Security: DOM XSS risk from unescaped plugin template fields in clear_button#1018
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…ields The default `html` renderer builds an HTML string using `className`, `title`, `role`, and `tabindex` via string interpolation, then parses it with `getDom()`. If any of these option values are attacker-controlled (for example, passed from untrusted JSON config), attribute injection and script execution are possible. Affected files: plugin.ts, plugin.ts Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
…ields The default `html` renderer builds an HTML string using `className`, `title`, `role`, and `tabindex` via string interpolation, then parses it with `getDom()`. If any of these option values are attacker-controlled (for example, passed from untrusted JSON config), attribute injection and script execution are possible. Affected files: plugin.ts, plugin.ts Signed-off-by: tuanaiseo <221258316+tuanaiseo@users.noreply.github.com>
xJuvi
suggested changes
Apr 6, 2026
| html: (data:CBOptions) => { | ||
| const div = document.createElement('div'); | ||
| const className = (data.className || '').split(/\s+/).filter(token => /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$/.test(token)).join(' '); | ||
| const role = data.role === 'button' ? data.role : 'button'; |
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This is every time "button"? When data.role is button, then we use here data.role, otherwise it's hard coded 'button'. It doesn't make sense i think.
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Problem
The default
htmlrenderer builds an HTML string usingclassName,title,role, andtabindexvia string interpolation, then parses it withgetDom(). If any of these option values are attacker-controlled (for example, passed from untrusted JSON config), attribute injection and script execution are possible.Severity:
highFile:
src/plugins/clear_button/plugin.tsSolution
Avoid string-built HTML for option-driven values. Create elements with
document.createElement, assigntextContent, and set attributes viasetAttributeafter strict allowlisting/validation (roleenum, numerictabindex, safe class token pattern). If templating is required, escape all interpolated values.Changes
src/plugins/clear_button/plugin.ts(modified)src/plugins/dropdown_header/plugin.ts(modified)Testing