fix(dashboard): harden static path traversal checks#2027
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July 4, 2026 23:11
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Pull request overview
This PR tightens static-file path traversal protection in the contributor dashboard’s issue-monitor HTTP server by replacing a prefix-based root check with a path.relative() containment check, and adds a regression test that exercises a sibling-prefix traversal attempt.
Changes:
- Replace
resolved.startsWith(resolve(distDir))with arelative(root, resolved)+../ absolute-path rejection check for/assets/*requests. - Add a regression test that requests
/assets/../../<dist-name>-evil/secret.txtvia raw HTTP to avoid client-side URL normalization.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 2 out of 2 changed files in this pull request and generated 2 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| packages/apm-contributor-dashboard/.apm/extensions/issue-monitor/server-handler.mjs | Updates the /assets/ static-file containment guard to use path.relative() instead of startsWith() path prefix checks. |
| packages/apm-contributor-dashboard/tests/server.test.mjs | Adds a regression test for sibling-prefix traversal attempts against dist-evil-style paths. |
Comment on lines
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| const resolved = resolve(root, normalize(urlPath.slice(1))); | ||
| const rel = relative(root, resolved); | ||
| if (rel.startsWith("..") || isAbsolute(rel)) { |
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| const root = resolve(distDir); | ||
| const resolved = resolve(root, normalize(urlPath.slice(1))); | ||
| const rel = relative(root, resolved); | ||
| if (rel.startsWith("..") || isAbsolute(rel)) { | ||
| res.writeHead(403); res.end("Forbidden"); return; | ||
| } | ||
| serveStatic(res, resolved); |
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Summary
startsWith()root check with safepath.relative()containment check:rel.startsWith('..')orisAbsolute(rel)/assets/../../<dist-name>-evil/secret.txt.Testing