Update apps/site/pages/en/blog/vulnerability/january-2026-dos-mitigation-async-hooks.md

Co-authored-by: Joyee Cheung <joyeec9h3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>

Author: mcollina

apps/site/pages/en/blog/vulnerability/january-2026-dos-mitigation-async-hooks.md

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Due to the prevalence of this usage pattern in frameworks, including but not lim
 
 The bug fix is included in a security release because of its widespread impact on the ecosystem. However, this is only a mitigation for the general risk that lies in the ecosystem’s dependence on recoverable stack space exhaustion for service availability.
 
-For users of these frameworks/tools and server hosting providers: Update as soon as possible.
+**For users of these frameworks/tools and server hosting providers**: Update as soon as possible.
 
 For libraries and frameworks: apply a more robust defense against stack space exhaustion to ensure service availability (e.g., limit recursion depth or avoid recursions if the depth can be controlled by an attacker). A recoverable `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` is only an unspecified behavior implemented on a best-effort basis, and cannot be depended on for security guarantees.