security: fix SSRF in AutoGen Studio fetch_webpage tool#7706
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fetch_webpage() called httpx.get(url) with follow_redirects=True and no URL validation, allowing requests to private/internal network addresses when the tool is used in a server-side agent deployment. Changes: - Add _validate_url() that resolves hostname to IP and blocks RFC 1918, loopback, and link-local ranges (including cloud metadata endpoints). - Switch to follow_redirects=False and validate each redirect target before following, preventing redirect-chain bypass.
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Summary
fetch_webpage()inautogenstudio/gallery/tools/fetch_webpage.pycallshttpx.get(url)with no URL validation andfollow_redirects=True(httpx default). When deployed as a server-side agent, this allows any agent user to cause the server to fetch internal network addresses.Vulnerable code (before)
No IP range check.
follow_redirects=Truemeans an attacker-controlled server returning 302 to an internal address bypasses future URL-based filtering.Fix
_validate_url(): resolves hostname to IP and blocks RFC 1918, loopback, and link-local (169.254.x.x) ranges before making any request.follow_redirects=Falseand validate each redirect target before following.Test plan
http://127.0.0.1/→ ValueError (loopback)http://169.254.169.254/→ ValueError (cloud metadata)http://10.0.0.1/→ ValueError (RFC 1918)