benchmark-inventory.json

{
  "benchmark": "verity-benchmark",
  "manifest_schema_version": 1,
  "inventory_source": {
    "families": "families/*/family.yaml",
    "implementations": "families/*/implementations/*/implementation.yaml",
    "active_cases": "cases/*/*/case.yaml",
    "active_tasks": "cases/*/*/tasks/*.yaml",
    "backlog_cases": "backlog/*/*/case.yaml",
    "backlog_tasks": "backlog/*/*/tasks/*.yaml"
  },
  "summary": {
    "family_count": 27,
    "implementation_count": 28,
    "active_case_count": 25,
    "backlog_case_count": 3,
    "active_task_count": 134,
    "backlog_task_count": 8,
    "buildable_case_count": 27,
    "runnable_task_count": 141,
    "case_stage_counts": {
      "build_green": 23,
      "candidate": 1,
      "proof_complete": 4
    },
    "translation_status_counts": {
      "blocked": 1,
      "translated": 27
    },
    "proof_status_counts": {
      "blocked": 1,
      "complete": 19,
      "partial": 7,
      "proof": 1
    },
    "task_track_counts": {
      "proof-only": 142
    },
    "task_property_class_counts": {
      "access_control_identity": 10,
      "accounting_and_rate_guard": 1,
      "accounting_bound": 16,
      "accounting_conservation": 15,
      "accounting_effect": 2,
      "accounting_invariant_break": 1,
      "accounting_update": 6,
      "arithmetic_rounding": 3,
      "authorization_state": 9,
      "balance_conservation": 2,
      "balance_credit_update": 2,
      "balance_update": 1,
      "calldata_decoder_bounds": 1,
      "calldata_decoder_faithfulness": 1,
      "calldata_decoder_metadata": 1,
      "compliance_boundary": 3,
      "exploit_trace": 1,
      "fee_payout_bound": 1,
      "frame_property": 2,
      "guarded_solvency": 7,
      "isOwner_effect": 3,
      "lifecycle_accounting": 3,
      "linked_list_acyclicity": 4,
      "linked_list_invariant": 8,
      "mapping_consistency": 1,
      "monotonic_counter": 2,
      "non_leakage": 1,
      "noninterference": 1,
      "output_range": 2,
      "overflow_safety": 1,
      "pps_nondecrease": 1,
      "price_band": 2,
      "price_computation": 5,
      "reserve_state_transition": 5,
      "silent_failure": 2,
      "storage_update": 1,
      "storage_write": 6,
      "subtree_partition": 1,
      "supply_invariance": 1,
      "supply_update": 2,
      "threshold_activation": 1,
      "threshold_partition": 1,
      "total_conservation": 1,
      "tree_conservation": 1,
      "weighted_selection": 1
    },
    "task_proof_family_counts": {
      "arithmetic_accounting": 2,
      "auction_clearing_correctness": 1,
      "authorization_enablement": 25,
      "functional_correctness": 32,
      "protocol_transition_correctness": 22,
      "refinement_equivalence": 11,
      "state_preservation_local_effects": 49
    },
    "family_split_counts": {
      "active": 24,
      "backlog": 2,
      "mixed": 1
    }
  },
  "families": [
    {
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "display_name": "Alchemix",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Alchemix Finance V3 self-repaying lending. Covers the lazy-accrual debt accounting machinery \u2014 earmarking, redemption, and the conservation invariants that bridge per-account state to the global Transmuter claim.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "v3"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "alchemix/earmark_conservation"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/alchemix/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "balancer",
      "display_name": "Balancer",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Balancer protocol math and pool accounting invariants. The initial case targets ReClamm concentrated-liquidity swap rounding.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "reclamm"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/balancer/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "cork",
      "display_name": "Cork Protocol",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Cork Protocol (Phoenix version) covering pool solvency invariants from the Certora formal verification report (September-December 2025). Targets the P-02 solvency gap where Certora timed out on unwindExerciseOther.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "phoenix"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "cork/pool_solvency"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/cork/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "display_name": "Damn Vulnerable DeFi",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for compact Damn Vulnerable DeFi protocol slices that isolate high-signal exploit patterns from the training challenges.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "v2"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/damn_vulnerable_defi/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "display_name": "Ethereum",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Ethereum L1 benchmark slices covering deposit processing pinned from public upstream artifacts.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "deposit_contract"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "vyper"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/ethereum/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "display_name": "ForgeYields",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "ForgeYields protocol verification cases.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "contracts"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "forgeyields/global_solvency"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/forgeyields/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "ipor",
      "display_name": "IPOR",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "IPOR protocol verification cases.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "ipor_fusion"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/ipor/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "display_name": "Kleros",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for Kleros protocol slices focused on proving conservation and selection properties over jury-sampling logic.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "kleros_v2"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "kleros/sortition_trees"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/kleros/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "display_name": "Lagoon",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "ERC-7540 vault infrastructure with guardrails for vault valuation updates.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "v0_6_0"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "lagoon/guardrails"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/lagoon/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "lido",
      "display_name": "Lido",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Lido protocol slices covering vault collateral locking arithmetic and solvency invariants from the V3 vaults feature branch.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "core"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "lido/vaulthub_locked"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/lido/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "display_name": "Nexus Mutual",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for Nexus Mutual protocol slices centered on proving arithmetic and behavioral properties over real contract pricing logic.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "smart_contracts"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/nexus_mutual/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "display_name": "1delta",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for 1delta composer routing and compact-calldata execution invariants. The initial case targets caller-address integrity for user-fund pulls through transfer commands, flash-loan callback continuations, swap-callback continuations, and the V3 direct callback-pull shortcut.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "ethereum-composer"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "onedelta/caller_address_integrity"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/onedelta/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "display_name": "OpenZeppelin",
      "split": "backlog",
      "status": "backlog",
      "description": "Backlog benchmark family for OpenZeppelin contract logic, starting with an ERC-4626 virtual-offset deposit slice focused on rounding and inflation-attack mitigation.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "contracts"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/openzeppelin/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "display_name": "Paladin Votes",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Governance recovery flow benchmarks drawn from the Sonic earn recovery system with emphasis on accounting and claim-state updates.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "stream_recovery_claim"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/paladin_votes/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "piku",
      "display_name": "Piku",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Piku USP accounting benchmarks over the Inverter oracle-priced funding manager and queued redemption processor.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "inverter_oracle_queue"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "piku/fund_conservation"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/piku/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "display_name": "Polaris",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Polaris bonding curve and reserve-accounting benchmarks.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "bonding_curve"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "polaris/bonding_curve"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/polaris/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "polygon",
      "display_name": "Polygon / Agglayer",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Polygon Agglayer bridge and interoperability verification cases.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "agglayer_bridge"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "polygon/agglayer_bridge"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/polygon/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "display_name": "Reserve",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for Reserve DTF Protocol slices, focused on proving arithmetic and behavioral properties over the rebalance and auction surfaces of the production Folio contracts.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "dtfs"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "reserve/auction_price_band"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/reserve/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "display_name": "Rootstock",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Rootstock bridge and Flyover liquidity accounting invariants.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "flyover-lbc"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/rootstock/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "safe",
      "display_name": "Safe",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Safe smart account (formerly Gnosis Safe) covering the OwnerManager linked list invariants from the Certora OwnerReach.spec.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "smart_account"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "safe/owner_manager_reach"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/safe/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "term_finance",
      "display_name": "Term Finance",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for Term Finance fixed-rate lending auction correctness properties.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "term_finance_contracts"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "term_finance/term_auction_clearing"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/term_finance/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "termmax",
      "display_name": "TermMax",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Active benchmark family for TermMax protocol slices centered on proving AMM pricing-state transitions and fee-consistent reserve updates.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "contracts_v2"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/termmax/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "display_name": "Uniswap V2",
      "split": "backlog",
      "status": "backlog",
      "description": "Backlog benchmark family for Uniswap V2 core logic, starting with a fee-adjusted swap invariant slice over reserve updates.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "v2_core"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/uniswap_v2/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "usual",
      "display_name": "Usual",
      "split": "mixed",
      "status": "mixed",
      "description": "Usual stablecoin/RWA protocol cases focused on collateralized mint and redeem accounting for USD0 and related collateral assets.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "private_repo",
        "verified_proxy"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "usual/placeholder",
        "usual/dao_collateral"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/usual/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "wildcat",
      "display_name": "Wildcat",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Wildcat protocol slices focused on borrower liquidity obligations, reserve accounting, and withdrawal-priority-aware safety properties.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "v2_protocol"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/wildcat/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "zama",
      "display_name": "Zama",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Zama fhEVM confidential contract logic, starting with the ERC-7984 confidential token standard (co-developed with OpenZeppelin). Focuses on verifying the accounting correctness of FHE-based token operations where balances and transfer amounts are encrypted.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "confidential_contracts"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "zama/erc7984_confidential_token"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/zama/family.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "display_name": "Zodiac Roles",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "active",
      "description": "Benchmark family for Gnosis Guild Zodiac Roles permissioning logic, starting with the Roles v3 lazy ABI decoder and condition field-extraction surface.",
      "implementation_ids": [
        "roles-v3"
      ],
      "case_ids": [
        "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness"
      ],
      "source_languages": [
        "solidity"
      ],
      "manifest_path": "families/zodiac/family.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "implementations": [
    {
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "display_name": "Alchemix V3",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3",
      "upstream_commit": "117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "alchemix/earmark_conservation"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for the Alchemix V3 master branch, benchmarking the earmarking accounting system (_earmark, _sync, _computeUnrealizedAccount, redeem, _subEarmarkedDebt, _subDebt) and the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant the team identified as most important (Ov3rkoalafied, 2026-04-24).",
      "manifest_path": "families/alchemix/implementations/v3/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "balancer",
      "implementation_id": "reclamm",
      "display_name": "Balancer ReClamm",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/balancer/reclamm",
      "upstream_commit": "cff18033d401a61326a2d6c078507084cbdc864b",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/lib/ReClammMath.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding"
      ],
      "notes": "ReClamm is a Balancer v3 two-token readjusting concentrated-liquidity AMM. This implementation entry covers the swap quote arithmetic in ReClammMath.computeOutGivenIn / computeInGivenOut and the ReClammPool.onSwap dispatch path.",
      "manifest_path": "families/balancer/implementations/reclamm/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "cork",
      "implementation_id": "phoenix",
      "display_name": "Cork Phoenix",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Cork-Technology/phoenix",
      "upstream_commit": "40d9b173c4b2262a93f36167355b5311d5f58e6b",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/libraries/PoolLib.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "cork/pool_solvency"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for Cork Protocol Phoenix version (v1.1.2), benchmarking the pool solvency invariant (Certora P-02) for the unwindExerciseOther function path.",
      "manifest_path": "families/cork/implementations/phoenix/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "display_name": "Damn Vulnerable DeFi v2",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi",
      "upstream_commit": "6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance"
      ],
      "notes": "Active implementation entry for the Damn Vulnerable DeFi challenge set, starting with the Side Entrance flash-loan repayment bug modeled as a compact pool-balance versus credited-liability slice.",
      "manifest_path": "families/damn_vulnerable_defi/implementations/v2/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "display_name": "Ethereum Deposit Contract",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract",
      "upstream_commit": "691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8",
      "source_language": "vyper",
      "source_artifact_path": "deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "case_ids": [
        "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal"
      ],
      "notes": "Canonical validator deposit contract used for the minimal counter and threshold slice translated into Lean.",
      "manifest_path": "families/ethereum/implementations/deposit_contract/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "display_name": "ForgeYields Contracts",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code",
      "upstream_commit": "etherscan-verified-source",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "TokenGateway.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "forgeyields/global_solvency"
      ],
      "notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting implementation entry for the guarded global-solvency benchmark.",
      "manifest_path": "families/forgeyields/implementations/contracts/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "ipor",
      "implementation_id": "ipor_fusion",
      "display_name": "IPOR Fusion",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/IPOR-Labs/ipor-fusion",
      "upstream_commit": "3a83157ee75a7c1752d9151aff43eb92a50cb346",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/vaults/PlasmaVault.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split"
      ],
      "notes": "Focused PlasmaVault redeem accounting implementation entry for the split redemption fee-rounding benchmark.",
      "manifest_path": "families/ipor/implementations/ipor_fusion/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "display_name": "Kleros V2",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2",
      "upstream_commit": "75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "kleros/sortition_trees"
      ],
      "notes": "Active implementation entry for Kleros V2, currently benchmarking a fixed-tree slice of the sortition library.",
      "manifest_path": "families/kleros/implementations/kleros_v2/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "implementation_id": "v0_6_0",
      "display_name": "Lagoon v0.6.0",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0",
      "upstream_commit": "a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "lagoon/guardrails"
      ],
      "notes": "GuardrailsLib pure compliance decision for v0.6.0 vault valuation guardrails.",
      "manifest_path": "families/lagoon/implementations/v0_6_0/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "display_name": "Lido Core (V3 Vaults)",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core",
      "upstream_commit": "96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "lido/vaulthub_locked"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for the Lido core repository (master), benchmarking the VaultHub _locked() collateral computation and its solvency invariants.",
      "manifest_path": "families/lido/implementations/core/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "display_name": "Nexus Mutual Smart Contracts",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band"
      ],
      "notes": "Active implementation entry for the Nexus Mutual smart-contract repository, currently benchmarking the RAMM price-band slice.",
      "manifest_path": "families/nexus_mutual/implementations/smart_contracts/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "display_name": "OneDeltaComposerEthereum",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba",
      "upstream_commit": "verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "onedelta/caller_address_integrity"
      ],
      "notes": "Ethereum deployment of the 1delta composer. This implementation entry covers the BaseComposer dispatch surface, Ethereum callback inheritance, and transfer command paths used by the caller-address integrity case.",
      "manifest_path": "families/onedelta/implementations/ethereum-composer/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "display_name": "OpenZeppelin Contracts",
      "split": "backlog",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit"
      ],
      "notes": "Backlog implementation entry for the OpenZeppelin ERC-4626 reference implementation, scoped to a compact virtual-offset deposit slice that captures rounding-sensitive share minting behavior.",
      "manifest_path": "families/openzeppelin/implementations/contracts/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "display_name": "Stream Recovery Claim",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system",
      "upstream_commit": "699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc"
      ],
      "notes": "Claim accounting contract translated as a single-round slice with Merkle verification abstracted away from the benchmark.",
      "manifest_path": "families/paladin_votes/implementations/stream_recovery_claim/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "display_name": "Inverter Oracle Queue Funding Manager",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "piku/fund_conservation"
      ],
      "notes": "Docs-matching Piku workflow implementation: oracle-priced funding manager, manual queue payment processor, and manual oracle price module.",
      "manifest_path": "families/piku/implementations/inverter_oracle_queue/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "display_name": "Polaris Bonding Curve",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve",
      "upstream_commit": "540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "polaris/bonding_curve"
      ],
      "notes": "BaseBondingCurve reserve-ratio accounting for pETH buys, sells, and fee-router burns.",
      "manifest_path": "families/polaris/implementations/bonding_curve/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "polygon",
      "implementation_id": "agglayer_bridge",
      "display_name": "Polygon AgglayerBridge",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/agglayer/agglayer-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "110bda5a03e70ee7331bc06407a8e79226d3e520",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/AgglayerBridge.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "polygon/agglayer_bridge"
      ],
      "notes": "Verity model of the AgglayerBridge claim path, focused on valid exit-root membership and source-network/leaf-index nullifier consumption.",
      "manifest_path": "families/polygon/implementations/agglayer_bridge/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "display_name": "Reserve DTF Protocol",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs",
      "upstream_commit": "14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "reserve/auction_price_band"
      ],
      "notes": "Active implementation entry for Reserve's DTF Protocol repository, currently benchmarking the auction price-band slice on RebalancingLib._price.",
      "manifest_path": "families/reserve/implementations/dtfs/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "implementation_id": "flyover-lbc",
      "display_name": "Rootstock Flyover LBC",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract",
      "upstream_commit": "88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle"
      ],
      "notes": "Flyover's Liquidity Bridge Contract accelerates Rootstock peg-ins and peg-outs through liquidity providers. This implementation entry covers the peg-out quote lifecycle in PegOutContract.",
      "manifest_path": "families/rootstock/implementations/flyover-lbc/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "display_name": "Safe Smart Account",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account",
      "upstream_commit": "a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "safe/owner_manager_reach"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for the Safe smart account OwnerManager module, benchmarking linked list invariant preservation under addOwnerWithThreshold, removeOwner, swapOwner, and setupOwners.",
      "manifest_path": "families/safe/implementations/smart_account/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "term_finance",
      "implementation_id": "term_finance_contracts",
      "display_name": "Term Finance Contracts",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/term-finance/term-finance-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "127b74d871fc74e3a03d6d3b0f1fafe7e5d10275",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/TermAuction.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "term_finance/term_auction_clearing"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for the Term Finance protocol contracts repository, currently covering TermAuction clearing assignment correctness.",
      "manifest_path": "families/term_finance/implementations/term_finance_contracts/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "termmax",
      "implementation_id": "contracts_v2",
      "display_name": "TermMax Contracts V2",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/term-structure/termmax-contract-v2",
      "upstream_commit": "64bd47b98e064c7fb91ab4a59b70520e0ec285d5",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/v2/TermMaxOrderV2.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment"
      ],
      "notes": "Active implementation entry for the TermMax V2 contracts repository, currently benchmarking the single-segment `debtToken -> XT` pricing-state transition slice of `TermMaxOrderV2`.",
      "manifest_path": "families/termmax/implementations/contracts_v2/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "display_name": "Uniswap V2 Core",
      "split": "backlog",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core",
      "upstream_commit": "ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap"
      ],
      "notes": "Backlog implementation entry for the canonical Uniswap V2 pair contract, scoped to a compact swap invariant and reserve-update slice.",
      "manifest_path": "families/uniswap_v2/implementations/v2_core/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "private_repo",
      "display_name": "Usual Private Repository",
      "split": "backlog",
      "status": "blocked",
      "upstream_repo": null,
      "upstream_commit": null,
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "TBD",
      "case_ids": [
        "usual/placeholder"
      ],
      "notes": "Intake is blocked on repository access, so no implementation artifact or case slice can be pinned yet.",
      "manifest_path": "families/usual/implementations/private_repo/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "display_name": "Usual USD0 DaoCollateral Verified Proxy",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": null,
      "upstream_commit": null,
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "case_ids": [
        "usual/dao_collateral"
      ],
      "notes": "Source was taken from the verified Etherscan implementation behind the public DaoCollateral proxy at 0xde6e1F680C4816446C8D515989E2358636A38b04.",
      "manifest_path": "families/usual/implementations/verified_proxy/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "wildcat",
      "implementation_id": "v2_protocol",
      "display_name": "Wildcat V2 Protocol",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/wildcat-finance/v2-protocol",
      "upstream_commit": "a70f297fbd1b1ab597e0e9a3458a2d13a34b4657",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "src/market/WildcatMarket.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety"
      ],
      "notes": "Implementation entry for Wildcat V2. This benchmark case isolates the borrow path and proves the positive-borrow liquidity preservation property against the tagged `v2.0.0` market logic.",
      "manifest_path": "families/wildcat/implementations/v2_protocol/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "display_name": "OpenZeppelin Confidential Contracts (ERC-7984)",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "zama/erc7984_confidential_token"
      ],
      "notes": "OpenZeppelin's reference implementation of ERC-7984, the confidential fungible token standard for Zama's fhEVM. Uses FHESafeMath for overflow-safe encrypted arithmetic and the FHE.select pattern for branchless conditional transfers.",
      "manifest_path": "families/zama/implementations/confidential_contracts/implementation.yaml"
    },
    {
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "implementation_id": "roles-v3",
      "display_name": "Zodiac Roles v3 ABI Decoder",
      "split": "active",
      "status": "translated",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles",
      "upstream_commit": "172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "source_artifact_path": "packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "case_ids": [
        "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness"
      ],
      "notes": "Contracts-v3 branch decoder libraries for scoped permissions and ABI field extraction. The v3 architecture is deliberately targeted even though the currently deployed mastercopy is v2.1.",
      "manifest_path": "families/zodiac/implementations/roles-v3/implementation.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "cases": [
    {
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "project": "alchemix",
      "case_name": "earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3",
      "upstream_commit": "117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5",
      "original_contract_path": "src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_earmark",
        "_sync",
        "_computeUnrealizedAccount",
        "redeem",
        "_subEarmarkedDebt",
        "_subDebt"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Earmark conservation invariant for Alchemix V3 lazy-accrual debt accounting. The literal \"sum of stored account.earmarked equals cumulativeEarmarked\" is provably false on the deployed code (see AlchemistV3.sol:1014 comment \"Global can lag local by rounding\") because per-account earmarked is updated lazily inside _sync(tokenId). The lazy-projected version proven here is the property the design actually maintains and that downstream consumers (redemption math, collateral debit) rely on.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "q128_idealized",
        "cross_epoch_path_elided",
        "external_calls_opaque",
        "access_control_elided",
        "cover_shares_abstracted",
        "account_fields_pruned",
        "active_id_set_explicit"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant agreed with the Alchemix team (Ov3rkoalafied, 2026-04-24): the sum over active accounts of project(account, _earmarkWeight, _redemptionWeight, _survivalAccumulator).newEarmarked equals cumulativeEarmarked. Q128 fixed-point operations are treated as exact (no floor-rounding drift) and the cross-epoch reconciliation branch of _computeUnrealizedAccount is folded into the same-epoch path. External calls (Transmuter.queryGraph, TokenUtils.safeBalanceOf, TokenUtils.safeTransfer) are modeled as opaque ghost reads / no-ops. Access control, NFT ownership, Initializable, and pause flags are elided. Account struct fields not on the earmark/debt path (collateralBalance, freeCollateral, lastCollateralWeight, lastMintBlock, lastRepayBlock, lastTotalRedeemed*, mintAllowances, allowancesVersion) are dropped. The set of active token IDs is passed as an explicit FiniteSet Uint256 because ContractState lacks a knownTokenIds ghost field for Uint256-keyed mappings.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding",
      "project": "balancer",
      "case_name": "reclamm_swap_rounding",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "balancer",
      "implementation_id": "reclamm",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "draft",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/balancer/reclamm",
      "upstream_commit": "cff18033d401a61326a2d6c078507084cbdc864b",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/lib/ReClammMath.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/balancer/reclamm@cff18033d401a61326a2d6c078507084cbdc864b:contracts/lib/ReClammMath.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "computeOutGivenIn",
        "computeInGivenOut",
        "onSwap"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Balancer.ReClammSwapRounding.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Certora I-01 identified that an intermediate floor division can undermine an intended rounding-up path. This case isolates the ReClamm arithmetic surface where that class of issue matters: exact-in swaps must not overpay output, and exact-out swaps must not undercharge input.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "two_token_memory_array_scalarized",
        "pool_swap_params_flattened",
        "current_virtual_balances_as_inputs",
        "vault_balance_application_spec_boundary",
        "library_call_inlined",
        "overflow_preconditions_explicit"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets the core ReClamm swap rounding invariant: for a successful exact-in or exact-out quote, with the current virtual balances fixed during the quote, applying the returned Vault-side real-balance deltas must not decrease (balanceA + virtualBalanceA) * (balanceB + virtualBalanceB). The model keeps the branch structure and rounding direction of computeOutGivenIn (floor) and computeInGivenOut (ceil via mulDivUp), while scalarizing the fixed two-token balances array and flattening PoolSwapParams. The virtual-balance refresh path is abstracted into explicit current virtual balance inputs because timestamp interpolation, sqrt, and powDown movement are separate from the rounding bug class targeted by this case. The onSwap model inlines the two ReClammMath helper bodies to avoid cross-contract/library-call macro surface while preserving the exact branch arithmetic.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "memory_dynamic_array_scalarized",
        "struct_memory_flattened",
        "library_call_inlined",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Balancer.ReClammSwapRounding.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Balancer.ReClammSwapRounding.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "cork/pool_solvency",
      "project": "cork",
      "case_name": "pool_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/cork/pool_solvency/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "cork",
      "implementation_id": "phoenix",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Cork-Technology/phoenix",
      "upstream_commit": "40d9b173c4b2262a93f36167355b5311d5f58e6b",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/libraries/PoolLib.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Cork-Technology/phoenix@40d9b173c4b2262a93f36167355b5311d5f58e6b:contracts/libraries/PoolLib.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "previewUnwindExerciseOther",
        "_unwindExercise"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Cork.PoolSolvency.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Cork Phoenix pool solvency slice targeting the Certora P-02 gap. Based on the Certora formal verification report (September-December 2025). P-02 was verified for all functions except unwindExerciseOther (timeout).",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "oracle_elided",
        "fee_decay_elided",
        "access_control_elided",
        "token_transfers_elided",
        "decimal_exponentiation_parameterized"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark isolates the solvency-critical arithmetic of Cork Phoenix unwindExerciseOther. The model captures how cST shares released and net collateral added relate to the solvency invariant. Time-decay fee computation is factored out (net effect preserved). Decimal scale factors are parameterized rather than computed from exponentiation. Oracle rate is a storage parameter. Certora P-02 timed out on this function; this case fills that gap and proves solvency for arbitrary exchange rates and decimal combinations (Certora restricted to rate=1 or 3*1e18, decimals=17/16).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Cork.PoolSolvency.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Cork.PoolSolvency.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "project": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "case_name": "side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi",
      "upstream_commit": "6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "deposit",
        "flashLoan",
        "withdraw"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Compact Side Entrance benchmark focused on the broken coherence between pool assets and withdrawable credit when flash-loan repayment is routed through the deposit path.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "callback_elided",
        "ether_transfer_elided",
        "flash_loan_slice",
        "deposit_coupling",
        "single_caller_credit"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark compresses the Side Entrance exploit into a compact state: tracked pool ETH, aggregate credited liabilities, and the current caller's withdrawable credit. The flash-loan callback is summarized as an atomic loan-plus-deposit step that restores pool ETH while still minting fresh credit.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "project": "ethereum",
      "case_name": "deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "vyper",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract",
      "upstream_commit": "691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8",
      "original_contract_path": "deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "selected_functions": [
        "deposit"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Counter-oriented slice of the deposit path. Merkle tree, SSZ hashing, and log emission are omitted so the benchmark can focus on threshold-driven state updates.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "merkle_elided",
        "ssz_elided",
        "event_elided",
        "deposit_counter_slice"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark keeps the threshold and counter state transitions while abstracting away Merkle tree updates, SSZ hashing, and event emission.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "project": "forgeyields",
      "case_name": "global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code",
      "upstream_commit": "etherscan-verified-source",
      "original_contract_path": "TokenGateway.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "deposit",
        "requestRedeem",
        "claimRedeem",
        "redeemTokenGatewayDepreciated",
        "transferRemote",
        "handle",
        "report"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Reference proofs are complete for the guarded invariant across the modeled successful paths. Arithmetic hypotheses expose Solidity checked-arithmetic obligations needed by the focused model.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "guarded_depreciation_invariant",
        "ghost_erc20_balance",
        "decoded_message_inputs",
        "bridge_external_call_elided"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting slice for the guarded global-solvency invariant: while `depreciated == 0`, the gateway's ghost ERC20 balance covers `buffer` plus `_redeemInfo.assetsLocked`. The invariant is intentionally vacuous after depreciation mode, matching ForgeYields' clarification that active code no longer uses `_redeemInfo.assetsLocked`.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split",
      "project": "ipor",
      "case_name": "plasma_vault_redeem_split",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ipor",
      "implementation_id": "ipor_fusion",
      "stage": "proof_complete",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "revised_after_failed_fairness_target",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/IPOR-Labs/ipor-fusion",
      "upstream_commit": "3a83157ee75a7c1752d9151aff43eb92a50cb346",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/vaults/PlasmaVault.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/IPOR-Labs/ipor-fusion/blob/3a83157ee75a7c1752d9151aff43eb92a50cb346/contracts/vaults/PlasmaVault.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "redeem",
        "_redeem",
        "_convertToAssets",
        "withdrawFee"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "This case is intentionally scoped to the safety property that remains true after the failed split-fairness target: a successful modeled redeem cannot decrease virtualized conversion PPS. It should be described as no decrease in the modeled ERC4626 redeemable-value ratio, not as a proof that fee-splitting is impossible or that the whole vault is bug-free.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "arithmetic_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "erc4626_virtual_offset",
        "withdraw_fee_rounding",
        "retained_fee_pps_recapture",
        "pps_nondecrease"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused arithmetic model of PlasmaVault redeem: fee shares are rounded down, all requested shares are burned, only net shares are converted to assets, and retained fee value remains in vault assets. An earlier split-payout fairness target was rejected as too strong for these semantics. The completed proof target is virtualized conversion PPS non-decrease, plus a one-step fee-payout upper bound.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "markets_elided_total_assets_ghosted",
        "release_queue_elided",
        "access_control_elided"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "project": "kleros",
      "case_name": "sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2",
      "upstream_commit": "75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "set",
        "updateParents",
        "draw"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Sortition-tree slice focused on additive parent invariants, root conservation, interval-based draws, and ID/index correspondence.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "fixed_arity_slice",
        "four_leaf_specialization",
        "bytes32_id_elided_to_uint",
        "hash_randomness_elided_to_ticket"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark specializes the dynamic K-ary sortition tree to a balanced four-leaf binary slice. It preserves the parent-update and draw-interval logic while abstracting dynamic arrays, bytes32 stake-path packing, and the hash used to derive the draw ticket.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "lagoon/guardrails",
      "project": "lagoon",
      "case_name": "guardrails",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lagoon/guardrails/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "implementation_id": "v0_6_0",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0",
      "upstream_commit": "a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470",
      "original_contract_path": "src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0@a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470:src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "isCompliant"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Proves that Lagoon guardrail compliance accepts exactly the annualized PPS variations admitted by the configured 1e18-scaled upper and signed lower bounds under the encoded successfulSolidityArithmeticScope.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "d71bf23d908a7a952bf041ee5ebe41ba68b54426",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "pure_function_slice",
        "successful_solidity_arithmetic",
        "signed_guardrail_bounds"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "This benchmark models the pure arithmetic decision in GuardrailsLib.isCompliant for successful Solidity executions. Storage, events, activation status, updateGuardrails state mutation, and role checks are out of scope. The updateGuardrails int256-min rejection is captured as lowerRateNotMin. The successfulSolidityArithmeticScope predicate also requires nonzero divisors and branch-specific multiplication safety for Solidity 0.8 checked arithmetic.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "project": "lido",
      "case_name": "vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core",
      "upstream_commit": "96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_locked",
        "getPooledEthBySharesRoundUp"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Locked-amount arithmetic slice of Lido VaultHub (V3 vaults branch). Based on the Certora formal verification report (December 2025). F-01 could not be proven by Certora and is the primary benchmark task. P-VH-03 and P-VH-04 were proven by Certora and serve as supporting lemmas.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "oracle_elided",
        "rebalance_elided",
        "minting_elided",
        "vault_lifecycle_elided",
        "locked_arithmetic_slice"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark isolates the pure arithmetic of the VaultHub _locked() function and the axiomatised getPooledEthBySharesRoundUp share-to-ether conversion. All state machine reasoning (minting, burning, rebalancing, oracle updates) is elided. The tasks focus on the solvency inequality from Certora finding F-01 and the supporting invariants P-VH-03 and P-VH-04.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band",
      "project": "nexus_mutual",
      "case_name": "ramm_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts@ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023:contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "calculateNxm",
        "_getReserves",
        "getSpotPrices",
        "getBookValue"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Price-band slice of Nexus Mutual RAMM. The Verity model keeps the buffered book-value computation behind buy and sell spot prices and omits unrelated state evolution machinery.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "reserve_dynamics_elided",
        "ratchet_elided",
        "twap_elided",
        "price_band_slice"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark freezes the 1 percent buy/sell band around book value that the RAMM exposes through its reserve-derived spot prices. Reserve ratchets, swap execution, and oracle accumulation are omitted so the tasks focus on the arithmetic safety band itself.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "project": "onedelta",
      "case_name": "caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "draft",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba",
      "upstream_commit": "verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "deltaCompose",
        "_deltaComposeInternal",
        "_transfers",
        "_transferFrom",
        "_permit2TransferFrom",
        "flashLoanCallback",
        "swapCallback",
        "clSwapCallback"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "This is a caller-identity benchmark, not an accounting benchmark. It proves that every modeled ERC20 and Permit2 fund-pull path uses the outer deltaCompose caller rather than an intermediate callback contract, the composer itself, or an embedded calldata address. The scope is transfer-command pulls plus the V3 callback direct-pull shortcut, not every transferFrom in the full composer source tree.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "d71bf23d908a7a952bf041ee5ebe41ba68b54426",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "packed_calldata_decoded_commands",
        "external_call_arguments_as_event_log",
        "callback_authentication_as_precondition",
        "transfer_commands_only",
        "occurrence_flags_for_modeled_pulls"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets caller-address integrity for user-fund pulls in OneDeltaComposerEthereum. The model preserves the key function boundaries: deltaCompose captures msg.sender, BaseComposer-style dispatch passes an explicit callerAddress, transfer command ids select ERC20 or Permit2 transferFrom, and flash-loan and swap callbacks continue dispatch with the same callerAddress. It also covers the V3 callback calldataLength == 0 shortcut that directly pays a pool with ERC20 transferFrom(callerAddress, ...). Packed calldata offsets are abstracted into decoded command ids. External token calls are represented by event-log slots recording the from argument.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "project": "paladin_votes",
      "case_name": "stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system",
      "upstream_commit": "699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12",
      "original_contract_path": "src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "claimUsdc",
        "_claimUsdc",
        "claimWeth",
        "_claimWeth",
        "claimBoth"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Single-round accounting slice of the full USDC/WETH claim surface, including `claimBoth`. Merkle verification is abstracted as a boolean witness and token transfer side effects are omitted.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "merkle_elided",
        "token_transfer_elided",
        "single_round_slice"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark focuses on the single-round USDC and WETH claim surface, including the sequential `claimBoth` path, while abstracting Merkle verification plus token transfer effects into a simpler state-only model.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "piku/fund_conservation",
      "project": "piku",
      "case_name": "fund_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/piku/fund_conservation/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588",
      "original_contract_path": "src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts@8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588:src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_sellOrder",
        "_createAndEmitOrder",
        "_addToOpenRedemptionAmount",
        "amountPaid",
        "processPayments",
        "executePaymentQueue"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Fund-conservation benchmark for Piku's oracle-priced queued redemption flow: distributed backing + queued redemption backing + remaining backing + protocol treasury fees + project treasury fees equals initial backing. Queue execution functions are source context; the modeled settlement transition is the successful `amountPaid` callback.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "ghost_accounting_slots",
        "oracle_price_abstracted",
        "queue_shape_elided",
        "external_calls_opaque",
        "access_control_elided",
        "erc20_transfers_abstracted",
        "protocol_fee_recalculation_abstracted",
        "ghost_solvency_precondition"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "Piku's docs-matching Inverter implementation stores `_openRedemptionAmount` but does not store cumulative distributed backing, remaining backing, or protocol/project treasury fee counters. The model introduces those as ghost slots so the team-proposed fund-conservation invariant is state-readable. Oracle pricing and decimal conversion are represented by the already-computed redemption amount. Queue linked-list shape, roles, ERC20 transfer mechanics, blacklisting fallback, and event payloads are elided.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "event_only_fee_accounting_requires_ghost_slot",
        "external_oracle_pricing_abstracted",
        "protocol_fee_recalculation_abstracted",
        "ghost_solvency_precondition"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "polaris/bonding_curve",
      "project": "polaris",
      "case_name": "bonding_curve",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "complete",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve",
      "upstream_commit": "540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0",
      "original_contract_path": "src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve@540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0:src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "init",
        "buy",
        "sell",
        "floorSellAndBurn"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Polaris' Foundry invariant asserts reserveRatioDeviation() == 0 and the same predicate for floorSupply/floorBalance. This case records the corresponding state-transition preservation property over the bonding curve accounting slice as Lean theorems with no custom axioms and no sorry/admit. The broad helper-output and raw-pow witness boundaries have been removed from the theorem statements: the proof now computes the helper's multiply and `(left + DECIMAL_PRECISION - 1) / B_PLUS_1` path around a linked external `curvePow` boundary. This benchmark still does not bit-prove PRB/ABDK pow. The generated task files remain open challenge entrypoints for agents; they do not contradict the reference proof.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "9eaf64218be14b59f6253219c111a5abf958e7b7",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "fixed_point_pow_linked_external_boundary",
        "reserve_helper_outer_arithmetic_modeled",
        "erc20_aggregate_supply",
        "external_transfers_omitted",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets Polaris' own primary invariant: reserve ratio deviation is zero for both the current curve point and the floor point. The model keeps the state variables and state-changing function boundaries from BaseBondingCurve. `_getBalanceFromReserveRatio` is modeled through its outer arithmetic: `(A * pow(supply, B_PLUS_1) + DECIMAL_PRECISION - 1) / B_PLUS_1`. The remaining explicit boundary is only the PRB/ABDK fixed-point `pow` implementation, represented as a linked external library boundary; the helper multiplication and decimal-precision rounding division are no longer trusted as a unit or supplied through theorem hypotheses. Theorems establish the post-state reserve to curve match for the modeled storage transition.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "fixed_point_exponentiation_abstracted",
        "erc20_per_account_balances_omitted"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "polygon/agglayer_bridge",
      "project": "polygon",
      "case_name": "agglayer_bridge",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polygon",
      "implementation_id": "agglayer_bridge",
      "stage": "proof_complete",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/agglayer/agglayer-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "110bda5a03e70ee7331bc06407a8e79226d3e520",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/AgglayerBridge.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/agglayer/agglayer-contracts@110bda5a03e70ee7331bc06407a8e79226d3e520:contracts/AgglayerBridge.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "claimAsset",
        "claimMessage",
        "_verifyLeafAndSetNullifier",
        "_verifyLeaf",
        "_setAndCheckClaimed",
        "isClaimed",
        "_validateAndDecodeGlobalIndex",
        "_bitmapPositions",
        "_addLeafBridge",
        "_updateGlobalExitRoot"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "The public claim theorems show successful claims validate the leaf and consume the source-network/leaf-index bitmap entry. A private reachability lemma feeds the shared helper theorem that proves successful nullifier-helper execution flips the expected bitmap bit.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "merkle_proof_summary",
        "nullifier_bitmap",
        "global_exit_root_ghost",
        "metadata_hash_parameter",
        "post_nullifier_effects_elided"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark models the claim validation and nullifier path of AgglayerBridge. Dynamic metadata bytes are represented by a precomputed metadata hash, Merkle proof calculation is summarized by a deterministic root combiner, and token or message side effects after nullifier consumption are elided.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "reserve/auction_price_band",
      "project": "reserve",
      "case_name": "auction_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs",
      "upstream_commit": "14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs@14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267:contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_price"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Auction price band slice of Reserve DTF Protocol's RebalancingLib._price. The Verity model keeps the start/end branching plus the interior exponential decay; storage I/O and external view calls (auction + rebalance state) are folded into pure parameters.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "auction_price_band",
        "exponential_decay_axiomatised",
        "storage_state_elided",
        "require_gate_as_precondition"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark freezes the per-pair auction price band that RebalancingLib._price exposes. The interior exponential decay (PRBMath ln + exp) is preserved structurally in the model with two opaque axioms: `MathLib.exp` and `MathLib.ln`. The proof uses one algebraic axiom on `exp` (`exp_nonpositive_le_d18`). The storage-mapping reads on `auction.prices[token]` and `rebalance.details[token].inRebalance` are taken as parameter inputs (NexusMutual RammSpotPrice precedent); the Solidity require gate is encoded as a precondition on the pure function rather than as a `Verity.require` call.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle",
      "project": "rootstock",
      "case_name": "flyover_quote_lifecycle",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "implementation_id": "flyover-lbc",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "draft",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract",
      "upstream_commit": "88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9",
      "original_contract_path": "src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract@88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9:src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "depositPegOut",
        "refundPegOut",
        "refundUserPegOut",
        "_increaseBalance"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "This case focuses on quote lifecycle conservation and single settlement for Rootstock Flyover / LBC peg-outs. The property proved here is not a Bitcoin proof verifier; it is the Rootstock-side accounting guarantee for the amount already registered by depositPegOut.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "9eaf64218be14b59f6253219c111a5abf958e7b7",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "quote_hash_address_keyed",
        "quote_struct_flattened_to_accounting_fields",
        "quote_recipient_identity_stored_and_proven",
        "user_refund_expiry_stored_explicitly",
        "bridge_and_signature_checks_as_preconditions",
        "external_call_success_as_boolean",
        "deposit_checked_addition_guards",
        "deposit_change_refund_branch",
        "computed_lp_penalty_timing"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets the compact peg-out quote lifecycle in PegOutContract: depositPegOut registers the Rootstock-side quote amount and user-refund expiry fields. refundPegOut settles the quote to the LP or fallback balance, and refundUserPegOut settles an expired quote to the user refund recipient or fallback balance while recording the external collateral slash call amount as separate penalty accounting. Refund recipient identity is modeled explicitly: depositPegOut stores the LP and user refund addresses, and the settlement proofs read those stored fields instead of taking recipient identity as a theorem assumption. Cryptographic quote validation, Bitcoin transaction parsing, and bridge confirmation checks are modeled as success preconditions because they gate the lifecycle but do not change the conserved Rootstock-side amount after a quote is accepted. Deposit overpayment refund behavior and the LP penalty timing predicate are modeled explicitly.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "bytes32_quote_hash_modeled_as_address_key",
        "struct_calldata_flattened",
        "external_bridge_calls_as_preconditions",
        "external_collateral_slash_call_as_witness",
        "external_value_transfer_as_boolean",
        "quote_hash_address_keyed"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "project": "safe",
      "case_name": "owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account",
      "upstream_commit": "a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "addOwnerWithThreshold",
        "removeOwner",
        "swapOwner",
        "setupOwners"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Linked list reachability invariant preservation and functional correctness for the Safe OwnerManager. Based on the Certora OwnerReach.spec which defines the inListReachable and reachableInList invariants. All 15 proof tasks are complete (0 sorry) covering acyclicity, inListReachable, ownerListInvariant preservation, and isOwner functional correctness for all four operations. The unprovable stronglyAcyclic axiom was replaced with the provable uniquePredecessor property. Functional correctness proofs verify that each operation changes exactly the intended owners and leaves all others unchanged.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "threshold_elided",
        "linked_list_reachability_slice"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark models all four ownership-mutating functions of the Safe OwnerManager: addOwnerWithThreshold, removeOwner, swapOwner, and setupOwners. Threshold management is elided as it does not affect the owners mapping. Four families of properties are specified: inListReachable (forward reachability from SENTINEL), ownerListInvariant (combined inListReachable + reachableInList biconditional), acyclicity (no cycles in the linked list), and isOwner functional correctness (each operation changes exactly the intended owners). setupOwners serves as the base case for invariant establishment.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "term_finance/term_auction_clearing",
      "project": "term_finance",
      "case_name": "term_auction_clearing",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/term_finance/term_auction_clearing/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "term_finance",
      "implementation_id": "term_finance_contracts",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "proof",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/term-finance/term-finance-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "127b74d871fc74e3a03d6d3b0f1fafe7e5d10275",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/TermAuction.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/term-finance/term-finance-contracts/blob/127b74d871fc74e3a03d6d3b0f1fafe7e5d10275/contracts/TermAuction.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_calculateClearingPrice",
        "_assignBids",
        "_assignOffers"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermFinance.TermAuctionClearing.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Clearing assignment correctness for the weekly sealed-bid uniform-price double auction: positive bid assignments respect the clearing rate floor, positive offer assignments respect the clearing rate ceiling, and assigned purchase-token principal balances exactly across both sides.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "9eaf64218be14b59f6253219c111a5abf958e7b7",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "clearing_offset_zero",
        "assignment_only",
        "sorted_input_hypothesis",
        "purchase_token_principal",
        "residual_sweep_proved"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "This benchmark proves the TermAuction assignment correctness property for a valid clearing point. It models bids and offers as abstract lists with sortedness kept as the real auction input-boundary hypothesis, although the assignment proof is order-insensitive once capacity is assumed. It treats `clearingPrice` and `maxAssignable` as clearing outputs satisfying eligible demand/supply capacity, and proves the assignment guarantee by induction over the residual sweeps. It does not prove the `_calculateClearingPrice` search loop or downstream repurchase-value rounding.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermFinance.TermAuctionClearing.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermFinance.TermAuctionClearing.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment",
      "project": "termmax",
      "case_name": "order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "termmax",
      "implementation_id": "contracts_v2",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/term-structure/termmax-contract-v2",
      "upstream_commit": "64bd47b98e064c7fb91ab4a59b70520e0ec285d5",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/v2/TermMaxOrderV2.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/term-structure/termmax-contract-v2@64bd47b98e064c7fb91ab4a59b70520e0ec285d5:contracts/v2/TermMaxOrderV2.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "swapExactTokenToToken",
        "_swapAndUpdateReserves",
        "_buyToken",
        "_buyXt",
        "_buyXtStep",
        "buyXt",
        "cutsReverseIter",
        "calcIntervalProps",
        "plusInt256"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermMax.OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "TermMax range-order AMM slice for pricing-state transition correctness. The proof target is the highest-signal easy theorem in this family: on the successful single-segment `debtToken -> XT` exact-input path, the stored `virtualXtReserve` decreases by exactly the XT amount implied by the curve.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "exact_in_xt_only",
        "single_segment_slice",
        "direct_curvecut_params",
        "helper_stack_restored",
        "higher_order_helper_specialized",
        "callbacks_elided",
        "transfer_rebalance_elided",
        "int256_native_offset",
        "named_errors",
        "nonreentrant_modeled"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "This benchmark isolates the exact-input `debtToken -> XT` pricing/state-update path of `TermMaxOrderV2`. The model keeps the Solidity helper stack structurally visible (`calcIntervalProps`, `cutsReverseIter`, `_buyXtStep`, `_buyToken`, `_buyXt`, `_swapAndUpdateReserves`), with each storage read happening in the same caller as in the Solidity source. The curve cut offset is now carried as a native `Int256` parameter, and `MathLib.plusInt256` is inlined as the same `if (b < 0) ... else ...` shape Solidity uses. Solidity custom errors (`UnexpectedAmount`, `InsufficientLiquidity`, `XtReserveTooHigh`) are mirrored as named Verity errors, and the entry function carries the `nonreentrant(nonReentrancyLock)` modifier. Remaining DSL gaps: `CurveCut[]` cannot exist as a parameter or storage field (Verity#1003/#1745 \u2014 nested arrays / storage struct arrays), and Solidity function-pointer parameters of `_buyToken` / `_swapAndUpdateReserves` cannot be passed in Verity, so they are specialized to the concrete `_buyXtStep` / `_buyXt` path. Token transfers, callbacks, pool/GT rebalancing, deadline/sameToken/onlyOpen modifiers, and event emission are omitted because they do not affect `virtualXtReserve` (and reentry is blocked by the `nonreentrant` modifier).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "array_of_struct_param_unsupported",
        "higher_order_function_param_specialized",
        "external_lean_helper_call_unsupported"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermMax.OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.TermMax.OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "project": "usual",
      "case_name": "dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": null,
      "upstream_commit": null,
      "original_contract_path": "src/daoCollateral/DaoCollateral.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "selected_functions": [
        "swap",
        "redeem",
        "_calculateFee",
        "_burnStableTokenAndTransferCollateral",
        "_getTokenAmountForAmountInUSD"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Usual USD0 DaoCollateral conservation case. It verifies that no direct swap/redeem transition can create unaccounted ghost USD0 supply or debit more ghost collateral than the contract's modeled accounting permits, modulo configured redeem fee, oracle price, CBR coefficient, token decimals, and floor rounding.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "9eaf64218be14b59f6253219c111a5abf958e7b7",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "oracle_price_explicit",
        "swap_quote_computed",
        "erc20_calls_ghosted",
        "usd0_supply_effect_ghosted",
        "direct_swap_redeem_only",
        "cbr_redeem_branch_modeled",
        "supported_token_decimals_0_to_18",
        "intent_paths_elided",
        "access_control_elided"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark targets DaoCollateral direct swap/redeem conservation. Oracle price and token decimal scale are explicit inputs. The swap quote is computed inside the model as floor(collateralAmount * price / tokenUnit), rather than supplied as a free theorem parameter. The token unit is explicitly gated to Solidity's supported `10 ** decimals` values for collateral decimals `0..18`; larger decimal counts are outside this benchmark because Solidity's normalization takes a different division branch. ERC20 transfers and USD0 mint/burn calls are represented by explicitly named ghost ledgers: `ghostTreasuryCollateral` and `ghostUsd0Supply`. This keeps the proof scoped to DaoCollateral accounting rather than USD0 or ERC20 token correctness. The direct swap path credits exactly the RWA amount to the ghost collateral ledger and mints exactly the computed oracle USD quote in the ghost supply ledger. Successful-call hypotheses expose Solidity checked-arithmetic boundaries, nonzero computed quote, uint128 swap amount bound, supported token unit, ghost collateral sufficiency, and configured redeem fee / CBR coefficient bounds. The redeem path burns the user amount in the ghost supply ledger, remints only the non-CBR fee there, and debits the exact ghost collateral amount computed from net burned USD0, oracle price, token decimals, CBR flag, and floor rounding. SwapperEngine, intent matching, permits, role checks, pause gates, events, and registry lookups are elided because they do not alter this conservation equation.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_calls_ghosted",
        "oracle_reads_parameterized",
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety",
      "project": "wildcat",
      "case_name": "borrow_liquidity_safety",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "wildcat",
      "implementation_id": "v2_protocol",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/wildcat-finance/v2-protocol",
      "upstream_commit": "a70f297fbd1b1ab597e0e9a3458a2d13a34b4657",
      "original_contract_path": "src/market/WildcatMarket.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/wildcat-finance/v2-protocol@a70f297fbd1b1ab597e0e9a3458a2d13a34b4657:src/market/WildcatMarket.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "borrow",
        "_getUpdatedState",
        "liquidityRequired",
        "borrowableAssets"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Wildcat.BorrowLiquiditySafety.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Wildcat V2 borrow safety slice proving that a successful positive borrow cannot pull market assets below the liquidity requirement computed from the updated state used by the borrow guard. The required liquidity includes the reserve-ratio-backed portion of non-pending supply, 100% of pending withdrawals, 100% of normalized unclaimed withdrawals, and updated accrued protocol fees.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "borrow_liquidity_slice",
        "state_update_compressed",
        "external_boundaries_trusted",
        "packed_storage_rewritten"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark keeps the Wildcat V2 successful borrow path, the `MarketState.liquidityRequired` arithmetic, and the final transfer/write sequence. `_getUpdatedState()` is compressed to a precomputed protocol-fee delta applied before the borrow check, while the pending-withdrawal and unclaimed-withdrawal fields are treated as already current borrow-check inputs. Hooks, sanctions, and ERC20 balance reads/transfers remain explicit trusted boundaries.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Wildcat.BorrowLiquiditySafety.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Wildcat.BorrowLiquiditySafety.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "project": "zama",
      "case_name": "erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "_update",
        "_transfer",
        "_mint",
        "_burn",
        "confidentialTransferFrom",
        "setOperator"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "ERC-7984 is the confidential fungible token standard co-developed by Zama and OpenZeppelin for the fhEVM. The key verification targets are balance conservation (no tokens created/destroyed by transfers), correctness of the FHE.select pattern (insufficient balance \u2192 silent 0-transfer instead of revert), mint/burn accounting, overflow protection via FHESafeMath.tryIncrease, operator-gated transferFrom, and functional correctness of setOperator. Eleven proof tasks cover the 5 modeled functions.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "fhe_homomorphic_plaintext_equivalence",
        "acl_elided",
        "disclosure_elided",
        "callbacks_elided",
        "block_timestamp_as_parameter"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark models the core accounting logic of ERC-7984: transfer, transferFrom, setOperator, mint, and burn. FHE operations are modeled as plaintext equivalents justified by homomorphism (FHE.add \u2192 mod-2^64 addition, FHE.select \u2192 if/then/else, FHESafeMath.tryDecrease/tryIncrease \u2192 inlined conditional arithmetic). The ACL system (FHE.allow/allowThis), cryptographic proof verification (fromExternal + inputProof), async disclosure/decryption via the off-chain gateway, and ERC1363-style receiver callbacks are omitted as they cannot be modeled in Verity. The nested operator mapping (address \u2192 address \u2192 uint48) is modeled faithfully using Verity's storageMap2 / getMapping2 / setMapping2. block.timestamp is passed as a parameter to transferFrom because the verity_contract DSL macro does not currently expose blockTimestamp as a bind source. FHE.isInitialized is modeled via a separate boolean mapping. All arithmetic uses explicit mod 2^64 to faithfully capture euint64 wrapping semantics.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_contract_call",
        "off_chain_interaction",
        "fhe_cryptographic_layer"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness",
      "project": "zodiac",
      "case_name": "roles_decoder_faithfulness",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/case.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "implementation_id": "roles-v3",
      "stage": "build_green",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles",
      "upstream_commit": "172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6",
      "original_contract_path": "packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles@172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6:packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "AbiLocation.children",
        "AbiLocation.size",
        "AbiLocation._tailLocation",
        "Topology.isInlined",
        "Topology.inlinedSize",
        "ConditionEvaluator.__input"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "This case targets the v3 decoder/callee mismatch class that required custom verifiers in Zodiac Roles v2. The theorem scope covers static values, dynamic bytes/string, tuples, dynamic arrays, nested AbiEncoded, and transparent logical wrappers. Operator.Custom, Zip, Slice, Pluck, MultiSendUnwrapper, comparison consumption, and external calls are intentionally out of scope.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "74d8fe20ffa2f5dbb94959f3dd40a62df6aa8224",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "lazy_abi_decoder",
        "guarded_calldata_word_reader",
        "head_tail_offsets",
        "non_forward_tail_rejection",
        "integrity_metadata_assumed"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark models the Roles v3 ABI decoder as a guarded byte-region walker. The reference decoder is an independent canonical Solidity ABI v2 layout model using HEAD/TAIL regions, block-relative offsets, length words, dynamic array element blocks, and ceil32-padded dynamic payloads. The reference solution proves the metadata bridge, recursive leaf-region faithfulness, and bounds-safety without case-specific axioms.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "condition_packer_integrity_roundtrip_assumed",
        "keccak_injectivity_for_hash_comparison_paths"
      ],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Proofs"
    }
  ],
  "backlog": [
    {
      "case_id": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "project": "openzeppelin",
      "case_name": "erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/case.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "stage": "proof_complete",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts",
      "upstream_commit": "45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45:contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "previewDeposit",
        "deposit"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Backlog ERC-4626 benchmark slice derived from OpenZeppelin's virtual-offset design and inflation-attack analysis. The committed proof module validates the four arithmetic and state-transition theorems, so the case is runnable in the reference-solution benchmark path while remaining backlog-scoped.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "erc4626",
        "preview_execution_consistency",
        "virtual_offset",
        "rounding_down",
        "inflation_attack_surface"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The slice models only `previewDeposit` and `deposit` using total-assets and total-shares storage together with fixed virtual offsets. Token transfers, fees, hooks, and withdrawals are omitted so the benchmark can focus on rounding-sensitive share minting and the virtual-liquidity defense surface.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "project": "uniswap_v2",
      "case_name": "pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/case.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "stage": "proof_complete",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "spec_status": "frozen",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core",
      "upstream_commit": "ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58",
      "original_contract_path": "contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core@ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58:contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "selected_functions": [
        "swap"
      ],
      "lean_target": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Compile",
      "failure_reason": null,
      "notes": "Backlog AMM benchmark slice for reasoning about fee-adjusted constant-product guards and post-swap reserve synchronization without exposing the full Uniswap execution path. The committed proof module makes the case runnable in the reference-solution benchmark path while it remains backlog-scoped.",
      "buildable": true,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "amm_invariant",
        "fee_adjusted_product",
        "reserve_update",
        "transfers_elided",
        "callback_elided"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The slice starts after the optimistic transfer path and callback, taking the observed token balances and inferred input amounts as arguments. It keeps the SafeMath-backed fee-adjusted product guard and the final reserve writes while omitting token movement, oracle accumulation, and event emission.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "spec_target": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Specs",
      "proof_target": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Proofs"
    },
    {
      "case_id": "usual/placeholder",
      "project": "usual",
      "case_name": "placeholder",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/usual/placeholder/case.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "private_repo",
      "stage": "candidate",
      "translation_status": "blocked",
      "spec_status": "not_started",
      "proof_status": "blocked",
      "source_language": "solidity",
      "upstream_repo": null,
      "upstream_commit": null,
      "original_contract_path": "TBD",
      "generated_artifact_path": null,
      "source_ref": "unresolved:usual/private_repo@unknown:TBD",
      "selected_functions": [],
      "lean_target": null,
      "failure_reason": "private_access",
      "notes": "Pending private repository access and target selection.",
      "buildable": false,
      "verity_commit": "4ebe4931d25e5a1594fcd3f43ff040ecc3c4225a",
      "lean_toolchain": "leanprover/lean4:v4.22.0",
      "abstraction_level": "inaccessible_upstream",
      "abstraction_tags": [
        "intake_placeholder",
        "private_repo"
      ],
      "abstraction_notes": "The benchmark cannot define a translation or spec slice until repository access is available and a concrete contract artifact can be pinned.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "private_repo_access"
      ],
      "spec_target": null,
      "proof_target": null
    }
  ],
  "tasks": [
    {
      "task_ref": "alchemix/earmark_conservation/earmark_preserves_invariant",
      "task_id": "earmark_preserves_invariant",
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/tasks/earmark_preserves_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "lazy_accrual_invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation._earmark_preserves_invariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Tasks/EarmarkPreservesInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that calling `earmark()` preserves the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant. The increment to `cumulativeEarmarked` (`effectiveEarmarked`) must equal the sum, over active accounts, of the corresponding increment in each account's `projectedEarmarked`. This is a Finset.sum distribution lemma over Q128 multiplication.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "alchemix/earmark_conservation/redeem_preserves_invariant",
      "task_id": "redeem_preserves_invariant",
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/tasks/redeem_preserves_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "lazy_accrual_invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.redeem_preserves_invariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Tasks/RedeemPreservesInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that calling `redeem(amount)` preserves the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant. Both `cumulativeEarmarked` and the per-account redemption survival ratio scale by the same `ratioApplied`, so the equality is preserved by Q128 linearity (under the idealization assumption).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "alchemix/earmark_conservation/sub_debt_preserves_invariant",
      "task_id": "sub_debt_preserves_invariant",
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/tasks/sub_debt_preserves_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "lazy_accrual_invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation._subDebt_preserves_invariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Tasks/SubDebtPreservesInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that `subDebt(tokenId, amount)` preserves the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant. Under the cumulativeEarmarked \u2264 totalDebt corollary (always holds under the invariant), the line 1306 clamp is a no-op and the global is unchanged; the per-account debt decrement does not affect projected earmarked.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "alchemix/earmark_conservation/sub_earmarked_debt_preserves_invariant",
      "task_id": "sub_earmarked_debt_preserves_invariant",
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/tasks/sub_earmarked_debt_preserves_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "lazy_accrual_invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation._subEarmarkedDebt_preserves_invariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Tasks/SubEarmarkedDebtPreservesInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that `subEarmarkedDebt(amount, accountId)` preserves the lazy- projected earmark conservation invariant. Under the invariant, the global is never less than the literal sum, so the `min(...)` clamp on the global subtraction is a no-op and both sides decrement by the same amount.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "alchemix/earmark_conservation/sync_account_preserves_invariant",
      "task_id": "sync_account_preserves_invariant",
      "case_id": "alchemix/earmark_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/tasks/sync_account_preserves_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "alchemix",
      "implementation_id": "v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/alchemix-finance/v3@117c95b6ee11a75221d6fbdc79f16ac6acdb96f5:src/AlchemistV3.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "lazy_accrual_invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation._sync_preserves_invariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/alchemix/earmark_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Alchemix/EarmarkConservation/Tasks/SyncAccountPreservesInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that calling `syncAccount(id)` preserves the lazy-projected earmark conservation invariant. Sync replaces stored values with the projected values at the current global weights. The projected sum is unchanged because we were already counting the projection.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "q128_fixed_point_helpers",
        "mapping_uint_keyset_tracking"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Alchemix.EarmarkConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding/on_swap_fixed_virtual_balances_product_non_decreasing",
      "task_id": "on_swap_fixed_virtual_balances_product_non_decreasing",
      "case_id": "balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding/tasks/on_swap_fixed_virtual_balances_product_non_decreasing.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "balancer",
      "implementation_id": "reclamm",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/balancer/reclamm@cff18033d401a61326a2d6c078507084cbdc864b:contracts/lib/ReClammMath.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "arithmetic_rounding",
      "category": "swap_rounding_invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Balancer.ReClammSwapRounding.onSwap_fixed_virtual_balances_product_non_decreasing",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Balancer/ReClammSwapRounding/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/balancer/reclamm_swap_rounding/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Balancer/ReClammSwapRounding/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Balancer/ReClammSwapRounding/Tasks/OnSwapFixedVirtualBalancesProductNonDecreasing.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that a successful `onSwap` quote preserves or increases the ReClamm product after applying the returned exact-in or exact-out real-balance deltas, with the current virtual balances held fixed. This captures the core \"swaps never round in the trader's favor\" property for the arithmetic branch where Certora I-01-style rounding mistakes occur.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "memory_dynamic_array_scalarized",
        "struct_memory_flattened",
        "library_call_inlined",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Balancer.ReClammSwapRounding.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "cork/pool_solvency/solvency_preserved",
      "task_id": "solvency_preserved",
      "case_id": "cork/pool_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/cork/pool_solvency/tasks/solvency_preserved.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "cork",
      "implementation_id": "phoenix",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Cork-Technology/phoenix@40d9b173c4b2262a93f36167355b5311d5f58e6b:contracts/libraries/PoolLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Cork.PoolSolvency.solvency_preserved",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/cork/pool_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Cork/PoolSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/cork/pool_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Cork/PoolSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Cork/PoolSolvency/Tasks/SolvencyPreserved.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora P-02 solvency invariant for unwindExerciseOther. After the operation, locked collateral normalized to 18 decimals must still cover the outstanding swap share supply. Requires showing that ceiling-rounded collateral added is at least the floor-rounded shares released, via the ceilDiv sandwich bound. Certora timed out on this function and restricted rate/decimals; this proof covers arbitrary parameters.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Cork.PoolSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/deposit_sets_pool_balance",
      "task_id": "deposit_sets_pool_balance",
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/tasks/deposit_sets_pool_balance.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.deposit_sets_pool_balance",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Tasks/DepositSetsPoolBalance.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task checks the direct pool-balance write of the simplified deposit path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/deposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "task_id": "deposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/tasks/deposit_sets_sender_credit.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "balance_credit_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.deposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Tasks/DepositSetsSenderCredit.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task isolates the caller-credit write of the simplified deposit path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/exploit_trace_drains_pool",
      "task_id": "exploit_trace_drains_pool",
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/tasks/exploit_trace_drains_pool.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "exploit_trace",
      "category": "flash-loan",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.exploit_trace_drains_pool",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Tasks/ExploitTraceDrainsPool.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task composes the flash-loan-plus-deposit step with withdraw to expose the bug: a caller that starts with zero credit can still reduce pool ETH by exactly the borrowed amount.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/flash_loan_via_deposit_preserves_pool_balance",
      "task_id": "flash_loan_via_deposit_preserves_pool_balance",
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/tasks/flash_loan_via_deposit_preserves_pool_balance.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_invariant_break",
      "category": "flash-loan",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.flashLoanViaDeposit_preserves_pool_balance",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Tasks/FlashLoanViaDepositPreservesPoolBalance.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task captures the key bug precondition: loan repayment through deposit restores tracked pool ETH even though it also mints withdrawable credit.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/flash_loan_via_deposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "task_id": "flash_loan_via_deposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "case_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/tasks/flash_loan_via_deposit_sets_sender_credit.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "damn_vulnerable_defi",
      "implementation_id": "v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/damn-vulnerable-defi@6797353c7cb5409e3d388e9e8f13954f9bb5f609:contracts/side-entrance/SideEntranceLenderPool.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "balance_credit_update",
      "category": "flash-loan",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.flashLoanViaDeposit_sets_sender_credit",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/damn_vulnerable_defi/side_entrance/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/DamnVulnerableDeFi/SideEntrance/Tasks/FlashLoanViaDepositSetsSenderCredit.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task captures the hidden liability-side effect of the summarized flash loan path: apparent repayment leaves pool ETH unchanged while still minting withdrawable caller credit.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.DamnVulnerableDeFi.SideEntrance.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/chain_start_threshold",
      "task_id": "chain_start_threshold",
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/tasks/chain_start_threshold.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "threshold_activation",
      "category": "bounds",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.full_deposit_starts_chain_at_threshold",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Tasks/ChainStartThreshold.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task focuses on the threshold-triggered state flip after enough full deposits, not on global beacon chain initialization mechanics.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/deposit_count",
      "task_id": "deposit_count",
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/tasks/deposit_count.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "monotonic_counter",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.deposit_increments_deposit_count",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Tasks/DepositCount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the counter increment effect of a successful deposit without exposing the omitted Merkle tree or event machinery.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/full_deposit_increments_full_count",
      "task_id": "full_deposit_increments_full_count",
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/tasks/full_deposit_increments_full_count.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "monotonic_counter",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.full_deposit_increments_full_count",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Tasks/FullDepositIncrementsFullCount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the full-deposit branch: deposits at or above the full threshold must increment the full-deposit counter by one.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/full_deposit_preserves_partial_gap",
      "task_id": "full_deposit_preserves_partial_gap",
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/tasks/full_deposit_preserves_partial_gap.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.full_deposit_preserves_partial_gap",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Tasks/FullDepositPreservesPartialGap.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task treats the difference between all deposits and full deposits as the \"partial deposit\" mass. A full-sized deposit increments both counters in lockstep, so that gap must remain unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/small_deposit_preserves_full_count",
      "task_id": "small_deposit_preserves_full_count",
      "case_id": "ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/tasks/small_deposit_preserves_full_count.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ethereum",
      "implementation_id": "deposit_contract",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/ethereum/deposit_contract@691feb18330d3d102b5a4b3d4434fac7571f51b8:deposit_contract/contracts/validator_registration.v.py",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "threshold_partition",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.small_deposit_preserves_full_count",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ethereum/deposit_contract_minimal/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Ethereum/DepositContractMinimal/Tasks/SmallDepositPreservesFullCount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the non-full-deposit branch: deposits below the full threshold must leave the full-deposit counter unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Ethereum.DepositContractMinimal.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/claim_redeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "claim_redeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/claim_redeem_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.claimRedeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/ClaimRedeemPreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/deposit_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "deposit_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/deposit_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.deposit_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/DepositPreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/handle_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "handle_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/handle_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.handle_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/HandlePreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/redeem_token_gateway_depreciated_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "redeem_token_gateway_depreciated_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/redeem_token_gateway_depreciated_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.redeemTokenGatewayDepreciated_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/RedeemTokenGatewayDepreciatedPreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/report_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "report_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/report_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.report_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/ReportPreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/request_redeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "request_redeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/request_redeem_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.requestRedeem_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/RequestRedeemPreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "forgeyields/global_solvency/transfer_remote_preserves_global_solvency",
      "task_id": "transfer_remote_preserves_global_solvency",
      "case_id": "forgeyields/global_solvency",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/tasks/transfer_remote_preserves_global_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "forgeyields",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0xf1d326d806fa5d0d1f3747505397553cd31b191a#code@etherscan-verified-source:TokenGateway.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "guarded_solvency",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.transferRemote_preserves_global_solvency",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/forgeyields/global_solvency/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/ForgeYields/GlobalSolvency/Tasks/TransferRemotePreservesGlobalSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused TokenGateway accounting proof for the guarded active-mode solvency invariant.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_balance_ghosted",
        "hyperlane_bridge_calls_elided",
        "bytes_report_parsing_decoded"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.ForgeYields.GlobalSolvency.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/fee_payout_bounded_by_fee_free",
      "task_id": "fee_payout_bounded_by_fee_free",
      "case_id": "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/tasks/fee_payout_bounded_by_fee_free.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ipor",
      "implementation_id": "ipor_fusion",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/IPOR-Labs/ipor-fusion/blob/3a83157ee75a7c1752d9151aff43eb92a50cb346/contracts/vaults/PlasmaVault.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "fee_payout_bound",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "low",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.fee_payout_bounded_by_fee_free_task",
      "proof_family": "arithmetic_accounting",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Tasks/FeePayoutBoundedByFeeFree.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/redeem_preserves_pps",
      "task_id": "redeem_preserves_pps",
      "case_id": "ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/tasks/redeem_preserves_pps.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "ipor",
      "implementation_id": "ipor_fusion",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/IPOR-Labs/ipor-fusion/blob/3a83157ee75a7c1752d9151aff43eb92a50cb346/contracts/vaults/PlasmaVault.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "pps_nondecrease",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.redeem_preserves_pps_task",
      "proof_family": "arithmetic_accounting",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/ipor/plasma_vault_redeem_split/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/IPOR/PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit/Tasks/RedeemPreservesPps.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.IPOR.PlasmaVaultRedeemSplit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/draw_interval_matches_weights",
      "task_id": "draw_interval_matches_weights",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/draw_interval_matches_weights.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "weighted_selection",
      "category": "probabilistic-encoding",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.draw_interval_matches_weights",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/DrawIntervalMatchesWeights.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The probabilistic claim is encoded as interval preservation: each leaf owns a contiguous ticket interval whose width equals its weight.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/draw_selects_valid_leaf",
      "task_id": "draw_selects_valid_leaf",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/draw_selects_valid_leaf.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "output_range",
      "category": "bounds",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.draw_selects_valid_leaf",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/DrawSelectsValidLeaf.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task turns the interval-based draw semantics into a concrete range guarantee: every in-range draw must resolve to one of the four leaf indices in the fixed benchmark tree.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/node_id_bijection",
      "task_id": "node_id_bijection",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/node_id_bijection.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "mapping_consistency",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.node_id_bijection",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/NodeIdBijection.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks the explicit two-way correspondence between node indexes and stake-path IDs in the fixed tree slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/parent_equals_sum_of_children",
      "task_id": "parent_equals_sum_of_children",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/parent_equals_sum_of_children.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "tree_conservation",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.parent_equals_sum_of_children",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/ParentEqualsSumOfChildren.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks that each internal node remains the sum of its direct children after a leaf update.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/root_equals_sum_of_leaves",
      "task_id": "root_equals_sum_of_leaves",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/root_equals_sum_of_leaves.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "total_conservation",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.root_equals_sum_of_leaves",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/RootEqualsSumOfLeaves.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks that the root always equals the total stake stored in the leaves of the benchmarked tree slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "kleros/sortition_trees/root_minus_left_equals_right_subtree",
      "task_id": "root_minus_left_equals_right_subtree",
      "case_id": "kleros/sortition_trees",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/tasks/root_minus_left_equals_right_subtree.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "kleros",
      "implementation_id": "kleros_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/kleros/kleros-v2@75125dfa54eee723cac239f20e5746d15786196b:contracts/src/libraries/SortitionTrees.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "subtree_partition",
      "category": "data-structure",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.root_minus_left_equals_right_subtree",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/kleros/sortition_trees/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Kleros/SortitionTrees/Tasks/RootMinusLeftEqualsRightSubtree.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task turns the tree conservation slice into a partition theorem: once the root and parent sums are established, subtracting the left subtree mass from the root must leave exactly the right subtree mass.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Kleros.SortitionTrees.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lagoon/guardrails/exact_compliance",
      "task_id": "exact_compliance",
      "case_id": "lagoon/guardrails",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lagoon/guardrails/tasks/exact_compliance.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "implementation_id": "v0_6_0",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0@a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470:src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "compliance_boundary",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.guardrails_exact_compliance",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lagoon/Guardrails/Tasks/ExactCompliance.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task proves the source-shaped branch predicate under successfulSolidityArithmeticScope: lowerRate is not int256.min, currentPps and timePast are nonzero, and the branch-specific variation multiplications do not overflow Solidity 0.8 checked arithmetic.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lagoon/guardrails/negative_variation_bounded",
      "task_id": "negative_variation_bounded",
      "case_id": "lagoon/guardrails",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lagoon/guardrails/tasks/negative_variation_bounded.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "implementation_id": "v0_6_0",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0@a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470:src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "compliance_boundary",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.guardrails_negative_bounded",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lagoon/Guardrails/Tasks/NegativeVariationBounded.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task proves the negative-variation branch under the same successful Solidity arithmetic scope as the case manifest.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lagoon/guardrails/positive_variation_bounded",
      "task_id": "positive_variation_bounded",
      "case_id": "lagoon/guardrails",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lagoon/guardrails/tasks/positive_variation_bounded.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lagoon",
      "implementation_id": "v0_6_0",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/hopperlabsxyz/lagoon-v0@a8e73f5a5276aa4047b901083cbce127d7f7b470:src/v0.6.0/libraries/GuardrailsLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "compliance_boundary",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.guardrails_positive_bounded",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lagoon/guardrails/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lagoon/Guardrails/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lagoon/Guardrails/Tasks/PositiveVariationBounded.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task proves the positive-variation bounded branch under the same successful Solidity arithmetic scope as the case manifest.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lagoon.Guardrails.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lido/vaulthub_locked/ceildiv_sandwich",
      "task_id": "ceildiv_sandwich",
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/tasks/ceildiv_sandwich.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-lemma",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.ceildiv_sandwich",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Tasks/CeildivSandwich.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Supporting arithmetic lemma for F-01. Proves that ceil(x/d) * d >= x for positive d. This is the key bound that connects the ceiling division in the reserve computation back to the original liability amount.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lido/vaulthub_locked/locked_funds_solvency",
      "task_id": "locked_funds_solvency",
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/tasks/locked_funds_solvency.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.locked_funds_solvency",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Tasks/LockedFundsSolvency.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora finding F-01. The locked amount multiplied by the reserve ratio complement is at least the liability multiplied by total basis points. Requires a case split on whether the reserve-ratio-based reserve or the minimal reserve dominates, plus the ceilDiv sandwich bound and share conversion monotonicity.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lido/vaulthub_locked/max_liability_shares_bound",
      "task_id": "max_liability_shares_bound",
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/tasks/max_liability_shares_bound.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.max_liability_shares_bound",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Tasks/MaxLiabilitySharesBound.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora proven property P-VH-04. maxLiabilityShares is always at least liabilityShares. Used as a supporting lemma for the F-01 solvency proof.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lido/vaulthub_locked/reserve_ratio_bounds",
      "task_id": "reserve_ratio_bounds",
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/tasks/reserve_ratio_bounds.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.reserve_ratio_bounds",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Tasks/ReserveRatioBounds.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora proven property P-VH-03. The reserve ratio in basis points is strictly between 0 and TOTAL_BASIS_POINTS (10000). Used as a supporting lemma for F-01.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "lido/vaulthub_locked/shares_conversion_monotone",
      "task_id": "shares_conversion_monotone",
      "case_id": "lido/vaulthub_locked",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/tasks/shares_conversion_monotone.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "lido",
      "implementation_id": "core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/lidofinance/core@96738395ca3bffd6513700a45d4c9389662c5835:contracts/0.8.25/vaults/VaultHub.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-lemma",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.shares_conversion_monotone",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/lido/vaulthub_locked/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Lido/VaulthubLocked/Tasks/SharesConversionMonotone.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Supporting arithmetic lemma for F-01. Proves that getPooledEthBySharesRoundUp is monotone in the shares argument: if a >= b then the conversion of a is at least the conversion of b. Needed to lift the solvency bound from maxLiabilityShares down to liabilityShares.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Lido.VaulthubLocked.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/sync_sets_book_value",
      "task_id": "sync_sets_book_value",
      "case_id": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/tasks/sync_sets_book_value.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts@ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023:contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_computation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.syncPriceBand_sets_book_value",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Tasks/SyncSetsBookValue.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task proves that the synchronized book value stored on-chain matches the specification formula.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/sync_sets_buy_price",
      "task_id": "sync_sets_buy_price",
      "case_id": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/tasks/sync_sets_buy_price.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts@ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023:contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_computation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.syncPriceBand_sets_buy_price",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Tasks/SyncSetsBuyPrice.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks that the synchronized buy-side quote matches the buffered book-value formula.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/sync_sets_capital",
      "task_id": "sync_sets_capital",
      "case_id": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/tasks/sync_sets_capital.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts@ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023:contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.syncPriceBand_sets_capital",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Tasks/SyncSetsCapital.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks the direct post-state write that synchronizes the stored capital value.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/sync_sets_sell_price",
      "task_id": "sync_sets_sell_price",
      "case_id": "nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/tasks/sync_sets_sell_price.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "nexus_mutual",
      "implementation_id": "smart_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/NexusMutual/smart-contracts@ad212043a78953a2cd98cd02b06c8e3e354c6023:contracts/modules/capital/Ramm.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_computation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.syncPriceBand_sets_sell_price",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/nexus_mutual/ramm_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/NexusMutual/RammPriceBand/Tasks/SyncSetsSellPrice.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks that the synchronized sell-side quote matches the discounted book-value formula.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.NexusMutual.RammPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/delta_compose_internal_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "delta_compose_internal_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/delta_compose_internal_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.delta_compose_internal_erc20_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/DeltaComposeInternalErc20TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the decoded BaseComposer._deltaComposeInternal transfer command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the ERC20 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/delta_compose_internal_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "delta_compose_internal_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/delta_compose_internal_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.delta_compose_internal_permit2_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/DeltaComposeInternalPermit2TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the decoded BaseComposer._deltaComposeInternal permit2 command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the Permit2 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/direct_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "direct_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/direct_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.direct_erc20_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/DirectErc20TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the direct transfer command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the ERC20 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/direct_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "direct_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/direct_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.direct_permit2_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/DirectPermit2TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the direct Permit2 transfer command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the Permit2 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/flash_callback_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "flash_callback_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/flash_callback_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "callback_caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.flash_callback_erc20_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/FlashCallbackErc20TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that an ERC20 transferFrom reached through a modeled flash-loan callback uses the original deltaCompose caller.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/nested_flash_and_swap_callbacks_keep_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "nested_flash_and_swap_callbacks_keep_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/nested_flash_and_swap_callbacks_keep_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "nested_callback_caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.nested_flash_and_swap_callbacks_keep_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/NestedFlashAndSwapCallbacksKeepOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves one modeled batch containing a direct ERC20 pull, a flash-callback ERC20 pull, and a swap-callback Permit2 pull keeps all sources equal to the outer deltaCompose caller.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/swap_callback_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "swap_callback_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/swap_callback_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "callback_caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.swap_callback_permit2_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/SwapCallbackPermit2TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that a Permit2 transferFrom reached through a modeled swap callback uses the original deltaCompose caller.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/transfers_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "transfers_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/transfers_erc20_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.transfers_erc20_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/TransfersErc20TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the decoded Transfers._transfers transfer command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the ERC20 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/transfers_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "transfers_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/transfers_permit2_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.transfers_permit2_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/TransfersPermit2TransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the decoded Transfers._transfers permit2 command records the outer deltaCompose sender as the Permit2 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity/v3_callback_direct_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "task_id": "v3_callback_direct_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller",
      "case_id": "onedelta/caller_address_integrity",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/tasks/v3_callback_direct_transfer_from_uses_outer_caller.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "onedelta",
      "implementation_id": "ethereum-composer",
      "source_ref": "https://www.codeslaw.app/contracts/ethereum/0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba@verified-source-0x97648606fcc22bd96f87345ac83bd6cfcdf0acba:contracts/1delta/composer/chains/ethereum/Composer.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "access_control_identity",
      "category": "callback_direct_pull_caller_address_integrity",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.v3_callback_direct_transferFrom_uses_outer_caller",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/onedelta/caller_address_integrity/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OneDelta/CallerAddressIntegrity/Tasks/V3CallbackDirectTransferFromUsesOuterCaller.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the Uniswap V3-style callback shortcut for calldataLength == 0 uses the outer caller as the ERC20 transferFrom source.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OneDelta.CallerAddressIntegrity.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_claim_marks_both_claimed",
      "task_id": "both_claim_marks_both_claimed",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_claim_marks_both_claimed.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_marks_both_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothClaimMarksBothClaimed.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task checks that the combined entry point marks the caller as claimed for both tokens on the successful path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "task_id": "both_claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_claim_updates_round_claimed.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_updates_round_claimed",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothClaimUpdatesRoundClaimed.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the paired round-level accounting increments induced by the combined claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "task_id": "both_claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_claim_updates_total_allocated.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_updates_total_allocated",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothClaimUpdatesTotalAllocated.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the paired decreases in remaining USDC and WETH allocations along the combined claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "task_id": "both_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothClaimedPlusAllocatedConserved.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task composes the paired USDC and WETH accounting updates from `claimBoth` into a two-token conservation theorem.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_matches_independent_claims",
      "task_id": "both_matches_independent_claims",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_matches_independent_claims.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "noninterference",
      "category": "equivalence",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_matches_independent_claims",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothMatchesIndependentClaims.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task proves the non-interference property for the combined entry point: the USDC slice matches `claimUsdc` alone and the WETH slice matches `claimWeth` alone.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_no_overclaim",
      "task_id": "both_no_overclaim",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_no_overclaim.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_preserves_round_bounds",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothNoOverclaim.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task captures the two-token round-balance bounds after a successful `claimBoth` call inside the benchmark's simplified single-round model.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_usdc_bound_violation_rejected",
      "task_id": "both_usdc_bound_violation_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_usdc_bound_violation_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "revert",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_reverts_if_usdc_exceeds_total",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothUsdcBoundViolationRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the USDC round-total bound inside `claimBoth` and proves that an overclaim attempt aborts the whole call without state mutation.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_usdc_double_claim_rejected",
      "task_id": "both_usdc_double_claim_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_usdc_double_claim_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "revert",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_reverts_if_usdc_already_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothUsdcDoubleClaimRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the first guard in `claimBoth` and proves that an already claimed USDC entitlement aborts the whole call without state mutation.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_weth_bound_violation_rejected",
      "task_id": "both_weth_bound_violation_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_weth_bound_violation_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "revert",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_reverts_if_weth_exceeds_total",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothWethBoundViolationRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task proves that a WETH-side bound failure causes `claimBoth` to revert and roll back the earlier USDC sub-claim.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/both_weth_double_claim_rejected",
      "task_id": "both_weth_double_claim_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/both_weth_double_claim_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "revert",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimBoth_reverts_if_weth_already_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BothWethDoubleClaimRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task proves that a WETH-side repeat claim causes `claimBoth` to revert and roll back the earlier USDC sub-claim.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/bound_violation_rejected",
      "task_id": "bound_violation_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/bound_violation_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "bounds",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_reverts_if_exceeds_total",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/BoundViolationRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task isolates the round-total bound check and proves that an overclaiming attempt reverts without mutating the benchmark state.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/claim_marks_user",
      "task_id": "claim_marks_user",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/claim_marks_user.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_marks_user_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/ClaimMarksUser.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task checks the claimed flag update in isolation from Merkle validation and ERC20 transfer side effects.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "task_id": "claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/claim_updates_round_claimed.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_updates_round_claimed",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/ClaimUpdatesRoundClaimed.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the direct round-level accounting increment on the successful claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "task_id": "claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/claim_updates_total_allocated.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_updates_total_allocated",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/ClaimUpdatesTotalAllocated.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the compensating decrease in remaining allocated USDC on the successful claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "task_id": "claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/claimed_plus_allocated_conserved.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/ClaimedPlusAllocatedConserved.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task composes the claim path's two accounting updates into a single conservation theorem: claimed USDC increases by exactly the amount removed from total allocated USDC in the benchmark's single-round slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/double_claim_rejected",
      "task_id": "double_claim_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/double_claim_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_reverts_if_already_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/DoubleClaimRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task isolates the repeated-claim guard and proves that a rejected second claim leaves the benchmark state unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/no_overclaim",
      "task_id": "no_overclaim",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/no_overclaim.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_preserves_round_bound",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/NoOverclaim.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task captures the round-level accounting bound after a claim while staying inside the benchmark's simplified single-round model.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/usdc_preserves_weth_state",
      "task_id": "usdc_preserves_weth_state",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/usdc_preserves_weth_state.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "frame_property",
      "category": "isolation",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimUsdc_preserves_weth_state",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/UsdcPreservesWethState.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the frame condition for the USDC claim path and shows that the WETH accounting slice remains untouched.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_bound_violation_rejected",
      "task_id": "weth_bound_violation_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_bound_violation_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "bounds",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_reverts_if_exceeds_total",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethBoundViolationRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task isolates the WETH round-total bound check and proves that an overclaiming attempt reverts without mutating the benchmark state.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_claim_marks_user",
      "task_id": "weth_claim_marks_user",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_claim_marks_user.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_marks_user_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethClaimMarksUser.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task checks the WETH claimed-flag update in isolation from Merkle validation and ERC20 transfer side effects.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "task_id": "weth_claim_updates_round_claimed",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_claim_updates_round_claimed.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_updates_round_claimed",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethClaimUpdatesRoundClaimed.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the direct round-level WETH accounting increment on the successful claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "task_id": "weth_claim_updates_total_allocated",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_claim_updates_total_allocated.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_update",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_updates_total_allocated",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethClaimUpdatesTotalAllocated.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the compensating decrease in remaining allocated WETH on the successful claim path.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "task_id": "weth_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_claimed_plus_allocated_conserved",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethClaimedPlusAllocatedConserved.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task composes the WETH claim path's two accounting updates into a single conservation theorem in the benchmark's single-round slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_double_claim_rejected",
      "task_id": "weth_double_claim_rejected",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_double_claim_rejected.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_reverts_if_already_claimed",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethDoubleClaimRejected.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task isolates the repeated WETH-claim guard and proves that a rejected second claim leaves the benchmark state unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_no_overclaim",
      "task_id": "weth_no_overclaim",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_no_overclaim.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_preserves_round_bound",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethNoOverclaim.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The task captures the round-level WETH accounting bound after a claim while staying inside the benchmark's simplified single-round model.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/weth_preserves_usdc_state",
      "task_id": "weth_preserves_usdc_state",
      "case_id": "paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/tasks/weth_preserves_usdc_state.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "paladin_votes",
      "implementation_id": "stream_recovery_claim",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Figu3/sonic-earn-recovery-system@699cbbc79def374cab9739e451acbbf866293d12:src/StreamRecoveryClaim.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "frame_property",
      "category": "isolation",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.claimWeth_preserves_usdc_state",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/paladin_votes/stream_recovery_claim_usdc/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/PaladinVotes/StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc/Tasks/WethPreservesUsdcState.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the frame condition for the WETH claim path and shows that the USDC accounting slice remains untouched.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.PaladinVotes.StreamRecoveryClaimUsdc.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "piku/fund_conservation/amount_paid_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "task_id": "amount_paid_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "case_id": "piku/fund_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/piku/fund_conservation/tasks/amount_paid_preserves_fund_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts@8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588:src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "fund_conservation",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.amountPaid_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Piku/FundConservation/Tasks/AmountPaidPreservesFundConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves conservation for queue payment execution once queued collateral is split between the recipient and protocol treasury.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "erc20_transfers_abstracted",
        "protocol_fee_recalculation_abstracted"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "piku/fund_conservation/amount_paid_records_distribution",
      "task_id": "amount_paid_records_distribution",
      "case_id": "piku/fund_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/piku/fund_conservation/tasks/amount_paid_records_distribution.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts@8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588:src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_effect",
      "category": "fund_conservation",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.amountPaid_records_distribution",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Piku/FundConservation/Tasks/AmountPaidRecordsDistribution.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Records the local accounting effect of queue settlement: queued redemption backing is split into user distribution and protocol treasury buckets.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "erc20_transfers_abstracted",
        "protocol_fee_recalculation_abstracted"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "piku/fund_conservation/sell_order_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "task_id": "sell_order_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "case_id": "piku/fund_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/piku/fund_conservation/tasks/sell_order_preserves_fund_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts@8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588:src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "fund_conservation",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation._sellOrder_preserves_fund_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Piku/FundConservation/Tasks/SellOrderPreservesFundConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves conservation for redemption-order creation under an explicit fee split arithmetic hypothesis. Ghost accounting slots expose event-only fee and distribution effects.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "event_only_fee_accounting_requires_ghost_slot",
        "ghost_solvency_precondition"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "piku/fund_conservation/sell_order_records_redemption_buckets",
      "task_id": "sell_order_records_redemption_buckets",
      "case_id": "piku/fund_conservation",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/piku/fund_conservation/tasks/sell_order_records_redemption_buckets.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "piku",
      "implementation_id": "inverter_oracle_queue",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/InverterNetwork/contracts@8b7bc438344d646bab05b751c8eb4a7f0c8ca588:src/modules/fundingManager/oracle/FM_PC_Oracle_Redeeming_v1.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_effect",
      "category": "fund_conservation",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation._sellOrder_records_redemption_buckets",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/piku/fund_conservation/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Piku/FundConservation/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Piku/FundConservation/Tasks/SellOrderRecordsRedemptionBuckets.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Records the local accounting effect of redemption-order creation: backing moves from the remaining bucket into queued redemption and project-fee buckets.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "event_only_fee_accounting_requires_ghost_slot",
        "ghost_solvency_precondition"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Piku.FundConservation.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polaris/bonding_curve/buy_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "task_id": "buy_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "case_id": "bonding_curve",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/tasks/buy_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve@540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0:src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "reserve_state_transition",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.buy_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero_task",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polaris/BondingCurve/Tasks/buy_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polaris/bonding_curve/floor_sell_and_burn_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "task_id": "floor_sell_and_burn_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "case_id": "bonding_curve",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/tasks/floor_sell_and_burn_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve@540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0:src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "reserve_state_transition",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.floor_sell_and_burn_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero_task",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polaris/BondingCurve/Tasks/floor_sell_and_burn_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polaris/bonding_curve/init_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "task_id": "init_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "case_id": "bonding_curve",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/tasks/init_reserve_ratio_zero.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve@540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0:src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "reserve_state_transition",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.init_reserve_ratio_zero_task",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polaris/BondingCurve/Tasks/init_reserve_ratio_zero.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polaris/bonding_curve/sell_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "task_id": "sell_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero",
      "case_id": "bonding_curve",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/tasks/sell_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polaris",
      "implementation_id": "bonding_curve",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Polaris-Finance/bonding-curve@540c4ba5d0b86c0f42399d214f02120f3f8719b0:src/BaseBondingCurve.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "reserve_state_transition",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.sell_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero_task",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polaris/bonding_curve/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polaris/BondingCurve/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polaris/BondingCurve/Tasks/sell_preserves_reserve_ratio_zero.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": null,
      "abstraction_notes": "",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polaris.BondingCurve.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polygon/agglayer_bridge/claimAsset_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "task_id": "claimAsset_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "case_id": "polygon/agglayer_bridge",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/tasks/claimAsset_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polygon",
      "implementation_id": "agglayer_bridge",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/agglayer/agglayer-contracts@110bda5a03e70ee7331bc06407a8e79226d3e520:contracts/AgglayerBridge.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.claimAsset_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Tasks/claimAsset_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Asset claims are proved to validate the modeled leaf against an accepted global exit root and consume the source-network/leaf-index bitmap nullifier. A private reachability lemma feeds the shared helper-consumption theorem.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "polygon/agglayer_bridge/claimMessage_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "task_id": "claimMessage_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "case_id": "polygon/agglayer_bridge",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/tasks/claimMessage_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "polygon",
      "implementation_id": "agglayer_bridge",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/agglayer/agglayer-contracts@110bda5a03e70ee7331bc06407a8e79226d3e520:contracts/AgglayerBridge.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "authorization_state",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.claimMessage_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/polygon/agglayer_bridge/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Polygon/AgglayerBridge/Tasks/claimMessage_valid_leaf_and_consumes_unique_nullifier.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Message claims are proved to validate the modeled leaf against an accepted global exit root and consume the source-network/leaf-index bitmap nullifier. A private reachability lemma feeds the shared helper-consumption theorem.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Polygon.AgglayerBridge.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "reserve/auction_price_band/price_at_end_time",
      "task_id": "price_at_end_time",
      "case_id": "reserve/auction_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/tasks/price_at_end_time.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs@14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267:contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_computation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.price_at_end_time",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Tasks/PriceAtEndTime.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Boundary exactness at endTime: when the auction has reached its end timestamp and the auction is not atomic-swap, `_price` returns the launcher-published endPrice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "reserve/auction_price_band/price_at_start_time",
      "task_id": "price_at_start_time",
      "case_id": "reserve/auction_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/tasks/price_at_start_time.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs@14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267:contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_computation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.price_at_start_time",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Tasks/PriceAtStartTime.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Boundary exactness at startTime: `_price` returns the launcher-published startPrice when the auction has just opened.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "reserve/auction_price_band/price_lower_bound",
      "task_id": "price_lower_bound",
      "case_id": "reserve/auction_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/tasks/price_lower_bound.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs@14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267:contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_band",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.price_lower_bound",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Tasks/PriceLowerBound.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Lower band: `endPrice \u2264 price` for any timestamp. The interior branch is closed by the explicit `if (p < endPrice) p = endPrice` clamp; the boundary branches are closed via the `hBand` precondition.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "reserve/auction_price_band/price_upper_bound",
      "task_id": "price_upper_bound",
      "case_id": "reserve/auction_price_band",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/tasks/price_upper_bound.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "reserve",
      "implementation_id": "dtfs",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/reserve-protocol/dtfs@14f75d18856d587adfaff24e77e5b20dda7c7267:contracts/utils/RebalancingLib.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "price_band",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.price_upper_bound",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/reserve/auction_price_band/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Reserve/AuctionPriceBand/Tasks/PriceUpperBound.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Upper band: `price \u2264 startPrice` for any timestamp. Discharged via the axiom `MathLib_exp_nonpositive_le_D18` (declared in Contract.lean) plus the `mulDivUp_le_self_of_le` ceil-division lemma proven inline in Proofs.lean.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Reserve.AuctionPriceBand.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/deposit_peg_out_registers_required_amount",
      "task_id": "deposit_peg_out_registers_required_amount",
      "case_id": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/tasks/deposit_peg_out_registers_required_amount.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "implementation_id": "flyover-lbc",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract@88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9:src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "lifecycle_accounting",
      "category": "bridge_quote_lifecycle",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.depositPegOut_registers_required_amount",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Tasks/DepositPegOutRegistersRequiredAmount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the successful deposit path records the required quote amount, deposit timestamp, LP recipient, user-refund recipient, and user-refund expiry fields after checked-addition guards and dust/change-refund handling. Signature, provider, and quote-hash validation are outside this proof task and handled as benchmark scope assumptions.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "bytes32_quote_hash_modeled_as_address_key",
        "struct_calldata_flattened",
        "external_bridge_calls_as_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/refund_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount",
      "task_id": "refund_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount",
      "case_id": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/tasks/refund_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "implementation_id": "flyover-lbc",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract@88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9:src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "lifecycle_accounting",
      "category": "bridge_quote_lifecycle",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.refundPegOut_conserves_quote_amount",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Tasks/RefundPegOutConservesQuoteAmount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the successful LP refund path completes and clears a registered quote, assigns the registered amount either to the stored LP recipient transfer witness or that recipient's fallback balance, and records the external collateral slash-call amount when the computed timing predicate penalizes the LP.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "bytes32_quote_hash_modeled_as_address_key",
        "external_bridge_calls_as_preconditions",
        "external_value_transfer_as_boolean",
        "external_collateral_slash_call_as_witness"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/refund_user_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount",
      "task_id": "refund_user_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount",
      "case_id": "rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/tasks/refund_user_peg_out_conserves_quote_amount.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "rootstock",
      "implementation_id": "flyover-lbc",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/rsksmart/liquidity-bridge-contract@88a6d1ad64aeb3ad24e01042f4211ad8649784b9:src/PegOutContract.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "lifecycle_accounting",
      "category": "bridge_quote_lifecycle",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.refundUserPegOut_conserves_quote_amount",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/rootstock/flyover_quote_lifecycle/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Rootstock/FlyoverQuoteLifecycle/Tasks/RefundUserPegOutConservesQuoteAmount.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the successful expired user refund path completes and clears a registered quote, assigns the registered amount either to the stored user refund recipient transfer witness or that recipient's fallback balance, and records the external collateral slash-call amount with the quote penalty.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "bytes32_quote_hash_modeled_as_address_key",
        "external_bridge_calls_as_preconditions",
        "external_value_transfer_as_boolean",
        "external_collateral_slash_call_as_witness"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Rootstock.FlyoverQuoteLifecycle.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/add_owner_acyclicity",
      "task_id": "add_owner_acyclicity",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/add_owner_acyclicity.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_acyclicity",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.addOwner_acyclicity",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/AddOwnerAcyclicity.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proving acyclicity preservation under addOwner would eliminate the hAcyclic axiom from the existing inListReachable proof, making the overall verification stronger.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/add_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "task_id": "add_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/add_owner_is_owner_correctness.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "isOwner_effect",
      "category": "correctness",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.addOwner_isOwnerCorrectness",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/AddOwnerIsOwnerCorrectness.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Functional correctness of addOwner: the new address becomes an owner (isOwner s' owner) and all other addresses' ownership is unchanged. This corresponds to Certora's addOwnerEffect rule.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/add_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "task_id": "add_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/add_owner_owner_list_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.addOwner_ownerListInvariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/AddOwnerOwnerListInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Combined ownerListInvariant preservation under addOwner. The ownerListInvariant merges inListReachable and reachableInList into a biconditional: membership is equivalent to reachability from SENTINEL.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/in_list_reachable",
      "task_id": "in_list_reachable",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/in_list_reachable.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.in_list_reachable",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/InListReachable.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora inListReachable invariant preservation under addOwnerWithThreshold. The proof requires witness-chain construction: showing that every node reachable in the pre-state remains reachable in the post-state after inserting a new owner at the head of the linked list. Requires acyclicity and freshness hypotheses to lift pre-state chains.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/remove_owner_acyclicity",
      "task_id": "remove_owner_acyclicity",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/remove_owner_acyclicity.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_acyclicity",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.removeOwner_acyclicity",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/RemoveOwnerAcyclicity.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Acyclicity preservation under removeOwner. Removing a node shortens the chain by one element without introducing SENTINEL into any chain.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/remove_owner_in_list_reachable",
      "task_id": "remove_owner_in_list_reachable",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/remove_owner_in_list_reachable.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.removeOwner_inListReachable",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/RemoveOwnerInListReachable.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora inListReachable invariant preservation under removeOwner. The proof requires showing that unlinking a node from the list preserves reachability for all remaining nodes. Chains through the removed node must be adapted by splicing it out.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/remove_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "task_id": "remove_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/remove_owner_is_owner_correctness.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "isOwner_effect",
      "category": "correctness",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.removeOwner_isOwnerCorrectness",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/RemoveOwnerIsOwnerCorrectness.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Functional correctness of removeOwner: the removed address is no longer an owner (\u00acisOwner s' owner) and all other addresses' ownership is unchanged. This corresponds to Certora's removeOwnerEffect rule.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/remove_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "task_id": "remove_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/remove_owner_owner_list_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.removeOwner_ownerListInvariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/RemoveOwnerOwnerListInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Combined ownerListInvariant preservation under removeOwner. Requires showing that unlinking one node preserves the biconditional between membership and reachability from SENTINEL.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/setup_owners_acyclicity",
      "task_id": "setup_owners_acyclicity",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/setup_owners_acyclicity.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_acyclicity",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.setupOwners_acyclicity",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SetupOwnersAcyclicity.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Base case: setupOwners establishes acyclicity of the owner linked list. The constructed list has no internal cycles by construction.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/setup_owners_in_list_reachable",
      "task_id": "setup_owners_in_list_reachable",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/setup_owners_in_list_reachable.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.setupOwners_inListReachable",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SetupOwnersInListReachable.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Base case: setupOwners establishes the inListReachable invariant. No pre-state invariant required. The proof constructs explicit witness chains for the known list structure SENTINEL \u2192 o1 \u2192 o2 \u2192 o3 \u2192 SENTINEL.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/setup_owners_owner_list_invariant",
      "task_id": "setup_owners_owner_list_invariant",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/setup_owners_owner_list_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.setupOwners_ownerListInvariant",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SetupOwnersOwnerListInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "setupOwners establishes the combined ownerListInvariant (base case). After initialization, the linked list SENTINEL -> o1 -> o2 -> o3 -> SENTINEL satisfies both directions of the biconditional.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/swap_owner_acyclicity",
      "task_id": "swap_owner_acyclicity",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/swap_owner_acyclicity.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_acyclicity",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.swapOwner_acyclicity",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SwapOwnerAcyclicity.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Acyclicity preservation under swapOwner. The acyclic property is proven state-independently via acyclic_generic, so swapOwner cannot break it.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/swap_owner_in_list_reachable",
      "task_id": "swap_owner_in_list_reachable",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/swap_owner_in_list_reachable.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.swapOwner_inListReachable",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SwapOwnerInListReachable.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Certora inListReachable invariant preservation under swapOwner. The proof requires showing that atomically replacing one node with another preserves reachability. The new node inherits the old node's successor, so chains are re-spliced in place.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/swap_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "task_id": "swap_owner_is_owner_correctness",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/swap_owner_is_owner_correctness.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "isOwner_effect",
      "category": "correctness",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.swapOwner_isOwnerCorrectness",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SwapOwnerIsOwnerCorrectness.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Functional correctness of swapOwner: the old owner is removed (\u00acisOwner s' oldOwner), the new owner is added (isOwner s' newOwner), and all other addresses' ownership is unchanged. This corresponds to Certora's swapOwnerEffect rule.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "safe/owner_manager_reach/swap_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "task_id": "swap_owner_owner_list_invariant",
      "case_id": "safe/owner_manager_reach",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/tasks/swap_owner_owner_list_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "safe",
      "implementation_id": "smart_account",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/safe-global/safe-smart-account@a2e19c6aa42a45ceec68057f3fa387f169c5b321:contracts/base/OwnerManager.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "linked_list_invariant",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.swapOwner_ownerListInvariant",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/safe/owner_manager_reach/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Safe/OwnerManagerReach/Tasks/SwapOwnerOwnerListInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Combined ownerListInvariant preservation under swapOwner. Requires showing that atomically replacing one owner with another preserves the biconditional between membership and reachability from SENTINEL.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Safe.OwnerManagerReach.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "term_finance/term_auction_clearing/clearing_assignment_correct",
      "task_id": "clearing_assignment_correct",
      "case_id": "term_finance/term_auction_clearing",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/term_finance/term_auction_clearing/tasks/clearing_assignment_correct.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "term_finance",
      "implementation_id": "term_finance_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/term-finance/term-finance-contracts/blob/127b74d871fc74e3a03d6d3b0f1fafe7e5d10275/contracts/TermAuction.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_and_rate_guard",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.TermFinance.TermAuctionClearing.clearing_assignment_correct_task",
      "proof_family": "auction_clearing_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "proof",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/term_finance/term_auction_clearing/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/TermFinance/TermAuctionClearing/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/term_finance/term_auction_clearing/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/TermFinance/TermAuctionClearing/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/TermFinance/TermAuctionClearing/Tasks/ClearingAssignmentCorrect.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Assignment-only slice over a valid clearing point. The reference proof closes by induction over the residual bid and offer sweeps. Sortedness is retained as the production input-boundary hypothesis, but the assignment proof itself is order-insensitive after eligible demand/supply capacity is assumed.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.TermFinance.TermAuctionClearing.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "blocked",
        "reference_solution": "blocked"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment/swap_debt_token_to_xt_updates_virtual_xt_reserve",
      "task_id": "swap_debt_token_to_xt_updates_virtual_xt_reserve",
      "case_id": "termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment/tasks/swap_debt_token_to_xt_updates_virtual_xt_reserve.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "termmax",
      "implementation_id": "contracts_v2",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/term-structure/termmax-contract-v2@64bd47b98e064c7fb91ab4a59b70520e0ec285d5:contracts/v2/TermMaxOrderV2.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "reserve_state_transition",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.TermMax.OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment.swapDebtTokenToXt_updates_virtual_xt_reserve",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/TermMax/OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/termmax/order_v2_buy_xt_single_segment/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/TermMax/OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/TermMax/OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment/Tasks/SwapDebtTokenToXtUpdatesVirtualXtReserve.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Single-segment slice of the exact-input `debtToken -> XT` path. The theorem proves only the pricing-state transition: successful execution stores `virtualXtReserve_before - deltaXt_curve`.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "array_of_struct_param_unsupported",
        "higher_order_function_param_specialized"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.TermMax.OrderV2BuyXtSingleSegment.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "usual/dao_collateral/redeem_conservation",
      "task_id": "redeem_conservation",
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/tasks/redeem_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "stablecoin_collateral_accounting",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.redeem_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Usual/DaoCollateral/Tasks/RedeemConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that a successful direct `redeem` decreases ghosted USD0 supply by the user amount net of the explicitly reminted non-CBR fee, and debits treasury ghost collateral by the exact returned amount computed from net burned USD0, oracle price, supported token decimals `0..18`, CBR state, and floor rounding. Successful-call hypotheses expose fee bounds, checked arithmetic, supported token unit, and ghost collateral sufficiency.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_calls_ghosted",
        "oracle_reads_parameterized",
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "usual/dao_collateral/redeem_fee_formula",
      "task_id": "redeem_fee_formula",
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/tasks/redeem_fee_formula.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "arithmetic_rounding",
      "category": "stablecoin_collateral_accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.redeem_fee_formula",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Usual/DaoCollateral/Tasks/RedeemFeeFormula.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the fee helper used by redeem matches the configured basis-point fee and the supported-token-decimal normalization path modeled from `_calculateFee`.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "usual/dao_collateral/redeem_return_formula",
      "task_id": "redeem_return_formula",
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/tasks/redeem_return_formula.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "arithmetic_rounding",
      "category": "stablecoin_collateral_accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.redeem_return_formula",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Usual/DaoCollateral/Tasks/RedeemReturnFormula.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves the returned collateral value is exactly the modeled formula: floor((stableAmount - fee) * tokenUnit / price), with the CBR coefficient applied by floor multiplication when CBR is active, under successful-call arithmetic, supported token-unit, and configuration-bound hypotheses.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "oracle_reads_parameterized",
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "checked_uint256_overflow_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "usual/dao_collateral/swap_conservation",
      "task_id": "swap_conservation",
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/tasks/swap_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "stablecoin_collateral_accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.swap_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Usual/DaoCollateral/Tasks/SwapConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Proves that a successful direct `swap` computes the oracle quote from explicit price and supported token-unit inputs, increases ghosted USD0 supply by that computed quote, and credits the ghost treasury-collateral ledger by the exact RWA amount received, under explicit successful-call assumptions for nonzero computed quote, uint128 amount bound, supported token unit, and checked addition.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_calls_ghosted",
        "oracle_reads_parameterized",
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "usual/dao_collateral/swap_value_conservation",
      "task_id": "swap_value_conservation",
      "case_id": "usual/dao_collateral",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/usual/dao_collateral/tasks/swap_value_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "usual",
      "implementation_id": "verified_proxy",
      "source_ref": "https://etherscan.io/address/0x0eec861d49f15f585d6bb4301fc4f89bce22af4e#code",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "stablecoin_collateral_accounting",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.swap_value_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/usual/dao_collateral/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Usual/DaoCollateral/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Usual/DaoCollateral/Tasks/SwapValueConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Strengthens local swap state preservation by removing the free quote parameter from the modeled transition. The theorem requires a supported `10 ** decimals` token unit for collateral decimals `0..18` and successful-call arithmetic hypotheses, then proves the minted USD0 delta equals the quote computed inside the model: floor(collateralAmount * price / tokenUnit).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "external_erc20_calls_ghosted",
        "oracle_reads_parameterized",
        "supported_token_unit_preconditions",
        "successful_call_preconditions"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Usual.DaoCollateral.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety/positive_borrow_preserves_required_liquidity",
      "task_id": "positive_borrow_preserves_required_liquidity",
      "case_id": "wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety/tasks/positive_borrow_preserves_required_liquidity.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "wildcat",
      "implementation_id": "v2_protocol",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/wildcat-finance/v2-protocol@a70f297fbd1b1ab597e0e9a3458a2d13a34b4657:src/market/WildcatMarket.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Wildcat.BorrowLiquiditySafety.positive_borrow_preserves_required_liquidity",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Wildcat/BorrowLiquiditySafety/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/wildcat/borrow_liquidity_safety/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Wildcat/BorrowLiquiditySafety/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Wildcat/BorrowLiquiditySafety/Tasks/PositiveBorrowPreservesRequiredLiquidity.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Focused Wildcat V2 borrow/liquidity benchmark. The state update is compressed to a protocol-fee delta while the borrow theorem still reasons about the updated liquidity requirement that includes reserve-ratio-backed outstanding supply, pending withdrawals, normalized unclaimed withdrawals, and accrued protocol fees.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Wildcat.BorrowLiquiditySafety.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/burn_decreases_supply",
      "task_id": "burn_decreases_supply",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/burn_decreases_supply.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "supply_update",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.burn_decreases_supply",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/BurnDecreasesSupply.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "When the sender has sufficient balance, burning decreases both the sender's balance and totalSupply by exactly amount.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/burn_insufficient",
      "task_id": "burn_insufficient",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/burn_insufficient.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "silent_failure",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.burn_insufficient",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/BurnInsufficient.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "When the holder has insufficient balance, burn silently burns 0 tokens instead of reverting. Both holder balance and totalSupply remain unchanged. Same FHE.select mechanism as transfer \u2014 the balance comparison cannot leak information through the control flow.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/mint_increases_supply",
      "task_id": "mint_increases_supply",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/mint_increases_supply.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "supply_update",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.mint_increases_supply",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/MintIncreasesSupply.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "When totalSupply + amount does not overflow uint64, minting increases both totalSupply and the receiver's balance by exactly amount.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/mint_overflow_protection",
      "task_id": "mint_overflow_protection",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/mint_overflow_protection.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "overflow_safety",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.mint_overflow_protection",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/MintOverflowProtection.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "When totalSupply + amount would overflow uint64, FHESafeMath.tryIncrease detects it (newValue < oldValue after wrapping) and returns the original supply unchanged. No tokens are minted.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/setOperator_updates",
      "task_id": "setOperator_updates",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/setOperator_updates.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.setOperator_updates",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/SetOperatorUpdates.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "setOperator writes into the nested operator mapping at key (msg.sender, operator). The theorem proves both the positive effect (the target entry is updated) and frame preservation (all other entries unchanged).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transferFrom_conservation",
      "task_id": "transferFrom_conservation",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transferFrom_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "balance_conservation",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transferFrom_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferFromConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Operator-gated transferFrom preserves the sum balances[holder] + balances[recipient]. The operator expiry is read from the nested mapping _operators[holder][msg.sender] using getMapping2. Authorization is granted if holder == msg.sender or block.timestamp <= expiry (passed as a parameter since Verity's verity_contract DSL does not expose blockTimestamp as a bind source).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transfer_conservation",
      "task_id": "transfer_conservation",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transfer_conservation.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "balance_conservation",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transfer_conservation",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferConservation.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The fundamental accounting invariant: the sum of sender and receiver balances is preserved by a transfer, regardless of whether the sender has sufficient balance. This holds because tryDecrease either subtracts amount (and adds it to receiver) or leaves both unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transfer_insufficient",
      "task_id": "transfer_insufficient",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transfer_insufficient.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "silent_failure",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transfer_insufficient",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferInsufficient.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "The defining semantic of ERC-7984 vs ERC-20: when the sender has insufficient balance, the transfer silently transfers 0 instead of reverting. Both sender and receiver balances remain unchanged.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transfer_no_balance_revert",
      "task_id": "transfer_no_balance_revert",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transfer_no_balance_revert.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "non_leakage",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transfer_no_balance_revert",
      "proof_family": "protocol_transition_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferNoBalanceRevert.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Contract-level non-leakage: the transfer function never reverts based on the encrypted balance comparison. Only plaintext checks (zero address, uninitialized balance) can cause reverts. This ensures an on-chain observer cannot distinguish sufficient from insufficient transfers by observing transaction success/failure. Combined with FHE encryption of the return value and emitted events, this provides confidentiality of transfer outcomes.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transfer_preserves_supply",
      "task_id": "transfer_preserves_supply",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transfer_preserves_supply.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "supply_invariance",
      "category": "invariant",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transfer_preserves_supply",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferPreservesSupply.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Transfer does not touch totalSupply. Only mint and burn paths in _update modify slot 0.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token/transfer_sufficient",
      "task_id": "transfer_sufficient",
      "case_id": "zama/erc7984_confidential_token",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/tasks/transfer_sufficient.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zama",
      "implementation_id": "confidential_contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-confidential-contracts@83364738f0d2b1655c60627588e3493099c359f7:contracts/token/ERC7984/ERC7984.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "balance_update",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.transfer_sufficient",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "partial",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zama/erc7984_confidential_token/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zama/ERC7984ConfidentialToken/Tasks/TransferSufficient.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "When the sender has sufficient balance (fromBalance >= amount), the transfer moves exactly amount tokens: fromBalance decreases by amount, toBalance increases by amount (mod 2^64).",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zama.ERC7984ConfidentialToken.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/metadata_bridge",
      "task_id": "metadata_bridge",
      "case_id": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/tasks/metadata_bridge.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "implementation_id": "roles-v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles@172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6:packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "calldata_decoder_metadata",
      "category": "authorization_decoder",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.metadata_bridge",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Tasks/MetadataBridge.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "Checks the bridge between Roles decoder metadata and ABI staticness/static byte size for the focused ABI tree model. The reference proof is discharged structurally over the ABI type tree; the flat ConditionFlat parent-pointer traversal and pack/unpack integrity bridge remain manifest-level hypotheses.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "condition_packer_integrity_roundtrip_assumed"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/roles_decoder_bounds_safe",
      "task_id": "roles_decoder_bounds_safe",
      "case_id": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/tasks/roles_decoder_bounds_safe.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "implementation_id": "roles-v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles@172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6:packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "calldata_decoder_bounds",
      "category": "authorization_decoder",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.roles_decoder_bounds_safe",
      "proof_family": "authorization_enablement",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Tasks/RolesDecoderBoundsSafe.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "States that every successful Roles decoder byte region emitted at the ConditionEvaluator.__input extraction boundary lies inside calldata, with malformed guarded reads and non-forward or out-of-range tail offsets mapped to overflow in the focused model. The reference proof is discharged by induction over the fuel-bounded Roles walker.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "condition_packer_integrity_roundtrip_assumed"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/roles_decoder_faithful",
      "task_id": "roles_decoder_faithful",
      "case_id": "zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness",
      "suite": "active",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/tasks/roles_decoder_faithful.yaml",
      "split": "active",
      "family_id": "zodiac",
      "implementation_id": "roles-v3",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/gnosisguild/zodiac-modifier-roles@172723b165d482c5565e413e9927604b0dc168b6:packages/evm/contracts/common/AbiLocation.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "calldata_decoder_faithfulness",
      "category": "authorization_decoder",
      "difficulty": "hard",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.roles_decoder_faithful",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "cases/zodiac/roles_decoder_faithfulness/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/Zodiac/RolesDecoderFaithfulness/Tasks/RolesDecoderFaithful.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "States that the modeled Roles v3 lazy decoder isolates the same leaf byte region as an independent canonical Solidity ABI v2 reference decoder over static words, dynamic bytes/string, tuple, dynamic array, nested AbiEncoded, and transparent logical wrappers. The reference proof is discharged by structural metadata bridge lemmas plus fuel-bounded recursive walker equivalence. Pack/unpack integrity and hash-comparison semantics are explicitly out-of-model assumptions.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [
        "condition_packer_integrity_roundtrip_assumed",
        "keccak_injectivity_for_hash_comparison_paths"
      ],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.Zodiac.RolesDecoderFaithfulness.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    }
  ],
  "backlog_tasks": [
    {
      "task_ref": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/deposit_sets_total_assets",
      "task_id": "deposit_sets_total_assets",
      "case_id": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/tasks/deposit_sets_total_assets.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45:contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.deposit_sets_totalAssets",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Tasks/DepositSetsTotalAssets.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the `totalAssets` post-state write performed by the virtual-offset deposit slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/deposit_sets_total_shares",
      "task_id": "deposit_sets_total_shares",
      "case_id": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/tasks/deposit_sets_total_shares.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45:contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.deposit_sets_totalShares",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Tasks/DepositSetsTotalShares.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the share-supply update and ties it to the previewed minted amount from the old state.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/positive_deposit_mints_positive_shares_under_rate_bound",
      "task_id": "positive_deposit_mints_positive_shares_under_rate_bound",
      "case_id": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/tasks/positive_deposit_mints_positive_shares_under_rate_bound.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45:contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "output_range",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.positive_deposit_mints_positive_shares_under_rate_bound",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Tasks/PositiveDepositMintsPositiveSharesUnderRateBound.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task expresses the virtual-offset guarantee that a positively sized deposit mints a positive number of shares once the exchange-rate lower bound is met.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/preview_deposit_rounds_down",
      "task_id": "preview_deposit_rounds_down",
      "case_id": "openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/tasks/preview_deposit_rounds_down.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "openzeppelin",
      "implementation_id": "contracts",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts@45f032d1bcf1a88b7bc90154d7eef76c87bf9d45:contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC4626.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.previewDeposit_rounds_down",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/openzeppelin/erc4626_virtual_offset_deposit/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/OpenZeppelin/ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit/Tasks/PreviewDepositRoundsDown.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task captures the floor-division bound for ERC-4626 previewed shares under the virtual-offset rule.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.OpenZeppelin.ERC4626VirtualOffsetDeposit.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/swap_enforces_fee_adjusted_invariant",
      "task_id": "swap_enforces_fee_adjusted_invariant",
      "case_id": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/tasks/swap_enforces_fee_adjusted_invariant.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core@ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58:contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_bound",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.applySwap_enforces_fee_adjusted_invariant",
      "proof_family": "functional_correctness",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Tasks/SwapEnforcesFeeAdjustedInvariant.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task captures the core Uniswap V2 fee-adjusted constant-product guard in the abstracted swap slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/swap_sets_reserve0",
      "task_id": "swap_sets_reserve0",
      "case_id": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/tasks/swap_sets_reserve0.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core@ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58:contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.applySwap_sets_reserve0",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Tasks/SwapSetsReserve0.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the first post-guard reserve write in the fee-adjusted Uniswap V2 swap slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/swap_sets_reserve1",
      "task_id": "swap_sets_reserve1",
      "case_id": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/tasks/swap_sets_reserve1.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core@ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58:contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "storage_write",
      "category": "state-transition",
      "difficulty": "easy",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.applySwap_sets_reserve1",
      "proof_family": "state_preservation_local_effects",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Tasks/SwapSetsReserve1.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task isolates the second post-guard reserve write in the fee-adjusted Uniswap V2 swap slice.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    },
    {
      "task_ref": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/swap_sets_reserve_product",
      "task_id": "swap_sets_reserve_product",
      "case_id": "uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap",
      "suite": "backlog",
      "schema_version": 1,
      "manifest_path": "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/tasks/swap_sets_reserve_product.yaml",
      "split": "backlog",
      "family_id": "uniswap_v2",
      "implementation_id": "v2_core",
      "source_ref": "https://github.com/Uniswap/v2-core@ee547b17853e71ed4e0101ccfd52e70d5acded58:contracts/UniswapV2Pair.sol",
      "task_interface_version": 2,
      "track": "proof-only",
      "property_class": "accounting_conservation",
      "category": "arithmetic-invariant",
      "difficulty": "medium",
      "theorem_name": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.applySwap_sets_reserve_product",
      "proof_family": "refinement_equivalence",
      "translation_status": "translated",
      "proof_status": "complete",
      "implementation_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Contract.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Contract.lean"
      ],
      "specification_files": [
        "backlog/uniswap_v2/pair_fee_adjusted_swap/verity/Specs.lean",
        "Benchmark/Cases/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Specs.lean"
      ],
      "editable_files": [
        "Benchmark/Generated/UniswapV2/PairFeeAdjustedSwap/Tasks/SwapSetsReserveProduct.lean"
      ],
      "abstraction_level": "protocol_slice",
      "abstraction_notes": "This task composes the two reserve writes into a single post-state arithmetic identity over the stored reserve product.",
      "unsupported_feature_codes": [],
      "reference_solution_module": "Benchmark.Cases.UniswapV2.PairFeeAdjustedSwap.Proofs",
      "evaluation": {
        "engine": "lean_proof_generation",
        "target_kind": "proof_generation"
      },
      "readiness": {
        "prompt_context": "ready",
        "editable_proof": "ready",
        "reference_solution": "ready"
      }
    }
  ],
  "generated_at": "2026-06-04T14:16:46.965853+00:00"
}