| title | Approval workflow |
|---|---|
| description | Route a record for sign-off — who can configure the automation, and the run-identity decision that keeps an approval flow from quietly bypassing row-level security. |
A record (an invoice, a discount, a leave request) must be routed for approval before it proceeds. Who is allowed to build that automation, and how do I make sure it runs safely?
An approval is a flow with an approval node. Two access decisions matter as much as the routing itself.
Authoring flows/automations is a builder capability — it needs manage_metadata (typically Studio users). End users submit records and act on approval requests, but they do not edit the automation. Keep the automation surfaces out of consumer apps (see audience-based interfaces).
A flow declares runAs (ADR-0049), and for approvals this is the decision that keeps it safe:
runAs: 'user'(default) — the flow's data operations run as the submitter, respecting their RLS. Good when the flow only touches records the submitter can already see.runAs: 'system'— elevated, bypasses RLS. Needed when the flow must read/write records the submitter can't (e.g. post to a ledger, notify an approver who owns rows the submitter can't see). Declare it explicitly so the elevation is visible, not accidental.
A schedule-triggered escalation has no triggering user, so under the default runAs: 'user' its data operations run unscoped (elevated, RLS-bypassing) anyway — declare system to make that elevation explicit and intended rather than an implicit fail-open (the engine warns, and os lint flags the bare shape as flow-schedule-runas-unscoped).
The node declares who approves (a named user, a position, the submitter's manager, …) and what happens on approve / reject / escalate. The authoritative shape is ApprovalNodeConfig / ApproverType; a flow strings the trigger, the approval node, and the post-decision branches together.
// Illustrative — see the Approval reference for the exact node schema.
defineFlow({
name: 'invoice_approval',
type: 'record_change',
runAs: 'user', // submitter's RLS unless a step needs more
nodes: [
{ id: 'start', type: 'start', label: 'Start',
config: { objectName: 'invoice', triggerType: 'record-after-create' } },
{ id: 'approval', type: 'approval', label: 'Approval',
config: { approvers: [{ type: 'position', value: 'finance_manager' }] } },
{ id: 'mark_approved', type: 'update_record', label: 'Mark Approved' },
{ id: 'mark_rejected', type: 'update_record', label: 'Mark Rejected' },
],
edges: [
{ id: 'e1', source: 'start', target: 'approval' },
{ id: 'e2', source: 'approval', target: 'mark_approved', label: 'approve' },
{ id: 'e3', source: 'approval', target: 'mark_rejected', label: 'reject' },
],
});Authored type: 'role' on 15.x? That is the deprecated spelling of org_membership_level
(ADR-0090 D3): it still resolves, warns at runtime, and is removed in the next major.
Approving is itself a gated action — model "may approve" as a capability (approve_invoice) the approver's permission set grants, and gate the approve action's requiredPermissions on it so the gate is enforced on both the UI and the server (ADR-0066 D4).
Approvals are authored as Flow nodes with type: 'approval'. The
@objectstack/plugin-approvals package owns the durable approval state
(sys_approval_request and sys_approval_action), record locking, approver
resolution, and resume-on-decision behavior.
export const opportunityApproval: Flow = {
name: 'opportunity_approval',
label: 'Opportunity Approval',
type: 'record_change',
status: 'active',
nodes: [
{
id: 'start',
type: 'start',
label: 'Start',
config: {
triggerType: 'record-after-update',
objectName: 'opportunity',
condition: "record.amount >= 50000 && record.stage == 'proposal'",
},
},
{
id: 'manager_approval',
type: 'approval',
label: 'Manager Approval',
config: {
approvers: [{ type: 'field', value: 'owner_manager_id' }],
behavior: 'unanimous',
approvalStatusField: 'approval_status',
lockRecord: true,
},
},
{ id: 'mark_approved', type: 'update_record', label: 'Mark Approved' },
{ id: 'mark_rejected', type: 'update_record', label: 'Mark Rejected' },
{ id: 'end', type: 'end', label: 'End' },
],
edges: [
{ id: 'e1', source: 'start', target: 'manager_approval' },
{ id: 'approved', source: 'manager_approval', target: 'mark_approved', label: 'approve' },
{ id: 'rejected', source: 'manager_approval', target: 'mark_rejected', label: 'reject' },
{ id: 'e4', source: 'mark_approved', target: 'end' },
{ id: 'e5', source: 'mark_rejected', target: 'end' },
],
};For multi-step approvals, chain multiple approval nodes. For parallel
approvals, see the aggregating-node pattern in Flow Metadata.
When a node has several approvers, behavior decides what "approved" means —
one node, no parallel branches needed:
behavior |
Advances when… | Use for |
|---|---|---|
first_response (default) |
any one approves | single reviewer / "any manager" |
unanimous |
every resolved approver approves | small fixed panels |
quorum |
minApprovals of N approve (M-of-N) |
"2 of 3 directors" |
per_group |
each group reaches minApprovals (default 1) |
"legal and finance" sign-off (会签) |
// One legal AND one finance approver must sign off; either rejection vetoes.
{ type: 'approval', config: {
approvers: [
{ type: 'position', value: 'legal_counsel', group: 'legal' },
{ type: 'position', value: 'controller', group: 'finance' },
],
behavior: 'per_group', // or 'quorum' with minApprovals: 2
} }A single rejection always finalizes the node as rejected (one veto), in
every mode. minApprovals is clamped to the resolvable approver count / group
size, so it can never deadlock. A decision may also carry attachments (file
references) recorded on its audit row — e.g. a signed contract. Weighted voting
and approval-matrix governance are enterprise, not here.
What actually happens between "the flow hits the approval node" and "the record says approved":
The node writes a sys_approval_request row: status: 'pending',
pending_approvers (the resolved approver list), and — if you declared
approvalStatusField — it mirrors 'pending' onto your record's field. The
record is locked against edits while pending (lockRecord, default true),
and the flow run parks until a decision arrives.
Only approvers is required on the node; everything else has a default
(behavior: 'first_response', lockRecord: true, maxRevisions: 3).
Approver entries resolve by kind — position, user, field, manager,
team, department, queue, and org_membership_level, described in the
callout above, which is the one that silently resolves
to nobody when it's mistaken for a business hierarchy. An entry that resolves
to nobody is not an error: the request opens with an empty pending_approvers
and nothing can move it, so the run parks forever.
Requests land in Setup → Approvals → Requests, whose my_pending view
filters to status = pending and pending_approvers containing the current
user. Programmatically:
curl -b cookies.txt \
"https://your-app.example.com/api/v1/approvals/requests?status=pending&approverId=usr_123"approverId accepts a user id, an email, or a <type>:<value> approver literal
(position:finance_manager — the form an entry falls back to when it resolves
to no users) — and takes several values (comma-separated or repeated) to cover
a person's identities in one call.
Other filters: status, object, recordId, submitterId, q, limit,
offset.
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST \
https://your-app.example.com/api/v1/approvals/requests/req_456/approve \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{ "comment": "Within budget." }'
# POST .../reject for the other direction; body: { actorId?, comment? }actorId defaults to the caller. The actor must be in pending_approvers
or the call returns 403 (FORBIDDEN: actor '…' is not a pending approver); a
request that isn't pending returns 409 (INVALID_STATE). Always go through
these endpoints — never resume the flow run directly.
A decision may carry file attachments — attachments: string[] of sys_file
ids — recorded on its audit row (e.g. a signed contract on the approve):
On finalization the request row gets status: 'approved' (or 'rejected'),
pending_approvers: null, and completed_at; your approvalStatusField is
mirrored to the same value, and the record unlocks. The parked run resumes down
the approve or reject branch.
Statuses in full: pending, approved, rejected, recalled, returned.
approve / reject move the flow; the rest are thread interactions and
continuity levers on the same request. All are POST /api/v1/approvals/requests/:id/<verb>; the service enforces who may call each:
| Verb | Route | Who | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
approve / reject |
/approve /reject |
pending approver | Records the decision (finalizes per behavior). Accepts comment, attachments. |
reassign |
/reassign |
pending approver | Hands one slot to another user (to); the request stays pending. |
revise (send back) |
/revise |
pending approver | Ends this round as returned, unlocks the record for rework (ADR-0044). |
request-info |
/request-info |
pending approver | Asks the submitter for more info; the request stays pending. comment required. |
remind |
/remind |
submitter | Nudges the pending approvers (publishes a notification topic). |
recall |
/recall |
submitter | Withdraws a pending (or abandons a returned) request → recalled. |
resubmit |
/resubmit |
submitter | After a send-back, re-enters the approval node and opens the next round (ADR-0044). |
comment |
/comment |
participant | Free-form reply on the request thread; accepts attachments. |
Send-back → resubmit (ADR-0044). An approver who wants changes rather than a
hard reject calls revise: the round finalizes returned, the record unlocks,
and the run parks at a wait point. The submitter reworks the record and
resubmits (a fresh round opens for all approvers) or recalls (abandons it).
Past the node's maxRevisions budget (default 3) a send-back auto-rejects
instead. The flow's approval node must declare a revise edge for send-back to
be available.
You rarely call these routes by hand. The decision verbs above ship as
server-declared actions on sys_approval_request (actions[] in its object
metadata) — approval_approve, approval_reject, approval_reassign,
approval_send_back, approval_request_info, approval_remind,
approval_recall, approval_resubmit. The console's generic action runtime
renders and executes them wherever the object is surfaced — the Approvals
inbox included — so a decision (comment, a file-upload for attachments, the
reassign user-picker) is collected by the generic action dialog with no
per-action UI code. New decision capabilities ship as backend metadata, not
hand-written buttons.
Each action's visibility is gated by a server-computed per-viewer block the service attaches to every request it returns:
// getRequest / listRequests responses carry, per the calling user:
"viewer": { "can_act": true, "is_submitter": false, "can_override": false }can_act— the caller is a current pending approver (their id is in the resolvedpending_approverswhile the request ispending). This is the same check the decision routes authorize with, so it already reflects position/team/manager resolution.is_submitter— the caller submitted the request.can_override— the caller is a platform or tenant admin who may act on apendingrequest despite holding no slot (see the admin-override callout below).
Approver actions gate on record.viewer.can_act, submitter levers
(remind/recall/resubmit) on record.viewer.is_submitter, and Approve/Reject/
Reassign additionally OR in record.viewer.can_override. So a submitter viewing
their own pending request never sees Approve/Reject/Reassign (buttons the server
would 403 anyway), a position-addressed approver is never wrongly hidden, and an
admin can rescue a stuck request. The service stays the sole authority — the
predicate only trims the UI.
A pending multi-approver request also carries a server-computed
decision_progress block, so the console shows real progress rather than a
client guess:
// getRequest, for a pending multi-approver request:
"decision_progress": {
"behavior": "per_group",
"got": 1, "need": 2, // unanimous / quorum: a running M-of-N tally
"groups": [ // per_group: one entry per approver group
{ "label": "manager", "got": 1, "need": 1 },
{ "label": "finance", "got": 0, "need": 1 }
]
}It is computed from the open-time approver snapshot (OOO substitution applied), so it reflects who actually still needs to sign — the console renders it as per-group tick badges or a "2 of 3 · finance pending" count.
Approval notifications deep-link into the request: notify() rewrites the
inbox action URL to /system/approvals?request=<id>, so clicking the bell opens
that request's drawer directly instead of a generic list.
escalation is real, not decorative: set enabled: true and timeoutHours,
and pick an action — notify (default), reassign, auto_approve, or
auto_reject. Auto decisions run through the normal decide path, so the flow
resumes exactly as if a human had clicked. Every escalation writes an audit row.
An approval routes to a specific person, and people take leave. Declare an out-of-office delegation so an approver's individually-routed slots reroute to a backup while they're away — the approval never freezes:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST \
https://your-app.example.com/api/v1/data/sys_approval_delegation \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"delegator_id": "usr_alice",
"delegate_id": "usr_bob",
"valid_from": "2026-05-26T00:00:00Z",
"valid_until": "2026-05-30T00:00:00Z",
"reason": "Annual leave"
}'When a request opens, approvers that resolve to a specific individual
(type: user, type: field, type: manager) are checked against active
delegations and rerouted to the delegate. The window is half-open
[valid_from, valid_until) (UTC), evaluated at resolution time — no
background job — so a lapsed delegation simply stops applying. Chains
(A → B → C) are followed and cycle-safe. The delegate acts under their own
identity; the reroute is recorded as an ooo_substitute audit action and both
the delegate and the skipped approver are notified.
| Code | HTTP | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
VALIDATION_FAILED |
400 | Malformed request |
FORBIDDEN |
403 | Actor may not take this action (not a pending approver, or not the submitter for a submitter-only verb) |
REQUEST_NOT_FOUND |
404 | No such request |
DUPLICATE_REQUEST |
409 | A pending request already exists for this record |
INVALID_STATE |
409 | The request is no longer pending |
THROTTLED |
429 | Rate limited |
✅ DO:
- Define clear entry criteria
- Set reasonable timeout periods
- Allow recall when appropriate
- Notify all stakeholders
- Track approval history
❌ DON'T:
- Create too many approval steps
- Make approvals too complex
- Forget rejection paths
- Hard-code approvers
Separating who configures from who approves from as whom it runs is the same capability/assignment/requirement decoupling as the rest of authorization (ADR-0066). The runAs default of user means an approval flow can't silently grant the submitter cross-tenant or cross-owner reach — elevation is opt-in and auditable. That is the safe-by-default posture: the common case respects RLS; the elevated case is explicit.
- Flows:
examples/app-showcase/src/automation/flows. - Approval schema:
packages/spec/src/automation/approval.zod.ts.
runAs: 'system'everywhere "to make it work". Default touser; elevate a single step only when it genuinely needs to bypass RLS.- Exposing automation config to approvers/submitters. Configuring the flow is a
manage_metadata(builder) concern; acting on a request is not. - Gating "Approve" only in the UI. Make
approve_*a capability and gate the action so the server enforces it too.
- Decision records: ADR-0049 (
runAs), ADR-0066 (unified authorization). - Guide: Hooks and Flows; Who can see data / automation / interface.
- Reference: Flow, Approval.
POST .../approve { "comment": "Signed.", "attachments": ["file_abc", "file_def"] }