chore: update pvtr plugin to v0.24.0+2fixes (#4314)

Signed-off-by: Joana Maia <jmaia@contractor.linuxfoundation.org>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: joanagmaia

scripts/services/docker/Dockerfile.security_best_practices_worker

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-ARG PVTR_VERSION=v0.23.2
+ARG PVTR_VERSION=v0.24.0
 
 FROM alpine:3.21 AS core
 RUN apk add --no-cache wget tar unzip
@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ ARG PLATFORM=Linux_x86_64
 RUN wget https://github.com/privateerproj/privateer/releases/download/v${VERSION}/privateer_${PLATFORM}.tar.gz
 RUN tar -xzf privateer_${PLATFORM}.tar.gz
 
-FROM golang:1.26.3-alpine3.23 AS plugin
+FROM golang:1.26.4-alpine3.22 AS plugin
 RUN apk add --no-cache make git
 WORKDIR /plugin
-ARG PVTR_COMMIT=c7bd9538d64f7eaab94a05c9b5fd05458a387b1c
+ARG PVTR_COMMIT=c1095c95a1b399ec63e4f4e2b7880b0ef55e604f
 ARG PVTR_VERSION
 # To run the latest version of the plugin, we need to use the latest commit of the pvtr-github-repo-scanner repository.
-# Currently using v0.23.2: https://github.com/ossf/pvtr-github-repo-scanner/commit/c7bd9538d64f7eaab94a05c9b5fd05458a387b1c
+# Currently using v0.24.0+2fixes: https://github.com/ossf/pvtr-github-repo-scanner/commit/c1095c95a1b399ec63e4f4e2b7880b0ef55e604f
 RUN git clone https://github.com/ossf/pvtr-github-repo-scanner.git && cd pvtr-github-repo-scanner && git checkout ${PVTR_COMMIT}
 RUN cd pvtr-github-repo-scanner && make binary && cp github-repo ../github-repo
 

services/apps/security_best_practices_worker/example-config.yml

@@ -12,6 +12,6 @@ services:
         - Maturity Level 1
 
     vars:
-      owner: $REPO_OWNER
-      repo: $REPO_NAME
-      token: $GITHUB_TOKEN
+      owner: '$REPO_OWNER'
+      repo: '$REPO_NAME'
+      token: '$GITHUB_TOKEN'

services/apps/security_best_practices_worker/src/activities.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 import {
   findObsoleteRepos,
+  getCurrentTimeMs,
   getOSPSBaselineInsights,
   initializeTokenInfos,
   saveOSPSBaselineInsightsToDB,
@@ -12,4 +13,5 @@ export {
   findObsoleteRepos,
   initializeTokenInfos,
   updateTokenInfos,
+  getCurrentTimeMs,
 }

services/apps/security_best_practices_worker/src/activities/index.ts

@@ -44,25 +44,12 @@ export async function getOSPSBaselineInsights(repoUrl: string, token: string): P
 
     const combinedOutput = `${stdout}\n${stderr}`
 
-    if (combinedOutput.includes('403')) {
-      svc.log.warn('Detected 403 error in privateer output!')
-      throw ApplicationFailure.create({
-        message: 'GitHub token rate-limited',
-        type: 'Token403Error',
-      })
-    }
+    classifyTokenError(combinedOutput, 'privateer output')
   } catch (err) {
     svc.log.error(`Privateer run failed: ${err.message}`)
 
-    // check for 403 in captured output if available
     const output = `${err.stdout || ''}\n${err.stderr || ''}`
-    if (output.includes('403')) {
-      svc.log.warn('Detected 403 error in failed privateer output!')
-      throw ApplicationFailure.create({
-        message: 'GitHub token rate-limited',
-        type: 'Token403Error',
-      })
-    }
+    classifyTokenError(output, 'failed privateer output')
     throw err
   }
 
@@ -196,6 +183,40 @@ export async function saveOSPSBaselineInsightsToRedis(
   await redisCache.set(key, JSON.stringify(insights), 60 * 60 * 24) // 1 day
 }
 
+function classifyTokenError(output: string, source: string): void {
+  const failedAtMs = Date.now()
+
+  if (output.includes('401 Unauthorized') || output.includes('401 Bad credentials')) {
+    svc.log.warn(`Detected 401 error in ${source} - token invalid or expired!`)
+    throw ApplicationFailure.create({
+      message: 'GitHub token invalid or expired',
+      type: 'TokenAuthError',
+      nonRetryable: true,
+      details: [failedAtMs],
+    })
+  }
+
+  // Word-boundary match so unrelated numbers don't get misclassified as HTTP 429/403.
+  const has403 = /\b403\b/.test(output)
+  const has429 = /\b429\b/.test(output)
+  if (!has403 && !has429) return
+
+  // 429 is always rate-limit. 403 with rate-limit body is rate-limit. 403 without is a
+  // permission problem (SAML, missing scopes) — log it but don't throw; the child workflow's
+  // retry policy will exhaust retries and the repo will be deferred to the next scheduled run.
+  const isRateLimit = has429 || /rate limit|rate_limit|secondary rate/i.test(output)
+  if (isRateLimit) {
+    svc.log.warn(`Detected rate-limit in ${source} - token rate-limited!`)
+    throw ApplicationFailure.create({
+      message: 'GitHub token rate-limited',
+      type: 'Token403Error',
+      nonRetryable: true,
+      details: [failedAtMs],
+    })
+  }
+  svc.log.warn(`Detected 403 permission error in ${source} - token may lack access to this repo`)
+}
+
 function computeRunDuration(start: string | undefined, end: string | undefined): string {
   if (!start || !end) return ''
   const startMs = new Date(start).getTime()
@@ -258,13 +279,13 @@ async function runBinary(
         resolve({ stdout, stderr })
       } else {
         const truncated = (s: string) => (s.length > 500 ? s.slice(0, 500) + '…' : s)
-        const truncStdout = truncated(stdout)
-        const truncStderr = truncated(stderr)
+        // Attach full stdout/stderr so classifyTokenError sees rate-limit markers that may
+        // appear after the truncation cut. Message is still truncated for log readability.
         const err = Object.assign(
           new Error(
-            `Binary exited with code ${code}\nStderr:\n${truncStderr}\nStdout:\n${truncStdout}`,
+            `Binary exited with code ${code}\nStderr:\n${truncated(stderr)}\nStdout:\n${truncated(stdout)}`,
           ),
-          { stdout: truncStdout, stderr: truncStderr },
+          { stdout, stderr },
         )
         reject(err)
       }
@@ -276,20 +297,45 @@ export async function initializeTokenInfos(): Promise<ITokenInfo[]> {
   const redisCache = new RedisCache(`osps-baseline-insights`, svc.redis, svc.log)
 
   const tokenInfosInRedis = await redisCache.get('tokenInfos')
-
-  if (tokenInfosInRedis) {
-    return JSON.parse(tokenInfosInRedis)
-  }
-
-  return process.env['CROWD_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKENS'].split(',').map((token) => ({
-    token,
-    inUse: false,
-    lastUsed: new Date(),
-    isRateLimited: false,
-  }))
+  const cached: ITokenInfo[] = tokenInfosInRedis ? JSON.parse(tokenInfosInRedis) : []
+  const cachedByToken = new Map(cached.map((t) => [t.token, t]))
+
+  // Env var is authoritative for pool membership so PAT rotation is picked up on next run:
+  // a new token in CROWD_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKENS joins the pool fresh, and a removed
+  // token drops out even if its cached entry is still in Redis.
+  const envTokens = process.env['CROWD_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKENS'].split(',')
+
+  return envTokens.map((token) => {
+    const t = cachedByToken.get(token)
+    if (t) {
+      return {
+        ...t,
+        // Reset inUse — workflow processes may have crashed leaving stale in-use flags.
+        inUse: false,
+        // Backward compat: legacy entries have isRateLimited=true with no rateLimitedAt timestamp.
+        // Without a timestamp the 1-hour expiry can't apply and the token would be stuck forever.
+        // Clear stale rate-limits that lack a timestamp so they can be retried on this run.
+        isRateLimited: t.isRateLimited && !!t.rateLimitedAt,
+        rateLimitedAt: t.isRateLimited && t.rateLimitedAt ? t.rateLimitedAt : undefined,
+      }
+    }
+    return {
+      token,
+      inUse: false,
+      lastUsed: new Date(),
+      isRateLimited: false,
+    }
+  })
 }
 
 export async function updateTokenInfos(tokenInfos: ITokenInfo[]): Promise<void> {
   const redisCache = new RedisCache(`osps-baseline-insights`, svc.redis, svc.log)
   await redisCache.set('tokenInfos', JSON.stringify(tokenInfos), 60 * 60 * 24) // 1 day
 }
+
+// Wall-clock time via activity — workflow code can't call Date.now() (determinism rule),
+// but rate-limit cooldowns need real elapsed time to expire mid-run rather than only at
+// the next continueAsNew batch boundary.
+export async function getCurrentTimeMs(): Promise<number> {
+  return Date.now()
+}

services/apps/security_best_practices_worker/src/types.ts

@@ -52,6 +52,10 @@ export interface ITriggerSecurityInsightsCheckForReposParams {
 export interface ITokenInfo {
   token: string
   inUse: boolean
-  lastUsed: Date
+  // Date at initialization time; becomes an ISO string after JSON round-trip through Redis
+  // and Temporal payloads, so callers must wrap in `new Date()` before comparing.
+  lastUsed: Date | string
   isRateLimited: boolean
+  rateLimitedAt?: string // ISO timestamp; used to auto-reset after 1 hour
+  isInvalid?: boolean // 401 auth failure; recover by rotating the PAT out of CROWD_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKENS
 }