Expose per-channel features in ChannelDetails

We previously flattened ChannelCounterparty fields
into ChannelDetails as individual counterparty_*
fields, and InitFeatures was entirely omitted.
This made it impossible for consumers to access per-peer
feature flags, and awkward to access counterparty
forwarding information without navigating the flattened
field names.

This commit replaces the flattened fields with a
structured ChannelCounterparty type that mirrors
LDK's ChannelCounterparty, exposing InitFeatures
and CounterpartyForwardingInfo that were previously
inaccessible.

Breaking change!

Author: enigbe

src/ffi/types.rs

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ pub use bitcoin::{Address, BlockHash, Network, OutPoint, ScriptBuf, Txid};
 pub use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::BalanceSource;
 use lightning::events::PaidBolt12Invoice as LdkPaidBolt12Invoice;
 pub use lightning::events::{ClosureReason, PaymentFailureReason};
-use lightning::ln::channel_state::ChannelShutdownState;
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo};
 use lightning::ln::channelmanager::PaymentId;
 use lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
 pub use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ pub use lightning_liquidity::lsps0::ser::LSPSDateTime;
 pub use lightning_liquidity::lsps1::msgs::{
 	LSPS1ChannelInfo, LSPS1OrderId, LSPS1OrderParams, LSPS1PaymentState,
 };
+use lightning_types::features::InitFeatures as LdkInitFeatures;
 pub use lightning_types::payment::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
 pub use lightning_types::string::UntrustedString;
 use vss_client::headers::{
@@ -1519,6 +1520,114 @@ pub enum ClosureReason {
 	},
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, uniffi::Object)]
+#[uniffi::export(Debug, Eq)]
+pub struct InitFeatures {
+	pub(crate) inner: LdkInitFeatures,
+}
+
+impl InitFeatures {
+	/// Constructs init features from big-endian BOLT 9 encoded bytes.
+	#[uniffi::constructor]
+	pub fn from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Self {
+		Self { inner: LdkInitFeatures::from_be_bytes(bytes.to_vec()).into() }
+	}
+
+	/// Returns the BOLT 9 big-endian encoded representation of these features.
+	pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+		self.inner.encode()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_static_remotekey` (bit 13).
+	///
+	/// This ensures the non-broadcaster's output pays directly to their specified key,
+	/// simplifying recovery if a channel is force-closed.
+	pub fn supports_static_remote_key(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_static_remote_key()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` (bit 23).
+	///
+	/// Anchor channels allow fee-bumping commitment transactions after broadcast,
+	/// improving on-chain fee management.
+	pub fn supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_support_large_channel` (bit 19).
+	///
+	/// When supported, channels larger than 2^24 satoshis (≈0.168 BTC) may be opened.
+	pub fn supports_wumbo(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_wumbo()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_route_blinding` (bit 25).
+	///
+	/// Route blinding allows the recipient to hide their node identity and
+	/// last-hop channel from the sender.
+	pub fn supports_route_blinding(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_route_blinding()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_onion_messages` (bit 39).
+	///
+	/// Onion messages enable communication over the Lightning Network without
+	/// requiring a payment, used by BOLT 12 offers and async payments.
+	pub fn supports_onion_messages(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_onion_messages()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_scid_alias` (bit 47).
+	///
+	/// When supported, the peer will only forward using short channel ID aliases,
+	/// preventing the real channel UTXO from being revealed during routing.
+	pub fn supports_scid_privacy(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_scid_privacy()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_zeroconf` (bit 51).
+	///
+	/// Zero-conf channels can be used immediately without waiting for
+	/// on-chain funding confirmations.
+	pub fn supports_zero_conf(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.requires_zero_conf()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_dual_fund` (bit 29).
+	///
+	/// Dual-funded channels allow both parties to contribute funds
+	/// to the channel opening transaction.
+	pub fn supports_dual_fund(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_dual_fund()
+	}
+
+	/// Whether the peer supports `option_quiesce` (bit 35).
+	///
+	/// Quiescence is a prerequisite for splicing, allowing both sides to
+	/// pause HTLC activity before modifying the funding transaction.
+	pub fn supports_quiescence(&self) -> bool {
+		self.inner.supports_quiescence()
+	}
+}
+
+impl From<LdkInitFeatures> for InitFeatures {
+	fn from(ldk_init: LdkInitFeatures) -> Self {
+		Self { inner: ldk_init }
+	}
+}
+
+/// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
+#[uniffi::remote(Record)]
+pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
+	/// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
+	pub fee_base_msat: u32,
+	/// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
+	pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
+	/// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
+	/// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty.
+	pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
+}
+
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
 	use std::num::NonZeroU64;

src/types.rs

@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@ use bitcoin::{OutPoint, ScriptBuf};
 
 use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
 use lightning::impl_writeable_tlv_based;
-use lightning::ln::channel_state::{ChannelDetails as LdkChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState};
+use lightning::ln::channel_state::{
+	ChannelDetails as LdkChannelDetails, ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo,
+};
 use lightning::ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, SocketAddress};
 use lightning::ln::peer_handler::IgnoringMessageHandler;
 use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
@@ -43,11 +45,17 @@ use crate::chain::ChainSource;
 use crate::config::ChannelConfig;
 use crate::data_store::DataStore;
 use crate::fee_estimator::OnchainFeeEstimator;
+use crate::ffi::maybe_wrap;
 use crate::logger::Logger;
 use crate::message_handler::NodeCustomMessageHandler;
 use crate::payment::{PaymentDetails, PendingPaymentDetails};
 use crate::runtime::RuntimeSpawner;
 
+#[cfg(not(feature = "uniffi"))]
+type InitFeatures = lightning::types::features::InitFeatures;
+#[cfg(feature = "uniffi")]
+type InitFeatures = Arc<crate::ffi::InitFeatures>;
+
 /// A supertrait that requires that a type implements both [`KVStore`] and [`KVStoreSync`] at the
 /// same time.
 pub trait SyncAndAsyncKVStore: KVStore + KVStoreSync {}
@@ -416,6 +424,34 @@ impl fmt::Display for UserChannelId {
 	}
 }
 
+/// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
+/// to better separate parameters.
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
+#[cfg_attr(feature = "uniffi", derive(uniffi::Record))]
+pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
+	/// The node_id of our counterparty
+	pub node_id: PublicKey,
+	/// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
+	/// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
+	/// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
+	pub features: InitFeatures,
+	/// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
+	/// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
+	/// claiming at least this value on chain.
+	///
+	/// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
+	///
+	/// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
+	pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
+	/// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
+	/// payments to us through this channel.
+	pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
+	/// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel.
+	pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
+	/// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
+	pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
+}
+
 /// Details of a channel as returned by [`Node::list_channels`].
 ///
 /// When a channel is spliced, most fields continue to refer to the original pre-splice channel
@@ -432,8 +468,8 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails {
 	/// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
 	/// lifetime of the channel.
 	pub channel_id: ChannelId,
-	/// The node ID of our the channel's counterparty.
-	pub counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
+	/// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
+	pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
 	/// The channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
 	/// our counterparty already.
 	///
@@ -549,28 +585,6 @@ pub struct ChannelDetails {
 	/// The difference in the CLTV value between incoming HTLCs and an outbound HTLC forwarded over
 	/// the channel.
 	pub cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>,
-	/// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
-	/// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
-	/// claiming at least this value on chain.
-	///
-	/// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
-	///
-	/// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
-	pub counterparty_unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
-	/// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel.
-	///
-	/// This field is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or
-	/// `AcceptChannel` message from the remote peer.
-	pub counterparty_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
-	/// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
-	pub counterparty_outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
-	/// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
-	pub counterparty_forwarding_info_fee_base_msat: Option<u32>,
-	/// Proportional fee, in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
-	pub counterparty_forwarding_info_fee_proportional_millionths: Option<u32>,
-	/// The minimum difference in CLTV expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
-	/// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty.
-	pub counterparty_forwarding_info_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>,
 	/// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
 	/// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
 	/// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
@@ -608,7 +622,16 @@ impl From<LdkChannelDetails> for ChannelDetails {
 	fn from(value: LdkChannelDetails) -> Self {
 		ChannelDetails {
 			channel_id: value.channel_id,
-			counterparty_node_id: value.counterparty.node_id,
+			counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
+				node_id: value.counterparty.node_id,
+				features: maybe_wrap(value.counterparty.features),
+				unspendable_punishment_reserve: value.counterparty.unspendable_punishment_reserve,
+				forwarding_info: value.counterparty.forwarding_info,
+				// unwrap safety: This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions
+				// prior to 0.0.115.
+				outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: value.counterparty.outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.unwrap(),
+				outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: value.counterparty.outbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
+			},
 			funding_txo: value.funding_txo.map(|o| o.into_bitcoin_outpoint()),
 			funding_redeem_script: value.funding_redeem_script,
 			short_channel_id: value.short_channel_id,
@@ -629,26 +652,6 @@ impl From<LdkChannelDetails> for ChannelDetails {
 			is_usable: value.is_usable,
 			is_announced: value.is_announced,
 			cltv_expiry_delta: value.config.map(|c| c.cltv_expiry_delta),
-			counterparty_unspendable_punishment_reserve: value
-				.counterparty
-				.unspendable_punishment_reserve,
-			counterparty_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: value.counterparty.outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
-			counterparty_outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: value.counterparty.outbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
-			counterparty_forwarding_info_fee_base_msat: value
-				.counterparty
-				.forwarding_info
-				.as_ref()
-				.map(|f| f.fee_base_msat),
-			counterparty_forwarding_info_fee_proportional_millionths: value
-				.counterparty
-				.forwarding_info
-				.as_ref()
-				.map(|f| f.fee_proportional_millionths),
-			counterparty_forwarding_info_cltv_expiry_delta: value
-				.counterparty
-				.forwarding_info
-				.as_ref()
-				.map(|f| f.cltv_expiry_delta),
 			next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: value.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
 			next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: value.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
 			force_close_spend_delay: value.force_close_spend_delay,

tests/integration_tests_rust.rs

@@ -2197,7 +2197,7 @@ async fn lsps2_client_trusts_lsp() {
 		client_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == service_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == service_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(0)
@@ -2206,7 +2206,7 @@ async fn lsps2_client_trusts_lsp() {
 		service_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == client_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == client_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(0)
@@ -2241,7 +2241,7 @@ async fn lsps2_client_trusts_lsp() {
 		client_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == service_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == service_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(6)
@@ -2250,7 +2250,7 @@ async fn lsps2_client_trusts_lsp() {
 		service_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == client_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == client_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(6)
@@ -2370,7 +2370,7 @@ async fn lsps2_lsp_trusts_client_but_client_does_not_claim() {
 		client_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == service_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == service_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(6)
@@ -2379,7 +2379,7 @@ async fn lsps2_lsp_trusts_client_but_client_does_not_claim() {
 		service_node
 			.list_channels()
 			.iter()
-			.find(|c| c.counterparty_node_id == client_node_id)
+			.find(|c| c.counterparty.node_id == client_node_id)
 			.unwrap()
 			.confirmations,
 		Some(6)
@@ -2822,7 +2822,7 @@ async fn open_channel_with_all_with_anchors() {
 	assert_eq!(channels.len(), 1);
 	let channel = &channels[0];
 	assert!(channel.channel_value_sats > premine_amount_sat - anchor_reserve_sat - 500);
-	assert_eq!(channel.counterparty_node_id, node_b.node_id());
+	assert_eq!(channel.counterparty.node_id, node_b.node_id());
 	assert_eq!(channel.funding_txo.unwrap(), funding_txo);
 
 	node_a.stop().unwrap();
@@ -2873,7 +2873,7 @@ async fn open_channel_with_all_without_anchors() {
 	assert_eq!(channels.len(), 1);
 	let channel = &channels[0];
 	assert!(channel.channel_value_sats > premine_amount_sat - 500);
-	assert_eq!(channel.counterparty_node_id, node_b.node_id());
+	assert_eq!(channel.counterparty.node_id, node_b.node_id());
 	assert_eq!(channel.funding_txo.unwrap(), funding_txo);
 
 	node_a.stop().unwrap();