, which removes the limit. This reaches a consumer only once it
+  re-pins past that commit — the script is read from `standards` HEAD, but the
+  job definition comes from the pinned SHA — so it lands naturally with the
+  propagation that these deny-listed pins need anyway.
diff --git a/scripts/check-workflow-staleness.sh b/scripts/check-workflow-staleness.sh
index 9d065157..51faa3ea 100755
--- a/scripts/check-workflow-staleness.sh
+++ b/scripts/check-workflow-staleness.sh
@@ -67,6 +67,9 @@ set -eo pipefail
 #                               server-side integrity check (default
 #                               hyperpolymath/standards).
 #   STALENESS_STANDARDS_BRANCH— branch a pin must be reachable from (default main).
+#   STALENESS_API_BASE        — API root for the server-side integrity check
+#                               (default https://api.github.com; set for GHES,
+#                               or to an unreachable host in tests).
 #   STALENESS_KNOWN_BAD_BEFORE— override the known-bad deny-list, as space- or
 #                               comma-separated <reusable>:<fix-sha> entries.
 #                               "-" disables it. For the hermetic fixture tests
@@ -82,6 +85,7 @@ WINDOW_DAYS="${STALENESS_WINDOW_DAYS:-14}"
 # below). Overridable so a fork can point the gate at its own standards.
 STANDARDS_NWO="${STALENESS_STANDARDS_NWO:-hyperpolymath/standards}"
 STANDARDS_BRANCH="${STALENESS_STANDARDS_BRANCH:-main}"
+STANDARDS_API="${STALENESS_API_BASE:-https://api.github.com}"
 
 # ── Known-bad pins: hard fail regardless of age ─────────────────────────────
 # A recency *window* is only a proxy for "this pin might contain a known
@@ -213,8 +217,12 @@ ensure_commit() {
 clone_is_complete() {
   [ "$HAVE_HISTORY" = true ] || return 1
   local gd
-  gd=$(git -C "$STANDARDS_DIR" rev-parse --git-dir 2>/dev/null) || return 1
-  [ -e "$STANDARDS_DIR/$gd/shallow" ] || [ -e "$gd/shallow" ] && return 1
+  # --absolute-git-dir, not --git-dir: the latter returns a path relative to the
+  # CWD, which here is the *consumer's* checkout. actions/checkout is shallow by
+  # default, so a relative ".git/shallow" test would see the consumer's marker
+  # and call every standards clone incomplete.
+  gd=$(git -C "$STANDARDS_DIR" rev-parse --absolute-git-dir 2>/dev/null) || return 1
+  [ -e "$gd/shallow" ] && return 1
   [ -n "$(git -C "$STANDARDS_DIR" config --get remote.origin.partialclonefilter 2>/dev/null)" ] && return 1
   [ "$(git -C "$STANDARDS_DIR" config --get remote.origin.promisor 2>/dev/null)" = "true" ] && return 1
   return 0
@@ -235,7 +243,7 @@ resolve_negative() {
 api_compare() {
   local pin="$1" head="${2:-$STANDARDS_BRANCH}" url body code st ahead behind
   command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || return 1
-  url="https://api.github.com/repos/${STANDARDS_NWO}/compare/${pin}...${head}"
+  url="${STANDARDS_API}/repos/${STANDARDS_NWO}/compare/${pin}...${head}"
   local -a auth=()
   [ -n "${GITHUB_TOKEN:-}" ] && auth=(-H "Authorization: Bearer ${GITHUB_TOKEN}")
   body=$(curl -sS --max-time 20 -w '\n%{http_code}' \
@@ -298,7 +306,13 @@ pin_is_known_bad() {
         KNOWN_BAD_FIX="$fix_full"
         return 0
       fi
-      continue
+      # Local says "not affected". A local POSITIVE is trustworthy (no false
+      # positives observed), but a local NEGATIVE here is a FALSE GREEN — the
+      # exact failure this list exists to prevent — and the same
+      # `merge-base --is-ancestor` call is measured unreliable on the partial
+      # clone CI actually uses. Trust the negative only from a complete clone;
+      # otherwise fall through and confirm with the server.
+      clone_is_complete && continue
     fi
 
     # Degraded clone: ask the server rather than skip. A check that quietly
diff --git a/scripts/tests/check-workflow-staleness-test.sh b/scripts/tests/check-workflow-staleness-test.sh
index 54c06f68..6c211fa5 100755
--- a/scripts/tests/check-workflow-staleness-test.sh
+++ b/scripts/tests/check-workflow-staleness-test.sh
@@ -91,7 +91,12 @@ run_case_out() {
     bash "$CHECK_SCRIPT" "$repo" 2>&1)
   rc=$?
   set -e
-  if [ "$rc" -eq "$expected" ] && printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qE "$regex"; then
+  # A leading '!' inverts the match: assert the gate did NOT say this.
+  local want=0
+  case "$regex" in '!'*) want=1; regex="${regex#!}" ;; esac
+  local got=0
+  printf '%s' "$out" | grep -qE "$regex" || got=1
+  if [ "$rc" -eq "$expected" ] && [ "$got" -eq "$want" ]; then
     echo "PASS: $desc"
     PASS=$((PASS + 1))
   else
@@ -214,6 +219,49 @@ write_pin "$R/.github/workflows/hypatia.yml" "hypatia-scan-reusable.yml" "$C4"
 write_pin "$R/.github/workflows/scorecard.yml" "scorecard-reusable.yml" "$C4"
 run_case "clean multi-reusable repo passes" 0 "$R"
 
+# ── 13. THE PRODUCTION PATH: partial clone, where a local negative is not
+#       trustworthy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# In CI the governance reusable clones standards with `--filter=tree:0`, so the
+# checkout is ALWAYS partial — and `merge-base --is-ancestor` is measured
+# unreliable there (awesome-haskell, four consecutive runs). Cases 1-12 all run
+# against a complete `git init` fixture, so none of them exercise the code that
+# actually protects production. Mark the fixture partial to reach it.
+#
+# The API is pointed at a closed port so these stay hermetic and fast: the
+# question is what the gate does when it can neither trust the clone nor reach
+# the server.
+UNREACHABLE="http://127.0.0.1:1"
+git -C "$FIX" config remote.origin.promisor true
+
+# 13a. A local POSITIVE is still trusted — a deny must not need the network.
+R="$TEST_DIR/partial-deny"; mk_repo "$R"
+write_pin "$R/.github/workflows/governance.yml" "governance-reusable.yml" "$C1"
+run_case_out "partial clone: local positive still denies without the network" 1 \
+  'predates' "$R" \
+  STALENESS_WINDOW_COMMITS=9999 STALENESS_WINDOW_DAYS=9999 \
+  STALENESS_API_BASE="$UNREACHABLE" \
+  STALENESS_KNOWN_BAD_BEFORE="governance-reusable.yml:$C3"
+
+# 13b. A local NEGATIVE must NOT be silently accepted. Unverifiable is reported
+#      as SKIPPED — "could not check" must never read as "passed".
+R="$TEST_DIR/partial-unchecked"; mk_repo "$R"
+write_pin "$R/.github/workflows/governance.yml" "governance-reusable.yml" "$C4"
+run_case_out "partial clone: unverifiable deny-list check is reported SKIPPED, not passed" 0 \
+  'SKIPPED, not passed' "$R" \
+  STALENESS_WINDOW_COMMITS=9999 STALENESS_WINDOW_DAYS=9999 \
+  STALENESS_API_BASE="$UNREACHABLE" \
+  STALENESS_KNOWN_BAD_BEFORE="governance-reusable.yml:$C3"
+
+# 13c. A complete clone's negative IS trusted — no warning, no network.
+git -C "$FIX" config --unset remote.origin.promisor
+R="$TEST_DIR/complete-quiet"; mk_repo "$R"
+write_pin "$R/.github/workflows/governance.yml" "governance-reusable.yml" "$C4"
+run_case_out "complete clone: local negative is trusted silently (no SKIPPED warning)" 0 \
+  '!SKIPPED' "$R" \
+  STALENESS_WINDOW_COMMITS=9999 STALENESS_WINDOW_DAYS=9999 \
+  STALENESS_API_BASE="$UNREACHABLE" \
+  STALENESS_KNOWN_BAD_BEFORE="governance-reusable.yml:$C3"
+
 echo "----------------------------------------"
 echo "$PASS/$TOTAL test cases passed."
 [ "$PASS" -eq "$TOTAL" ] || { echo "Some regression tests FAILED."; exit 1; }