MSC4464: verifiable links in profile#4464
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Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Clarify the role of the 'scope' field in verification.
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
- ranging from grammar fixes `it's` -> `its` - expanding on security considerations - clarifying the `result` value for failed verifications - expanded the motivation in the introduction section Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
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Implementation requirements:
- Server
- Client
Signed-off-by: Rye <git@itsrye.dev>
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If it’s a work in progress should u mark as a draft for now? |
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I’m a little bit concerned that this would be used by bad actors for impersonation attacks Eg they could spin up a homeserver without the requirements you outlined and make their profile link to any account they want. |
@DidiDidi129 Since the verification is handled via the Client-to-Server (C2S) API rather than a Server-to-Server (S2S) protocol, the validation logic resides within the user's own homeserver. Consequently, the security of this implementation relies on the integrity of the specific homeserver the user is registered with. While the trustworthiness of public homeservers is a valid point of discussion, the specific impersonation vector you mentioned, where a malicious actor spins up a rogue homeserver to affect others, is not feasible here, as their server would have no authority over the victim's verification process. Note: Please use threads (reviews) for further technical discussions to keep the PR history organized. |
Ahh yes that makes sense. Sorry for my comprehension issues lmao |
Rendered
Follow-up for MSC4462