Status: current local Linux alpha.
- check-ins, annotations, and context tags;
- browser and OS aggregate records;
- consent history and insight evidence;
- the SQLCipher database key and backup recovery secrets; and
- the integrity of deletion, export, backup, and connector controls.
- React webview to fixed Tauri commands;
- Tauri shell to the local daemon socket;
- browser extension to the native-messaging host;
- native host to the daemon protocol;
- daemon to SQLCipher and the OS keyring; and
- user-created exports and backups leaving app-owned storage.
- a malicious or compromised browser extension update;
- another local process running as the same user;
- malformed or replayed native messages;
- protocol downgrade or source impersonation;
- accidental logging of private values;
- copied database, export, or backup files;
- misleading deletion or support wording; and
- dependency or release-artifact compromise.
- no browsing-history permission or broad host access;
- strict protocol schemas and metric allowlists;
- native-host origin restrictions and administrative-request rejection;
- daemon-side consent checks over the complete aggregate period;
- idempotent batch and check-in identifiers;
- user-only local IPC and fixed packaged helper paths;
- SQLCipher encryption with an OS-keyring key;
- short-lived confirmations for destructive operations;
- separate extension queue reset, record deletion, and complete removal;
- preview-first diagnostics with no automatic upload; and
- privacy scans and isolated lifecycle tests in the release workflow.
- Malware running as the same unlocked user can observe local data or UI.
- Browser permissions still grant observation capability to extension code even when MindCanary deliberately stores less.
- Plaintext exports inherit the security of the folder chosen by the user.
- An encrypted backup is unrecoverable without its recovery secret.
- Unsigned early-alpha Linux packages rely on GitHub transport and published checksums rather than a mature signing identity.
- Bugs can still violate documented boundaries; this is why security reports and reproducible source review matter.
- No URL, title, page text, search term, message content, screenshot, keystroke, or raw browsing history crosses a protocol boundary.
- A connector cannot enable its own canonical storage permission.
- Delayed delivery cannot backfill a period that was paused.
- Replaying the same batch does not duplicate records.
- The desktop cannot execute arbitrary daemon commands or paths.
- Product removal never claims to delete browser-owned storage or user-owned exports and backups.
- Deterministic insight evidence remains inspectable and non-diagnostic.