feat(authz): ADR-0066 Phase 1 — secure-by-default object posture + requiredPermissions (D2/D3)#2235
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…edence order, roadmap - ① Generalize the private RLS exemption into one explainable rule: viewAllRecords bypasses read RLS and modifyAllRecords bypasses write RLS, gated by the object's platform-global/private posture (Salesforce View All Data / Dataverse Org level). Covers the write path too; replaces the narrow "private skips tenant_isolation". - ② Add an explicit "Precedence / combination semantics" section (AND-gates → union grants → RLS OR-within/AND-with-global → deny overrides), closing the ADR's own open edge-case; fix the vague Consequences bullet. - ③ Author guidance for private (posture) vs requiredPermissions (capability contract); clarify requiredPermissions is an AND-gate. - ④–⑦ "Future refinements": deny-by-default target, per-operation requiredPermissions, capabilities in the CEL surface, permission-set-group muting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- access: { default: 'public' | 'private' } — secure-by-default object posture
(ObjectAccessConfigSchema), a data-model posture like tenancy. private opts the
object out of wildcard '*' grants and (via the engine) out of wildcard RLS.
- requiredPermissions: string[] on Object — capability contract (mirrors
App.requiredPermissions), enforced by the engine as an AND-gate.
- Both optional; absent ⇒ public / no gate (no migration for existing objects).
- Tests + full-DTS build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…iredPermissions, posture-gated RLS bypass - D2 CRUD: a `private` object is not covered by a non-super-user '*' wildcard grant (resolveObjectPermission); access needs an explicit per-object grant OR the View/Modify All Data super-user wildcard. Explicit grants always honored. - D3 capability AND-gate: object `requiredPermissions` checked before the CRUD grant (caller's systemPermissions union); missing capability → deny. - ① posture-gated super-user RLS bypass: on a private/platform-global object, viewAllRecords bypasses read RLS and modifyAllRecords bypasses write RLS (incl. pre-image + post-image check) — so a platform admin who is also an org admin sees all rows, while the bypass never leaks cross-tenant data on ordinary tenant business objects. - New getObjectSecurityMeta cache (private/tenancy/requiredPermissions), invalidated on metadata change. Evaluator: getSystemPermissions, hasSuperuserRead/WriteBypass; checkObjectPermission/getEffectiveScope take an isPrivate option (backward-compatible). - 10 new tests (evaluator units + full-middleware integration). Full DTS green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📓 Docs Drift CheckThis PR changes 3 package(s): 98 hand-written doc(s) reference the affected code and may need an implementation-accuracy re-verification:
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…ions in liveness ledger ADR-0054 spec-property liveness gate requires every governed-type property to be classified. Mark both new object props `live`, citing their plugin-security enforcement sites. Not in BOUND_PROOF_PATHS, so no dogfood proof is required; unit + full-middleware coverage lives in plugin-security/security-plugin.test.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…-0066 D2) Non-breaking: +ObjectAccessConfig (type) +ObjectAccessConfigSchema (const). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…der an active org resolveExecutionContext queried sys_user_permission_set with `organization_id = tenantId`, which DROPPED a platform-scoped (organization_id IS NULL) grant the moment a user had an active org. A platform admin who also owns an org therefore silently lost `admin_full_access` (and its systemPermissions) — and with ADR-0066 that locked them out of a requiredPermissions-gated control-plane object (sys_license). Mirror the role-binding logic (null org = global, cross-org): fetch the user's grants and keep null-org + active-org ones, dropping only grants scoped to a DIFFERENT org. +2 regression tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Implements ADR-0066 Phase 1 (D2 + D3 + engine enforcement) — the minimal unblock so a sensitive object like cloud
sys_licensecan be expressed: platform-global, secure-by-default, platform-admin-only.What's here
docs/adr/0066-...): generalizes the private RLS exemption into one explainable rule —viewAllRecordsbypasses read RLS /modifyAllRecordsbypasses write RLS, gated by the object's platform-global/private posture (Salesforce View/Modify All Data); adds an explicit Precedence / combination semantics section (AND-gates → union grants → RLS OR-within/AND-with-global → deny overrides); author guidance forprivate(posture) vsrequiredPermissions(capability); a Future refinements roadmap (deny-by-default target, per-op requiredPermissions, capabilities in CEL, PSG muting).packages/spec):access: { default: 'public' | 'private' }object posture + object-levelrequiredPermissions: string[](mirrorsApp.requiredPermissions). Both optional; absent ⇒ public / no gate (no migration for existing objects).privateobject is not covered by a non-super-user'*'wildcard grant (resolveObjectPermission); access needs an explicit per-object grant or a View/Modify-All-Data wildcard. Explicit grants always honored.requiredPermissionschecked before the CRUD grant — caller'ssystemPermissionsunion must cover it, else deny.private/platform-global object, the super-user bit skips wildcard RLS (incl. pre-image + post-image write checks) so a platform admin who is also an org admin sees all rows — without ever leaking cross-tenant data on ordinary tenant business objects.Tests
@objectstack/specand@objectstack/plugin-security.Follow-ups (separate PRs)
sys_licenseadopts the posture +.framework-shabump to this PR's merge SHA (browser-verified on the local stack).🤖 Generated with Claude Code