Please address the comments from this code review:

## Overall Comments
- The `runCommandSafely` helper filters `shell-quote.parse` output down to only string tokens, which will silently drop things like redirections, pipes, or env assignments; consider explicitly detecting non-string tokens and failing with a clear error rather than changing the behavior of such commands in a non-obvious way.
- The buffer enforcement now tracks `stdout` and `stderr` separately, whereas `exec`'s `maxBuffer` applies to combined output; if you need to preserve original semantics, you may want to track total output length across both streams instead of per-stream.

## Individual Comments

### Comment 1
<location> `src/tools/bash.ts:73-75` </location>
<code_context>
+        reject(error);
+      });
+
+      child.on("close", code => {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+        if (killedForTimeout) {
+          return reject(new Error("Command timed out"));
+        }
</code_context>

<issue_to_address>
**issue (bug_risk):** Non-zero exit codes no longer cause a rejected promise, changing error handling semantics vs. `exec`.

Previously, `execAsync` rejected on non-zero exit codes, allowing callers to use `try/catch` for failures. Here the promise resolves regardless of `code` (unless killed/errored), so failing commands can appear successful. Please add an explicit `code !== 0` check in the `close` handler and reject with an `Error` that includes the exit code (and maybe truncated `stderr`) to preserve the prior behavior and avoid regressions.
</issue_to_address>

### Comment 2
<location> `src/tools/bash.ts:13` </location>
<code_context>
   private currentDirectory: string = process.cwd();
   private confirmationService = ConfirmationService.getInstance();

+  private async runCommandSafely(
+    command: string,
+    options: { cwd?: string; timeout?: number; maxBuffer?: number },
</code_context>

<issue_to_address>
**issue (complexity):** Consider replacing the custom spawn-based implementation of runCommandSafely with promisified execFile to keep safety guarantees while simplifying the control flow and resource handling logic.

You can keep the “safer command handling” (no shell, timeout, maxBuffer) while dropping most of the custom exec-like implementation by switching to `execFile` instead of manual `spawn` wiring.

This removes:
- manual stdout/stderr buffering
- explicit `maxBuffer` / `timeout` management
- `killedForTimeout` / `killedForBuffer` flags and custom timer
- the unused `promisifyFn` alias

and keeps:
- no shell invocation
- `timeout` and `maxBuffer` behavior
- `command: string` API with `shell-quote` parsing

Example refactor:

```ts
import { spawn, execFile } from "child_process"; // or drop `spawn` if unused
import { promisify } from "util";
import * as shellQuote from "shell-quote";

const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile);

export class BashTool {
  // ...

  private async runCommandSafely(
    command: string,
    options: { cwd?: string; timeout?: number; maxBuffer?: number },
  ): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
    const argv = shellQuote
      .parse(command)
      .filter(token => typeof token === "string") as string[];

    if (argv.length === 0) {
      return { stdout: "", stderr: "" };
    }

    const [file, ...args] = argv;

    // execFile does no shell, and honors timeout/maxBuffer
    const { stdout, stderr } = await execFileAsync(file, args, {
      cwd: options.cwd,
      timeout: options.timeout ?? 30000,
      maxBuffer: options.maxBuffer ?? 1024 * 1024,
    });

    return { stdout, stderr };
  }
}
```

This preserves the new safety behavior and resource limits but substantially reduces control-flow and implementation complexity.
</issue_to_address>

### Comment 3
<location> `src/tools/bash.ts:30` </location>
<code_context>
      const child = spawn(cmd, args, {
</code_context>

<issue_to_address>
**security (javascript.lang.security.detect-child-process):** Detected calls to child_process from a function argument `command`. This could lead to a command injection if the input is user controllable. Try to avoid calls to child_process, and if it is needed ensure user input is correctly sanitized or sandboxed.

*Source: opengrep*
</issue_to_address>