doc: clarify process._debugProcess() in Permission Model

Author: cybe4sent1nel

doc/api/permissions.md

@@ -244,6 +244,30 @@ There are constraints you need to know before using this system:
 * Using existing file descriptors via the `node:fs` module bypasses the
   Permission Model.
 
+#### process.\_debugProcess() and cross-process Inspector activation
+
+The kInspector permission scope restricts the current process from opening its own V8 Inspector. However,
+process.\_debugProcess(pid) — which sends an OS-level signal (SIGUSR1 on POSIX, a remote thread on Windows)
+to an external process — is not gated by the kInspector scope or any other Permission Model scope.
+
+A sandboxed process running under --permission with no additional grants can call process.\_debugProcess(pid)
+to force another Node.js process to open its V8 Inspector. The target process does not need to be running
+under --permission for this to work — any Node.js process running on the same host under the same OS user
+can be signaled.
+
+This is consistent with the Node.js threat model: Node.js trusts the OS environment in which it runs.
+Cross-process signaling is an operating-system-level capability; restricting it is the responsibility of
+the operator (for example, using OS-level process isolation, separate OS users per process, or
+seccomp/AppArmor profiles on Linux).
+
+Developers relying on --permission to sandbox untrusted code should be aware that:
+
+* process.\_debugProcess() is callable from any sandboxed process with no grants.
+* If a target Node.js process is running on the same host under the same OS user, it can be forced to
+  open its Inspector via this API.
+* To prevent this, run sandboxed and target processes under different OS users, or use OS-level isolation
+  mechanisms outside of Node.js.
+
 #### Limitations and Known Issues
 
 * Symbolic links will be followed even to locations outside of the set of paths