Zero-fee commitments support#660
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👋 Thanks for assigning @tnull as a reviewer! |
| /// `option_anchor_zero_fee_commitments`. All the caveats and warnings in | ||
| /// [`AnchorChannelsConfig`] still apply. | ||
| /// [`AnchorChannelsConfig`]: Config::anchor_channels_config | ||
| pub enable_zero_fee_commitments: bool, |
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I don't think we'll wan to add a new flag here that's probably hard to understand for the user? Rather, shouldn't we enable this for the user based on our current 'trust model settings' here?
Also, from these docs it's very unclear what this setting even does, when the user would want to enable it, what drawbacks it has, etc
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FWIW, thinking about it again it seems that we should never set negotiate_anchor_zero_fee_commitments until we're positive our chain sources support submitpackage/TRUC, no? And once we are positive, we would always set it?
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Rather, shouldn't we enable this for the user based on our current 'trust model settings' here?
Don't quite follow here could you expand ? I think 0FC channels merit an explicit setting somewhere rather than derived from trust model settings.
Also, from these docs it's very unclear what this setting even does, when the user would want to enable it, what drawbacks it has, etc
Yes will expand
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Don't quite follow here could you expand ? I think 0FC channels merit an explicit setting somewhere rather than derived from trust model settings.
Why, what do they fundamentally change for the user compared to our three current modes (fully trusted/keep 0-reserve, still try to claim/keep X reserve, try to claim)? Keep in mind that communicating these three modes to the user is already very hard, they always have a very hard time understanding what this means. Now, how would we communicate any changed assumptions for 0FC here? If we already trust our counterparty already, wouldn't we always want to enable 0FC for the UX improvements?
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Why, what do they fundamentally change for the user compared to our three current modes (fully trusted/keep 0-reserve, still try to claim/keep X reserve, try to claim)?
Let me see I don't think they change anything ? Whether to enable or disable 0FC channels is orthogonal to these modes ie trusted_peers_no_reserve and per_channel_reserve_sats should have no influence on whether we enable 0FC channels (only that per_channel_reserve_sats should be set to some value). I suspect you don't agree :)
If we already trust our counterparty already, wouldn't we always want to enable 0FC for the UX improvements?
It seems to me trusting our counterparty -> keeping 0 reserve is orthogonal to whether the user wants to enable 0FC channels ? for example a user trusts their counterparty, but wants to wait for greater adoption of Core v29+ before using 0FC channels.
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Marked as draft: I think we should wait for electrum and esplora submit package support before merging this PR. |
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Successfully opened some 0FC channels, made payments, and force closed them with the esplora diff in this branch. https://mutinynet.com/tx/508a954d85f5b7daf224a2fdc54ea6de9a26c0f62f7d58284bf61c3cdfd346e6 |
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tnull
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Excuse the considerable delay here, did a first pass.
| txs_to_broadcast.len() | ||
| ); | ||
| } | ||
| let count: usize = unconfirmed_outbound_txids |
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Makes sense, though in #888 we'll probably introduce a strong type for a package anyways, which should get rid of that API misuse case.
Sounds good !
Do you think it's worth doing the same change in LDK's interface, too? I.e., introduce a dedicated TransactionPackage type that disallows misuse?
Do you mean introducing a separate method to BroadcasterInterface ? ie
pub trait BroadcasterInterface {
fn broadcast_transactions(&self, txs: &[(&Transaction, TransactionType)]);
fn broadcast_package(&self, package: (&TransactionPackage, TransactionType));
}I do agree the current BroadcasterInterface API is prone to misuse. See lightningdevkit/rust-lightning#4173 for some context.
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Yes, a separate method makes sense to me, though then maybe we'll want to change the original to broadcast_transaction: (Transaction, TransactionType)? FWIW, the &[(&Transaction, TransactionType)] seems like an over-eager optimization that has resulted in many cases that force us to unnecessarily clone just to massage it into the right type. Seems like a simple (Transaction, TransactionType) or (&Transaction, TransactionType) would be easier, and then the callsite could decide when it's really necessary to clone.
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| } | ||
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| fn sort_parents_child_package_topologically(txs: &mut [Transaction]) { |
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Hmm, rather than doing this here, maybe we should already do the change just mentioned in this PR and create a dedicated TransactionPackage type that enforces topological sorting upon creation?
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we should already do the change just mentioned in this PR
Can you clarify this part ? Thank you I don't quite follow
create a dedicated TransactionPackage type that enforces topological sorting upon creation
Yes overall makes sense to me. I'm thinking we create an enum, constructed at the current callsite of sort_parents_child_package_topologically , with one Singleton variant that contains a single transaction, and one Package variant that contains a child-with-parents package, itself topologically sorted on construction.
At the process_broadcast_package of each chain source, we match on the variant instead of matching on package.len() > 1 to determine whether we should use submit_package to broadcast the transaction.
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Done below, let me know what you think of the direction
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Can you clarify this part ? Thank you I don't quite follow
Sorry, was referring to #660 (comment)
Yes overall makes sense to me. I'm thinking we create an enum, constructed at the current callsite of
sort_parents_child_package_topologically, with oneSingletonvariant that contains a single transaction, and onePackagevariant that contains a child-with-parents package, itself topologically sorted on construction.
FWIW, that might not even be necessary, we could also just do a wrapper struct that wraps Vec<(Transaction, TransactionType)>, but offers constructors (single, package) that enforce the correct ordering. Could even offer From implementations to keep it easy to use at the callsites.
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| fn sort_parents_child_package_topologically(txs: &mut [Transaction]) { | ||
| // LDK multi-transaction broadcasts are one child plus its direct parents, and the |
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Do we see a scenario where this assumption could ever fail, i.e., where we change LDK's behavior (quietly)? Maybe it would at least be worth somehow detecting a counterexample and debug_asserting?
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I just made another pass on the LDK broadcast_transactions callsites on current 0.3, and at the moment I don't see this assumption failing: we always explicitly construct the array of transactions ie [tx1, tx2], no pushes or appends.
Certainly we can add a debug assert here thank you.
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Added the debug assertions below
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I just made another pass on the LDK
broadcast_transactionscallsites on current 0.3, and at the moment I don't see this assumption failing: we always explicitly construct the array of transactions ie [tx1, tx2], no pushes or appends.
Right, I wasn't saying it's violated right now, just seems like the kind of thing that we might change slightly for some reason, and then our logic here would silently be off if we don't add defensive measures to detect that something changed (as surely nobody will remember to re-review the logic here, esp. if there's no API break).
| if txs.len() < 2 { | ||
| return; | ||
| } | ||
| let mut child_pos = txs.len() - 1; |
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This seems equivalent and cleaner (?):
diff --git a/src/tx_broadcaster.rs b/src/tx_broadcaster.rs
index 01d23782..00000000 100644
--- a/src/tx_broadcaster.rs
+++ b/src/tx_broadcaster.rs
@@ -57,37 +57,19 @@ fn sort_parents_child_package_topologically(txs: &mut [Transaction]) {
if txs.len() < 2 {
return;
}
- let mut child_pos = txs.len() - 1;
- let mut pos = txs.len() - 1;
- 'outer: while pos > 0 {
- let txid_a = txs[pos - 1].compute_txid();
- for txid in txs[pos].input.iter().map(|input| input.previous_output.txid) {
- if txid == txid_a {
- child_pos = pos;
- break 'outer;
- }
- }
- let txid_b = txs[pos].compute_txid();
- for txid in txs[pos - 1].input.iter().map(|input| input.previous_output.txid) {
- if txid == txid_b {
- child_pos = pos - 1;
- break 'outer;
- }
- }
- if pos == 2 {
- pos = 1;
- } else {
- pos = pos.saturating_sub(2);
- }
- }
- debug_assert!(pos != 0);
- txs.swap(child_pos, txs.len() - 1);
+
+ let package_txids = txs.iter().map(Transaction::compute_txid).collect::<Vec<_>>();
+ let spends_package_tx = |tx: &Transaction| {
+ tx.input
+ .iter()
+ .any(|input| package_txids.contains(&input.previous_output.txid))
+ };
+
+ debug_assert!(txs.iter().any(spends_package_tx));
+ txs.sort_by_key(spends_package_tx);
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Yes thanks initially I wanted to avoid hashing every transaction, but we can expect the number of transactions here to be small, so I am fine to hash all of them.
This also allows us to easily debug assert the multi-transaction == single-child-with-parents assumption.
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| HOST_PLATFORM="$(rustc --version --verbose | grep "host:" | awk '{ print $2 }')" | ||
| ELECTRS_GIT_REPO="https://github.com/tankyleo/blockstream-electrs.git" | ||
| ELECTRS_TAG="2026-05-26-electrum-submit-package" |
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If we do this, we should use a specific commit revision, not point to a general branch.
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This is indeed my intention, and I believe the script currently does this.
See the tag here: https://github.com/tankyleo/blockstream-electrs/releases/tag/2026-05-26-electrum-submit-package
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Ah, sorry, I took 2026-05-26-electrum-submit-package to be a branch name, not a tag. Would still be good to pin the specific revision hash here rather than a tag.
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Done below, the tag remains useful to do a git checkout --depth 1 --branch <tag_name>
| ## Compatibility Notes | ||
| - Pending JIT-channel payments created before upgrading may fail after upgrade because the | ||
| prior LSPS2 fee-limit state stored in `PaymentKind::Bolt11Jit` is not migrated. | ||
| - Usage of anchor channels now requires an Esplora or Electrum chain source that supports |
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Why do we require submitpackage for all anchor channels now? Technically we only need it for 0fc channels, no?
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Further above we decided against adding a separate knob dedicated to 0FC channels. This means that when we turn on anchor channels, 0FC channels can be negotiated against any peer that supports them, so the corresponding chain source should support submitpackage.
| match timeout_fut.await { | ||
| Ok(res) => match res { | ||
| Ok(result) => { | ||
| if result.contains(r#""package_msg":"success""#) { |
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Hmm, rather than matching on the string, please rather properly parse the results.
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see the commit below, note I only parse the package_msg field, and leave the rest untouched as they are not needed besides logging.
| rpc_client | ||
| .call_method::<serde_json::Value>("submitpackage", &[package_json]) | ||
| .await | ||
| .map(|value| value.to_string()) |
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Let's please parse the result into a proper type to avoid having to deal with raw strings (if we need the data in there).
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see the commit below, note I only parse the package_msg field, and leave the rest untouched as they are not needed besides logging.
| ); | ||
| }, | ||
| } | ||
| } else if package.len() > 1 { |
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It seems we're duplicating a lot of the same handling/logging logic here (and possibly elsewhere). Do we see a chance to DRY it up? (possibly in a prefactor commit)
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agreed we should DRY it up, haven't finished this yet.
| let required_funds_sats = channel_amount_sats | ||
| + self.config.anchor_channels_config.as_ref().map_or(0, |c| { | ||
| if init_features.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() | ||
| if anchor_channel |
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We recently merged #841
Please validate that the logic for determining ReserveType there also still works for 0fc channels / whether it needs to be updated to account for them.
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thanks for the heads up, yes this will need an update for 0fc channels, I will do this on the next rebase here.
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Let me know if I can rebase |
| } | ||
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| async fn get_node_version_inner(rpc_client: Arc<RpcClient>) -> Result<u64, RpcClientError> { | ||
| rpc_client.call_method::<serde_json::Value>("getnetworkinfo", &[]).await.and_then(|value| { |
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Can also look into properly parsing the return value here like how we did for submitpackage let me know
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Feel free to squash/rebase
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| const BCAST_PACKAGE_QUEUE_SIZE: usize = 50; | ||
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| pub(crate) enum TransactionsToBroadcast { |
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See comment above, I think I'd prefer a simple struct TransactionBroadcast that wraps a Vec, enforcing the rules in constructors that could even be called via From implementations?
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Done below, let me know if this matches what you had in mind
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| } | ||
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| pub struct SubmitPackageResponse(String); |
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Should we even return the full response string here rather than ()?
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See the esplora and electrum chain sources, I prefer to log the full response at trace even in the success case for debugging purposes. We get information on replaced transactions, transactions already in the mempool, and transactions freshly accepted into the mempool.
`BroadcasterInterface::broadcast_transactions` requires that any passed vector containing multiple transactions must be a single child together with its parents. We will lean on this contract in upcoming commits, so here we fix a case where we broke this contract.
Implementations of `BroadcasterInterface` cannot assume any topological ordering on the transactions received, so here we order the received transactions before adding them to the broadcast queue. Any consumers of the queue can now assume all transactions received to be topologically sorted. Codex wrote the tests.
The patch adds support for the `broadcast_package` method added in electrum protocol v1.6. Upcoming commits will require this patch to pass CI.
The mempool/electrs docker image used in those tests only supports submitpackage via the esplora interface, not the electrum interface.
We bump the Bitcoin Core version used in kotlin and python tests to support ephemeral dust. This is required for 0FC channels.
Do this roundtrip at the same time we make a roundtrip to retrieve the feerates to keep startup as fast as possible.
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We rely on the `BroadcasterInterface` contract whereby any multi-transaction vector must be a single child and its parents, and must be broadcasted together as a package using `submitpackage`. In a prior commit, we added the guarantee that any packages received from the broadcast queue are already topologically sorted, and hence can be passed directly to the `submit_package` Bitcoin Core RPC.
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Rebased, squashed the previous fixups, added a few more |
| } | ||
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| pub(super) async fn validate_zero_fee_commitments_support(&self) -> Result<(), Error> { | ||
| self.esplora_client.submit_package(&super::dummy_package(), None, None).await.map_err( |
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Especially if we already submitted this package before, couldn't the backend return an different error that we'd misinterpret as 'doesn't support submitpackage'? E.g., typical transaction broadcast errors are 'already known' or 'missing-inputs'. Why can't we ever hit them here?
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I've looked down the stack, and also had codex review the mempool-electrs and blockstream-electrs code.
already-known and missing-inputs errors get placed in the package_msg and error fields of the response, but still yield status 200.
Non 200 error codes are for transport-level errors, not for errors returned in the fields of the submitpackage response. As long as Bitcoin Core RPC returns some valid response for submitpackage, we get back 200.
| .init_features; | ||
| let anchor_channel = init_features.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx(); | ||
| let anchor_channel = init_features.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() | ||
| || init_features.requires_anchor_zero_fee_commitments(); |
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Hmm, pre-existing, but it seems for init features we should be using supports_?
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Yes @febyeji had a similar question further above in this comment: #660 (comment)
Can we revisit these checks in a standalone PR ?
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Let me know if I can squash |
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