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Update dependency langchain to v1.3.9 [SECURITY]#145

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renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability
Jun 17, 2026
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Update dependency langchain to v1.3.9 [SECURITY]#145
trask merged 1 commit into
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renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
langchain (changelog) 1.3.61.3.9 age confidence

LangChain: Path traversal and sandbox escape in LangChain file-search middleware and loaders

GHSA-gr75-jv2w-4656

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Details

Summary

Several LangChain components that resolve filesystem paths or expand search patterns do not consistently confine the resolved path to the intended root directory. Affected behaviors include: a file-search agent middleware that validates a starting directory but not the search pattern or the resolved target of matched files, so glob patterns and symlinks can reach files outside the configured root; prompt- and chain/agent-configuration loaders that accept path fields and resolve them without confining the result to a trusted base or rejecting symlink targets; and path-prefix authorization checks that compare by string prefix without a path-segment boundary, so a sibling path sharing the prefix is accepted. When these components receive path values, search patterns, or workspace contents influenced by an untrusted source — including an LLM acting on untrusted input — the result can be disclosure of files outside the intended boundary. We have no evidence of this behavior being triggered in the wild.

Affected users / systems

You may be affected if you expose an agent with filesystem-search middleware over a directory and accept prompts or retrieved content influenced by untrusted sources; load prompt or chain/agent configuration from untrusted or shared sources; or rely on path-prefix restrictions to confine tool file access. Callers that confine these components to fully trusted inputs and first-party configuration are not affected.

Impact
  • Confidentiality: disclosure of file contents outside the intended root/sandbox.
  • Authorization: path-prefix bypass can grant access to sibling resources beyond the intended subtree.
Patches / mitigation

The affected components will canonicalize candidate paths (resolving symlinks) and verify the resolved real path remains within the configured root before reading or returning it; search patterns will be normalized so they cannot escape the root; configuration loaders will confine resolved path fields and reject symlink escapes unless the caller explicitly opts in to dangerous loading; and path-prefix checks will enforce a path-segment boundary. Path validation will be made operating-system-portable.

Compatibility

Callers that already pass only in-root paths, validated configuration, and trusted search inputs see no behavioral change. Callers that intentionally reference external paths can opt in via the existing dangerous-loading flag.

Operational guidance

Confine filesystem-backed agent tools to a dedicated directory and prefer running them sandboxed/containerized; validate path and identifier inputs where untrusted input enters; do not enable dangerous loading for configuration whose origin you do not control.

LangSmith / hosted deployments note

This issue concerns library components executed by agents.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).


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Copilot AI review requested due to automatic review settings June 16, 2026 20:10
@renovate renovate Bot requested a review from a team as a code owner June 16, 2026 20:10

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@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability branch from 8a2a79f to a00fce6 Compare June 16, 2026 20:30
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability branch from a00fce6 to 92fc951 Compare June 17, 2026 17:31
@renovate renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability branch from 92fc951 to 79f563a Compare June 17, 2026 17:34
@trask trask enabled auto-merge June 17, 2026 17:37
@trask trask added this pull request to the merge queue Jun 17, 2026
Merged via the queue into main with commit a5d7fa2 Jun 17, 2026
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@trask trask deleted the renovate/pypi-langchain-vulnerability branch June 17, 2026 18:03
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