ci: set persist-credentials: false on checkout steps#32
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actions/checkout persists the job token into the workspace .git/config by default. These jobs never push or fetch with it, so persisting it only lets a later compromised step in the same job read the token from disk. Setting persist-credentials: false keeps it out of the checkout.
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What
Set
persist-credentials: falseon everyactions/checkoutstep across the CI and release workflows.Why
By default
actions/checkoutwrites the job token into the workspace.git/configas an auth header. Persisting it only widens the attack surface: any later step in the same job (a compromised action, or a malicious transitive dependency pulled in during install) could read the token from disk. Settingpersist-credentials: falsekeeps it out of the checkout and shrinks the blast radius.Scope
Now includes the release changelog workflow. That job pushes its branch via
create-pull-request, which authenticates with thetokenit is given as an input rather than the credentials persisted by checkout, sopersist-credentials: falseis the recommended setup there (it also ensures the action's own token, not the one baked into git config by checkout, is used for the push).