diff --git a/packages/runtime/src/dispatcher-plugin.ts b/packages/runtime/src/dispatcher-plugin.ts
index bb8f31eadc..8cb135e048 100644
--- a/packages/runtime/src/dispatcher-plugin.ts
+++ b/packages/runtime/src/dispatcher-plugin.ts
@@ -971,35 +971,17 @@ export function createDispatcherPlugin(config: DispatcherPluginConfig = {}): Plu
                     const sessionData = await api.getSession({ headers: headersInstance });
                     const userId: string | undefined = sessionData?.user?.id ?? sessionData?.session?.userId;
                     if (!userId) return undefined;
-                    // Env-side AI-seat synthesis (ADR-0024, sys_user.ai_access boolean
-                    // model). The per-agent gate (evaluateAgentAccess → requires the
-                    // `ai_seat` capability) reads `req.user.permissions`, which the AI
-                    // routes get from THIS resolver — but it previously returned an empty
-                    // permission set, so a SEATED user (ai_access=true) was still denied
-                    // (empty /ai/agents catalog). Mirror plugin-hono-server's data-route
-                    // resolveCtx: read the boolean with a GUARDED system query on the
-                    // per-request env kernel's `sys_user` and, when true, synthesize the
-                    // `ai_seat` capability. Absent/false/missing-column/error → no seat
-                    // (deny, unchanged) so this can only ever ADD access, never break auth.
-                    const permissions: string[] = [];
-                    try {
-                        const dataEngine: any = ctx.getService('data');
-                        if (dataEngine && typeof dataEngine.find === 'function') {
-                            const uRows = await dataEngine
-                                .find('sys_user', { where: { id: userId }, limit: 1 }, { context: { isSystem: true } })
-                                .catch(() => []);
-                            if ((uRows?.[0] as any)?.ai_access === true) permissions.push('ai_seat');
-                        }
-                    } catch {
-                        /* no ai_access column / query failed → no seat (safe) */
-                    }
+                    // AI-route req.user permissions (incl. the synthesized `ai_seat`) are
+                    // populated from the ExecutionContext by the /ai/* dispatch path
+                    // (http-dispatcher → resolveExecutionContext, the single scope-correct
+                    // source). This concrete-route resolver returns an empty set.
                     return {
                         userId,
                         id: userId,
                         displayName: sessionData?.user?.name ?? sessionData?.user?.email ?? userId,
                         email: sessionData?.user?.email,
                         roles: [],
-                        permissions,
+                        permissions: [],
                         organizationId: sessionData?.session?.activeOrganizationId,
                     };
                 } catch {
diff --git a/packages/runtime/src/http-dispatcher.ts b/packages/runtime/src/http-dispatcher.ts
index b930a73970..1b6cb3ef54 100644
--- a/packages/runtime/src/http-dispatcher.ts
+++ b/packages/runtime/src/http-dispatcher.ts
@@ -3217,38 +3217,9 @@ export class HttpDispatcher {
             // for anonymous requests — the route's own `auth: true` guard
             // is enforced by upstream middleware.
             const ec: any = context.executionContext;
-            // Build the caller's permission set, then synthesize the env-side
-            // AI seat. The per-agent gate (evaluateAgentAccess → requires the
-            // `ai_seat` capability) reads `req.user.permissions`, but the
-            // dispatch ExecutionContext does NOT carry the seat — so a SEATED
-            // user (sys_user.ai_access=true) was denied (empty /ai/agents
-            // catalog). Read the boolean on the per-request (env) kernel via the
-            // env-scoped ObjectQL service and, when true, ADD `ai_seat`. Copy the
-            // array first so we never mutate the shared ec. Guarded system read →
-            // can only ever ADD access, never break auth (absent/false/error →
-            // no seat, unchanged).
-            const permissions: string[] = ec?.userId && Array.isArray(ec.permissions)
-                ? [...ec.permissions]
-                : [];
-            if (ec?.userId && !permissions.includes('ai_seat')) {
-                try {
-                    // Resolve via the DEFAULT (current per-request env) ObjectQL
-                    // service. Do NOT pass `context.environmentId`: in the cloud
-                    // runtime that is the control-plane env UUID, which keys a
-                    // DISTINCT, empty per-scope engine — the env's own `sys_user`
-                    // (where `ai_access` lives) is served by the default service.
-                    // Passing the id yields an empty result and the seat is lost.
-                    const ql: any = await this.getObjectQLService();
-                    if (ql && typeof ql.find === 'function') {
-                        const rows = await ql
-                            .find('sys_user', { where: { id: ec.userId }, limit: 1 }, { context: { isSystem: true } })
-                            .catch(() => []);
-                        if ((rows?.[0] as any)?.ai_access === true) permissions.push('ai_seat');
-                    }
-                } catch {
-                    /* no ai_access column / lookup failed → no seat (safe) */
-                }
-            }
+            // `ai_seat` is synthesized into ec.permissions by resolveExecutionContext
+            // (the single, scope-correct source — security/resolve-execution-context.ts),
+            // so it flows through here with no extra per-request lookup.
             const user = ec?.userId
                 ? {
                     userId: ec.userId,
@@ -3256,7 +3227,7 @@ export class HttpDispatcher {
                     displayName: ec.userDisplayName ?? ec.userName ?? ec.userId,
                     email: ec.userEmail,
                     roles: Array.isArray(ec.roles) ? ec.roles : [],
-                    permissions,
+                    permissions: Array.isArray(ec.permissions) ? ec.permissions : [],
                     organizationId: ec.tenantId,
                 }
                 : undefined;
diff --git a/packages/runtime/src/security/resolve-execution-context.ts b/packages/runtime/src/security/resolve-execution-context.ts
index 1a193fadc8..1aef758aaa 100644
--- a/packages/runtime/src/security/resolve-execution-context.ts
+++ b/packages/runtime/src/security/resolve-execution-context.ts
@@ -405,6 +405,20 @@ export async function resolveExecutionContext(opts: ResolveOptions): Promise<Exe
     ctx.roles!.unshift(BUILTIN_ROLE_PLATFORM_ADMIN);
   }
 
+  // [ADR-0024] Env-side AI seat. The per-agent gate (evaluateAgentAccess →
+  // requires the `ai_seat` capability) reads ctx.permissions. Synthesize it from
+  // the boolean `sys_user.ai_access`, read via the SAME scope-correct `ql` used
+  // for the permission sets above — so it resolves on single-env local AND on the
+  // sharded multi-tenant runtime, where only the per-request scope selects the
+  // right engine (a no-arg / wrong-scope lookup returns empty and loses the seat).
+  // Guarded (tryFind swallows errors) → can only ever ADD access, never break auth.
+  if (userId && !ctx.permissions!.includes('ai_seat')) {
+    const seatRows = await tryFind(ql, 'sys_user', { id: userId }, 1);
+    if ((seatRows?.[0] as { ai_access?: unknown } | undefined)?.ai_access === true) {
+      ctx.permissions!.push('ai_seat');
+    }
+  }
+
   // 4. Localization (ADR-0053 Phase 2) — reference timezone + locale resolved
   //    once per request from the `localization` settings and carried on the
   //    context. Consumers: formula today()/datetime, analytics date buckets,