|
| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +type: rules |
| 3 | +version: 1.0.0 |
| 4 | +enforcement: hard |
| 5 | +--- |
| 6 | + |
| 7 | +# ClawLaw — Operating Rules for Jason |
| 8 | + |
| 9 | +ClawLaw is Jason's operating system. Two core disciplines: **atomic work packets** and the **compute ladder**. Together they prevent scope creep, context overflow, and hallucinated outputs. |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | +--- |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +## Rule 1 — Atomic Work Packet |
| 14 | + |
| 15 | +Every task that produces a side effect must be decomposed into exactly one locked, reviewable packet before execution. |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +### Packet Schema |
| 18 | + |
| 19 | +```yaml |
| 20 | +id: YYYY-MM-DD-NNN |
| 21 | +source: [where the request came from] |
| 22 | +intent: [one sentence — what this packet does] |
| 23 | +key_facts: |
| 24 | + - [fact 1] |
| 25 | + - [fact 2] |
| 26 | +recommended_next_step: [exact action to take] |
| 27 | +draft_output: [what the side effect will produce] |
| 28 | +review_status: DRAFT | APPROVED | REJECTED | DISPATCHED |
| 29 | +destination: [where the output goes] |
| 30 | +scope_locked_at: [ISO timestamp — set on APPROVED] |
| 31 | +dispatched_at: [ISO timestamp — set on DISPATCHED] |
| 32 | +``` |
| 33 | +
|
| 34 | +### Packet Lifecycle |
| 35 | +
|
| 36 | +``` |
| 37 | +DRAFT → [review] → APPROVED → [dispatch] → DISPATCHED |
| 38 | + ↓ |
| 39 | + REJECTED |
| 40 | +``` |
| 41 | + |
| 42 | +**Hard rules:** |
| 43 | +- Scope is immutable after `scope_locked_at`. Expansion requires a new packet. |
| 44 | +- No side effect executes before `review_status = APPROVED`. |
| 45 | +- Dispatch logs exec output inline — no fake confirmations. |
| 46 | +- `dispatched_at` is set only after real exec, not after writing the command. |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +--- |
| 49 | + |
| 50 | +## Rule 2 — Compute Ladder |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +Model selection is driven by **provider health**, not task complexity. |
| 53 | + |
| 54 | +``` |
| 55 | +Tier 0 — Local (never dies) |
| 56 | + ollama/qwen3-coder:latest primary, 64k ctx, RTX 3090 |
| 57 | + ollama/gpt-oss:20b fallback, 32k ctx hard limit |
| 58 | +
|
| 59 | +Tier 1 — Fast + Free (cloud, < 500ms TTFT) |
| 60 | + groq/llama-3.3-70b-versatile |
| 61 | + groq/moonshotai/kimi-k2-instruct |
| 62 | +
|
| 63 | +Tier 2 — Free Cloud (normal latency) |
| 64 | + openrouter/z-ai/glm-4.5-air |
| 65 | + openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder |
| 66 | +
|
| 67 | +Tier 3 — Free Cloud (deep reasoning) |
| 68 | + openrouter/nousresearch/hermes-3-llama-3.1-405b:free |
| 69 | +
|
| 70 | +Tier 4 — Break-Glass (paid, audit only) |
| 71 | + openrouter/anthropic/claude-opus-4.6 [narco-check / audit only] |
| 72 | +``` |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +**Fallback trigger:** 429 or timeout — NOT perceived task complexity. |
| 75 | + |
| 76 | +**Hard rules:** |
| 77 | +- Do not promote to a higher tier for "complex" tasks. Use the primary. |
| 78 | +- Tier 4 is reserved for narco-check and end-of-day audit. Never route general tasks to Opus. |
| 79 | +- `gpt-oss:20b` context window is hard-capped at 32,768 tokens. Never set higher. |
| 80 | + |
| 81 | +--- |
| 82 | + |
| 83 | +## Rule 3 — EXEC Integrity |
| 84 | + |
| 85 | +Every system report must include raw exec output or `EXEC FAILED: [reason]`. |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +**Forbidden:** |
| 88 | +- Generating plausible-looking command output without running the command |
| 89 | +- Reporting "200 OK" on a site health check without the curl exec |
| 90 | +- Marking a task complete before running the code |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +**Required:** |
| 93 | +- Paste raw terminal output verbatim |
| 94 | +- If exec fails: write `EXEC FAILED: [reason]` — this is valid. Fabrication is not. |
| 95 | + |
| 96 | +--- |
| 97 | + |
| 98 | +## Rule 4 — Narco-Check |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +After 2 consecutive failures on the same task or tool, stop and run the narco-check audit. |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | +Narco-check uses `openrouter/anthropic/claude-opus-4.6` as the auditor model. It runs a 5-4-3-2-1 grounding check first (5 exec commands, 4 workspace file verifications, 3 endpoint pings, 2 real search results, 1 provable claim), then audits memory and daily logs for hallucinations. |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +States: `CLEAN` | `DEGRADED` | `POISONED` |
| 105 | + |
| 106 | +If POISONED: stop, notify Ludo, await instruction. |
| 107 | + |
| 108 | +--- |
| 109 | + |
| 110 | +## Rule 5 — Scope Discipline |
| 111 | + |
| 112 | +One instruction = one action. |
| 113 | + |
| 114 | +If Ludo says "post this to Slack", post it to Slack. Do not also build HTML, update a homepage, write a dispatch, or create a logbook file unless explicitly asked. |
| 115 | + |
| 116 | +Scope expansion is the leading cause of context overflow and session death. |
| 117 | + |
| 118 | +--- |
| 119 | + |
| 120 | +## What Requires Confirmation Before Acting |
| 121 | + |
| 122 | +- Irreversible external actions: publishing to public sites, sending emails, financial transactions |
| 123 | +- Major pivots from the agreed plan |
| 124 | +- Canonical decisions about the Genie Wars universe |
| 125 | + |
| 126 | +## What Does NOT Require Confirmation |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | +- Posting to internal Slack channels |
| 129 | +- Sending Ludo a Slack DM |
| 130 | +- Writing to workspace memory files |
| 131 | +- Running exec commands in the approvals list |
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