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input: passthrough virtio-input device#2

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dyang23:20200414.161720
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input: passthrough virtio-input device#2
dyang23 wants to merge 1 commit into
projectceladon:masterfrom
dyang23:20200414.161720

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@dyang23

@dyang23 dyang23 commented Apr 15, 2020

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The virtio-input device event should be passthrough
and send to uplayer directly, since the events get
from host, and already handled in host input driver.

Tracked-On: OAM-90659
Signed-off-by: Yang, Dong dong.yang@intel.com

@dyang23

dyang23 commented Apr 15, 2020

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LGTM, please review

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Autobuild started from pull-request-changes on this PR.

FAILURE: CheckBug Bad comments/Bugs

For more information, see: /absp/builders/celadon-autobuild/builds/1855

…virtio input

Virtio input was missing the the amount of multitouch
slots and kernel was filtering out ABS_MT_SLOT events
for a screen is touched in more than one place.

Bug: 143488374
Signed-off-by: Roman Kiryanov <rkir@google.com>
Change-Id: I617099435af311e6b0ee127b76eafe13834ea8f8
Signed-off-by: Yang, Dong <dong.yang@intel.com>
@dyang23 dyang23 force-pushed the 20200414.161720 branch 2 times, most recently from 36bcd07 to f629305 Compare April 20, 2020 08:39
@dyang23

dyang23 commented Apr 20, 2020

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test passed with this patch.

@dyang23

dyang23 commented Apr 20, 2020

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LGTM, please review

JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 29, 2020
commit 90db6d772f749e38171d04619a5e3cd8804a6d02 upstream.

The bucket->lock is not needed in the sock_hash_free and sock_map_free
calls, in fact it is causing a splat due to being inside rcu block.

| BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/sock.c:2935
| in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 62, name: kworker/0:1
| 3 locks held by kworker/0:1/62:
|  #0: ffff88813b019748 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #1: ffffc900000abe50 ((work_completion)(&map->work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x1d7/0x5e0
|  #2: ffff8881381f6df8 (&stab->lock){+...}, at: sock_map_free+0x26/0x180
| CPU: 0 PID: 62 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 5.5.0-04008-g7b083332376e #454
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS ?-20190727_073836-buildvm-ppc64le-16.ppc.fedoraproject.org-3.fc31 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events bpf_map_free_deferred
| Call Trace:
|  dump_stack+0x71/0xa0
|  ___might_sleep.cold+0xa6/0xb6
|  lock_sock_nested+0x28/0x90
|  sock_map_free+0x5f/0x180
|  bpf_map_free_deferred+0x58/0x80
|  process_one_work+0x260/0x5e0
|  worker_thread+0x4d/0x3e0
|  kthread+0x108/0x140
|  ? process_one_work+0x5e0/0x5e0
|  ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
|  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

The reason we have stab->lock and bucket->locks in sockmap code is to
handle checking EEXIST in update/delete cases. We need to be careful during
an update operation that we check for EEXIST and we need to ensure that the
psock object is not in some partial state of removal/insertion while we do
this. So both map_update_common and sock_map_delete need to guard from being
run together potentially deleting an entry we are checking, etc. But by the
time we get to the tear-down code in sock_{ma[|hash}_free we have already
disconnected the map and we just did synchronize_rcu() in the line above so
no updates/deletes should be in flight. Because of this we can drop the
bucket locks from the map free'ing code, noting no update/deletes can be
in-flight.

Fixes: 604326b ("bpf, sockmap: convert to generic sk_msg interface")
Reported-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/158385850787.30597.8346421465837046618.stgit@john-Precision-5820-Tower
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 5, 2020
…dency

[ Upstream commit 7809f7011c3bce650e502a98afeb05961470d865 ]

On a very heavily loaded D05 with GICv4, I managed to trigger the
following lockdep splat:

[ 6022.598864] ======================================================
[ 6022.605031] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[ 6022.611200] 5.6.0-rc4-00026-geee7c7b0f498 #680 Tainted: G            E
[ 6022.618061] ------------------------------------------------------
[ 6022.624227] qemu-system-aar/7569 is trying to acquire lock:
[ 6022.629789] ffff042f97606808 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}, at: try_to_wake_up+0x54/0x7a0
[ 6022.637102]
[ 6022.637102] but task is already holding lock:
[ 6022.642921] ffff002fae424cf0 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}, at: __irq_get_desc_lock+0x5c/0x98
[ 6022.651350]
[ 6022.651350] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[ 6022.651350]
[ 6022.659512]
[ 6022.659512] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[ 6022.666980]
[ 6022.666980] -> #2 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}:
[ 6022.672983]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x78
[ 6022.677848]        __irq_get_desc_lock+0x5c/0x98
[ 6022.682453]        irq_set_vcpu_affinity+0x40/0xc0
[ 6022.687236]        its_make_vpe_non_resident+0x6c/0xb8
[ 6022.692364]        vgic_v4_put+0x54/0x70
[ 6022.696273]        vgic_v3_put+0x20/0xd8
[ 6022.700183]        kvm_vgic_put+0x30/0x48
[ 6022.704182]        kvm_arch_vcpu_put+0x34/0x50
[ 6022.708614]        kvm_sched_out+0x34/0x50
[ 6022.712700]        __schedule+0x4bc/0x7f8
[ 6022.716697]        schedule+0x50/0xd8
[ 6022.720347]        kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5f0/0x978
[ 6022.725473]        kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3d4/0x8f8
[ 6022.729820]        ksys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0
[ 6022.733642]        __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x24/0x30
[ 6022.738074]        el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xa8/0x1e8
[ 6022.743373]        do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6022.747198]        el0_svc+0x14/0x40
[ 6022.750761]        el0_sync_handler+0x124/0x2b8
[ 6022.755278]        el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6022.759100]
[ 6022.759100] -> #1 (&rq->lock){-.-.}:
[ 6022.764143]        _raw_spin_lock+0x38/0x50
[ 6022.768314]        task_fork_fair+0x40/0x128
[ 6022.772572]        sched_fork+0xe0/0x210
[ 6022.776484]        copy_process+0x8c4/0x18d8
[ 6022.780742]        _do_fork+0x88/0x6d8
[ 6022.784478]        kernel_thread+0x64/0x88
[ 6022.788563]        rest_init+0x30/0x270
[ 6022.792390]        arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c
[ 6022.796995]        start_kernel+0x498/0x4c4
[ 6022.801164]
[ 6022.801164] -> #0 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}:
[ 6022.806382]        __lock_acquire+0xdd8/0x15c8
[ 6022.810813]        lock_acquire+0xd0/0x218
[ 6022.814896]        _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x50/0x78
[ 6022.819761]        try_to_wake_up+0x54/0x7a0
[ 6022.824018]        wake_up_process+0x1c/0x28
[ 6022.828276]        wakeup_softirqd+0x38/0x40
[ 6022.832533]        __tasklet_schedule_common+0xc4/0xf0
[ 6022.837658]        __tasklet_schedule+0x24/0x30
[ 6022.842176]        check_irq_resend+0xc8/0x158
[ 6022.846609]        irq_startup+0x74/0x128
[ 6022.850606]        __enable_irq+0x6c/0x78
[ 6022.854602]        enable_irq+0x54/0xa0
[ 6022.858431]        its_make_vpe_non_resident+0xa4/0xb8
[ 6022.863557]        vgic_v4_put+0x54/0x70
[ 6022.867469]        kvm_arch_vcpu_blocking+0x28/0x38
[ 6022.872336]        kvm_vcpu_block+0x48/0x490
[ 6022.876594]        kvm_handle_wfx+0x18c/0x310
[ 6022.880938]        handle_exit+0x138/0x198
[ 6022.885022]        kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x4d4/0x978
[ 6022.890148]        kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x3d4/0x8f8
[ 6022.894494]        ksys_ioctl+0x90/0xd0
[ 6022.898317]        __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x24/0x30
[ 6022.902748]        el0_svc_common.constprop.3+0xa8/0x1e8
[ 6022.908046]        do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
[ 6022.911871]        el0_svc+0x14/0x40
[ 6022.915434]        el0_sync_handler+0x124/0x2b8
[ 6022.919951]        el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[ 6022.923773]
[ 6022.923773] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 6022.923773]
[ 6022.931762] Chain exists of:
[ 6022.931762]   &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock --> &irq_desc_lock_class
[ 6022.931762]
[ 6022.942101]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 6022.942101]
[ 6022.948007]        CPU0                    CPU1
[ 6022.952523]        ----                    ----
[ 6022.957039]   lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
[ 6022.961036]                                lock(&rq->lock);
[ 6022.966595]                                lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
[ 6022.973109]   lock(&p->pi_lock);
[ 6022.976324]
[ 6022.976324]  *** DEADLOCK ***

This is happening because we have a pending doorbell that requires
retrigger. As SW retriggering is done in a tasklet, we trigger the
circular dependency above.

The easy cop-out is to provide a retrigger callback that doesn't
require acquiring any extra lock.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200310184921.23552-5-maz@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 5, 2020
commit f0cc2cd70164efe8f75c5d99560f0f69969c72e4 upstream.

During unmount we can have a job from the delayed inode items work queue
still running, that can lead to at least two bad things:

1) A crash, because the worker can try to create a transaction just
   after the fs roots were freed;

2) A transaction leak, because the worker can create a transaction
   before the fs roots are freed and just after we committed the last
   transaction and after we stopped the transaction kthread.

A stack trace example of the crash:

 [79011.691214] kernel BUG at lib/radix-tree.c:982!
 [79011.692056] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC PTI
 [79011.693180] CPU: 3 PID: 1394 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Tainted: G        W         5.6.0-rc2-btrfs-next-54 #2
 (...)
 [79011.696789] Workqueue: btrfs-delayed-meta btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
 [79011.697904] RIP: 0010:radix_tree_tag_set+0xe7/0x170
 (...)
 [79011.702014] RSP: 0018:ffffb3c84a317ca0 EFLAGS: 00010293
 [79011.702949] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
 [79011.704202] RDX: ffffb3c84a317cb0 RSI: ffffb3c84a317ca8 RDI: ffff8db3931340a0
 [79011.705463] RBP: 0000000000000005 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: ffffffff974629d0
 [79011.706756] R10: ffffb3c84a317bc0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8db393134000
 [79011.708010] R13: ffff8db3931340a0 R14: ffff8db393134068 R15: 0000000000000001
 [79011.709270] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8db3b6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
 [79011.710699] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [79011.711710] CR2: 00007f22c2a0a000 CR3: 0000000232ad4005 CR4: 00000000003606e0
 [79011.712958] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
 [79011.714205] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
 [79011.715448] Call Trace:
 [79011.715925]  record_root_in_trans+0x72/0xf0 [btrfs]
 [79011.716819]  btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x4b/0x70 [btrfs]
 [79011.717925]  start_transaction+0xdd/0x5c0 [btrfs]
 [79011.718829]  btrfs_async_run_delayed_root+0x17e/0x2b0 [btrfs]
 [79011.719915]  btrfs_work_helper+0xaa/0x720 [btrfs]
 [79011.720773]  process_one_work+0x26d/0x6a0
 [79011.721497]  worker_thread+0x4f/0x3e0
 [79011.722153]  ? process_one_work+0x6a0/0x6a0
 [79011.722901]  kthread+0x103/0x140
 [79011.723481]  ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70
 [79011.724379]  ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
 (...)

The following diagram shows a sequence of steps that lead to the crash
during ummount of the filesystem:

        CPU 1                                             CPU 2                                CPU 3

 btrfs_punch_hole()
   btrfs_btree_balance_dirty()
     btrfs_balance_delayed_items()
       --> sees
           fs_info->delayed_root->items
           with value 200, which is greater
           than
           BTRFS_DELAYED_BACKGROUND (128)
           and smaller than
           BTRFS_DELAYED_WRITEBACK (512)
       btrfs_wq_run_delayed_node()
         --> queues a job for
             fs_info->delayed_workers to run
             btrfs_async_run_delayed_root()

                                                                                            btrfs_async_run_delayed_root()
                                                                                              --> job queued by CPU 1

                                                                                              --> starts picking and running
                                                                                                  delayed nodes from the
                                                                                                  prepare_list list

                                                 close_ctree()

                                                   btrfs_delete_unused_bgs()

                                                   btrfs_commit_super()

                                                     btrfs_join_transaction()
                                                       --> gets transaction N

                                                     btrfs_commit_transaction(N)
                                                       --> set transaction state
                                                        to TRANTS_STATE_COMMIT_START

                                                                                             btrfs_first_prepared_delayed_node()
                                                                                               --> picks delayed node X through
                                                                                                   the prepared_list list

                                                       btrfs_run_delayed_items()

                                                         btrfs_first_delayed_node()
                                                           --> also picks delayed node X
                                                               but through the node_list
                                                               list

                                                         __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items()
                                                            --> runs all delayed items from
                                                                this node and drops the
                                                                node's item count to 0
                                                                through call to
                                                                btrfs_release_delayed_inode()

                                                         --> finishes running any remaining
                                                             delayed nodes

                                                       --> finishes transaction commit

                                                   --> stops cleaner and transaction threads

                                                   btrfs_free_fs_roots()
                                                     --> frees all roots and removes them
                                                         from the radix tree
                                                         fs_info->fs_roots_radix

                                                                                             btrfs_join_transaction()
                                                                                               start_transaction()
                                                                                                 btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
                                                                                                   record_root_in_trans()
                                                                                                     radix_tree_tag_set()
                                                                                                       --> crashes because
                                                                                                           the root is not in
                                                                                                           the radix tree
                                                                                                           anymore

If the worker is able to call btrfs_join_transaction() before the unmount
task frees the fs roots, we end up leaking a transaction and all its
resources, since after the call to btrfs_commit_super() and stopping the
transaction kthread, we don't expect to have any transaction open anymore.

When this situation happens the worker has a delayed node that has no
more items to run, since the task calling btrfs_run_delayed_items(),
which is doing a transaction commit, picks the same node and runs all
its items first.

We can not wait for the worker to complete when running delayed items
through btrfs_run_delayed_items(), because we call that function in
several phases of a transaction commit, and that could cause a deadlock
because the worker calls btrfs_join_transaction() and the task doing the
transaction commit may have already set the transaction state to
TRANS_STATE_COMMIT_DOING.

Also it's not possible to get into a situation where only some of the
items of a delayed node are added to the fs/subvolume tree in the current
transaction and the remaining ones in the next transaction, because when
running the items of a delayed inode we lock its mutex, effectively
waiting for the worker if the worker is running the items of the delayed
node already.

Since this can only cause issues when unmounting a filesystem, fix it in
a simple way by waiting for any jobs on the delayed workers queue before
calling btrfs_commit_supper() at close_ctree(). This works because at this
point no one can call btrfs_btree_balance_dirty() or
btrfs_balance_delayed_items(), and if we end up waiting for any worker to
complete, btrfs_commit_super() will commit the transaction created by the
worker.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 5, 2020
commit 351cbf6e4410e7ece05e35d0a07320538f2418b4 upstream.

Zygo reported the following lockdep splat while testing the balance
patches

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
5.6.0-c6f0579d496a+ #53 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
kswapd0/1133 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888092f622c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8fc5f860 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}:
       fs_reclaim_acquire.part.91+0x29/0x30
       fs_reclaim_acquire+0x19/0x20
       kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x32/0x740
       add_block_entry+0x45/0x260
       btrfs_ref_tree_mod+0x6e2/0x8b0
       btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x789/0x880
       alloc_tree_block_no_bg_flush+0xc6/0xf0
       __btrfs_cow_block+0x270/0x940
       btrfs_cow_block+0x1ba/0x3a0
       btrfs_search_slot+0x999/0x1030
       btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x81/0xe0
       btrfs_insert_delayed_items+0x128/0x7d0
       __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0xf4/0x2a0
       btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x13/0x20
       btrfs_commit_transaction+0x5cc/0x1390
       insert_balance_item.isra.39+0x6b2/0x6e0
       btrfs_balance+0x72d/0x18d0
       btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x3de/0x4c0
       btrfs_ioctl+0x30ab/0x44a0
       ksys_ioctl+0xa1/0xe0
       __x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50
       do_syscall_64+0x77/0x2c0
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}:
       __lock_acquire+0x197e/0x2550
       lock_acquire+0x103/0x220
       __mutex_lock+0x13d/0xce0
       mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
       __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0
       btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x49/0x50
       btrfs_evict_inode+0x6fc/0x900
       evict+0x19a/0x2c0
       dispose_list+0xa0/0xe0
       prune_icache_sb+0xbd/0xf0
       super_cache_scan+0x1b5/0x250
       do_shrink_slab+0x1f6/0x530
       shrink_slab+0x32e/0x410
       shrink_node+0x2a5/0xba0
       balance_pgdat+0x4bd/0x8a0
       kswapd+0x35a/0x800
       kthread+0x1e9/0x210
       ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(fs_reclaim);
                               lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
                               lock(fs_reclaim);
  lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kswapd0/1133:
 #0: ffffffff8fc5f860 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}, at: __fs_reclaim_acquire+0x5/0x30
 #1: ffffffff8fc380d8 (shrinker_rwsem){++++}, at: shrink_slab+0x1e8/0x410
 #2: ffff8881e0e6c0e8 (&type->s_umount_key#42){++++}, at: trylock_super+0x1b/0x70

stack backtrace:
CPU: 2 PID: 1133 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.6.0-c6f0579d496a+ #53
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xc1/0x11a
 print_circular_bug.isra.38.cold.57+0x145/0x14a
 check_noncircular+0x2a9/0x2f0
 ? print_circular_bug.isra.38+0x130/0x130
 ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x90/0x90
 ? save_trace+0x3cc/0x420
 __lock_acquire+0x197e/0x2550
 ? btrfs_inode_clear_file_extent_range+0x9b/0xb0
 ? register_lock_class+0x960/0x960
 lock_acquire+0x103/0x220
 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0
 __mutex_lock+0x13d/0xce0
 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0
 ? __asan_loadN+0xf/0x20
 ? pvclock_clocksource_read+0xeb/0x190
 ? __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0
 ? mutex_lock_io_nested+0xc20/0xc20
 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
 ? check_chain_key+0x1e6/0x2e0
 mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
 ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
 __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x7c/0x5b0
 btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x49/0x50
 btrfs_evict_inode+0x6fc/0x900
 ? btrfs_setattr+0x840/0x840
 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0xa8/0x140
 evict+0x19a/0x2c0
 dispose_list+0xa0/0xe0
 prune_icache_sb+0xbd/0xf0
 ? invalidate_inodes+0x310/0x310
 super_cache_scan+0x1b5/0x250
 do_shrink_slab+0x1f6/0x530
 shrink_slab+0x32e/0x410
 ? do_shrink_slab+0x530/0x530
 ? do_shrink_slab+0x530/0x530
 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
 ? mem_cgroup_protected+0x13d/0x260
 shrink_node+0x2a5/0xba0
 balance_pgdat+0x4bd/0x8a0
 ? mem_cgroup_shrink_node+0x490/0x490
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x27/0x40
 ? finish_task_switch+0xce/0x390
 ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xb0/0xb0
 kswapd+0x35a/0x800
 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x4c/0x60
 ? balance_pgdat+0x8a0/0x8a0
 ? finish_wait+0x110/0x110
 ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
 ? __kthread_parkme+0xc6/0xe0
 ? balance_pgdat+0x8a0/0x8a0
 kthread+0x1e9/0x210
 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0xc0/0xc0
 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

This is because we hold that delayed node's mutex while doing tree
operations.  Fix this by just wrapping the searches in nofs.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 5, 2020
commit 28936b62e71e41600bab319f262ea9f9b1027629 upstream.

inode->i_blocks could be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,

 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_do_update_inode [ext4] / inode_add_bytes

 write to 0xffff9a00d4b982d0 of 8 bytes by task 22100 on cpu 118:
  inode_add_bytes+0x65/0xf0
  __inode_add_bytes at fs/stat.c:689
  (inlined by) inode_add_bytes at fs/stat.c:702
  ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x418/0xca0 [ext4]
  ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x1a6b/0x27b0 [ext4]
  ext4_map_blocks+0x1a9/0x950 [ext4]
  _ext4_get_block+0xfc/0x270 [ext4]
  ext4_get_block_unwritten+0x33/0x50 [ext4]
  __block_write_begin_int+0x22e/0xae0
  __block_write_begin+0x39/0x50
  ext4_write_begin+0x388/0xb50 [ext4]
  ext4_da_write_begin+0x35f/0x8f0 [ext4]
  generic_perform_write+0x15d/0x290
  ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4]
  ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4]
  new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0
  __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0
  vfs_write+0x103/0x260
  ksys_write+0x9d/0x130
  __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

 read to 0xffff9a00d4b982d0 of 8 bytes by task 8 on cpu 65:
  ext4_do_update_inode+0x4a0/0xf60 [ext4]
  ext4_inode_blocks_set at fs/ext4/inode.c:4815
  ext4_mark_iloc_dirty+0xaf/0x160 [ext4]
  ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x129/0x3e0 [ext4]
  ext4_convert_unwritten_extents+0x253/0x2d0 [ext4]
  ext4_convert_unwritten_io_end_vec+0xc5/0x150 [ext4]
  ext4_end_io_rsv_work+0x22c/0x350 [ext4]
  process_one_work+0x54f/0xb90
  worker_thread+0x80/0x5f0
  kthread+0x1cd/0x1f0
  ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 4 locks held by kworker/u256:0/8:
  #0: ffff9a025abc4328 ((wq_completion)ext4-rsv-conversion){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0xb90
  #1: ffffab5a862dbe20 ((work_completion)(&ei->i_rsv_conversion_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x443/0xb90
  #2: ffff9a025a9d0f58 (jbd2_handle){++++}, at: start_this_handle+0x1c1/0x9d0 [jbd2]
  #3: ffff9a00d4b985d8 (&(&ei->i_raw_lock)->rlock){+.+.}, at: ext4_do_update_inode+0xaa/0xf60 [ext4]
 irq event stamp: 3009267
 hardirqs last  enabled at (3009267): [<ffffffff980da9b7>] __find_get_block+0x107/0x790
 hardirqs last disabled at (3009266): [<ffffffff980da8f9>] __find_get_block+0x49/0x790
 softirqs last  enabled at (3009230): [<ffffffff98a0034c>] __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 softirqs last disabled at (3009223): [<ffffffff97cc67a2>] irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
 CPU: 65 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u256:0 Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200221+ #7
 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019
 Workqueue: ext4-rsv-conversion ext4_end_io_rsv_work [ext4]

The plain read is outside of inode->i_lock critical section which
results in a data race. Fix it by adding READ_ONCE() there.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222043258.2279-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 5, 2020
[ Upstream commit a86675968e2300fb567994459da3dbc4cd1b322a ]

This reverts commit 64e62bdf04ab8529f45ed0a85122c703035dec3a.

This commit ends up causing some lockdep splats due to trying to grab the
payload lock while holding the mgr's lock:

[   54.010099]
[   54.011765] ======================================================
[   54.018670] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   54.025577] 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 Not tainted
[   54.031610] ------------------------------------------------------
[   54.038516] kworker/1:6/1040 is trying to acquire lock:
[   54.044354] ffff888272af3228 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.054957]
[   54.054957] but task is already holding lock:
[   54.061473] ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4
[   54.071193]
[   54.071193] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   54.071193]
[   54.080334]
[   54.080334] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   54.088697]
[   54.088697] -> #1 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}:
[   54.094440]        __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498
[   54.099015]        drm_dp_mst_topology_get_port_validated+0x25/0x80
[   54.106018]        drm_dp_update_payload_part1+0xa2/0x2e2
[   54.112051]        intel_mst_pre_enable_dp+0x144/0x18f
[   54.117791]        intel_encoders_pre_enable+0x63/0x70
[   54.123532]        hsw_crtc_enable+0xa1/0x722
[   54.128396]        intel_update_crtc+0x50/0x194
[   54.133455]        skl_commit_modeset_enables+0x40c/0x540
[   54.139485]        intel_atomic_commit_tail+0x5f7/0x130d
[   54.145418]        intel_atomic_commit+0x2c8/0x2d8
[   54.150770]        drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x5a/0x70
[   54.156801]        drm_mode_setcrtc+0x2ab/0x833
[   54.161862]        drm_ioctl+0x2e5/0x424
[   54.166242]        vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x2f
[   54.170426]        do_vfs_ioctl+0x5fb/0x61e
[   54.175096]        ksys_ioctl+0x55/0x75
[   54.179377]        __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e
[   54.184146]        do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x6d
[   54.188721]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[   54.194946]
[   54.194946] -> #0 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}:
[   54.201463]
[   54.201463] other info that might help us debug this:
[   54.201463]
[   54.210410]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   54.210410]
[   54.217025]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   54.222082]        ----                    ----
[   54.227138]   lock(&mgr->lock);
[   54.230643]                                lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
[   54.237742]                                lock(&mgr->lock);
[   54.244062]   lock(&mgr->payload_lock);
[   54.248346]
[   54.248346]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   54.248346]
[   54.254959] 7 locks held by kworker/1:6/1040:
[   54.259822]  #0: ffff888275c4f528 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.},
at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.269451]  #1: ffffc9000119beb0
((work_completion)(&(&dev_priv->hotplug.hotplug_work)->work)){+.+.},
at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.282768]  #2: ffff888272a403f0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.},
at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x4b/0x2be
[   54.293368]  #3: ffffffff824fc6c0 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+},
at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x17e/0x2be
[   54.304061]  #4: ffffc9000119bc58 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.},
at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x40/0xfd
[   54.314855]  #5: ffff888272a40470 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at:
drm_modeset_lock+0x74/0xe2
[   54.324385]  #6: ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at:
drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4
[   54.334597]
[   54.334597] stack backtrace:
[   54.339464] CPU: 1 PID: 1040 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted
5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47
[   54.348893] Hardware name: Google Fizz/Fizz, BIOS
Google_Fizz.10139.39.0 01/04/2018
[   54.357451] Workqueue: events i915_hotplug_work_func
[   54.362995] Call Trace:
[   54.365724]  dump_stack+0x71/0x9c
[   54.369427]  check_noncircular+0x91/0xbc
[   54.373809]  ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66
[   54.378286]  ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66
[   54.382763]  ? lock_acquire+0x175/0x1ac
[   54.387048]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.393177]  ? __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498
[   54.397362]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.403492]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.409620]  ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0x101
[   54.414390]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.420517]  ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4
[   54.426645]  ? intel_digital_port_connected+0x34d/0x35c
[   54.432482]  ? intel_dp_detect+0x227/0x44e
[   54.437056]  ? ww_mutex_lock+0x49/0x9a
[   54.441242]  ? drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x75/0xfd
[   54.446789]  ? intel_encoder_hotplug+0x4b/0x97
[   54.451752]  ? intel_ddi_hotplug+0x61/0x2e0
[   54.456423]  ? mark_held_locks+0x53/0x68
[   54.460803]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3a/0x51
[   54.466347]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x187/0x1a4
[   54.471310]  ? drm_connector_list_iter_next+0x89/0x9a
[   54.476953]  ? i915_hotplug_work_func+0x206/0x2be
[   54.482208]  ? worker_thread+0x4d5/0x6e2
[   54.486587]  ? worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2
[   54.490966]  ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64
[   54.495151]  ? kthread+0x1e9/0x1f1
[   54.498946]  ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64
[   54.503130]  ? kthread_unpark+0x5e/0x5e
[   54.507413]  ? ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50

The proper fix for this is probably cleanup the VCPI allocations when we're
enabling the topology, or on the first payload allocation. For now though,
let's just revert.

Signed-off-by: Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com>
Fixes: 64e62bdf04ab ("drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr")
Cc: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>
Cc: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200117205149.97262-1-lyude@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit 696ac2e3bf267f5a2b2ed7d34e64131f2287d0ad ]

Similar to commit 0266d81 ("acpi/processor: Prevent cpu hotplug
deadlock") except this is for acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe():

"The problem is that the work is scheduled on the current CPU from the
hotplug thread associated with that CPU.

It's not required to invoke these functions via the workqueue because
the hotplug thread runs on the target CPU already.

Check whether current is a per cpu thread pinned on the target CPU and
invoke the function directly to avoid the workqueue."

 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 ------------------------------------------------------
 cpuhp/1/15 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffffc90003447a28 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x4c6/0x630

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
 cpus_read_lock+0x3e/0xc0
 irq_calc_affinity_vectors+0x5f/0x91
 __pci_enable_msix_range+0x10f/0x9a0
 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity+0x13e/0x1f0
 pci_alloc_irq_vectors_affinity at drivers/pci/msi.c:1208
 pqi_ctrl_init+0x72f/0x1618 [smartpqi]
 pqi_pci_probe.cold.63+0x882/0x892 [smartpqi]
 local_pci_probe+0x7a/0xc0
 work_for_cpu_fn+0x2e/0x50
 process_one_work+0x57e/0xb90
 worker_thread+0x363/0x5b0
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&wfc.work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
 (work_completion)(&wfc.work) --> cpuhp_state-up --> cpuidle_lock

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

 CPU0                    CPU1
 ----                    ----
 lock(cpuidle_lock);
                         lock(cpuhp_state-up);
                         lock(cpuidle_lock);
 lock((work_completion)(&wfc.work));

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 3 locks held by cpuhp/1/15:
 #0: ffffffffaf51ab10 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
 #1: ffffffffaf51ad40 (cpuhp_state-up){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: cpuhp_thread_fun+0x69/0x2f0
 #2: ffffffffafa1c0e8 (cpuidle_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: cpuidle_pause_and_lock+0x17/0x20

 Call Trace:
 dump_stack+0xa0/0xea
 print_circular_bug.cold.52+0x147/0x14c
 check_noncircular+0x295/0x2d0
 __lock_acquire+0x2244/0x32a0
 lock_acquire+0x1a2/0x680
 __flush_work+0x4e6/0x630
 work_on_cpu+0x114/0x160
 acpi_processor_ffh_cstate_probe+0x129/0x250
 acpi_processor_evaluate_cst+0x4c8/0x580
 acpi_processor_get_power_info+0x86/0x740
 acpi_processor_hotplug+0xc3/0x140
 acpi_soft_cpu_online+0x102/0x1d0
 cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x197/0x1120
 cpuhp_thread_fun+0x252/0x2f0
 smpboot_thread_fn+0x255/0x440
 kthread+0x1f4/0x220
 ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[ rjw: Subject ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2020
commit d3ec10aa95819bff18a0d936b18884c7816d0914 upstream.

A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:

[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE    --------- -  -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434]        down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202]        __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232]        request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734]        request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450]        cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250]        smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659]        cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920]        read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583]        __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047]        ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069]        filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637]        __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216]        do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390]        __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408]        handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401]        __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395]        do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777]        page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875]        lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848]        __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006]        keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936]        assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154]        keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558]        keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470]        do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829]   &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431]        CPU0                    CPU1
[12538.572654]        ----                    ----
[12538.595865]   lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737]                                lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234]                                lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410]   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097]  #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908]  print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891]  ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979]  check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643]  ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738]  ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555]  __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554]  lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079]  __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234]  keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787]  ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059]  assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526]  keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561]  ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076]  keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660]  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf

One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.

That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,

  1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
  2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
  3) All the fault handling code is removed.

Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.

Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2020
commit 056ad39ee9253873522f6469c3364964a322912b upstream.

FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found a free-while-still-in-use bug
in the USB scatter-gather library:

BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read
include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170
drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888065379610 by task kworker/u4:1/27

CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.5.11 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: scsi_tmf_2 scmd_eh_abort_handler
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
 dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118
 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374
 __kasan_report+0x153/0x1cb mm/kasan/report.c:506
 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639
 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline]
 check_memory_region+0x152/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192
 __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:95
 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline]
 usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607
 usb_unlink_urb+0x72/0xb0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:657
 usb_sg_cancel+0x14e/0x290 drivers/usb/core/message.c:602
 usb_stor_stop_transport+0x5e/0xa0 drivers/usb/storage/transport.c:937

This bug occurs when cancellation of the S-G transfer races with
transfer completion.  When that happens, usb_sg_cancel() may continue
to access the transfer's URBs after usb_sg_wait() has freed them.

The bug is caused by the fact that usb_sg_cancel() does not take any
sort of reference to the transfer, and so there is nothing to prevent
the URBs from being deallocated while the routine is trying to use
them.  The fix is to take such a reference by incrementing the
transfer's io->count field while the cancellation is in progres and
decrementing it afterward.  The transfer's URBs are not deallocated
until io->complete is triggered, which happens when io->count reaches
zero.

Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2003281615140.14837-100000@netrider.rowland.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 18, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

commit fcc99734d1d4ced30167eb02e17f656735cb9928 upstream.

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JeevakaPrabu pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 26, 2020
commit 0b80f9866e6bbfb905140ed8787ff2af03652c0c upstream.

abs_vdebt is an atomic_64 which tracks how much over budget a given cgroup
is and controls the activation of use_delay mechanism. Once a cgroup goes
over budget from forced IOs, it has to pay it back with its future budget.
The progress guarantee on debt paying comes from the iocg being active -
active iocgs are processed by the periodic timer, which ensures that as time
passes the debts dissipate and the iocg returns to normal operation.

However, both iocg activation and vdebt handling are asynchronous and a
sequence like the following may happen.

1. The iocg is in the process of being deactivated by the periodic timer.

2. A bio enters ioc_rqos_throttle(), calls iocg_activate() which returns
   without anything because it still sees that the iocg is already active.

3. The iocg is deactivated.

4. The bio from #2 is over budget but needs to be forced. It increases
   abs_vdebt and goes over the threshold and enables use_delay.

5. IO control is enabled for the iocg's subtree and now IOs are attributed
   to the descendant cgroups and the iocg itself no longer issues IOs.

This leaves the iocg with stuck abs_vdebt - it has debt but inactive and no
further IOs which can activate it. This can end up unduly punishing all the
descendants cgroups.

The usual throttling path has the same issue - the iocg must be active while
throttled to ensure that future event will wake it up - and solves the
problem by synchronizing the throttling path with a spinlock. abs_vdebt
handling is another form of overage handling and shares a lot of
characteristics including the fact that it isn't in the hottest path.

This patch fixes the above and other possible races by strictly
synchronizing abs_vdebt and use_delay handling with iocg->waitq.lock.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reported-by: Vlad Dmitriev <vvd@fb.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Fixes: e1518f6 ("blk-iocost: Don't let merges push vtime into the future")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to muhammadaksar/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit 20a785aa52c82246055a089e55df9dac47d67da1 ]

This BUG halt was reported a while back, but the patch somehow got
missed:

PID: 2879   TASK: c16adaa0  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "sctpn"
 #0 [f418dd28] crash_kexec at c04a7d8c
 projectceladon#1 [f418dd7c] oops_end at c0863e02
 projectceladon#2 [f418dd90] do_invalid_op at c040aaca
 projectceladon#3 [f418de28] error_code (via invalid_op) at c08631a5
    EAX: f34baac0  EBX: 00000090  ECX: f418deb0  EDX: f5542950  EBP: 00000000
    DS:  007b      ESI: f34ba800  ES:  007b      EDI: f418dea0  GS:  00e0
    CS:  0060      EIP: c046fa5e  ERR: ffffffff  EFLAGS: 00010286
 projectceladon#4 [f418de5c] add_timer at c046fa5e
 projectceladon#5 [f418de68] sctp_do_sm at f8db8c77 [sctp]
 projectceladon#6 [f418df30] sctp_primitive_SHUTDOWN at f8dcc1b5 [sctp]
 projectceladon#7 [f418df48] inet_shutdown at c080baf9
 projectceladon#8 [f418df5c] sys_shutdown at c079eedf
 projectceladon#9 [f418df70] sys_socketcall at c079fe88
    EAX: ffffffda  EBX: 0000000d  ECX: bfceea90  EDX: 0937af98
    DS:  007b      ESI: 0000000c  ES:  007b      EDI: b7150ae4
    SS:  007b      ESP: bfceea7c  EBP: bfceeaa8  GS:  0033
    CS:  0073      EIP: b775c424  ERR: 00000066  EFLAGS: 00000282

It appears that the side effect that starts the shutdown timer was processed
multiple times, which can happen as multiple paths can trigger it.  This of
course leads to the BUG halt in add_timer getting called.

Fix seems pretty straightforward, just check before the timer is added if its
already been started.  If it has mod the timer instead to min(current
expiration, new expiration)

Its been tested but not confirmed to fix the problem, as the issue has only
occured in production environments where test kernels are enjoined from being
installed.  It appears to be a sane fix to me though.  Also, recentely,
Jere found a reproducer posted on list to confirm that this resolves the
issues

Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: jere.leppanen@nokia.com
CC: marcelo.leitner@gmail.com
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to muhammadaksar/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jun 25, 2020
commit 2b86cb8299765688c5119fd18d5f436716c81010 upstream.

Be there a platform with the following layout:

      Regular NIC
       |
       +----> DSA master for switch port
               |
               +----> DSA master for another switch port

After changing DSA back to static lockdep class keys in commit
1a33e10e4a95 ("net: partially revert dynamic lockdep key changes"), this
kernel splat can be seen:

[   13.361198] ============================================
[   13.366524] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   13.371851] 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988 Not tainted
[   13.377874] --------------------------------------------
[   13.383201] swapper/0/0 is trying to acquire lock:
[   13.388004] ffff0000668ff298 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[   13.397879]
[   13.397879] but task is already holding lock:
[   13.403727] ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[   13.413593]
[   13.413593] other info that might help us debug this:
[   13.420140]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   13.420140]
[   13.426075]        CPU0
[   13.428523]        ----
[   13.430969]   lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key);
[   13.435946]   lock(&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key);
[   13.440924]
[   13.440924]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   13.440924]
[   13.446860]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   13.446860]
[   13.453668] 6 locks held by swapper/0/0:
[   13.457598]  #0: ffff800010003de0 ((&idev->mc_ifc_timer)){+.-.}-{0:0}, at: call_timer_fn+0x0/0x400
[   13.466593]  projectceladon#1: ffffd4d3fb478700 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: mld_sendpack+0x0/0x560
[   13.474803]  projectceladon#2: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip6_finish_output2+0x64/0xb10
[   13.483886]  projectceladon#3: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0
[   13.492793]  projectceladon#4: ffff0000661a1698 (&dsa_slave_netdev_xmit_lock_key){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[   13.503094]  projectceladon#5: ffffd4d3fb478728 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x6c/0xbe0
[   13.512000]
[   13.512000] stack backtrace:
[   13.516369] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-02121-gc32a05ecd7af-dirty #988
[   13.530421] Call trace:
[   13.532871]  dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1d8
[   13.536539]  show_stack+0x24/0x30
[   13.539862]  dump_stack+0xe8/0x150
[   13.543271]  __lock_acquire+0x1030/0x1678
[   13.547290]  lock_acquire+0xf8/0x458
[   13.550873]  _raw_spin_lock+0x44/0x58
[   13.554543]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x84c/0xbe0
[   13.558562]  dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30
[   13.562232]  dsa_slave_xmit+0xe0/0x128
[   13.565988]  dev_hard_start_xmit+0xf4/0x448
[   13.570182]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x808/0xbe0
[   13.574200]  dev_queue_xmit+0x24/0x30
[   13.577869]  neigh_resolve_output+0x15c/0x220
[   13.582237]  ip6_finish_output2+0x244/0xb10
[   13.586430]  __ip6_finish_output+0x1dc/0x298
[   13.590709]  ip6_output+0x84/0x358
[   13.594116]  mld_sendpack+0x2bc/0x560
[   13.597786]  mld_ifc_timer_expire+0x210/0x390
[   13.602153]  call_timer_fn+0xcc/0x400
[   13.605822]  run_timer_softirq+0x588/0x6e0
[   13.609927]  __do_softirq+0x118/0x590
[   13.613597]  irq_exit+0x13c/0x148
[   13.616918]  __handle_domain_irq+0x6c/0xc0
[   13.621023]  gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x160
[   13.624779]  el1_irq+0xbc/0x180
[   13.627927]  cpuidle_enter_state+0xb4/0x4d0
[   13.632120]  cpuidle_enter+0x3c/0x50
[   13.635703]  call_cpuidle+0x44/0x78
[   13.639199]  do_idle+0x228/0x2c8
[   13.642433]  cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x48
[   13.646363]  rest_init+0x1ac/0x280
[   13.649773]  arch_call_rest_init+0x14/0x1c
[   13.653878]  start_kernel+0x490/0x4bc

Lockdep keys themselves were added in commit ab92d68 ("net: core:
add generic lockdep keys"), and it's very likely that this splat existed
since then, but I have no real way to check, since this stacked platform
wasn't supported by mainline back then.

>From Taehee's own words:

  This patch was considered that all stackable devices have LLTX flag.
  But the dsa doesn't have LLTX, so this splat happened.
  After this patch, dsa shares the same lockdep class key.
  On the nested dsa interface architecture, which you illustrated,
  the same lockdep class key will be used in __dev_queue_xmit() because
  dsa doesn't have LLTX.
  So that lockdep detects deadlock because the same lockdep class key is
  used recursively although actually the different locks are used.
  There are some ways to fix this problem.

  1. using NETIF_F_LLTX flag.
  If possible, using the LLTX flag is a very clear way for it.
  But I'm so sorry I don't know whether the dsa could have LLTX or not.

  2. using dynamic lockdep again.
  It means that each interface uses a separate lockdep class key.
  So, lockdep will not detect recursive locking.
  But this way has a problem that it could consume lockdep class key
  too many.
  Currently, lockdep can have 8192 lockdep class keys.
   - you can see this number with the following command.
     cat /proc/lockdep_stats
     lock-classes:                         1251 [max: 8192]
     ...
     The [max: 8192] means that the maximum number of lockdep class keys.
  If too many lockdep class keys are registered, lockdep stops to work.
  So, using a dynamic(separated) lockdep class key should be considered
  carefully.
  In addition, updating lockdep class key routine might have to be existing.
  (lockdep_register_key(), lockdep_set_class(), lockdep_unregister_key())

  3. Using lockdep subclass.
  A lockdep class key could have 8 subclasses.
  The different subclass is considered different locks by lockdep
  infrastructure.
  But "lock-classes" is not counted by subclasses.
  So, it could avoid stopping lockdep infrastructure by an overflow of
  lockdep class keys.
  This approach should also have an updating lockdep class key routine.
  (lockdep_set_subclass())

  4. Using nonvalidate lockdep class key.
  The lockdep infrastructure supports nonvalidate lockdep class key type.
  It means this lockdep is not validated by lockdep infrastructure.
  So, the splat will not happen but lockdep couldn't detect real deadlock
  case because lockdep really doesn't validate it.
  I think this should be used for really special cases.
  (lockdep_set_novalidate_class())

Further discussion here:
https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/netdev/patch/20200503052220.4536-2-xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com/

There appears to be no negative side-effect to declaring lockless TX for
the DSA virtual interfaces, which means they handle their own locking.
So that's what we do to make the splat go away.

Patch tested in a wide variety of cases: unicast, multicast, PTP, etc.

Fixes: ab92d68 ("net: core: add generic lockdep keys")
Suggested-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit 3c2214b6027ff37945799de717c417212e1a8c54 ]

Removing the pcrypt module triggers this:

  general protection fault, probably for non-canonical
    address 0xdead000000000122
  CPU: 5 PID: 264 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.6.0+ projectceladon#2
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC
  RIP: 0010:__cpuhp_state_remove_instance+0xcc/0x120
  Call Trace:
   padata_sysfs_release+0x74/0xce
   kobject_put+0x81/0xd0
   padata_free+0x12/0x20
   pcrypt_exit+0x43/0x8ee [pcrypt]

padata instances wrongly use the same hlist node for the online and dead
states, so __padata_free()'s second cpuhp remove call chokes on the node
that the first poisoned.

cpuhp multi-instance callbacks only walk forward in cpuhp_step->list and
the same node is linked in both the online and dead lists, so the list
corruption that results from padata_alloc() adding the node to a second
list without removing it from the first doesn't cause problems as long
as no instances are freed.

Avoid the issue by giving each state its own node.

Fixes: 894c9ef9780c ("padata: validate cpumask without removed CPU during offline")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit fd689871bbfbb41cd77379d3e9e5f4def0f7d6c6 ]

Alloc new map and request for new hardware queue when increse
hardware queue count. Before this patch, it will show a
warning for each new hardware queue, but it's not enough, these
hctx have no maps and reqeust, when a bio was mapped to these
hardware queue, it will trigger kernel panic when get request
from these hctx.

Test environment:
 * A NVMe disk supports 128 io queues
 * 96 cpus in system

A corner case can always trigger this panic, there are 96
io queues allocated for HCTX_TYPE_DEFAULT type, the corresponding kernel
log: nvme nvme0: 96/0/0 default/read/poll queues. Now we set nvme write
queues to 96, then nvme will alloc others(32) queues for read, but
blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues does not alloc map and request for these new
added io queues. So when process read nvme disk, it will trigger kernel
panic when get request from these hardware context.

Reproduce script:

nr=$(expr `cat /sys/block/nvme0n1/device/queue_count` - 1)
echo $nr > /sys/module/nvme/parameters/write_queues
echo 1 > /sys/block/nvme0n1/device/reset_controller
dd if=/dev/nvme0n1 of=/dev/null bs=4K count=1

[ 8040.805626] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 8040.805627] WARNING: CPU: 82 PID: 12921 at block/blk-mq.c:2578 blk_mq_map_swqueue+0x2b6/0x2c0
[ 8040.805627] Modules linked in: nvme nvme_core nf_conntrack_netlink xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT nft_counter nf_nat_tftp nf_conntrack_tftp nft_masq nf_tables_set nft_fib_inet nft_f
ib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack tun bridge nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 stp llc ip6_tables ip_tables nft_compat rfkill ip_set nf_tables nfne
tlink sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass ipmi_ssif crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support ghash_clmulni_intel intel_
cstate intel_uncore raid0 joydev intel_rapl_perf ipmi_si pcspkr mei_me ioatdma sg ipmi_devintf mei i2c_i801 dca lpc_ich ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c sd_mod ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_ttm_helper ttm d
rm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops
[ 8040.805637]  ahci drm i40e libahci crc32c_intel libata t10_pi wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: nvme_core]
[ 8040.805640] CPU: 82 PID: 12921 Comm: kworker/u194:2 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         5.6.0-rc5.78317c+ projectceladon#2
[ 8040.805640] Hardware name: Inspur SA5212M5/YZMB-00882-104, BIOS 4.0.9 08/27/2019
[ 8040.805641] Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work [nvme]
[ 8040.805642] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_map_swqueue+0x2b6/0x2c0
[ 8040.805643] Code: 00 00 00 00 00 41 83 c5 01 44 39 6d 50 77 b8 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 8b bb 98 00 00 00 89 d6 e8 8c 81 03 00 eb 83 <0f> 0b e9 52 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 57 48 89 f1 41 56
[ 8040.805643] RSP: 0018:ffffba590d2e7d48 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 8040.805643] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f013e1ba800 RCX: 000000000000003d
[ 8040.805644] RDX: ffff9f00ffff6000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: ffff9ed200246d90
[ 8040.805644] RBP: ffff9f00f6a79860 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000003d
[ 8040.805645] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9f0138c3d000 R12: ffff9f00fb3a9008
[ 8040.805645] R13: 000000000000007f R14: ffffffff96822660 R15: 000000000000005f
[ 8040.805645] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f013fa80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8040.805646] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8040.805646] CR2: 00007f7f397fa6f8 CR3: 0000003d8240a002 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 8040.805647] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8040.805647] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8040.805647] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8040.805647] Call Trace:
[ 8040.805649]  blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues+0x31b/0x390
[ 8040.805650]  nvme_reset_work+0xb4b/0xeab [nvme]
[ 8040.805651]  process_one_work+0x1a7/0x370
[ 8040.805652]  worker_thread+0x1c9/0x380
[ 8040.805653]  ? max_active_store+0x80/0x80
[ 8040.805655]  kthread+0x112/0x130
[ 8040.805656]  ? __kthread_parkme+0x70/0x70
[ 8040.805657]  ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
[ 8040.805658] ---[ end trace b5f13b1e73ccb5d3 ]---
[ 8229.365135] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
[ 8229.365165] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 8229.365178] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 8229.365191] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 8229.365201] Oops: 0000 [projectceladon#1] SMP PTI
[ 8229.365212] CPU: 77 PID: 13024 Comm: dd Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W         5.6.0-rc5.78317c+ projectceladon#2
[ 8229.365232] Hardware name: Inspur SA5212M5/YZMB-00882-104, BIOS 4.0.9 08/27/2019
[ 8229.365253] RIP: 0010:blk_mq_get_tag+0x227/0x250
[ 8229.365265] Code: 44 24 04 44 01 e0 48 8b 74 24 38 65 48 33 34 25 28 00 00 00 75 33 48 83 c4 40 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 48 8d 68 10 4c 89 ef <44> 8b 60 04 48 89 ee e8 dd f9 ff ff 83 f8 ff 75 c8 e9 67 fe ff ff
[ 8229.365304] RSP: 0018:ffffba590e977970 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 8229.365317] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f00f6a79860 RCX: ffffba590e977998
[ 8229.365333] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff9f012039b140 RDI: ffffba590e977a38
[ 8229.365349] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: ffffda58ff94e190 R09: ffffda58ff94e198
[ 8229.365365] R10: 0000000000000011 R11: ffff9f00f6a79860 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 8229.365381] R13: ffffba590e977a38 R14: ffff9f012039b140 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 8229.365397] FS:  00007f481c230580(0000) GS:ffff9f013f940000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8229.365415] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8229.365428] CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 0000005f35e26004 CR4: 00000000007606e0
[ 8229.365444] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8229.365460] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8229.365476] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8229.365484] Call Trace:
[ 8229.365498]  ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80
[ 8229.365512]  blk_mq_get_request+0xcb/0x3f0
[ 8229.365525]  blk_mq_make_request+0x143/0x5d0
[ 8229.365538]  generic_make_request+0xcf/0x310
[ 8229.365553]  ? scan_shadow_nodes+0x30/0x30
[ 8229.365564]  submit_bio+0x3c/0x150
[ 8229.365576]  mpage_readpages+0x163/0x1a0
[ 8229.365588]  ? blkdev_direct_IO+0x490/0x490
[ 8229.365601]  read_pages+0x6b/0x190
[ 8229.365612]  __do_page_cache_readahead+0x1c1/0x1e0
[ 8229.365626]  ondemand_readahead+0x182/0x2f0
[ 8229.365639]  generic_file_buffered_read+0x590/0xab0
[ 8229.365655]  new_sync_read+0x12a/0x1c0
[ 8229.365666]  vfs_read+0x8a/0x140
[ 8229.365676]  ksys_read+0x59/0xd0
[ 8229.365688]  do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1d0
[ 8229.365700]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Weiping Zhang <zhangweiping@didiglobal.com>
Tested-by: Weiping Zhang <zhangweiping@didiglobal.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd7fc5545bbafdbd6c1efdc996b61883b285bdc5 ]

When station connected to AP, and run TX traffic such as TCP/UDP, and
system enter suspend state, then mac80211 call ath10k_flush with set
drop flag, recently it only send wmi peer flush to firmware and
firmware will flush all pending TX packets, for PCIe, firmware will
indicate the TX packets status to ath10k, and then ath10k indicate to
mac80211 TX complete with the status, then all the packets has been
flushed at this moment. For SDIO chip, it is different, its TX
complete indication is disabled by default, and it has a tx queue in
ath10k, and its tx credit control is enabled, total tx credit is 96,
when its credit is not sufficient, then the packets will buffered in
the tx queue of ath10k, max packets is TARGET_TLV_NUM_MSDU_DESC_HL
which is 1024, for SDIO, when mac80211 call ath10k_flush with set drop
flag, maybe it have pending packets in tx queue of ath10k, and if it
does not have sufficient tx credit, the packets will stay in queue
untill tx credit report from firmware, if it is a noisy environment,
tx speed is low and the tx credit report from firmware will delay more
time, then the num_pending_tx will remain > 0 untill all packets send
to firmware. After the 1st ath10k_flush, mac80211 will call the 2nd
ath10k_flush without set drop flag immediately, then it will call to
ath10k_mac_wait_tx_complete, and it wait untill num_pending_tx become
to 0, in noisy environment, it is esay to wait about near 5 seconds,
then it cause the suspend take long time.

1st and 2nd callstack of ath10k_flush
[  303.740427] ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1: ath10k_flush drop:1, pending:0-0
[  303.740495] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  303.740739] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3921 at /mnt/host/source/src/third_party/kernel/v4.19/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c:7025 ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.740757] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc ath10k_sdio ath10k_core rfcomm uinput cros_ec_rpmsg mtk_seninf mtk_cam_isp mtk_vcodec_enc mtk_fd mtk_vcodec_dec mtk_vcodec_common mtk_dip mtk_mdp3 videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_memops v4l2_mem2mem videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common hid_google_hammer hci_uart btqca bluetooth dw9768 ov8856 ecdh_generic ov02a10 v4l2_fwnode mtk_scp mtk_rpmsg rpmsg_core mtk_scp_ipi ipt_MASQUERADE fuse iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_sensors_ring cros_ec_sensors_sync cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer
[  303.740914]  kfifo_buf cros_ec_activity cros_ec_sensors_core lzo_rle lzo_compress ath mac80211 zram cfg80211 joydev [last unloaded: ath10k_core]
[  303.741009] CPU: 1 PID: 3921 Comm: kworker/u16:10 Tainted: G        W         4.19.95 projectceladon#2
[  303.741027] Hardware name: MediaTek krane sku176 board (DT)
[  303.741061] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[  303.741086] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[  303.741166] pc : ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.741244] lr : ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.741260] sp : ffffffdf080e77a0
[  303.741276] x29: ffffffdf080e77a0 x28: ffffffdef3730040
[  303.741300] x27: ffffff907c2240a0 x26: ffffffde6ff39afc
[  303.741321] x25: ffffffdef3730040 x24: ffffff907bf61018
[  303.741343] x23: ffffff907c2240a0 x22: ffffffde6ff39a50
[  303.741364] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: ffffffde6ff39a50
[  303.741385] x19: ffffffde6bac2420 x18: 0000000000017200
[  303.741407] x17: ffffff907c24a000 x16: 0000000000000037
[  303.741428] x15: ffffff907b49a568 x14: ffffff907cf332c1
[  303.741476] x13: 00000000000922e4 x12: 0000000000000000
[  303.741497] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000007
[  303.741518] x9 : f2256b8c1de4bc00 x8 : f2256b8c1de4bc00
[  303.741539] x7 : ffffff907ab5e764 x6 : 0000000000000000
[  303.741560] x5 : 0000000000000080 x4 : 0000000000000001
[  303.741582] x3 : ffffffdf080e74a8 x2 : ffffff907aa91244
[  303.741603] x1 : ffffffdf080e74a8 x0 : 0000000000000024
[  303.741624] Call trace:
[  303.741701]  ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.741941]  __ieee80211_flush_queues+0x1dc/0x358 [mac80211]
[  303.742098]  ieee80211_flush_queues+0x34/0x44 [mac80211]
[  303.742253]  ieee80211_set_disassoc+0xc0/0x5ec [mac80211]
[  303.742399]  ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x720/0x7d4 [mac80211]
[  303.742535]  ieee80211_deauth+0x24/0x30 [mac80211]
[  303.742720]  cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x250/0x3bc [cfg80211]
[  303.742849]  cfg80211_mlme_down+0x90/0xd0 [cfg80211]
[  303.742971]  cfg80211_disconnect+0x340/0x3a0 [cfg80211]
[  303.743087]  __cfg80211_leave+0xe4/0x17c [cfg80211]
[  303.743203]  cfg80211_leave+0x38/0x50 [cfg80211]
[  303.743319]  wiphy_suspend+0x84/0x5bc [cfg80211]
[  303.743335]  dpm_run_callback+0x170/0x304
[  303.743346]  __device_suspend+0x2dc/0x3e8
[  303.743356]  async_suspend+0x2c/0xb0
[  303.743370]  async_run_entry_fn+0x48/0xf8
[  303.743383]  process_one_work+0x304/0x604
[  303.743394]  worker_thread+0x248/0x3f4
[  303.743403]  kthread+0x120/0x130
[  303.743416]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

[  303.743812] ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1: ath10k_flush drop:0, pending:0-0
[  303.743858] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  303.744057] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3921 at /mnt/host/source/src/third_party/kernel/v4.19/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath10k/mac.c:7025 ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.744075] Modules linked in: bridge stp llc ath10k_sdio ath10k_core rfcomm uinput cros_ec_rpmsg mtk_seninf mtk_cam_isp mtk_vcodec_enc mtk_fd mtk_vcodec_dec mtk_vcodec_common mtk_dip mtk_mdp3 videobuf2_dma_contig videobuf2_memops v4l2_mem2mem videobuf2_v4l2 videobuf2_common hid_google_hammer hci_uart btqca bluetooth dw9768 ov8856 ecdh_generic ov02a10 v4l2_fwnode mtk_scp mtk_rpmsg rpmsg_core mtk_scp_ipi ipt_MASQUERADE fuse iio_trig_sysfs cros_ec_sensors_ring cros_ec_sensors_sync cros_ec_light_prox cros_ec_sensors industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf cros_ec_activity cros_ec_sensors_core lzo_rle lzo_compress ath mac80211 zram cfg80211 joydev [last unloaded: ath10k_core]
[  303.744256] CPU: 1 PID: 3921 Comm: kworker/u16:10 Tainted: G        W         4.19.95 projectceladon#2
[  303.744273] Hardware name: MediaTek krane sku176 board (DT)
[  303.744301] Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
[  303.744325] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[  303.744403] pc : ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.744480] lr : ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.744496] sp : ffffffdf080e77a0
[  303.744512] x29: ffffffdf080e77a0 x28: ffffffdef3730040
[  303.744534] x27: ffffff907c2240a0 x26: ffffffde6ff39afc
[  303.744556] x25: ffffffdef3730040 x24: ffffff907bf61018
[  303.744577] x23: ffffff907c2240a0 x22: ffffffde6ff39a50
[  303.744598] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: ffffffde6ff39a50
[  303.744620] x19: ffffffde6bac2420 x18: 000000000001831c
[  303.744641] x17: ffffff907c24a000 x16: 0000000000000037
[  303.744662] x15: ffffff907b49a568 x14: ffffff907cf332c1
[  303.744683] x13: 00000000000922ea x12: 0000000000000000
[  303.744704] x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000007
[  303.744747] x9 : f2256b8c1de4bc00 x8 : f2256b8c1de4bc00
[  303.744768] x7 : ffffff907ab5e764 x6 : 0000000000000000
[  303.744789] x5 : 0000000000000080 x4 : 0000000000000001
[  303.744810] x3 : ffffffdf080e74a8 x2 : ffffff907aa91244
[  303.744831] x1 : ffffffdf080e74a8 x0 : 0000000000000024
[  303.744853] Call trace:
[  303.744929]  ath10k_flush+0x54/0x104 [ath10k_core]
[  303.745098]  __ieee80211_flush_queues+0x1dc/0x358 [mac80211]
[  303.745277]  ieee80211_flush_queues+0x34/0x44 [mac80211]
[  303.745424]  ieee80211_set_disassoc+0x108/0x5ec [mac80211]
[  303.745569]  ieee80211_mgd_deauth+0x720/0x7d4 [mac80211]
[  303.745706]  ieee80211_deauth+0x24/0x30 [mac80211]
[  303.745853]  cfg80211_mlme_deauth+0x250/0x3bc [cfg80211]
[  303.745979]  cfg80211_mlme_down+0x90/0xd0 [cfg80211]
[  303.746103]  cfg80211_disconnect+0x340/0x3a0 [cfg80211]
[  303.746219]  __cfg80211_leave+0xe4/0x17c [cfg80211]
[  303.746335]  cfg80211_leave+0x38/0x50 [cfg80211]
[  303.746452]  wiphy_suspend+0x84/0x5bc [cfg80211]
[  303.746467]  dpm_run_callback+0x170/0x304
[  303.746477]  __device_suspend+0x2dc/0x3e8
[  303.746487]  async_suspend+0x2c/0xb0
[  303.746498]  async_run_entry_fn+0x48/0xf8
[  303.746510]  process_one_work+0x304/0x604
[  303.746521]  worker_thread+0x248/0x3f4
[  303.746530]  kthread+0x120/0x130
[  303.746542]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

one sample's debugging log: it wait 3190 ms(5000 - 1810).

1st ath10k_flush, it has 120 packets in tx queue of ath10k:
<...>-1513  [000] .... 25374.786005: ath10k_log_err: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 ath10k_flush drop:1, pending:120-0
<...>-1513  [000] ...1 25374.788375: ath10k_log_warn: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 ath10k_htt_tx_mgmt_inc_pending htt->num_pending_mgmt_tx:0
<...>-1500  [001] .... 25374.790143: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:121

2st ath10k_flush, it has 121 packets in tx queue of ath10k:
<...>-1513  [000] .... 25374.790571: ath10k_log_err: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 ath10k_flush drop:0, pending:121-0
<...>-1513  [000] .... 25374.791990: ath10k_log_err: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 ath10k_mac_wait_tx_complete state:1 pending:121-0
<...>-1508  [001] .... 25374.792696: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:46
<...>-1508  [001] .... 25374.792700: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:46
<...>-1508  [001] .... 25374.792729: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:121
<...>-1508  [001] .... 25374.792937: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:88, count:32, len:49792
<...>-1508  [001] .... 25374.793031: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:75, count:14, len:21784
kworker/u16:0-25773 [003] .... 25374.793701: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx complete, eid:1, pending complete count:46
<...>-1881  [000] .... 25375.073178: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:24
<...>-1881  [000] .... 25375.073182: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:24
<...>-1881  [000] .... 25375.073429: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:75
<...>-1879  [001] .... 25375.074090: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx complete, eid:1, pending complete count:24
<...>-1881  [000] .... 25375.074123: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:51, count:24, len:37344
<...>-1879  [001] .... 25375.270126: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:26
<...>-1879  [001] .... 25375.270130: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:26
<...>-1488  [000] .... 25375.270174: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:51
<...>-1488  [000] .... 25375.270529: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:25, count:26, len:40456
<...>-1879  [001] .... 25375.270693: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx complete, eid:1, pending complete count:26
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.775885: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:12
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.775890: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:12
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.775933: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:25
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.776059: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:13, count:12, len:18672
<...>-1879  [001] .... 25377.776100: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx complete, eid:1, pending complete count:12
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.878079: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:15
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.878087: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:15
<...>-1879  [000] .... 25377.878323: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:13
<...>-1879  [000] .... 25377.878487: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx status:0, eid:1, req count:0, count:13, len:20228
<...>-1879  [000] .... 25377.878497: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx complete, eid:1, pending complete count:13
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.919927: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit update: delta:11
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.919932: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 credit total:13
<...>-1488  [001] .... 25377.919976: ath10k_log_dbg: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 bundle tx work, eid:1, count:0
<...>-1881  [000] .... 25377.982645: ath10k_log_warn: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_MGMT_TX_COMPLETION status:0
<...>-1513  [001] .... 25377.982973: ath10k_log_err: ath10k_sdio mmc1:0001:1 ath10k_mac_wait_tx_complete time_left:1810, pending:0-0

Flush all pending TX packets for the 1st ath10k_flush reduced the wait
time of the 2nd ath10k_flush and then suspend take short time.

This Patch only effect SDIO chips.

Tested with QCA6174 SDIO with firmware WLAN.RMH.4.4.1-00042.

Signed-off-by: Wen Gong <wgong@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200415233730.10581-1-wgong@codeaurora.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit f6766ff6afff70e2aaf39e1511e16d471de7c3ae ]

We need to check mddev->del_work before flush workqueu since the purpose
of flush is to ensure the previous md is disappeared. Otherwise the similar
deadlock appeared if LOCKDEP is enabled, it is due to md_open holds the
bdev->bd_mutex before flush workqueue.

kernel: [  154.522645] ======================================================
kernel: [  154.522647] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
kernel: [  154.522650] 5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25 Tainted: G           O
kernel: [  154.522651] ------------------------------------------------------
kernel: [  154.522653] mdadm/2482 is trying to acquire lock:
kernel: [  154.522655] ffff888078529128 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}, at: flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [  154.522673]
kernel: [  154.522673] but task is already holding lock:
kernel: [  154.522675] ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [  154.522691]
kernel: [  154.522691] which lock already depends on the new lock.
kernel: [  154.522691]
kernel: [  154.522694]
kernel: [  154.522694] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
kernel: [  154.522696]
kernel: [  154.522696] -> projectceladon#4 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}:
kernel: [  154.522704]        __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950
kernel: [  154.522706]        __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [  154.522708]        blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [  154.522709]        blkdev_get_by_dev+0x2f/0x40
kernel: [  154.522716]        lock_rdev+0x3d/0x90 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522719]        md_import_device+0xd6/0x1b0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522723]        new_dev_store+0x15e/0x210 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522728]        md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522732]        kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0
kernel: [  154.522735]        vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
kernel: [  154.522737]        ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0
kernel: [  154.522745]        do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [  154.522748]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [  154.522749]
kernel: [  154.522749] -> projectceladon#3 (&mddev->reconfig_mutex){+.+.}:
kernel: [  154.522752]        __mutex_lock+0x87/0x950
kernel: [  154.522756]        new_dev_store+0xc9/0x210 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522759]        md_attr_store+0x7a/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522761]        kernfs_fop_write+0x117/0x1b0
kernel: [  154.522763]        vfs_write+0xad/0x1a0
kernel: [  154.522765]        ksys_write+0xa4/0xe0
kernel: [  154.522767]        do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [  154.522769]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [  154.522770]
kernel: [  154.522770] -> projectceladon#2 (kn->count#253){++++}:
kernel: [  154.522775]        __kernfs_remove+0x253/0x2c0
kernel: [  154.522778]        kernfs_remove+0x1f/0x30
kernel: [  154.522780]        kobject_del+0x28/0x60
kernel: [  154.522783]        mddev_delayed_delete+0x24/0x30 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522786]        process_one_work+0x2a7/0x5f0
kernel: [  154.522788]        worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
kernel: [  154.522793]        kthread+0x117/0x130
kernel: [  154.522795]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
kernel: [  154.522796]
kernel: [  154.522796] -> projectceladon#1 ((work_completion)(&mddev->del_work)){+.+.}:
kernel: [  154.522800]        process_one_work+0x27e/0x5f0
kernel: [  154.522802]        worker_thread+0x2d/0x3d0
kernel: [  154.522804]        kthread+0x117/0x130
kernel: [  154.522806]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
kernel: [  154.522807]
kernel: [  154.522807] -> #0 ((wq_completion)md_misc){+.+.}:
kernel: [  154.522813]        __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [  154.522816]        lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: [  154.522818]        flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0
kernel: [  154.522821]        md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522823]        __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590
kernel: [  154.522825]        blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [  154.522828]        do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380
kernel: [  154.522831]        path_openat+0x567/0xcc0
kernel: [  154.522834]        do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
kernel: [  154.522836]        do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [  154.522838]        do_sys_open+0x57/0x80
kernel: [  154.522840]        do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [  154.522842]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [  154.522844]
kernel: [  154.522844] other info that might help us debug this:
kernel: [  154.522844]
kernel: [  154.522846] Chain exists of:
kernel: [  154.522846]   (wq_completion)md_misc --> &mddev->reconfig_mutex --> &bdev->bd_mutex
kernel: [  154.522846]
kernel: [  154.522850]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
kernel: [  154.522850]
kernel: [  154.522852]        CPU0                    CPU1
kernel: [  154.522853]        ----                    ----
kernel: [  154.522854]   lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
kernel: [  154.522856]                                lock(&mddev->reconfig_mutex);
kernel: [  154.522858]                                lock(&bdev->bd_mutex);
kernel: [  154.522860]   lock((wq_completion)md_misc);
kernel: [  154.522861]
kernel: [  154.522861]  *** DEADLOCK ***
kernel: [  154.522861]
kernel: [  154.522864] 1 lock held by mdadm/2482:
kernel: [  154.522865]  #0: ffff88804efa9338 (&bdev->bd_mutex){+.+.}, at: __blkdev_get+0x79/0x590
kernel: [  154.522868]
kernel: [  154.522868] stack backtrace:
kernel: [  154.522873] CPU: 1 PID: 2482 Comm: mdadm Tainted: G           O      5.6.0-rc7-lp151.27-default #25
kernel: [  154.522875] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
kernel: [  154.522878] Call Trace:
kernel: [  154.522881]  dump_stack+0x8f/0xcb
kernel: [  154.522884]  check_noncircular+0x194/0x1b0
kernel: [  154.522888]  ? __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [  154.522890]  __lock_acquire+0x1392/0x1690
kernel: [  154.522893]  lock_acquire+0xb4/0x1a0
kernel: [  154.522895]  ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [  154.522898]  flush_workqueue+0xab/0x4b0
kernel: [  154.522900]  ? flush_workqueue+0x84/0x4b0
kernel: [  154.522905]  ? md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522908]  md_open+0xb6/0xc0 [md_mod]
kernel: [  154.522910]  __blkdev_get+0xea/0x590
kernel: [  154.522912]  ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0
kernel: [  154.522914]  blkdev_get+0x65/0x140
kernel: [  154.522916]  ? bd_acquire+0xc0/0xc0
kernel: [  154.522918]  do_dentry_open+0x1d1/0x380
kernel: [  154.522921]  path_openat+0x567/0xcc0
kernel: [  154.522923]  ? __lock_acquire+0x380/0x1690
kernel: [  154.522926]  do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
kernel: [  154.522929]  ? __alloc_fd+0xe5/0x1f0
kernel: [  154.522935]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x28c/0x630
kernel: [  154.522939]  ? do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [  154.522941]  do_sys_openat2+0x201/0x2a0
kernel: [  154.522944]  do_sys_open+0x57/0x80
kernel: [  154.522946]  do_syscall_64+0x64/0x2b0
kernel: [  154.522948]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
kernel: [  154.522951] RIP: 0033:0x7f98d279d9ae

And md_alloc also flushed the same workqueue, but the thing is different
here. Because all the paths call md_alloc don't hold bdev->bd_mutex, and
the flush is necessary to avoid race condition, so leave it as it is.

Signed-off-by: Guoqing Jiang <guoqing.jiang@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
commit 54505a1e2083fc54cbe8779b97479f969cd30a00 upstream.

The commits cd0e00c and 92d7223 broke boot on the Alpha Avanti
platform. The patches move memory barriers after a write before the write.
The result is that if there's iowrite followed by ioread, there is no
barrier between them.

The Alpha architecture allows reordering of the accesses to the I/O space,
and the missing barrier between write and read causes hang with serial
port and real time clock.

This patch makes barriers confiorm to the specification.

1. We add mb() before readX_relaxed and writeX_relaxed -
   memory-barriers.txt claims that these functions must be ordered w.r.t.
   each other. Alpha doesn't order them, so we need an explicit barrier.
2. We add mb() before reads from the I/O space - so that if there's a
   write followed by a read, there should be a barrier between them.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: cd0e00c ("alpha: io: reorder barriers to guarantee writeX() and iowriteX() ordering")
Fixes: 92d7223 ("alpha: io: reorder barriers to guarantee writeX() and iowriteX() ordering projectceladon#2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org      # v4.17+
Acked-by: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Reviewed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@linux-mips.org>
Signed-off-by: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit ab8b65be183180c3eef405d449163964ecc4b571 ]

It is unsafe to traverse kvm->arch.spapr_tce_tables and
stt->iommu_tables without the RCU read lock held. Also, add
cond_resched_rcu() in places with the RCU read lock held that could take
a while to finish.

 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:76 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 no locks held by qemu-kvm/4265.

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 96 PID: 4265 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4-next-20200508+ projectceladon#2
 Call Trace:
 [c000201a8690f720] [c000000000715948] dump_stack+0xfc/0x174 (unreliable)
 [c000201a8690f770] [c0000000001d9470] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x164
 [c000201a8690f7f0] [c008000010b9fb48] kvm_spapr_tce_release_iommu_group+0x1f0/0x220 [kvm]
 [c000201a8690f870] [c008000010b8462c] kvm_spapr_tce_release_vfio_group+0x54/0xb0 [kvm]
 [c000201a8690f8a0] [c008000010b84710] kvm_vfio_destroy+0x88/0x140 [kvm]
 [c000201a8690f8f0] [c008000010b7d488] kvm_put_kvm+0x370/0x600 [kvm]
 [c000201a8690f990] [c008000010b7e3c0] kvm_vm_release+0x38/0x60 [kvm]
 [c000201a8690f9c0] [c0000000005223f4] __fput+0x124/0x330
 [c000201a8690fa20] [c000000000151cd8] task_work_run+0xb8/0x130
 [c000201a8690fa70] [c0000000001197e8] do_exit+0x4e8/0xfa0
 [c000201a8690fb70] [c00000000011a374] do_group_exit+0x64/0xd0
 [c000201a8690fbb0] [c000000000132c90] get_signal+0x1f0/0x1200
 [c000201a8690fcc0] [c000000000020690] do_notify_resume+0x130/0x3c0
 [c000201a8690fda0] [c000000000038d64] syscall_exit_prepare+0x1a4/0x280
 [c000201a8690fe20] [c00000000000c8f8] system_call_common+0xf8/0x278

 ====
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:368 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 2 locks held by qemu-kvm/4264:
  #0: c000201ae2d000d8 (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0xdc/0x950 [kvm]
  projectceladon#1: c000200c9ed0c468 (&kvm->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: kvmppc_h_put_tce+0x88/0x340 [kvm]

 ====
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:108 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257:
  #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm]

 ====
 arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_64_vio.c:146 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

 other info that might help us debug this:

 rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
 1 lock held by qemu-kvm/4257:
  #0: c000200b1b363a40 (&kv->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x598/0x6c0 [kvm]

Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit 027690c75e8fd91b60a634d31c4891a6e39d45bd ]

I made every global per-network-namespace instead.  But perhaps doing
that to this slab was a step too far.

The kmem_cache_create call in our net init method also seems to be
responsible for this lockdep warning:

[   45.163710] Unable to find swap-space signature
[   45.375718] trinity-c1 (855): attempted to duplicate a private mapping with mremap.  This is not supported.
[   46.055744] futex_wake_op: trinity-c1 tries to shift op by -209; fix this program
[   51.011723]
[   51.013378] ======================================================
[   51.013875] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   51.014378] 5.2.0-rc2 projectceladon#1 Not tainted
[   51.014672] ------------------------------------------------------
[   51.015182] trinity-c2/886 is trying to acquire lock:
[   51.015593] 000000005405f099 (slab_mutex){+.+.}, at: slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130
[   51.016190]
[   51.016190] but task is already holding lock:
[   51.016652] 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500
[   51.017266]
[   51.017266] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[   51.017266]
[   51.017909]
[   51.017909] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   51.018497]
[   51.018497] -> projectceladon#1 (kn->count#43){++++}:
[   51.018956]        __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20
[   51.019317]        lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390
[   51.019658]        __kernfs_remove+0x892/0xae0
[   51.020020]        kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x78/0x110
[   51.020435]        sysfs_remove_link+0x55/0xb0
[   51.020832]        sysfs_slab_add+0xc1/0x3e0
[   51.021332]        __kmem_cache_create+0x155/0x200
[   51.021720]        create_cache+0xf5/0x320
[   51.022054]        kmem_cache_create_usercopy+0x179/0x320
[   51.022486]        kmem_cache_create+0x1a/0x30
[   51.022867]        nfsd_reply_cache_init+0x278/0x560
[   51.023266]        nfsd_init_net+0x20f/0x5e0
[   51.023623]        ops_init+0xcb/0x4b0
[   51.023928]        setup_net+0x2fe/0x670
[   51.024315]        copy_net_ns+0x30a/0x3f0
[   51.024653]        create_new_namespaces+0x3c5/0x820
[   51.025257]        unshare_nsproxy_namespaces+0xd1/0x240
[   51.025881]        ksys_unshare+0x506/0x9c0
[   51.026381]        __x64_sys_unshare+0x3a/0x50
[   51.026937]        do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0
[   51.027509]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[   51.028175]
[   51.028175] -> #0 (slab_mutex){+.+.}:
[   51.028817]        validate_chain+0x1c51/0x2cc0
[   51.029422]        __lock_acquire+0x7cf/0x1a20
[   51.029947]        lock_acquire+0x17d/0x390
[   51.030438]        __mutex_lock+0x100/0xfa0
[   51.030995]        mutex_lock_nested+0x27/0x30
[   51.031516]        slab_attr_store+0xa2/0x130
[   51.032020]        sysfs_kf_write+0x11d/0x180
[   51.032529]        kernfs_fop_write+0x32a/0x500
[   51.033056]        do_loop_readv_writev+0x21d/0x310
[   51.033627]        do_iter_write+0x2e5/0x380
[   51.034148]        vfs_writev+0x170/0x310
[   51.034616]        do_pwritev+0x13e/0x160
[   51.035100]        __x64_sys_pwritev+0xa3/0x110
[   51.035633]        do_syscall_64+0x110/0x10b0
[   51.036200]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[   51.036924]
[   51.036924] other info that might help us debug this:
[   51.036924]
[   51.037876]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   51.037876]
[   51.038556]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   51.039130]        ----                    ----
[   51.039676]   lock(kn->count#43);
[   51.040084]                                lock(slab_mutex);
[   51.040597]                                lock(kn->count#43);
[   51.041062]   lock(slab_mutex);
[   51.041320]
[   51.041320]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   51.041320]
[   51.041793] 3 locks held by trinity-c2/886:
[   51.042128]  #0: 000000001f55e152 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}, at: vfs_writev+0x2b9/0x310
[   51.042739]  projectceladon#1: 00000000c7d6c034 (&of->mutex){+.+.}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x25b/0x500
[   51.043400]  projectceladon#2: 00000000ac662005 (kn->count#43){++++}, at: kernfs_fop_write+0x286/0x500

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Fixes: 3ba7583 "drc containerization"
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 8, 2020
[ Upstream commit 2d3a8e2deddea6c89961c422ec0c5b851e648c14 ]

In blkdev_get() we call __blkdev_get() to do some internal jobs and if
there is some errors in __blkdev_get(), the bdput() is called which
means we have released the refcount of the bdev (actually the refcount of
the bdev inode). This means we cannot access bdev after that point. But
acctually bdev is still accessed in blkdev_get() after calling
__blkdev_get(). This results in use-after-free if the refcount is the
last one we released in __blkdev_get(). Let's take a look at the
following scenerio:

  CPU0            CPU1                    CPU2
blkdev_open     blkdev_open           Remove disk
                  bd_acquire
		  blkdev_get
		    __blkdev_get      del_gendisk
					bdev_unhash_inode
  bd_acquire          bdev_get_gendisk
    bd_forget           failed because of unhashed
	  bdput
	              bdput (the last one)
		        bdev_evict_inode

	  	    access bdev => use after free

[  459.350216] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0
[  459.351190] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88806c815a80 by task syz-executor.0/20132
[  459.352347]
[  459.352594] CPU: 0 PID: 20132 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.90 projectceladon#2
[  459.353628] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[  459.354947] Call Trace:
[  459.355337]  dump_stack+0x111/0x19e
[  459.355879]  ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0
[  459.356523]  print_address_description+0x60/0x223
[  459.357248]  ? __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0
[  459.357887]  kasan_report.cold+0xae/0x2d8
[  459.358503]  __lock_acquire+0x24c1/0x31b0
[  459.359120]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
[  459.359784]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x37b/0x580
[  459.360465]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40
[  459.361123]  ? finish_task_switch+0x125/0x600
[  459.361812]  ? finish_task_switch+0xee/0x600
[  459.362471]  ? mark_held_locks+0xf0/0xf0
[  459.363108]  ? __schedule+0x96f/0x21d0
[  459.363716]  lock_acquire+0x111/0x320
[  459.364285]  ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.364846]  ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.365390]  __mutex_lock+0xf9/0x12a0
[  459.365948]  ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.366493]  ? bdev_evict_inode+0x1f0/0x1f0
[  459.367130]  ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.367678]  ? destroy_inode+0xbc/0x110
[  459.368261]  ? mutex_trylock+0x1a0/0x1a0
[  459.368867]  ? __blkdev_get+0x3e6/0x1280
[  459.369463]  ? bdev_disk_changed+0x1d0/0x1d0
[  459.370114]  ? blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.370656]  blkdev_get+0xce/0xbe0
[  459.371178]  ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[  459.371774]  ? __blkdev_get+0x1280/0x1280
[  459.372383]  ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680
[  459.373002]  ? lock_acquire+0x111/0x320
[  459.373587]  ? bd_acquire+0x21/0x2c0
[  459.374134]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250
[  459.374780]  blkdev_open+0x202/0x290
[  459.375325]  do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050
[  459.375924]  ? blkdev_get_by_dev+0x70/0x70
[  459.376543]  ? __x64_sys_fchdir+0x1f0/0x1f0
[  459.377192]  ? inode_permission+0xbe/0x3a0
[  459.377818]  path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50
[  459.378392]  ? kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280
[  459.379016]  ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  459.379802]  ? path_lookupat.isra.0+0x900/0x900
[  459.380489]  ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140
[  459.381093]  do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280
[  459.381654]  ? may_open_dev+0xf0/0xf0
[  459.382214]  ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110
[  459.382816]  ? lock_downgrade+0x680/0x680
[  459.383425]  ? __lock_is_held+0xad/0x140
[  459.384024]  ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x4f/0x250
[  459.384668]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1f/0x30
[  459.385280]  ? __alloc_fd+0x448/0x560
[  459.385841]  do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500
[  459.386386]  ? filp_open+0x70/0x70
[  459.386911]  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
[  459.387610]  ? trace_hardirqs_off_caller+0x55/0x1c0
[  459.388342]  ? do_syscall_64+0x1a/0x520
[  459.388930]  do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520
[  459.389490]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  459.390248] RIP: 0033:0x416211
[  459.390720] Code: 75 14 b8 02 00 00 00 0f 05 48 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83
04 19 00 00 c3 48 83 ec 08 e8 0a fa ff ff 48 89 04 24 b8 02 00 00 00 0f
   05 <48> 8b 3c 24 48 89 c2 e8 53 fa ff ff 48 89 d0 48 83 c4 08 48 3d
      01
[  459.393483] RSP: 002b:00007fe45dfe9a60 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000002
[  459.394610] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fe45dfea6d4 RCX: 0000000000416211
[  459.395678] RDX: 00007fe45dfe9b0a RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: 00007fe45dfe9b00
[  459.396758] RBP: 000000000076bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000a
[  459.397930] R10: 0000000000000075 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 00000000ffffffff
[  459.399022] R13: 0000000000000bd9 R14: 00000000004cdb80 R15: 000000000076bf2c
[  459.400168]
[  459.400430] Allocated by task 20132:
[  459.401038]  kasan_kmalloc+0xbf/0xe0
[  459.401652]  kmem_cache_alloc+0xd5/0x280
[  459.402330]  bdev_alloc_inode+0x18/0x40
[  459.402970]  alloc_inode+0x5f/0x180
[  459.403510]  iget5_locked+0x57/0xd0
[  459.404095]  bdget+0x94/0x4e0
[  459.404607]  bd_acquire+0xfa/0x2c0
[  459.405113]  blkdev_open+0x110/0x290
[  459.405702]  do_dentry_open+0x49e/0x1050
[  459.406340]  path_openat+0x148c/0x3f50
[  459.406926]  do_filp_open+0x1a1/0x280
[  459.407471]  do_sys_open+0x3c3/0x500
[  459.408010]  do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x520
[  459.408572]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
[  459.409415]
[  459.409679] Freed by task 1262:
[  459.410212]  __kasan_slab_free+0x129/0x170
[  459.410919]  kmem_cache_free+0xb2/0x2a0
[  459.411564]  rcu_process_callbacks+0xbb2/0x2320
[  459.412318]  __do_softirq+0x225/0x8ac

Fix this by delaying bdput() to the end of blkdev_get() which means we
have finished accessing bdev.

Fixes: 77ea887 ("implement in-kernel gendisk events handling")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Jul 15, 2020
commit e5a15e17a78d58f933d17cafedfcf7486a29f5b4 upstream.

The following kernel panic was captured when running nfs server over
ocfs2, at that time ocfs2_test_inode_bit() was checking whether one
inode locating at "blkno" 5 was valid, that is ocfs2 root inode, its
"suballoc_slot" was OCFS2_INVALID_SLOT(65535) and it was allocted from
//global_inode_alloc, but here it wrongly assumed that it was got from per
slot inode alloctor which would cause array overflow and trigger kernel
panic.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 0000000000001088
  IP: [<ffffffff816f6898>] _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0
  PGD 1e06ba067 PUD 1e9e7d067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0002 [projectceladon#1] SMP
  CPU: 6 PID: 24873 Comm: nfsd Not tainted 4.1.12-124.36.1.el6uek.x86_64 projectceladon#2
  Hardware name: Huawei CH121 V3/IT11SGCA1, BIOS 3.87 02/02/2018
  RIP: _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0
  RSP: e02b:ffff88005ae97908  EFLAGS: 00010206
  RAX: ffff88005ae98000 RBX: 0000000000001088 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 0000000000000009 RDI: 0000000000001088
  RBP: ffff88005ae97928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880212878e00
  R10: 0000000000007ff0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001088
  R13: ffff8800063c0aa8 R14: ffff8800650c27d0 R15: 000000000000ffff
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880218180000(0000) knlGS:ffff880218180000
  CS:  e033 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000001088 CR3: 00000002033d0000 CR4: 0000000000042660
  Call Trace:
    igrab+0x1e/0x60
    ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x63/0x3a0 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_test_inode_bit+0x328/0xa00 [ocfs2]
    ocfs2_get_parent+0xba/0x3e0 [ocfs2]
    reconnect_path+0xb5/0x300
    exportfs_decode_fh+0xf6/0x2b0
    fh_verify+0x350/0x660 [nfsd]
    nfsd4_putfh+0x4d/0x60 [nfsd]
    nfsd4_proc_compound+0x3d3/0x6f0 [nfsd]
    nfsd_dispatch+0xe0/0x290 [nfsd]
    svc_process_common+0x412/0x6a0 [sunrpc]
    svc_process+0x123/0x210 [sunrpc]
    nfsd+0xff/0x170 [nfsd]
    kthread+0xcb/0xf0
    ret_from_fork+0x61/0x90
  Code: 83 c2 02 0f b7 f2 e8 18 dc 91 ff 66 90 eb bf 0f 1f 40 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 fb ba 00 00 02 00 <f0> 0f c1 17 89 d0 45 31 e4 45 31 ed c1 e8 10 66 39 d0 41 89 c6
  RIP   _raw_spin_lock+0x18/0xf0
  CR2: 0000000000001088
  ---[ end trace 7264463cd1aac8f9 ]---
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616183829.87211-4-junxiao.bi@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2020
[ Upstream commit 440ab9e10e2e6e5fd677473ee6f9e3af0f6904d6 ]

At times when I'm using kgdb I see a splat on my console about
suspicious RCU usage.  I managed to come up with a case that could
reproduce this that looked like this:

  WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
  5.7.0-rc4+ #609 Not tainted
  -----------------------------
  kernel/pid.c:395 find_task_by_pid_ns() needs rcu_read_lock() protection!

  other info that might help us debug this:

    rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
  3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
   #0: ffffff81b6b8e988 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __device_attach+0x40/0x13c
   projectceladon#1: ffffffd01109e9e8 (dbg_master_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x20c/0x7ac
   projectceladon#2: ffffffd01109ea90 (dbg_slave_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: kgdb_cpu_enter+0x3ec/0x7ac

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.7.0-rc4+ #609
  Hardware name: Google Cheza (rev3+) (DT)
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1b8
   show_stack+0x1c/0x24
   dump_stack+0xd4/0x134
   lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xf0/0x100
   find_task_by_pid_ns+0x5c/0x80
   getthread+0x8c/0xb0
   gdb_serial_stub+0x9d4/0xd04
   kgdb_cpu_enter+0x284/0x7ac
   kgdb_handle_exception+0x174/0x20c
   kgdb_brk_fn+0x24/0x30
   call_break_hook+0x6c/0x7c
   brk_handler+0x20/0x5c
   do_debug_exception+0x1c8/0x22c
   el1_sync_handler+0x3c/0xe4
   el1_sync+0x7c/0x100
   rpmh_rsc_probe+0x38/0x420
   platform_drv_probe+0x94/0xb4
   really_probe+0x134/0x300
   driver_probe_device+0x68/0x100
   __device_attach_driver+0x90/0xa8
   bus_for_each_drv+0x84/0xcc
   __device_attach+0xb4/0x13c
   device_initial_probe+0x18/0x20
   bus_probe_device+0x38/0x98
   device_add+0x38c/0x420

If I understand properly we should just be able to blanket kgdb under
one big RCU read lock and the problem should go away.  We'll add it to
the beast-of-a-function known as kgdb_cpu_enter().

With this I no longer get any splats and things seem to work fine.

Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200602154729.v2.1.I70e0d4fd46d5ed2aaf0c98a355e8e1b7a5bb7e4e@changeid
Signed-off-by: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2020
[ Upstream commit cb551b8dc079d2ef189145782627c99cb68c0255 ]

In BRM_status_show(), if the condition "!ioc->is_warpdrive" tested on entry
to the function is true, a "goto out" is called. This results in unlocking
ioc->pci_access_mutex without this mutex lock being taken.  This generates
the following splat:

[ 1148.539883] mpt3sas_cm2: BRM_status_show: BRM attribute is only for warpdrive
[ 1148.547184]
[ 1148.548708] =====================================
[ 1148.553501] WARNING: bad unlock balance detected!
[ 1148.558277] 5.8.0-rc3+ #827 Not tainted
[ 1148.562183] -------------------------------------
[ 1148.566959] cat/5008 is trying to release lock (&ioc->pci_access_mutex) at:
[ 1148.574035] [<ffffffffc070b7a3>] BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas]
[ 1148.580574] but there are no more locks to release!
[ 1148.585524]
[ 1148.585524] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1148.599624] 3 locks held by cat/5008:
[ 1148.607085]  #0: ffff92aea3e392c0 (&p->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: seq_read+0x34/0x480
[ 1148.618509]  projectceladon#1: ffff922ef14c4888 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x2a/0xb0
[ 1148.630729]  projectceladon#2: ffff92aedb5d7310 (kn->active#224){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_seq_start+0x32/0xb0
[ 1148.643347]
[ 1148.643347] stack backtrace:
[ 1148.655259] CPU: 73 PID: 5008 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.8.0-rc3+ #827
[ 1148.665309] Hardware name: HGST H4060-S/S2600STB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[ 1148.678394] Call Trace:
[ 1148.684750]  dump_stack+0x78/0xa0
[ 1148.691802]  lock_release.cold+0x45/0x4a
[ 1148.699451]  __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x35/0x270
[ 1148.707675]  BRM_status_show+0xd3/0x100 [mpt3sas]
[ 1148.716092]  dev_attr_show+0x19/0x40
[ 1148.723664]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x87/0x100
[ 1148.731193]  seq_read+0xbc/0x480
[ 1148.737882]  vfs_read+0xa0/0x160
[ 1148.744514]  ksys_read+0x58/0xd0
[ 1148.751129]  do_syscall_64+0x4c/0xa0
[ 1148.757941]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1148.766240] RIP: 0033:0x7f1230566542
[ 1148.772957] Code: Bad RIP value.
[ 1148.779206] RSP: 002b:00007ffeac1bcac8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.790063] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000020000 RCX: 00007f1230566542
[ 1148.800284] RDX: 0000000000020000 RSI: 00007f1223460000 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 1148.810474] RBP: 00007f1223460000 R08: 00007f122345f010 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.820641] R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1148.830728] R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000020000 R15: 0000000000020000

Fix this by returning immediately instead of jumping to the out label.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200701085254.51740-1-damien.lemoal@wdc.com
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Acked-by: Sreekanth Reddy <sreekanth.reddy@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
muhammadaksar pushed a commit to projectceladon-ci/linux-intel-lts2019-yocto that referenced this pull request Aug 17, 2020
commit fde9f39ac7f1ffd799a96ffa1e06b2051f0898f1 upstream.

This patch fixes a race condition that causes a use-after-free during
amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail. This can occur when 2 non-blocking commits
are requested and the second one finishes before the first. Essentially,
this bug occurs when the following sequence of events happens:

1. Non-blocking commit projectceladon#1 is requested w/ a new dm_state projectceladon#1 and is
deferred to the workqueue.

2. Non-blocking commit projectceladon#2 is requested w/ a new dm_state projectceladon#2 and is
deferred to the workqueue.

3. Commit projectceladon#2 starts before commit projectceladon#1, dm_state projectceladon#1 is used in the
commit_tail and commit projectceladon#2 completes, freeing dm_state projectceladon#1.

4. Commit projectceladon#1 starts after commit projectceladon#2 completes, uses the freed dm_state
1 and dereferences a freelist pointer while setting the context.

Since this bug has only been spotted with fast commits, this patch fixes
the bug by clearing the dm_state instead of using the old dc_state for
fast updates. In addition, since dm_state is only used for its dc_state
and amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail will retain the dc_state if none is found,
removing the dm_state should not have any consequences in fast updates.

This use-after-free bug has existed for a while now, but only caused a
noticeable issue starting from 5.7-rc1 due to 3202fa62f ("slub: relocate
freelist pointer to middle of object") moving the freelist pointer from
dm_state->base (which was unused) to dm_state->context (which is
dereferenced).

Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207383
Fixes: bd200d1 ("drm/amd/display: Don't replace the dc_state for fast updates")
Reported-by: Duncan <1i5t5.duncan@cox.net>
Signed-off-by: Mazin Rezk <mnrzk@protonmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicholas Kazlauskas <nicholas.kazlauskas@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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