fix(rules-rm): allow temp targets when cwd is home directory

dist/bin/cc-safety-net.js

@@ -2865,6 +2865,7 @@ function normalizePathForComparison(p) {
 }
 var REASON_RM_RF = "rm -rf outside cwd is blocked. Use explicit paths within the current directory, or delete manually.";
 var REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME = "rm -rf targeting root or home directory is extremely dangerous and always blocked.";
+var REASON_RM_HOME_CWD = "rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.";
 function analyzeRm(tokens, options = {}) {
   const {
     cwd,
@@ -2921,18 +2922,16 @@ function classifyTarget(target, ctx) {
   if (isDangerousRootOrHomeTarget(target)) {
     return { kind: "root_or_home_target" };
   }
-  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
-  if (anchoredCwd) {
-    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
-      return { kind: "cwd_self_target" };
-    }
-  }
   if (isTempTarget(target, ctx.trustTmpdirVar)) {
     return { kind: "temp_target" };
   }
+  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
   if (anchoredCwd) {
     if (isCwdHomeForRmPolicy(anchoredCwd, ctx.homeDir)) {
-      return { kind: "root_or_home_target" };
+      return { kind: "home_cwd_target" };
+    }
+    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
+      return { kind: "cwd_self_target" };
     }
     if (isTargetWithinCwd(target, anchoredCwd, ctx.resolvedCwd ?? anchoredCwd)) {
       return { kind: "within_anchored_cwd" };
@@ -2944,10 +2943,12 @@ function reasonForClassification(classification, ctx) {
   switch (classification.kind) {
     case "root_or_home_target":
       return REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME;
-    case "cwd_self_target":
-      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case "temp_target":
       return null;
+    case "home_cwd_target":
+      return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
+    case "cwd_self_target":
+      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case "within_anchored_cwd":
       if (ctx.paranoid) {
         return `${REASON_RM_RF} (SAFETY_NET_PARANOID_RM enabled)`;
@@ -3069,14 +3070,6 @@ function isTargetWithinCwd(target, originalCwd, effectiveCwd) {
     return false;
   }
 }
-function isHomeDirectory(cwd) {
-  const home = process.env.HOME ?? homedir3();
-  try {
-    return normalizePathForComparison(cwd) === normalizePathForComparison(home);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
 
 // src/core/analyze/parallel.ts
 var REASON_PARALLEL_RM = "parallel rm -rf with dynamic input is dangerous. Use explicit file list instead.";
@@ -3497,7 +3490,6 @@ function matchesBlockArgs(tokens, blockArgs, shortOpts) {
 // src/core/analyze/segment.ts
 var REASON_INTERPRETER_DANGEROUS = "Detected potentially dangerous command in interpreter code.";
 var REASON_INTERPRETER_BLOCKED = "Interpreter one-liners are blocked in paranoid mode.";
-var REASON_RM_HOME_CWD = "rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.";
 function deriveCwdContext(options) {
   const cwdUnknown = options.effectiveCwd === null;
   const cwdForRm = cwdUnknown ? undefined : options.effectiveCwd ?? options.cwd;
@@ -3561,11 +3553,6 @@ function analyzeSegment(tokens, depth, options) {
     }
   }
   if (isRm) {
-    if (cwdForRm && isHomeDirectory(cwdForRm)) {
-      if (hasRecursiveForceFlags(stripped)) {
-        return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
-      }
-    }
     const rmResult = analyzeRm(stripped, {
       cwd: cwdForRm,
       originalCwd,
@@ -4682,19 +4669,9 @@ function explainSegment(tokens, depth, options, steps) {
       return { reason };
   }
   if (isRm) {
-    if (effectiveCwd && isHomeDirectory(effectiveCwd) && hasRecursiveForceFlags(strippedTokens)) {
-      const reason2 = "rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.";
-      steps.push({
-        type: "rule-check",
-        ruleModule: "rules-rm.ts",
-        ruleFunction: "isHomeDirectory",
-        matched: true,
-        reason: reason2
-      });
-      return { reason: reason2 };
-    }
     const reason = analyzeRm(strippedTokens, {
-      cwd: effectiveCwd ?? undefined,
+      cwd: cwdForRm,
+      originalCwd,
       paranoid: options.paranoidRm,
       allowTmpdirVar
     });

dist/core/rules-rm.d.ts

@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ export interface AnalyzeRmOptions {
     tmpdirOverridden?: boolean;
 }
 export declare function analyzeRm(tokens: string[], options?: AnalyzeRmOptions): string | null;
+/** @internal Exported for testing */
 export declare function isHomeDirectory(cwd: string): boolean;

dist/index.js

@@ -1724,6 +1724,7 @@ function normalizePathForComparison(p) {
 }
 var REASON_RM_RF = "rm -rf outside cwd is blocked. Use explicit paths within the current directory, or delete manually.";
 var REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME = "rm -rf targeting root or home directory is extremely dangerous and always blocked.";
+var REASON_RM_HOME_CWD = "rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.";
 function analyzeRm(tokens, options = {}) {
   const {
     cwd,
@@ -1780,18 +1781,16 @@ function classifyTarget(target, ctx) {
   if (isDangerousRootOrHomeTarget(target)) {
     return { kind: "root_or_home_target" };
   }
-  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
-  if (anchoredCwd) {
-    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
-      return { kind: "cwd_self_target" };
-    }
-  }
   if (isTempTarget(target, ctx.trustTmpdirVar)) {
     return { kind: "temp_target" };
   }
+  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
   if (anchoredCwd) {
     if (isCwdHomeForRmPolicy(anchoredCwd, ctx.homeDir)) {
-      return { kind: "root_or_home_target" };
+      return { kind: "home_cwd_target" };
+    }
+    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
+      return { kind: "cwd_self_target" };
     }
     if (isTargetWithinCwd(target, anchoredCwd, ctx.resolvedCwd ?? anchoredCwd)) {
       return { kind: "within_anchored_cwd" };
@@ -1803,10 +1802,12 @@ function reasonForClassification(classification, ctx) {
   switch (classification.kind) {
     case "root_or_home_target":
       return REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME;
-    case "cwd_self_target":
-      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case "temp_target":
       return null;
+    case "home_cwd_target":
+      return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
+    case "cwd_self_target":
+      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case "within_anchored_cwd":
       if (ctx.paranoid) {
         return `${REASON_RM_RF} (SAFETY_NET_PARANOID_RM enabled)`;
@@ -1928,14 +1929,6 @@ function isTargetWithinCwd(target, originalCwd, effectiveCwd) {
     return false;
   }
 }
-function isHomeDirectory(cwd) {
-  const home = process.env.HOME ?? homedir();
-  try {
-    return normalizePathForComparison(cwd) === normalizePathForComparison(home);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-}
 
 // src/core/analyze/parallel.ts
 var REASON_PARALLEL_RM = "parallel rm -rf with dynamic input is dangerous. Use explicit file list instead.";
@@ -2356,7 +2349,6 @@ function matchesBlockArgs(tokens, blockArgs, shortOpts) {
 // src/core/analyze/segment.ts
 var REASON_INTERPRETER_DANGEROUS = "Detected potentially dangerous command in interpreter code.";
 var REASON_INTERPRETER_BLOCKED = "Interpreter one-liners are blocked in paranoid mode.";
-var REASON_RM_HOME_CWD = "rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.";
 function deriveCwdContext(options) {
   const cwdUnknown = options.effectiveCwd === null;
   const cwdForRm = cwdUnknown ? undefined : options.effectiveCwd ?? options.cwd;
@@ -2420,11 +2412,6 @@ function analyzeSegment(tokens, depth, options) {
     }
   }
   if (isRm) {
-    if (cwdForRm && isHomeDirectory(cwdForRm)) {
-      if (hasRecursiveForceFlags(stripped)) {
-        return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
-      }
-    }
     const rmResult = analyzeRm(stripped, {
       cwd: cwdForRm,
       originalCwd,

src/bin/explain/segment.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import { dangerousInText } from '@/core/analyze/dangerous-text';
 import { analyzeFind } from '@/core/analyze/find';
 import { containsDangerousCode, extractInterpreterCodeArg } from '@/core/analyze/interpreters';
 import { analyzeParallel } from '@/core/analyze/parallel';
-import { hasRecursiveForceFlags } from '@/core/analyze/rm-flags';
 import {
   REASON_INTERPRETER_BLOCKED,
   REASON_INTERPRETER_DANGEROUS,
@@ -25,7 +24,7 @@ import { isTmpdirOverriddenToNonTemp } from '@/core/analyze/tmpdir';
 import { analyzeXargs } from '@/core/analyze/xargs';
 import { checkCustomRules } from '@/core/rules-custom';
 import { analyzeGit } from '@/core/rules-git';
-import { analyzeRm, isHomeDirectory } from '@/core/rules-rm';
+import { analyzeRm } from '@/core/rules-rm';
 import {
   normalizeCommandToken,
   splitShellCommands,
@@ -302,19 +301,9 @@ export function explainSegment(
   }
 
   if (isRm) {
-    if (effectiveCwd && isHomeDirectory(effectiveCwd) && hasRecursiveForceFlags(strippedTokens)) {
-      const reason = 'rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.';
-      steps.push({
-        type: 'rule-check',
-        ruleModule: 'rules-rm.ts',
-        ruleFunction: 'isHomeDirectory',
-        matched: true,
-        reason,
-      });
-      return { reason };
-    }
     const reason = analyzeRm(strippedTokens, {
-      cwd: effectiveCwd ?? undefined,
+      cwd: cwdForRm,
+      originalCwd,
       paranoid: options.paranoidRm,
       allowTmpdirVar,
     });

src/core/analyze/segment.ts

@@ -2,13 +2,12 @@ import { DISPLAY_COMMANDS } from '@/core/analyze/constants';
 import { analyzeFind } from '@/core/analyze/find';
 import { containsDangerousCode, extractInterpreterCodeArg } from '@/core/analyze/interpreters';
 import { analyzeParallel } from '@/core/analyze/parallel';
-import { hasRecursiveForceFlags } from '@/core/analyze/rm-flags';
 import { extractDashCArg } from '@/core/analyze/shell-wrappers';
 import { isTmpdirOverriddenToNonTemp } from '@/core/analyze/tmpdir';
 import { analyzeXargs } from '@/core/analyze/xargs';
 import { checkCustomRules } from '@/core/rules-custom';
 import { analyzeGit } from '@/core/rules-git';
-import { analyzeRm, isHomeDirectory } from '@/core/rules-rm';
+import { analyzeRm } from '@/core/rules-rm';
 import {
   getBasename,
   normalizeCommandToken,
@@ -27,8 +26,6 @@ import {
 export const REASON_INTERPRETER_DANGEROUS =
   'Detected potentially dangerous command in interpreter code.';
 export const REASON_INTERPRETER_BLOCKED = 'Interpreter one-liners are blocked in paranoid mode.';
-const REASON_RM_HOME_CWD =
-  'rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.';
 
 export type InternalOptions = AnalyzeOptions & {
   config: Config;
@@ -123,11 +120,6 @@ export function analyzeSegment(
   }
 
   if (isRm) {
-    if (cwdForRm && isHomeDirectory(cwdForRm)) {
-      if (hasRecursiveForceFlags(stripped)) {
-        return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
-      }
-    }
     const rmResult = analyzeRm(stripped, {
       cwd: cwdForRm,
       originalCwd,

src/core/rules-rm.ts

@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ const REASON_RM_RF =
   'rm -rf outside cwd is blocked. Use explicit paths within the current directory, or delete manually.';
 const REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME =
   'rm -rf targeting root or home directory is extremely dangerous and always blocked.';
+const REASON_RM_HOME_CWD =
+  'rm -rf in home directory is dangerous. Change to a project directory first.';
 
 export interface AnalyzeRmOptions {
   cwd?: string;
@@ -55,8 +57,9 @@ interface RmContext {
 
 type TargetClassification =
   | { kind: 'root_or_home_target' }
-  | { kind: 'cwd_self_target' }
   | { kind: 'temp_target' }
+  | { kind: 'home_cwd_target' }
+  | { kind: 'cwd_self_target' }
   | { kind: 'within_anchored_cwd' }
   | { kind: 'outside_anchored_cwd' };
 
@@ -127,20 +130,18 @@ function classifyTarget(target: string, ctx: RmContext): TargetClassification {
     return { kind: 'root_or_home_target' };
   }
 
-  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
-  if (anchoredCwd) {
-    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
-      return { kind: 'cwd_self_target' };
-    }
-  }
-
   if (isTempTarget(target, ctx.trustTmpdirVar)) {
     return { kind: 'temp_target' };
   }
 
+  const anchoredCwd = ctx.anchoredCwd;
   if (anchoredCwd) {
     if (isCwdHomeForRmPolicy(anchoredCwd, ctx.homeDir)) {
-      return { kind: 'root_or_home_target' };
+      return { kind: 'home_cwd_target' };
+    }
+
+    if (isCwdSelfTarget(target, anchoredCwd)) {
+      return { kind: 'cwd_self_target' };
     }
 
     if (isTargetWithinCwd(target, anchoredCwd, ctx.resolvedCwd ?? anchoredCwd)) {
@@ -158,10 +159,12 @@ function reasonForClassification(
   switch (classification.kind) {
     case 'root_or_home_target':
       return REASON_RM_RF_ROOT_HOME;
-    case 'cwd_self_target':
-      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case 'temp_target':
       return null;
+    case 'home_cwd_target':
+      return REASON_RM_HOME_CWD;
+    case 'cwd_self_target':
+      return REASON_RM_RF;
     case 'within_anchored_cwd':
       if (ctx.paranoid) {
         return `${REASON_RM_RF} (SAFETY_NET_PARANOID_RM enabled)`;
@@ -319,6 +322,7 @@ function isTargetWithinCwd(target: string, originalCwd: string, effectiveCwd?: s
   }
 }
 
+/** @internal Exported for testing */
 export function isHomeDirectory(cwd: string): boolean {
   const home = process.env.HOME ?? homedir();
   try {

tests/bin/explain/command.test.ts

@@ -282,12 +282,23 @@ describe('explainCommand rm with home directory', () => {
     const allSteps = result.trace.segments.flatMap((s) => s.steps);
     const ruleStep = allSteps.find(
       (s) =>
-        s.type === 'rule-check' &&
-        s.ruleModule === 'rules-rm.ts' &&
-        s.ruleFunction === 'isHomeDirectory',
+        s.type === 'rule-check' && s.ruleModule === 'rules-rm.ts' && s.ruleFunction === 'analyzeRm',
     );
     expect(ruleStep).toBeDefined();
   });
+
+  test('temp-target rm in home directory cwd is allowed', () => {
+    const homeDir = process.env.HOME;
+    if (!homeDir) return;
+    const result = explainCommand('rm -rf /tmp/test-dir', { cwd: homeDir });
+    expect(result.result).toBe('allowed');
+    const allSteps = result.trace.segments.flatMap((s) => s.steps);
+    const analyzeRmStep = allSteps.find(
+      (s) =>
+        s.type === 'rule-check' && s.ruleModule === 'rules-rm.ts' && s.ruleFunction === 'analyzeRm',
+    );
+    expect(analyzeRmStep).toBeDefined();
+  });
 });
 
 describe('explainCommand parallel with nested blocked', () => {