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final_presentation.tex

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\maketitle
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\begin{frame}{Outline}
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\tableofcontents
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\begin{columns}[c]
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\begin{column}{0.45\textwidth}
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\tableofcontents
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\end{column}
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\begin{column}{0.45\textwidth}
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\end{column}
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\end{columns}
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\end{frame}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\begin{frame}{Oligopoly Experiments}
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\begin{figure}[htpb!]
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\centering
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\includesvg[width=0.7\linewidth]{latex/imgs/res/convergence_prices_by_num_agents.svg}
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\caption{}
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\label{fig:monopoly_convergence}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}[htpb!]
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\centering
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\includesvg[width=.65\linewidth]{latex/imgs/res/convergence_prices_by_num_agents.svg}
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\caption{Oligopolistic data distribution, 42--168 data points ($\bullet$) per supergroup (3 $\alpha$s $\times$ 7 runs $\times$ number of firms; average of last 50 rounds), triangles ($\blacktriangle$) represent subgroup averages, dashed lines ($\text{- -}$) represent Nash prices and Monopoly prices per supergroup.}
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\label{fig:oligopols}
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\end{figure}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}{Oligopoly Results: Folk Theorem-style effects?}
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\begin{frame}[fragile]{Textual analysis: clustering approach}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item Split PLANS into sentences;
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\item Embedded using SentenceTranformer\footnote{all-mpnet-base-v2};
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\item PCA from 768 → 9 dimensions (50\% variance);
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\item K-means to cluster sentences meaning-wise;
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\item Assign labels to clusters;
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\item Compared proportion of sentences for each cluster between P1 vs. P2 (relative prevalence);
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$$
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\text{Relative Prevalence} = \frac{\text{P1 Proportion}}{\text{P2 Proportion}} - 1
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$$
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item Split PLANS into stenentces;
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\item Embedded using SentenceTranformer\footnote{all-mpnet-base-v2};
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\item PCA from 768 → 9 dimensions (50\% variance);
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\item K-means to cluster sentences meaning-wise;
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\item Assign labels to clusters;
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\item Compared proportion of sentences for each cluster between P1 vs. P2 (relative prevalence);
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$$
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\text{Relative Prevalence} = \frac{\text{P1 Proportion}}{\text{P2 Proportion}} - 1
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$$
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\end{enumerate}
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\begin{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}[fragile]{Textual analysis: clustering approach (cont.)}
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\includesvg[width=0.9\linewidth]{latex/imgs/res/text_analysis_relative_prevalence_cluster.svg}
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\end{frame}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\section{Discussion}
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\begin{frame}{Findings}
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\end{frame}
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\begin{frame}{Limitations}
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\end{frame}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\section{References}
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\begin{column}{0.55\textwidth}
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\centering
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% Include your corrected plot here
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{ft_plot.pdf}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{latex/slides_pricing_collusion/imgs/ft_plot.pdf}
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\end{column}
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% --- RIGHT COLUMN: EXPLANATION ---
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\begin{column}{0.45\textwidth}
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\small
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{The Visualization Explained:}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item[\textcolor{gray!60}{\rule{0.3cm}{0.3cm}}] \textbf{Feasible Set:} All possible average payoffs from mixing pure strategy outcomes
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\item[\textbf{- -}] \textbf{Individual Rationality:} Minmax payoffs $(1,1)$ - players won't accept less than Nash equilibrium
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\item[\textcolor{orange}{\rule{0.3cm}{0.3cm}}] \textbf{Folk Theorem Set:} Sustainable equilibria when $\delta$ is sufficiently high
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\end{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Key Features:}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Any point in blue region can be sustained as equilibrium
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\item Requires appropriate punishment strategies
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\item Any point in orange can be sustained as equilibrium
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\item Requires approp. punishment strategies
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\item Players must be patient enough ($\delta$ high)
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\item Cooperation $(3,3)$ is feasible but not automatic
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\end{itemize}
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\item \textbf{Connection to Our Study:}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item We test if LLM agents actually achieve points in this set
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\item Focus on $(3,3)$-type outcomes in our market simulations
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\item Examine breakdown as theoretical conditions become harder to meet
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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\end{column}
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\end{columns}

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