objectstack-ai · os-zhuang · Jul 18, 2026 · Jul 18, 2026
diff --git a/.changeset/remove-agent-visibility.md b/.changeset/remove-agent-visibility.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+---
+'@objectstack/spec': minor
+---
+
+refactor(spec): remove unenforced agent `visibility` field (ADR-0056 D8, #1901)
+
+The agent `visibility` (`global`/`organization`/`private`) field is **removed**
+from `AgentSchema`. It was never enforced: the chat-access evaluator excluded it
+and the agent list route did not filter by it, so setting `private` never hid an
+agent. Per ADR-0049 / ADR-0056 D8 ("design+enforce or remove"), a security-shaped
+field with no runtime consumer is a liability — authors who set `private` believe
+they've restricted an agent when they have not.
+
+Unlike `field-encryption` (kept `[EXPERIMENTAL]` — it has a stable schema shape on
+a real roadmap), correct `visibility` enforcement is undesigned: it needs
+owner/org anchors that do not exist today. `agent.tenantId` was already removed
+(#2377), agents carry no owner field, and the `EXTERNAL` posture rung is defined
+but never derived — so `organization` vs `global` is runtime-indistinguishable.
+The semantics, not just the plumbing, are unresolved, so the field is dropped
+rather than carried marked.
+
+- `AgentSchema` is not `.strict()`, so existing metadata that still sets
+  `visibility` parses cleanly — the unknown key is stripped, not rejected.
+- Use `access` / `permissions` to restrict who can use an agent — both **enforced**
+  at the chat route (#1884).
+- Re-introduce `visibility` when the agent listing surface gains real owner/org
+  semantics; tracked in #1901.
+
+Also updated: authoring form (`agent.form.ts`), liveness ledger
+(`liveness/agent.json`), the ADR-0056 D10 authz-conformance matrix (moved from
+`experimental` to `removed`), and the generated schema reference docs.
diff --git a/content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx b/content/docs/permissions/authorization.mdx
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ one of two doors, each writing only what it owns:
 | 2 · Distribution / install / upgrade / uninstall | Install-consent scopes (ADR-0025 — consent ≠ RBAC grants); namespaced, collision-free composition; provenance axis makes uninstall well-defined | ADR-0025/0028/0048/0086 |
 | 3 · Environment composition / assignment | Platform-owned assignment records (`sys_user_position` etc.); anti-escalation; union semantics | ADR-0057 D4 |
 | 4 · Runtime enforcement | The six-gate chain above; ~18 primitives enforced and CI-guarded | ADR-0056 D10 matrix |
-| 5 · Production / enterprise | ADR-0056 D8 dispositions settled (2026-07): compliance configs, data masking, and the global RLSConfig were **removed** (never enforced); field encryption stays honestly `[EXPERIMENTAL]` (roadmap); agent `visibility` is marked `[EXPERIMENTAL]` pending #1901. Enterprise authentication hardening staged per ADR-0069 | ADR-0049/0056 D8, ADR-0069 |
+| 5 · Production / enterprise | ADR-0056 D8 dispositions settled (2026-07): compliance configs, data masking, the global RLSConfig, and agent `visibility` were **removed** (never enforced — for `visibility`, correct owner/org enforcement is undesigned, so it was dropped rather than carried; re-introduce under #1901); field encryption stays honestly `[EXPERIMENTAL]` (roadmap — stable schema shape). Enterprise authentication hardening staged per ADR-0069 | ADR-0049/0056 D8, ADR-0069 |
 
 ## Explaining a decision (ADR-0090 D6)
 

diff --git a/content/docs/references/ai/agent.mdx b/content/docs/references/ai/agent.mdx
@@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ const result = AIKnowledge.parse(data);
 | **active** | `boolean` | ✅ |  |
 | **access** | `string[]` | optional | Who can chat with this agent |
 | **permissions** | `string[]` | optional | Required permission-set capabilities |
-| **visibility** | `Enum<'global' \| 'organization' \| 'private'>` | ✅ | [EXPERIMENTAL — NOT ENFORCED, #1901] Intended listing scope. No runtime consumer yet; use access/permissions for real gating. |
 | **planning** | `{ maxIterations: integer }` | optional | Autonomous reasoning and planning configuration |
 | **memory** | `{ longTerm?: object; reflectionInterval?: integer }` | optional | Agent memory management |
 | **guardrails** | `{ maxTokensPerInvocation?: integer; maxExecutionTimeSec?: integer; blockedTopics?: string[] }` | optional | Safety guardrails for the agent |

diff --git a/packages/qa/dogfood/test/authz-conformance.matrix.ts b/packages/qa/dogfood/test/authz-conformance.matrix.ts
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@ export const AUTHZ_CONFORMANCE: AuthzPrimitive[] = [
   // ── Experimental — declared, NOT enforced (ADR-0049/0056 D8) ───────────
   { id: 'field-encryption', summary: 'at-rest field encryption', state: 'experimental',
     note: 'no crypto provider reads the config; marked [EXPERIMENTAL] (D8). Deliberately KEPT (2026-07 D8 disposition): at-rest encryption is a real enterprise roadmap item with a stable schema shape — removing and re-adding would cost more (ADR-0087) than carrying it marked.' },
-  { id: 'agent-visibility', summary: 'AI agent `visibility` listing scope (#1901)', state: 'experimental',
-    note: 'Intentionally NOT enforced — the chat-access evaluator excludes it (service-ai agent-access.ts) and the agent list route does not filter by it. Schema + authoring form carry EXPERIMENTAL banners (2026-07) so authors are told `private` does not hide the agent; `access`/`permissions` ARE enforced at the chat route (#1884). Enforce when the agent listing surface gains owner/org semantics — #1901.' },
 
   // ── Removed — by ADR-0056 D8 "design+enforce or remove" (2026-07) ──────
+  { id: 'agent-visibility', summary: 'AI agent `visibility` listing scope (#1901)', state: 'removed',
+    note: 'REMOVED from spec (agent.zod.ts `visibility` deleted, #1901). Never enforced — the chat-access evaluator excluded it and the agent list route did not filter by it, so `private` never hid an agent. Unlike field-encryption it has NO stable schema shape to preserve: correct enforcement needs owner/org anchors that do not exist (agents carry no owner field; the `EXTERNAL` posture rung is never derived), so the semantics — not just the plumbing — are undesigned. Per D8 a security-shaped field that lies is dropped, not carried marked. `access`/`permissions` ARE enforced at the chat route (#1884); re-introduce `visibility` when the listing surface gains real owner/org semantics.' },
   { id: 'compliance-configs', summary: 'GDPR/HIPAA/PCI configs', state: 'removed',
     note: 'REMOVED from spec (system/compliance.zod.ts deleted). Compliance-grade config must never merely look live: a parsed-but-dead `gdpr:` block is a liability in an audit. A real compliance subsystem will be designed top-down (data-subject rights engine, retention enforcer) when scheduled.' },
   { id: 'data-masking', summary: 'role-based data masking', state: 'removed',

diff --git a/packages/spec/liveness/agent.json b/packages/spec/liveness/agent.json
@@ -64,11 +64,6 @@
       "evidence": "packages/services/service-ai/src/routes/agent-access.ts:50",
       "note": "evaluateAgentAccess() — caller must hold ALL required permissions/roles; enforced at the chat route. #1884."
     },
-    "visibility": {
-      "status": "experimental",
-      "evidence": "packages/services/service-ai/src/routes/agent-access.ts:41",
-      "note": "intentionally NOT enforced — the chat-access evaluator excludes it and the GET /ai/agents list route does not filter by visibility. Needs owner/org semantics before it can gate listing."
-    },
     "knowledge": {
       "status": "live",
       "evidence": "objectui: packages/app-shell/src/views/metadata-admin/previews/AgentPreview.tsx:69 (d.knowledge; KnowledgeSummary renders sources/indexes)",

diff --git a/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.form.ts b/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.form.ts
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ export const agentForm = defineForm({
       collapsible: true,
       collapsed: true,
       fields: [
-        { field: 'visibility', helpText: 'EXPERIMENTAL — not enforced yet (#1901): setting "private" does not hide the agent. Use Access / Permissions below for real gating.' },
         { field: 'access', widget: 'string-tags', helpText: 'User IDs or role names who can chat with this agent' },
         { field: 'permissions', widget: 'string-tags', helpText: 'Required permissions to use this agent' },
         { field: 'guardrails', type: 'composite', helpText: 'Safety rules and content policies' },

diff --git a/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.test.ts b/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.test.ts
@@ -755,7 +755,6 @@ describe('defineAgent', () => {
       instructions: 'Testing agent.',
     });
     expect(result.active).toBe(true);
-    expect(result.visibility).toBe('organization');
   });
 
   it('should accept agent with tools', () => {

diff --git a/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.zod.ts b/packages/spec/src/ai/agent.zod.ts
@@ -167,17 +167,21 @@ export const AgentSchema = lazySchema(() => z.object({
   /** Permission-set capabilities required to use this agent */
   permissions: z.array(z.string()).optional().describe('Required permission-set capabilities'),
 
-  // `tenantId` removed in the 16.x line (#2377, ADR-0049): it had no runtime
-  // reader and did NOT scope the agent to a tenant — tenancy comes from the
-  // request context (resolveAuthzContext), not this field.
-  // ⚠️ EXPERIMENTAL — NOT ENFORCED (#1901, ADR-0049). The chat-access evaluator
-  // deliberately excludes `visibility` (agent-access.ts) and the agent list
-  // route does not filter by it — setting `private` does NOT hide the agent.
-  // Use `access` / `permissions` (both ENFORCED at the chat route, #1884) to
-  // actually restrict who can use an agent. Enforcement needs owner/org
-  // semantics on the listing surface first; tracked in #1901.
-  visibility: z.enum(['global', 'organization', 'private']).default('organization')
-    .describe('[EXPERIMENTAL — NOT ENFORCED, #1901] Intended listing scope. No runtime consumer yet; use access/permissions for real gating.'),
+  // Two agent-scoping fields were REMOVED as unenforced security properties
+  // (ADR-0049 / ADR-0056 D8 "design+enforce or remove"), not merely marked:
+  //   • `tenantId` — 16.x line (#2377): had no runtime reader and did NOT scope
+  //     the agent to a tenant. Tenancy comes from the request context
+  //     (resolveAuthzContext), never a field on the artifact.
+  //   • `visibility` (`global`/`organization`/`private`) — removed 2026-07 (#1901).
+  //     No runtime consumer ever read it: the chat-access evaluator excluded it
+  //     and the agent list route did not filter by it, so `private` never hid an
+  //     agent. Enforcing it correctly needs owner/org anchors that do not exist
+  //     yet (agents have no owner field; the `EXTERNAL` posture rung is never
+  //     derived — see #1901). Carrying a security-shaped field that lies is a
+  //     liability, so it was dropped rather than left marked. Restrict who can
+  //     use an agent with `access` / `permissions` — both ENFORCED at the chat
+  //     route (#1884). Re-introduce `visibility` when the listing surface gains
+  //     real owner/org semantics.
 
   /** Autonomous Reasoning */
   planning: z.object({