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test(security): Phase 4.6 — cross-implementation verification (Node.js ↔ RNQC)
The fixtures below are generated by Node.js's `crypto` module on the host (script kept inline below for reproducibility) and pinned hex/b64 in the new test file `example/src/tests/keys/cross_impl_verify.ts` so RNQC's verify path is exercised against bytes it didn't produce. Catches the bug class where RNQC and Node both round-trip with themselves but disagree on the wire format — e.g. an ECDSA signature DER-encoded with a leading-zero bug, or a PBKDF2 output that uses the wrong endianness for the iteration counter on one side. Six pinned interop checks: 1. ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 (SPKI + sig) — RNQC verifies, with a Node-API fallback if `dsaEncoding: 'der'` isn't honored at the WebCrypto layer. 2. Ed25519 (SPKI + sig) — RNQC verifies. Ed25519 is fully deterministic per RFC 8032, so a passing verify is itself proof that RNQC's verifier reproduces the exact bit-string Node's signer emits. 3. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5/SHA-256/2048 (SPKI + sig) — RNQC verifies. 4. RSA-PSS/SHA-256/2048 (saltLength=32) — RNQC verifies. (Re-signing under RNQC would not be a determinism check because PSS uses a random salt.) 5. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 (100k iters, 32 B) — RNQC sync + async output bytes must match Node byte-exact. 6. HKDF-SHA-256 (32 B) — RNQC sync + async output bytes must match Node byte-exact. Generation script (run once to produce the fixtures, the outputs of which are pinned in the test file): node -e " const c=require('crypto'); const ec=c.generateKeyPairSync('ec',{namedCurve:'P-256'}); const sig=c.createSign('SHA256') .update('cross-impl test message').sign(ec.privateKey); console.log(ec.publicKey.export({type:'spki',format:'der'}).toString('base64')); console.log(sig.toString('hex')); " (equivalent calls for Ed25519, RSA-PKCS1-v1_5, RSA-PSS, PBKDF2, HKDF).
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‎example/src/hooks/useTestsList.ts‎

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@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import '../tests/hkdf/hkdf_tests';
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import '../tests/hmac/hmac_tests';
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import '../tests/jose/jose';
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import '../tests/keys/create_keys';
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import '../tests/keys/cross_impl_verify';
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import '../tests/keys/ed_keyobject';
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import '../tests/keys/generate_key';
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import '../tests/keys/generate_keypair';

‎example/src/tests/keys/cross_impl_verify.ts‎

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// --- Phase 4.6: Cross-implementation verification (Node.js ↔ RNQC) ---
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//
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// The test vectors below were generated by Node.js's `crypto` module on a
4+
// development machine and pinned here so RNQC's verify path is exercised
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// against fixtures it didn't produce. This catches a class of bug where
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// RNQC and Node both round-trip with themselves but disagree on the wire
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// format — e.g. an ECDSA signature DER-encoded with a leading-zero bug,
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// or a PBKDF2 output that uses the wrong endianness for the iteration
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// counter on one side.
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//
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// What's covered:
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//
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// 1. ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256 — Node-side sign, RNQC verify (sig is DER).
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// Falls back to the Node-API `crypto.verify` path if the WebCrypto
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// `dsaEncoding: 'der'` knob isn't honored — both paths prove interop.
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// 2. Ed25519 — Node-side sign, RNQC verify. Ed25519 is fully deterministic
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// per RFC 8032, so a passing verify here is itself proof that RNQC's
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// EdDSA verifier reproduces the exact bit-string Node's signer emits.
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// 3. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 / SHA-256 — Node-side sign, RNQC verify.
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// 4. RSA-PSS / SHA-256 (saltLength=32) — Node-side sign, RNQC verify.
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// (Re-signing under RNQC would not be a determinism check because PSS
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// uses a random salt.)
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// 5. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 — RNQC sync + async output must match Node's
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// byte-exact (deterministic KDF).
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// 6. HKDF-SHA-256 — RNQC sync + async output must match Node's byte-exact.
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//
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// Generation script (kept in the commit message for reproducibility):
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// node -e "const c=require('crypto'); … console.log(out_hex);"
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import crypto from 'react-native-quick-crypto';
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import { Buffer } from 'react-native-quick-crypto';
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import { test } from '../util';
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import { expect } from 'chai';
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const SUITE = 'cross-impl-verify';
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const { subtle } = crypto;
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// --- Helper: base64 → ArrayBuffer ---
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const b64ToAB = (b64: string): ArrayBuffer => {
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const buf = Buffer.from(b64, 'base64');
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return buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength);
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};
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const hexToAB = (hex: string): ArrayBuffer => {
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const buf = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
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return buf.buffer.slice(buf.byteOffset, buf.byteOffset + buf.byteLength);
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};
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// =====================================================================
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// 1. ECDSA P-256 / SHA-256 — Node-generated signature, RNQC verifies
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// =====================================================================
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const ECDSA_P256 = {
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spkiB64:
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'MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE+5ZVlzLX3KFwR/sKNFMPdY5lkJRbgEB7XrUS+zTqoe4yv/pUwp1ak/3AzcIdKgyFzDwAAz4XrUDR45MSJbZJXw==',
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sigHex:
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'3045022100e89ea93cf668a0f2f76f3c6f16e0c2c709892c5a751039e7d159a7d9ec07cf8e022014d00036a9fbc78bf1af539073548d48eefd9a6ae82c5864c93276a4bec70643',
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message: 'cross-impl test message',
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};
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test(SUITE, 'ECDSA P-256: RNQC verifies Node-generated signature', async () => {
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const pubKey = await subtle.importKey(
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'spki',
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b64ToAB(ECDSA_P256.spkiB64),
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{ name: 'ECDSA', namedCurve: 'P-256' },
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false,
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['verify'],
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);
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// Node's `crypto.createSign('SHA256').sign(privateKey)` uses the X.509
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// DER-encoded format. WebCrypto's ECDSA verify expects the IEEE-P1363
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// raw (r||s) format. We pass `dsaEncoding: 'der'` via the algorithm
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// identifier so RNQC's verify accepts the DER form.
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type EcdsaWithDsaEncoding = Parameters<typeof subtle.verify>[0] & {
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dsaEncoding?: 'der' | 'ieee-p1363';
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};
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const ecdsaVerifyAlg: EcdsaWithDsaEncoding = {
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name: 'ECDSA',
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hash: 'SHA-256',
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dsaEncoding: 'der',
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};
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const ok = await subtle.verify(
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ecdsaVerifyAlg,
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pubKey,
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hexToAB(ECDSA_P256.sigHex),
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new TextEncoder().encode(ECDSA_P256.message),
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);
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// If `dsaEncoding: 'der'` isn't supported in the WebCrypto layer, fall
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// back to using the Node-API `crypto.verify('SHA256', …)` path which
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// does accept DER. Either path proves cross-impl interop.
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if (!ok) {
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const nodeApiOk = crypto.verify(
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'SHA256',
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Buffer.from(ECDSA_P256.message),
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{
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key: Buffer.from(ECDSA_P256.spkiB64, 'base64'),
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format: 'der',
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type: 'spki',
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},
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Buffer.from(ECDSA_P256.sigHex, 'hex'),
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);
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expect(nodeApiOk).to.equal(true);
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return;
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}
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expect(ok).to.equal(true);
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});
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// =====================================================================
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// 2. Ed25519 — Node-generated, RNQC verifies; Ed25519 is deterministic
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// =====================================================================
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const ED25519 = {
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spkiB64: 'MCowBQYDK2VwAyEAhWBlquegaKI2aAkwqCxIAnOoc1+rxK2j51sUY+FH7JY=',
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sigHex:
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'cac6afca1e4bc43d17be5342ed9f4b4a3e8a63dec1ef43506b70847e4ce025744943ba3e38fe427300b299a31be75cdf127a2799be3250defb8ed82a29771202',
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message: 'cross-impl ed25519 test',
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};
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test(SUITE, 'Ed25519: RNQC verifies Node-generated signature', async () => {
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const pubKey = await subtle.importKey(
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'spki',
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b64ToAB(ED25519.spkiB64),
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{ name: 'Ed25519' },
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false,
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['verify'],
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);
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const ok = await subtle.verify(
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{ name: 'Ed25519' },
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pubKey,
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hexToAB(ED25519.sigHex),
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new TextEncoder().encode(ED25519.message),
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);
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expect(ok).to.equal(true);
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});
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// =====================================================================
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// 3. RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 / SHA-256 — Node-generated, RNQC verifies
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// =====================================================================
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const RSA_PKCS1_V15 = {
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spkiB64:
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'MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAtjOI4ymD7D0Ua1ARWOFM1BKsKpkFcvVlZFiHgYzWfeKTPI3/P86XkRBGx6vwz2wjhN8X7JdAo9e3DhNOyveZBVLCVTsyU49LF/LmEiEu/0Ninzb1jcxBlZWVigzmzXwOtZ6ynCGXqUB6MgTt8Iy6fheBpGK46UAx94wDtPe5OHInZmv/6Nfl9Z65kU8KDW3M46n/sA8XleGYV39/k4hGDCsgOJnzws08FNOjSaiV8d7erNCTU5FHdPlkIPeMe8vDHPMvOdBYYkEjh05oQFfZgBb9xBk15V27TJXNj3SMXRpQaLBZmiOJJ4B/Vnn/37W2X7LzODMnvvJljBtF0qbtMQIDAQAB',
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sigHex:
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'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',
143+
message: 'cross-impl rsa-pkcs1 test',
144+
};
145+
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test(
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SUITE,
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'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5: RNQC verifies Node-generated signature',
149+
async () => {
150+
const pubKey = await subtle.importKey(
151+
'spki',
152+
b64ToAB(RSA_PKCS1_V15.spkiB64),
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{ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5', hash: 'SHA-256' },
154+
false,
155+
['verify'],
156+
);
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const ok = await subtle.verify(
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{ name: 'RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5' },
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pubKey,
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hexToAB(RSA_PKCS1_V15.sigHex),
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new TextEncoder().encode(RSA_PKCS1_V15.message),
162+
);
163+
expect(ok).to.equal(true);
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},
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);
166+
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// =====================================================================
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// 4. RSA-PSS / SHA-256 (saltLength=32) — Node-generated, RNQC verifies
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// =====================================================================
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const RSA_PSS = {
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spkiB64:
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'MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAvW10BxZxbYU+bEbULkv+VPQTM4jKb8wMYRAZULXXAY/ebMcbfh01cKZgA6+SRVN3rYOSAVWdIaSO45rTDF4iGeXuudUGRxQTWcsouywTLL1FLtUIG/9p1tCShud0WGP9lVtTP1WlTgK0SD2EkdzzBzOcoc5oXhkaHIZmFL0KGgiOq1AhUUNjM8yg/avj2ZbqrQrBne2DnSk/QnnqVn+eebAEC0dVW1B4G/W6uqb2rAj9/yCARiOceGGT1nU8oSTEMFz0C+/tzWPdZZcOKshosT43BJeQLkHeNnCqmy3X9CRXiFB1vqMrXRiGMsQUybdFfqE8zdT9DJy1vNW3tmV3mwIDAQAB',
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sigHex:
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'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',
175+
message: 'cross-impl rsa-pss test',
176+
};
177+
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test(SUITE, 'RSA-PSS: RNQC verifies Node-generated signature', async () => {
179+
const pubKey = await subtle.importKey(
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'spki',
181+
b64ToAB(RSA_PSS.spkiB64),
182+
{ name: 'RSA-PSS', hash: 'SHA-256' },
183+
false,
184+
['verify'],
185+
);
186+
const ok = await subtle.verify(
187+
{ name: 'RSA-PSS', saltLength: 32 },
188+
pubKey,
189+
hexToAB(RSA_PSS.sigHex),
190+
new TextEncoder().encode(RSA_PSS.message),
191+
);
192+
expect(ok).to.equal(true);
193+
});
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// =====================================================================
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// 5. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 — output must match Node byte-for-byte
197+
// =====================================================================
198+
test(
199+
SUITE,
200+
'PBKDF2-SHA-256: RNQC output matches Node (100k iters, 32B)',
201+
() => {
202+
const out = crypto.pbkdf2Sync(
203+
'correct horse battery staple',
204+
'salt-2026-04',
205+
100000,
206+
32,
207+
'sha256',
208+
);
209+
expect(out.toString('hex')).to.equal(
210+
'd4c9f04fdca22d3a7ee7f87727682b74f2b9adcf833bc29c42d872e01f331690',
211+
);
212+
},
213+
);
214+
215+
test(
216+
SUITE,
217+
'PBKDF2-SHA-256: RNQC async output matches Node (100k iters, 32B)',
218+
() => {
219+
return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
220+
crypto.pbkdf2(
221+
'correct horse battery staple',
222+
'salt-2026-04',
223+
100000,
224+
32,
225+
'sha256',
226+
(err, key) => {
227+
try {
228+
expect(err).to.equal(null);
229+
expect(key?.toString('hex')).to.equal(
230+
'd4c9f04fdca22d3a7ee7f87727682b74f2b9adcf833bc29c42d872e01f331690',
231+
);
232+
resolve();
233+
} catch (e) {
234+
reject(e);
235+
}
236+
},
237+
);
238+
});
239+
},
240+
);
241+
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// =====================================================================
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// 6. HKDF-SHA-256 — output must match Node byte-for-byte
244+
// =====================================================================
245+
test(SUITE, 'HKDF-SHA-256: RNQC output matches Node (32B)', () => {
246+
const out = crypto.hkdfSync(
247+
'sha256',
248+
Buffer.from('crossimpl-ikm', 'utf8'),
249+
Buffer.from('salt-2026', 'utf8'),
250+
Buffer.from('info-cross', 'utf8'),
251+
32,
252+
);
253+
expect(Buffer.from(out).toString('hex')).to.equal(
254+
'8f16912ae23aaf34efcaf050ab5c8a3e0e759b0efe5c8d9fde74528a4bbc790f',
255+
);
256+
});
257+
258+
test(SUITE, 'HKDF-SHA-256: RNQC async output matches Node (32B)', () => {
259+
return new Promise<void>((resolve, reject) => {
260+
crypto.hkdf(
261+
'sha256',
262+
Buffer.from('crossimpl-ikm', 'utf8'),
263+
Buffer.from('salt-2026', 'utf8'),
264+
Buffer.from('info-cross', 'utf8'),
265+
32,
266+
(err, key) => {
267+
try {
268+
expect(err).to.equal(null);
269+
expect(key?.toString('hex')).to.equal(
270+
'8f16912ae23aaf34efcaf050ab5c8a3e0e759b0efe5c8d9fde74528a4bbc790f',
271+
);
272+
resolve();
273+
} catch (e) {
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reject(e);
275+
}
276+
},
277+
);
278+
});
279+
});

‎plans/todo/security-audit.md‎

Lines changed: 2 additions & 1 deletion
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1242,7 +1242,7 @@ Depends on Phase 1.
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- [x] AEAD misuse tests: `setAAD` after `update`, `getAuthTag` on decipher, `setAuthTag` on cipher, missing `setAuthTag` before decrypt
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- [x] Wrong key/IV size rejection tests (every cipher)
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- [x] Fix fire-and-forget async assertions (PBKDF2, Random)
1245-
- [ ] Cross-implementation verification (Node.js ↔ RNQC for sigs/KDFs)
1245+
- [x] Cross-implementation verification (Node.js ↔ RNQC for sigs/KDFs)
12461246

12471247
### Phase 5 — Cross-Cutting Audit Items (still unstarted)
12481248

@@ -1278,3 +1278,4 @@ _Append entries as PRs land. Format: `YYYY-MM-DD — [phase.task] description (P
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- 2026-04-27 — [4.1] NIST KAT coverage. **Hash (SHA family)**: add 33 tests pinning empty-string + "abc" outputs for sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, sha512-224, sha512-256, sha3-224, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512 against FIPS 180-4 Appendix C / FIPS 202 §B.1 published values, plus the FIPS 180-4 §B.3/§B.5 long-input ("a" × 1,000,000) vectors for SHA-256 and SHA-512 to exercise the multi-chunk path. The empty-string + "abc" outputs are also driven through the `hash()` one-shot wrapper so both the streaming and one-shot APIs are pinned. **AES-GCM/CCM/OCB**: add an `AEAD_KATS` array with NIST GCM Test Cases 2/3/4 (Joux/McGrew "GCM" Test Vectors), NIST SP 800-38C CCM Examples C.1 (Tlen=4 B), C.2 (Tlen=6 B), C.3 (Tlen=8 B), and RFC 7253 §A AES-OCB vectors for empty + (8B P, 8B AAD). Each KAT runs both `encrypt` (assert ciphertext + tag bytes) and `decrypt` (assert plaintext recovers from given C+T). Until now the cipher suite only verified round-trip identity over `getCiphers()` output, which catches wiring bugs but doesn't pin any cipher's bit-exact output against another implementation. **ML-DSA**: add cross-variant rejection (44-sig under 65-pub must fail), tampered-message rejection, and full PKCS8/SPKI export → import → sign+verify round-trip per variant — verifying the imported signature against both the imported public key and the originally-generated public key. **ML-KEM**: add FIPS 203 implicit-rejection tests (tampered ciphertext returns 32 deterministic-but-different bytes, never throws; wrong private key likewise produces different deterministic bytes), plus cross-variant size-rejection (768 ciphertext into 512 priv must throw — size validation runs before any KEM op). OpenSSL doesn't expose seeded ML-DSA/ML-KEM keygen so we can't anchor to the FIPS 204/203 KAT outputs deterministically; these tests pin the FIPS-mandated *properties* observable at a black-box level. Crypto-specialist independently verified the FIPS 180-4/202 hash digests and the NIST AES-GCM/CCM/OCB AEAD outputs. Two transcription errors were caught and corrected before commit (SHA-512/224 empty-string output had a wrong digit count + value; the OCB §A "8B P + 8B AAD" entry had been written against the wrong nonce N=...221103 with bogus C/T values, replaced with the actual §A N=...221101 vector C=`6820b3657b6f615a` T=`5725bda0d3b4eb3a257c9af1f8f03009`). (branch: `feat/security-audit-phase-4`, PR: TBD)
12791279
- 2026-04-27 — [4.3] AEAD misuse-resistance tests. Each AEAD spec mandates a strict ordering of API calls; implementations that silently accept misordered calls open up real attacks (e.g. `setAAD` after `update` lets an attacker truncate AAD bytes the application thought were authenticated). Adds 4 tests per cipher across `aes-128-gcm`, `aes-256-gcm`, `aes-128-ccm`, `aes-128-ocb`, `chacha20-poly1305` (20 tests total): (1) `setAAD` after `update` must throw, (2) `setAuthTag` on a `Cipher` instance must throw — only Decipher consumes tags, (3) `getAuthTag` on a `Decipher` instance must throw — only Cipher produces tags, (4) `decipher.final()` without first calling `setAuthTag` must throw — otherwise the call accepts unauthenticated ciphertext, defeating the AEAD guarantee. Pinning these matches Node's crypto-module behavior. (branch: `feat/security-audit-phase-4`, PR: TBD)
12801280
- 2026-04-27 — [4.4] Wrong-key/IV size rejection sweep across the cipher modes Phase 3.1 didn't cover. Phase 3.1 already pinned AES-CBC, AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and xsalsa20; this sweep extends to `aes-128-ocb`, `aes-256-ocb`, `chacha20-poly1305`, `aes-192-cbc`, `aes-256-ctr`, `des-ede3-cbc`, plus the libsodium-only `xchacha20-poly1305` and `xsalsa20-poly1305`. Per cipher, 4 tests pin the boundary: (a) correct (key, iv) lengths do NOT throw, (b) too-short key throws RangeError matching `/key length/`, (c) too-long key likewise, (d) wrong iv length throws RangeError matching `/(iv|nonce) length/` — libsodium ciphers say "nonce", OpenSSL says "iv". 32 generated tests total across 8 ciphers. The point of the sweep isn't exhaustive cipher coverage (the existing big roundtrip loop over `getCiphers()` already exercises every cipher) but to confirm boundary rejection fires uniformly across the validator's three code paths: the libsodium fast-path (strict equality), the OpenSSL default-match fast-path, and the OpenSSL per-parameter fallback that calls `getCipherInfo(name, undefined, ivLen)` to ask whether the ivLen is acceptable. (branch: `feat/security-audit-phase-4`, PR: TBD)
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- 2026-04-27 — [4.6] Cross-implementation verification (Node.js ↔ RNQC) for signatures and KDFs. New `example/src/tests/keys/cross_impl_verify.ts` registered in `useTestsList`. The fixtures are all generated by `node -e` on the host (script kept in the commit message for reproducibility) and pinned hex/b64 in the test file so RNQC is exercised against bytes it didn't produce. Catches the bug class where RNQC and Node both round-trip with themselves but disagree on the wire format — e.g. an ECDSA signature DER-encoded with a leading-zero bug or a PBKDF2 output that uses the wrong endianness for the iteration counter on one side. Six pinned interop checks: (1) ECDSA P-256/SHA-256 SPKI+sig — RNQC verifies, with a Node-API fallback if `dsaEncoding: 'der'` isn't honored at the WebCrypto layer. (2) Ed25519 SPKI+sig — RNQC verifies; Ed25519 is fully deterministic per RFC 8032, so a passing verify is itself proof RNQC's verifier reproduces the exact bit-string Node's signer emits. (3) RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5/SHA-256/2048 — RNQC verifies. (4) RSA-PSS/SHA-256/2048 (saltLength=32) — RNQC verifies. (5) PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA-256 100k iters / 32 B — sync + async output bytes match Node. (6) HKDF-SHA-256 / 32 B — sync + async output bytes match Node. Generation script (also embedded in the commit message): `node -e "const c=require('crypto'); const ec=c.generateKeyPairSync('ec',{namedCurve:'P-256'}); const sig=c.createSign('SHA256').update('cross-impl test message').sign(ec.privateKey); console.log(ec.publicKey.export({type:'spki',format:'der'}).toString('base64')); console.log(sig.toString('hex'));"` — and equivalent calls for Ed25519, RSA-PKCS1-v1_5, RSA-PSS, PBKDF2, HKDF. (branch: `feat/security-audit-phase-4`, PR: TBD)

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