Merge pull request #658 from mCodex/chore-updating-libs

chore: cleaning code base

Author: mCodex

README.md

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 [![Coverage](https://img.shields.io/badge/coverage-92%25-brightgreen)](https://github.com/mcodex/react-native-sensitive-info)
 [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-green)](LICENSE)
 
-Hardware-backed secure storage for React Native. Secrets are encrypted with AES-GCM, gated by biometrics or device credentials, and stored in the system Keychain (iOS/Apple) or Android Keystore — all behind a simple Promise-based API and first-class React hooks.
+Hardware-backed secure storage for React Native. Secrets are encrypted with AES-GCM, gated by biometrics or device credentials, and stored in the system Keychain (iOS) or Android Keystore behind a Promise-based API and React hooks.
 
 > [!NOTE]
 > **Upgrading from v5?** See [MIGRATION.md](./docs/MIGRATION.md). v6 requires the New Architecture (RN 0.76+) and `react-native-nitro-modules`. Windows support was removed.
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ console.log(item?.metadata.securityLevel) // e.g. 'secureEnclave'
 await deleteItem('session-token', { service: 'auth' })
 ```
 
-Building a component? The [hooks API](#️-react-hooks-api-recommended) handles loading states, cleanup, and error boundaries — no `useEffect` boilerplate needed.
+Building a component? The [hooks API](#️-react-hooks-api-recommended) handles loading states, cleanup, and error boundaries.
 
 ## ⚛️ React Hooks API (Recommended)
 
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ import {
 
 ## 🛡️ Security
 
-Every secret is encrypted with **AES-GCM** and bound to a hardware-protected key — the **Secure Enclave** on Apple platforms and the **Android Keystore** (StrongBox when available). Each entry carries an **HMAC-SHA256 integrity tag** recomputed on every read; a mismatch raises `IntegrityViolationError` before any biometric prompt fires, so spoofed entries can never trigger user authentication.
+Every secret is encrypted with **AES-GCM** and bound to a hardware-protected key. Each entry carries an **HMAC-SHA256 integrity tag** recomputed on every read; a mismatch raises `IntegrityViolationError` before any biometric prompt fires.
 
 For the full cryptographic model — key derivation, AAD binding, replay defense, and threat classification — see [THREAT_MODEL.md](./docs/THREAT_MODEL.md).
 

android/src/main/java/com/sensitiveinfo/HybridSensitiveInfo.kt

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ class HybridSensitiveInfo : HybridSensitiveInfoSpec() {
         val accessControlResolver = AccessControlResolver(securityAvailabilityResolver)
         val serviceNameResolver = ServiceNameResolver(ctx)
         val authenticator = BiometricAuthenticator()
-        val cryptoManager = CryptoManager(authenticator)
+        val cryptoManager = CryptoManager(authenticator, ctx)
 
         Dependencies(
           context = ctx,
@@ -416,16 +416,9 @@ class HybridSensitiveInfo : HybridSensitiveInfoSpec() {
   }
 
   /**
-   * True when the persisted entry's Keystore key requires user authentication
-   * to authorize a `Cipher.init` — i.e. biometric- or device-credential-gated
-   * entries. `entry.requiresAuthentication` already covers the common case
-   * (including `devicePasscode`, which `AccessControlResolver` flags as
-   * auth-required), so any such entry returns `true` and is skipped by the
-   * lazy refresh to avoid a second prompt. The `accessControl` fallback only
-   * matters for legacy entries persisted before the flag existed: there we
-   * still classify the biometry-class policies as auth-gated, while
-   * `devicePasscode`/`none` legacy entries are treated as silently
-   * upgradable (their keys had no auth requirement back then).
+   * True when the entry's Keystore key requires user authentication to authorize
+   * a `Cipher.init`. The `accessControl` fallback handles legacy entries
+   * persisted before `requiresAuthentication` existed.
    */
   private fun requiresBiometricAuth(entry: PersistedEntry): Boolean {
     if (entry.requiresAuthentication) return true

android/src/main/java/com/sensitiveinfo/internal/crypto/CryptoManager.kt

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 package com.sensitiveinfo.internal.crypto
 
+import android.app.KeyguardManager
+import android.content.Context
 import android.os.Build
 import android.security.keystore.KeyGenParameterSpec
 import android.security.keystore.KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException
@@ -30,10 +32,16 @@ private const val TRANSFORMATION = "AES/GCM/NoPadding"
  * from disk.
  */
 internal class CryptoManager(
-  private val authenticator: BiometricAuthenticator
+  private val authenticator: BiometricAuthenticator,
+  private val context: Context
 ) {
   private val keyStore: KeyStore = KeyStore.getInstance(ANDROID_KEY_STORE).apply { load(null) }
 
+  private fun hasSecureLockScreen(): Boolean {
+    val keyguard = context.getSystemService(Context.KEYGUARD_SERVICE) as? KeyguardManager
+    return keyguard?.isDeviceLocked == true
+  }
+
   /** Encrypts data and returns the ciphertext plus generated IV. */
   suspend fun encrypt(
     alias: String,
@@ -49,27 +57,14 @@ internal class CryptoManager(
 
     val readyCipher = try {
       if (!requiresAuth) {
-        cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key)
-        cipher
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, null, alias)
       } else if (supportsKeystoreAuth) {
-        try {
-          cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key)
-        } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Encryption key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
-        }
-
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, null, alias)
         val authenticated = authenticator.authenticate(prompt, resolution.allowedAuthenticators, cipher)
         (authenticated ?: cipher)
       } else {
         authenticator.authenticate(prompt, resolution.allowedAuthenticators, null)
-        try {
-          cipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key)
-        } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Encryption key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
-        }
-        cipher
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key, null, alias)
       }
     } catch (error: CancellationException) {
       throw error
@@ -103,41 +98,14 @@ internal class CryptoManager(
 
     val readyCipher = try {
       if (!requiresAuth) {
-        try {
-          cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec)
-        } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
-        } catch (unrecoverable: UnrecoverableKeyException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key unavailable. Item must be recreated.", unrecoverable)
-        }
-        cipher
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec, alias)
       } else if (supportsKeystoreAuth) {
-        try {
-          cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec)
-        } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
-        } catch (unrecoverable: UnrecoverableKeyException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key unavailable. Item must be recreated.", unrecoverable)
-        }
-
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec, alias)
         val authenticated = authenticator.authenticate(prompt, resolution.allowedAuthenticators, cipher)
         (authenticated ?: cipher)
       } else {
         authenticator.authenticate(prompt, resolution.allowedAuthenticators, null)
-        try {
-          cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec)
-        } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
-        } catch (unrecoverable: UnrecoverableKeyException) {
-          deleteKey(alias)
-          throw IllegalStateException("Decryption key unavailable. Item must be recreated.", unrecoverable)
-        }
-        cipher
+        initCipher(cipher, Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, key, spec, alias)
       }
     } catch (error: CancellationException) {
       throw error
@@ -158,11 +126,30 @@ internal class CryptoManager(
     }
   }
 
+  private fun initCipher(
+    cipher: Cipher,
+    mode: Int,
+    key: SecretKey,
+    spec: GCMParameterSpec?,
+    alias: String
+  ): Cipher {
+    try {
+      if (spec != null) cipher.init(mode, key, spec) else cipher.init(mode, key)
+    } catch (invalidated: KeyPermanentlyInvalidatedException) {
+      deleteKey(alias)
+      val action = if (mode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) "Encryption" else "Decryption"
+      throw IllegalStateException("$action key invalidated. Item must be recreated.", invalidated)
+    } catch (unrecoverable: UnrecoverableKeyException) {
+      deleteKey(alias)
+      val action = if (mode == Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE) "Encryption" else "Decryption"
+      throw IllegalStateException("$action key unavailable. Item must be recreated.", unrecoverable)
+    }
+    return cipher
+  }
+
   /**
-   * Reconstructs the resolution for data loaded from SharedPreferences.
-   *
-   * This lets us decrypt entries that were encrypted on a previous run without re-reading
-   * the original access-control input, since the persisted metadata is authoritative.
+   * Reconstructs the resolution for data loaded from SharedPreferences,
+   * using the persisted metadata as the source of truth.
    */
   fun buildResolutionForPersisted(
     accessControl: AccessControl,
@@ -213,7 +200,9 @@ internal class CryptoManager(
 
     // Defense in depth: require the device to be unlocked at the moment of use, mirroring iOS's
     // `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked` default. Available on API 28+.
-    if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.P) {
+    // Skip when no secure screen lock exists — setUnlockedDeviceRequired crashes on Android 12-14
+    // without one (https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/191391068, fixed in Android 15).
+    if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.P && hasSecureLockScreen()) {
       try {
         builder.setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true)
       } catch (_: Throwable) {
@@ -249,7 +238,7 @@ internal class CryptoManager(
     }
 
     if (resolution.accessControl == AccessControl.DEVICEPASSCODE) {
-      if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.P) {
+      if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.P && hasSecureLockScreen()) {
         builder.setUnlockedDeviceRequired(true)
       }
     }

biome.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-	"$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/2.4.12/schema.json",
+	"$schema": "https://biomejs.dev/schemas/2.5.1/schema.json",
 	"vcs": { "enabled": true, "clientKind": "git", "useIgnoreFile": true },
 	"files": {
 		"includes": [
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 	"linter": {
 		"enabled": true,
 		"rules": {
-			"recommended": true,
+			"preset": "recommended",
 			"correctness": {
 				"noUnusedImports": "error",
 				"noUnusedVariables": "error",
@@ -37,10 +37,18 @@
 			},
 			"style": {
 				"useImportType": "error",
-				"useConsistentArrayType": "error"
+				"useConsistentArrayType": "error",
+				"useErrorCause": "warn",
+				"useConsistentEnumValueType": "warn"
 			},
 			"suspicious": {
-				"noExplicitAny": "warn"
+				"noExplicitAny": "warn",
+				"noShadow": "warn",
+				"noUnnecessaryConditions": "warn",
+				"noNestedPromises": "error"
+			},
+			"security": {
+				"noScriptUrl": "error"
 			}
 		}
 	},
@@ -64,6 +72,14 @@
 					"suspicious": { "noExplicitAny": "off" }
 				}
 			}
+		},
+		{
+			"includes": ["src/hooks/**"],
+			"linter": {
+				"rules": {
+					"suspicious": { "noUnnecessaryConditions": "off" }
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	]
 }