[Security] Restrict unserialize() allowed_classes in TaskProcessing distributed cache#60883
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getAvailableTaskTypes() stores a serialized array of ShapeDescriptor, ShapeEnumValue, and EShapeType values in the distributed cache and reads them back with bare unserialize() — no allowed_classes restriction. An attacker who can write to the distributed cache backend (e.g., via an unauthenticated Redis instance, SSRF to the cache server, or a cache-poisoning vulnerability) can inject a crafted PHP serialized payload containing a gadget chain and achieve Remote Code Execution when getAvailableTaskTypes() is next called. Restrict allowed_classes to the three value-object types actually stored in this cache entry (ShapeDescriptor, ShapeEnumValue, EShapeType). Any other class in the serialized string will become a harmless __PHP_Incomplete_Class without executing constructors or magic methods.
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Summary
TaskProcessing\Manager::getAvailableTaskTypes()serializesShapeDescriptor,ShapeEnumValue, andEShapeTypeobjects into the distributed cache and reads them back with bareunserialize()— noallowed_classesrestriction.An attacker who can write to the distributed cache backend can inject a crafted PHP serialized payload containing a gadget chain and achieve Remote Code Execution when
getAvailableTaskTypes()is next called.Attack scenario
__destruct/__wakeup).getAvailableTaskTypes()call, the gadget chain fires → RCE.Fix
Restrict
allowed_classesto the three value-object types that are actually stored in this cache entry (ShapeDescriptor,ShapeEnumValue,EShapeType). Any other class in the serialized string becomes a harmless__PHP_Incomplete_Class.Files changed
lib/private/TaskProcessing/Manager.php— add explicitallowed_classestounserialize()