fix(security): harden symlink target validation during extraction

Resolve symlink escape checks against real filesystem paths by validating the first existing path component with canonical resolution. This closes a bypass where lexical path checks could be fooled by pre-existing symlinks while keeping extraction behavior and performance stable.

log: fix cnnvd

Bug: https://pms.uniontech.com/bug-view-353989.html
https://pms.uniontech.com/bug-view-353985.html

Author: LiHua000

3rdparty/interface/common.cpp

@@ -518,6 +518,74 @@ bool Common::findLnfsPath(const QString &target, Compare func)
 }
 
 
+bool extractPathIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &absoluteDestPath)
+{
+    const QFileInfo rootFi(extractRoot);
+    const QString rootCanon = rootFi.canonicalFilePath();
+    if (rootCanon.isEmpty()) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    const QString destAbs = QFileInfo(absoluteDestPath).absoluteFilePath();
+    QString path = destAbs;
+
+    while (true) {
+        QFileInfo fi(path);
+        if (fi.exists()) {
+            const QString canon = fi.canonicalFilePath();
+            if (canon.isEmpty()) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            if (!canon.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) && canon != rootCanon) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            return true;
+        }
+        const QString parent = fi.path();
+        if (parent == path || parent.isEmpty()) {
+            break;
+        }
+        path = parent;
+    }
+    return rootFi.exists();
+}
+
+bool symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &symlinkFilePath, const QString &symlinkTarget)
+{
+    const QFileInfo rootFi(extractRoot);
+    const QString rootCanon = rootFi.canonicalFilePath();
+    if (rootCanon.isEmpty()) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (symlinkTarget.isEmpty()) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    const QString linkParent = QFileInfo(symlinkFilePath).path();
+    const QString resolved = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(linkParent).absoluteFilePath(symlinkTarget));
+    QString path = resolved;
+
+    while (true) {
+        QFileInfo fi(path);
+        if (fi.exists()) {
+            const QString canon = fi.canonicalFilePath();
+            if (canon.isEmpty()) {
+                return false;
+            }
+            return canon.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) || canon == rootCanon;
+        }
+
+        const QString parent = fi.path();
+        if (parent == path || parent.isEmpty()) {
+            break;
+        }
+        path = parent;
+    }
+
+    return resolved.startsWith(rootCanon + QDir::separator()) || resolved == rootCanon;
+}
+
 bool IsMtpFileOrDirectory(QString path) noexcept {
     const static QRegExp regexp("((/run/user/[0-9]+/gvfs/mtp:)|(/root/.gvfs/mtp:)).+");
     return regexp.exactMatch(path);

3rdparty/interface/common.h

@@ -58,4 +58,14 @@ class Common: public QObject
 */
 bool IsMtpFileOrDirectory(QString path) noexcept;
 
+/**
+ * 解压安全：校验目标绝对路径在真实文件系统解析后仍位于解压根目录内（防止符号链接路径逃逸）。
+ */
+bool extractPathIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &absoluteDestPath);
+
+/**
+ * 解压安全：ZIP 内符号链接目标解析后须位于解压根目录内。
+ */
+bool symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(const QString &extractRoot, const QString &symlinkFilePath, const QString &symlinkTarget);
+
 #endif

3rdparty/libarchive/libarchive/libarchiveplugin.cpp

@@ -826,6 +826,8 @@ int LibarchivePlugin::extractionFlags() const
 {
     int result = ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_TIME;
     result |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT;
+    result |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_SYMLINKS;
+    result |= ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS;
 
     // TODO: Don't use arksettings here
     /*if ( ArkSettings::preservePerms() )

3rdparty/libminizipplugin/libminizipplugin.cpp

@@ -283,6 +283,14 @@ ErrorType LibminizipPlugin::extractEntry(unzFile zipfile, unz_file_info file_inf
         strFileName = strFileName.remove(0, options.strDestination.size());
     }
 
+    while (strFileName.contains(QStringLiteral("../"))) {
+        qInfo() << "skipped ../ path component(s) in " << strFileName;
+        strFileName = strFileName.replace(QStringLiteral("../"), QString());
+    }
+    if (strFileName.contains(QLatin1Char('\\'))) {
+        strFileName = strFileName.replace(QLatin1Char('\\'), QDir::separator());
+    }
+
     emit signalCurFileName(strFileName);        // 发送当前正在解压的文件名
 
     bool bIsDirectory = strFileName.endsWith(QDir::separator());    // 是否为文件夹
@@ -293,6 +301,19 @@ ErrorType LibminizipPlugin::extractEntry(unzFile zipfile, unz_file_info file_inf
 
     // 解压完整文件名（含路径）
     QString strDestFileName = options.strTargetPath + QDir::separator() + strFileName;
+
+    const QString cleanTargetPath = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(options.strTargetPath).absolutePath());
+    const QString cleanDestPath = QDir::cleanPath(QDir(strDestFileName).absolutePath());
+    if (!cleanDestPath.startsWith(cleanTargetPath + QDir::separator()) &&
+        cleanDestPath != cleanTargetPath) {
+        qInfo() << "Path traversal detected! Rejected path: " << strFileName;
+        return ET_FileWriteError;
+    }
+    if (!extractPathIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName)) {
+        qInfo() << "Rejected path (symlink escape or out of root):" << strDestFileName;
+        return ET_FileWriteError;
+    }
+
     QFile file(strDestFileName);
 
     if (bIsDirectory) {     // 文件夹

3rdparty/libzipplugin/libzipplugin.cpp

@@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ ErrorType LibzipPlugin::extractEntry(zip_t *archive, zip_int64_t index, const Ex
         return ET_FileWriteError;
     }
 
+    if (!extractPathIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName)) {
+        qInfo() << "Rejected path (symlink escape or out of root):" << strDestFileName;
+        return ET_FileWriteError;
+    }
+
     QFile file(strDestFileName);
 
     // Store parent mtime.
@@ -951,6 +956,12 @@ ErrorType LibzipPlugin::extractEntry(zip_t *archive, zip_int64_t index, const Ex
         const auto readBytes = zip_fread(zipFile, buf, zip_uint64_t(READBYTES));
         if (readBytes > 0) {
             QString strBuf = QString(buf).toLocal8Bit();
+            if (!symlinkTargetIsWithinTarget(options.strTargetPath, strDestFileName, strBuf)) {
+                qInfo() << "Symlink target escapes extract root, rejected:" << strBuf;
+                zip_fclose(zipFile);
+                emit signalFileWriteErrorName(strBuf);
+                return ET_FileWriteError;
+            }
             if (QFile::link(strBuf, strDestFileName)) {
                 qInfo() << "Symlink's created:" << buf << strFileName;
             } else {