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ci: declare workflow-level contents: read on 5 build/test workflows#2730

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ci: declare workflow-level contents: read on 5 build/test workflows#2730
arpitjain099 wants to merge 1 commit into
nasa:devfrom
arpitjain099:chore/declare-workflow-perms-readonly

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Pins the default GITHUB_TOKEN to contents: read on the 5 workflows in .github/workflows/ that don't actually need any write scope:

  • build-documentation.yml: doxygen build, uploads as workflow artifact.
  • code-coverage-eds.yml, code-coverage.yml: lcov coverage runs, no GitHub API.
  • format-check.yml: clang-format check.
  • static-analysis.yml: scan-build / cppcheck.

Left implicit on purpose:

  • add-to-project.yml is on pull_request_target with actions/add-to-project, which needs projects: write.
  • icbundle.yml does git merge + push of PR sets via GITHUB_TOKEN.
  • mcdc.yml uses dawidd6/action-download-artifact, which needs actions: read.
  • codeql-build.yml needs security-events: write for SARIF upload.

All four are best declared by maintainers who know the right scope per workflow.

Why

CVE-2025-30066 (March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files supply-chain compromise) exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN from workflow logs and the leaked token retained whatever scope was issued at the workflow level. Pinning per workflow caps that runtime authority irrespective of the repo or org default, gives drift protection if the default ever widens, and is credited per-file by the OpenSSF Scorecard Token-Permissions check.

YAML validated locally with yaml.safe_load on each touched file.

Pins the default GITHUB_TOKEN to contents: read on the 5 workflows in
.github/workflows/ that don't actually need any write scope:

- build-documentation.yml: doxygen build, upload as artifact.
- code-coverage-eds.yml, code-coverage.yml: lcov coverage runs, no
  GitHub API.
- format-check.yml: clang-format check.
- static-analysis.yml: scan-build / cppcheck run.

Left implicit on purpose:

- add-to-project.yml is on pull_request_target with actions/add-to-
  project (needs projects: write).
- icbundle.yml does git merge/push of PR sets via GITHUB_TOKEN.
- mcdc.yml uses dawidd6/action-download-artifact (needs actions: read).
- codeql-build.yml needs security-events: write.

All of those are best hardened by a maintainer who knows the right
scope.

Motivation: CVE-2025-30066 (March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files
compromise) exfiltrated GITHUB_TOKEN from workflow logs. Per-workflow
caps bound runtime authority irrespective of repo or org default,
give drift protection if the default ever widens, and are credited
per-file by the OpenSSF Scorecard Token-Permissions check.

YAML validated locally with yaml.safe_load.

Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
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