feat(lab6): Checkov + KICS scans + custom RDS deletion protection policy

.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md

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+## Goal
+Lab 1 submission: Juice Shop deployed, triage report completed, and CI smoke test added.
+
+## Changes
+- Added `submissions/lab1.md` with full triage report.
+- Created `.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md`.
+- Added `.github/workflows/lab1-smoke.yml` for CI testing.
+
+## Testing
+- Verified Juice Shop is running locally on port 3000 (HTTP 200).
+- GitHub Actions workflow ran successfully and passed the smoke test.
+
+## Artifacts & Screenshots
+- See `submissions/lab1.md` for the full report.
+- Actions run: [link]
+
+---
+### Checklist
+- [x] Title is clear (`feat(lab1): juice shop deploy + PR template + triage report` style)
+- [x] No secrets/large temp files committed
+- [x] Submission file at `submissions/lab1.md` exists
+
+---
+### Task Checklist
+- [x] Task 1 done — Juice Shop deployed, triage report in submissions/lab1.md
+- [x] Task 2 done — .github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md created
+- [x] Task 3 done — GitHub stars + follows complete
+- [x] Bonus done — lab1-smoke.yml runs green on this PR

labs/lab6/policies/rds-deletion-protection.yaml

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+metadata:
+  id: CKV_CUSTOM_1
+  name: "Ensure RDS instances have deletion_protection enabled"
+  category: "GENERAL_SECURITY"
+  severity: HIGH
+definition:
+  cond_type: "attribute"
+  resource_types:
+    - "aws_db_instance"
+  attribute: "deletion_protection"
+  value: "true"

submissions/lab6.md

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+# Lab 6 — Submission
+
+## Task 1: Checkov on Terraform + Pulumi
+
+### Terraform scan
+- **Total checks:** 129 (49 passed, 82 failed)
+- **Breakdown:** 80 failed in Terraform resources, 2 failed in Secrets scan
+
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|------:|
+| Critical | 1 (Hardcoded AWS credentials in provider) |
+| High | ~30 (IAM wildcard policies, public S3, exposed security groups) |
+| Medium | ~25 (Missing encryption, logging, backups) |
+| Low | ~26 (Missing descriptions, tags, best practices) |
+
+*Note: Checkov CE does not populate `severity` field for most rules without Bridgecrew API key. Severity estimates above are based on official Checkov documentation.*
+
+### Top 5 rule IDs (by frequency)
+| Rule ID | Count | What it checks |
+|---------|------:|----------------|
+| CKV_AWS_289 | 4 | IAM policies allow permissions management without constraints |
+| CKV_AWS_355 | 4 | IAM policies allow "*" as resource for restrictable actions |
+| CKV_AWS_23 | 3 | Security group rules missing descriptions |
+| CKV_AWS_288 | 3 | IAM policies allow data exfiltration |
+| CKV_AWS_290 | 3 | IAM policies allow write access without constraints |
+
+### Pulumi scan (via KICS)
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|------:|
+| CRITICAL | 1 (RDS publicly accessible) |
+| HIGH | 2 (DynamoDB not encrypted, hardcoded password) |
+| MEDIUM | 1 (EC2 monitoring disabled) |
+| LOW | 0 |
+| INFO | 2 |
+| **Total** | **6** |
+
+### Module-leverage analysis (Lecture 6 slide 17)
+Looking at the top-5 Terraform rules, the **single highest-leverage fix** is enforcing least-privilege IAM policies at the module level. Rules CKV_AWS_289, CKV_AWS_355, CKV_AWS_288, and CKV_AWS_290 all fire because `iam.tf` contains policies with `Action = "*"` and `Resource = "*"`. If the IAM module enforced a policy template that requires explicit actions and scoped resources (e.g., using AWS managed policies or customer-managed policies with specific ARNs), all 14+ IAM-related findings would vanish with one architectural change. Similarly, adding a default `aws_s3_bucket_public_access_block` resource to the S3 module with all four block flags set to `true` would eliminate CKV_AWS_53/54/55/56 across all buckets.
+
+---
+
+## Task 2: KICS on Ansible
+
+### Severity breakdown
+| Severity | Count |
+|----------|------:|
+| CRITICAL | 0 |
+| HIGH | 9 |
+| MEDIUM | 0 |
+| LOW | 1 |
+| INFO | 0 |
+| **Total** | **10** |
+
+### Top 5 KICS queries (by frequency)
+| Query | Severity | Files |
+|-------|----------|------:|
+| Passwords And Secrets - Generic Password | HIGH | 6 |
+| Passwords And Secrets - Password in URL | HIGH | 2 |
+| Passwords And Secrets - Generic Secret | HIGH | 1 |
+| Unpinned Package Version | LOW | 1 |
+
+### Checkov vs KICS — when to use which? (Lecture 6 slide 10)
+- **One thing Checkov did better for Terraform:** Checkov natively understands Terraform's graph model and caught cross-resource misconfigurations like `CKV2_AWS_5` (security groups not attached to any resource) and `CKV2_AWS_6` (S3 bucket without public access block). These graph-based checks require understanding relationships between resources, which KICS cannot do because it scans files statically.
+- **One thing KICS did better for Ansible:** KICS uses Rego queries that are format-agnostic and accurately parsed the Ansible playbook structure, flagging Linux hardening gaps like hardcoded passwords in `inventory.ini` and `configure.yml`. Checkov's Ansible support is limited to cloud modules, not OS configuration playbooks.
+- **Example of single-tool catch:** Checkov flagged `CKV_SECRET_2` (AWS Access Key) in `main.tf` because it runs a dedicated secrets engine with pattern matching for AWS key formats (`AKIA...`). KICS skipped it because KICS focuses on infrastructure misconfiguration queries, not secret pattern detection.
+
+---
+
+## Bonus: Custom Checkov Policy
+
+### Policy file (`labs/lab6/policies/rds-deletion-protection.yaml`)
+```yaml
+metadata:
+  id: CKV_CUSTOM_1
+  name: "Ensure RDS instances have deletion_protection enabled"
+  category: GENERAL_SECURITY
+  severity: HIGH
+definition:
+  cond_type: attribute
+  resource_types:
+    - aws_db_instance
+  attribute: deletion_protection
+  value: true
+  operator: equals
+```
+
+### Rule fires
+Output of `jq '[.[] | .results.failed_checks[] | select(.check_id == "CKV_CUSTOM_1") | {resource: .resource, file: .file_path}]'`:
+```json
+[
+  {
+    "resource": "aws_db_instance.unencrypted_db",
+    "file": "\\database.tf"
+  },
+  {
+    "resource": "aws_db_instance.weak_db",
+    "file": "\\database.tf"
+  }
+]
+```
+
+### Why this rule matters
+Accidental database deletion causes catastrophic data loss and downtime. The 2021 GitLab outage (caused by accidental `rm -rf`) and multiple AWS RDS incidents highlight that `deletion_protection = true` is a critical safety net against human error or compromised CI/CD pipelines. This aligns with CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v1.5.0 (Section 2.3.1) and NIST SP 800-144 requirement for data integrity safeguards. Enforcing it via Policy-as-Code guarantees no RDS instance reaches production without this guardrail.