Fix buffer overflow vulnerabilities in ai/game_ai.c

Replace unsafe strcpy/strcat calls with safe strlcpy/strlcat to prevent
buffer overflow attacks. The original code could overflow the 1024-byte
buffers if input strings were too long.

Security impact:
- Prevents potential arbitrary code execution via buffer overflow
- Adds proper length validation for constructed file paths
- Uses RetroArch's existing safe string functions consistently

Affected functions:
- game_ai_load(): Fixed g_game_name buffer overflow
- game_ai_think(): Fixed data_path construction overflow

Author: Security Audit

ai/game_ai.c

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ void game_ai_shutdown(void)
 
 void game_ai_load(const char * name, void * ram_ptr, int ram_size, retro_log_printf_t log)
 {
-   strcpy((char *) &g_game_name[0], name);
+   strlcpy(g_game_name, name, sizeof(g_game_name));
 
    g_ram_ptr  = ram_ptr;
    g_ram_size = ram_size;
@@ -179,9 +179,13 @@ void game_ai_think(bool override_p1, bool override_p2, bool show_debug,
       if (ga)
       {
          char data_path[1024] = {0};
-         strcpy(&data_path[0], (char *)game_ai_lib_path);
-         strcat(&data_path[0], "/data/");
-         strcat(&data_path[0], (char *)g_game_name);
+         
+         /* Build path safely with proper length checking */
+         strlcpy(data_path, game_ai_lib_path, sizeof(data_path));
+         strlcat(data_path, "/data/", sizeof(data_path));
+         strlcat(data_path, g_game_name, sizeof(data_path));
+         if (strlen(data_path) >= sizeof(data_path) - 1)
+            return; /* Path too long, abort safely */
 
          game_ai_lib_init(ga, (void *) g_ram_ptr, g_ram_size);
          game_ai_lib_set_debug_log(ga, game_ai_debug_log);