Update apps/site/pages/en/blog/vulnerability/january-2026-dos-mitigation-async-hooks.md

Co-authored-by: Joyee Cheung <joyeec9h3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>

Author: mcollina

apps/site/pages/en/blog/vulnerability/january-2026-dos-mitigation-async-hooks.md

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ The bug fix is included in a security release because of its widespread impact o
 
 **For users of these frameworks/tools and server hosting providers**: Update as soon as possible.
 
-For libraries and frameworks: apply a more robust defense against stack space exhaustion to ensure service availability (e.g., limit recursion depth or avoid recursions if the depth can be controlled by an attacker). A recoverable `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` is only an unspecified behavior implemented on a best-effort basis, and cannot be depended on for security guarantees.
+**For libraries and frameworks**: apply a more robust defense against stack space exhaustion to ensure service availability (e.g., limit recursion depth or avoid recursions if the depth can be controlled by an attacker). A recoverable `RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded` is only an unspecified behavior implemented on a best-effort basis, and cannot be depended on for security guarantees.
 
 ## The Bug