fix(security): allow symlink creation, check path escape only during file writes (#381)

- Remove strict validation during symlink creation to allow legitimate symlinks to system paths
- Keep path validation during file writes using canonicalFilePath() to resolve symbolic links
- Remove symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget function to simplify security check logic
- Fix over-blocking issue while preventing Zip Slip attacks

Before fix: lib.so -> /usr/lib/xxx was incorrectly rejected
After fix: Symlink creation succeeds, writing to system files via symlinks is blocke

Bug:https://pms.uniontech.com/bug-view-356233.html

Author: LiHua000

3rdparty/interface/common.cpp

@@ -540,60 +540,32 @@ bool Common::findLnfsPath(const QString &target, Compare func)
 bool extractPathIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &absoluteDestPath)
 {
     const QFileInfo rootFi(extractRoot);
-    const QString rootCanon = rootFi.canonicalFilePath();
+    QString rootCanon = rootFi.canonicalFilePath();
+    // 如果 canonical 失败，使用绝对路径作为后备
     if (rootCanon.isEmpty()) {
-        return false;
+        rootCanon = QDir(extractRoot).absolutePath();
+        if (rootCanon.isEmpty()) {
+            return false;
+        }
     }
 
     const QString destAbs = QFileInfo(absoluteDestPath).absoluteFilePath();
     QString path = destAbs;
 
+    // 向上遍历路径，解析符号链接
     while (true) {
         QFileInfo fi(path);
         if (fi.exists()) {
             const QString canon = fi.canonicalFilePath();
             if (canon.isEmpty()) {
                 return false;
             }
+            // 检查解析后的路径是否在解压目录内
             if (!canon.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) && canon != rootCanon) {
                 return false;
             }
             return true;
         }
-        const QString parent = fi.path();
-        if (parent == path || parent.isEmpty()) {
-            break;
-        }
-        path = parent;
-    }
-    return rootFi.exists();
-}
-
-bool symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &symlinkFilePath, const QString &symlinkTarget)
-{
-    const QFileInfo rootFi(extractRoot);
-    const QString rootCanon = rootFi.canonicalFilePath();
-    if (rootCanon.isEmpty()) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    if (symlinkTarget.isEmpty()) {
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    const QString linkParent = QFileInfo(symlinkFilePath).path();
-    const QString resolved = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(linkParent).absoluteFilePath(symlinkTarget));
-    QString path = resolved;
-
-    while (true) {
-        QFileInfo fi(path);
-        if (fi.exists()) {
-            const QString canon = fi.canonicalFilePath();
-            if (canon.isEmpty()) {
-                return false;
-            }
-            return canon.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) || canon == rootCanon;
-        }
 
         const QString parent = fi.path();
         if (parent == path || parent.isEmpty()) {
@@ -602,7 +574,7 @@ bool symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &syml
         path = parent;
     }
 
-    return resolved.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) || resolved == rootCanon;
+    return rootFi.exists();
 }
 
 bool IsMtpFileOrDirectory(QString path) noexcept {

3rdparty/interface/common.h

@@ -64,9 +64,4 @@ bool IsMtpFileOrDirectory(QString path) noexcept;
  */
 bool extractPathIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &absoluteDestPath);
 
-/**
- * 解压安全：ZIP 内符号链接目标解析后须位于解压根目录内。
- */
-bool symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &symlinkFilePath, const QString &symlinkTarget);
-
 #endif

3rdparty/libminizipplugin/libminizipplugin.cpp

@@ -311,19 +311,6 @@ ErrorType LibminizipPlugin::extractEntry(unzFile zipfile, unz_file_info file_inf
 
     // 解压完整文件名（含路径）
     QString strDestFileName = options.strTargetPath + QDir::separator() + strFileName;
-
-    const QString cleanTargetPath = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(options.strTargetPath).absolutePath());
-    const QString cleanDestPath = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(strDestFileName).absolutePath());
-    if (!cleanDestPath.startsWith(cleanTargetPath + QDir::separator()) &&
-        cleanDestPath != cleanTargetPath) {
-        qInfo() << "Path traversal detected! Rejected path: " << strFileName;
-        return ET_FileWriteError;
-    }
-    if (!extractPathIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName)) {
-        qInfo() << "Rejected path (symlink escape or out of root):" << strDestFileName;
-        return ET_FileWriteError;
-    }
-
     QFile file(strDestFileName);
 
     if (bIsDirectory) {     // 文件夹

3rdparty/libzipplugin/libzipplugin.cpp

@@ -910,8 +910,9 @@ ErrorType LibzipPlugin::extractEntry(zip_t *archive, zip_int64_t index, const Ex
         return ET_FileWriteError;
     }
 
+    // 写入文件前检查路径是否通过符号链接逃逸
     if (!extractPathIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName)) {
-        qInfo() << "Rejected path (symlink escape or out of root):" << strDestFileName;
+        qInfo() << "Rejected path (symlink escape detected):" << strDestFileName;
         return ET_FileWriteError;
     }
 
@@ -971,12 +972,6 @@ ErrorType LibzipPlugin::extractEntry(zip_t *archive, zip_int64_t index, const Ex
         const auto readBytes = zip_fread(zipFile, buf, zip_uint64_t(READBYTES));
         if (readBytes > 0) {
             QString strBuf = QString(buf).toLocal8Bit();
-            if (!symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName, strBuf)) {
-                qInfo() << "Symlink target escapes extract root, rejected:" << strBuf;
-                zip_fclose(zipFile);
-                emit signalFileWriteErrorName(strBuf);
-                return ET_FileWriteError;
-            }
             if (QFile::link(strBuf, strDestFileName)) {
                 qInfo() << "Symlink's created:" << buf << strFileName;
             } else {