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chore(conf): update JDK version from 17 to 11 and change tag to 1.0.0#2

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bluestreak01 merged 2 commits into
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rd_fix_jdk_version
Feb 2, 2026
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chore(conf): update JDK version from 17 to 11 and change tag to 1.0.0#2
bluestreak01 merged 2 commits into
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rd_fix_jdk_version

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@RaphDal RaphDal commented Feb 2, 2026

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@RaphDal RaphDal changed the title ci: update JDK version from 17 to 11 and change tag to 1.0.0 chore(conf): update JDK version from 17 to 11 and change tag to 1.0.0 Feb 2, 2026
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bluestreak01 merged commit 9bcd0cb into main Feb 2, 2026
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bluestreak01 deleted the rd_fix_jdk_version branch February 2, 2026 19:51
bluestreak01 added a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 27, 2026
The cursor I/O loop previously treated any wire failure as terminal —
first disconnect = sender broken, every subsequent batch threw. Now,
when the sender wires a ReconnectFactory + ReconnectListener, a wire
failure triggers:

  1. WARN log
  2. Build a fresh WebSocketClient via the factory (same auth/TLS/host)
  3. Reset wire state: nextWireSeq=0, fsnAtZero = engine.ackedFsn() + 1
  4. Reposition the cursor at the first unacked FSN (replay)
  5. Notify the listener → producer's connectionGeneration bumps so
     the next encode emits full schema definitions, not refs the new
     server has never seen
  6. Outer ioLoop continues — nextWireSeq=0 starts on the new wire,
     trySendOne picks up at the repositioned cursor and replays every
     unacked frame, then continues with whatever the producer publishes
     next

Added in main:
  * CursorWebSocketSendLoop.ReconnectFactory + .ReconnectListener
    interfaces (both functional, both null-able for legacy "fail-fast"
    semantics)
  * positionCursorAt(fsn) — walks frames inside the segment containing
    fsn to find the byte offset
  * SegmentRing.findSegmentContaining(fsn) + CursorSendEngine
    pass-through — used by the cursor reposition
  * QwpWebSocketSender extracts buildAndConnect() to use both for the
    initial connect and as the reconnect factory; onWireReconnect()
    is the listener that bumps connectionGeneration

This commit covers the *mechanics* (one attempt, succeed-or-fail).
The follow-up commit adds policy: exponential backoff with jitter,
per-outage time cap (reconnect_max_duration_millis, default 300s
per spec decision #2), and auth-failure detection (401/403/non-101
treated as terminal so the retry budget isn't wasted on errors that
won't fix themselves).

Two integration tests:
  * testReconnectAfterServerInducedDisconnect — server ACKs then
    closes; sender reconnects, second batch lands on the new wire
  * testReplayResendsUnackedFramesAcrossReconnect — server receives
    the first frame WITHOUT ACKing then closes; sender reconnects
    and replays the unacked frame on the new connection

Spec decisions #5 (encode-mid-reconnect race) and the core of
#1/#2 (reconnect mechanics) land here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
bluestreak01 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 2, 2026
…burn the drainer's settle wall clock

The capability-gap episode deadline anchors at gap error #1 and keeps
ticking through an intervening transport window (cluster unreachable).
A window longer than reconnect_max_duration_millis makes gap error #2
observe an expired deadline and quarantine the slot after just 2 gap
sweeps -- contradicting the 16-attempt settle intent and the documented
contract that transients never consume the budget. Sibling test
testTransportErrorDoesNotResetCapabilityGapEpisode pins the attempt
counter across the window but cannot see the wall-clock burn (its
transport blip is instantaneous).
bluestreak01 added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 21, 2026
Recovery resumed appending at lastGood but left the stale bytes in
[lastGood, fileSize) on disk. Two ordinary crashes could then brick the
client permanently: crash #1 tears the active near its end; recovery
resumes and the session fills the segment, but the last frame stops
short of the old residue, so rotation reseals the recovered file with a
non-zero suffix; recovery #2 correctly refuses non-zero sealed suffixes
("corrupt torn tail in sealed SF segment") -- on every startup, since
the plain exception is not quarantined. Primary slot: Sender.build()
fails forever; orphan slot: the drainer drops a permanent .failed
sentinel and the unacked data is silently stranded. Sibling hazard: the
frame envelope binds neither position nor FSN, so a byte-aligned stale
frame with a valid CRC past the tear could be resurrected at a recycled
FSN by a later scan (stale replay).

openExisting now zeroes the residue right after the scan validates and
makes the zeroes durable with an msync+fsync barrier before the segment
is returned, restoring the invariant fresh segments already have: all
bytes past the append cursor are zero. The barrier is load-bearing in
MEMORY durability mode, where rotation does not sync the sealed
predecessor's data pages. A failed barrier aborts recovery fail-closed.
tornTailBytes still reports the pre-sanitization observation and the
sealed-suffix check in SegmentRing stays fail-closed on first sight.

Regression tests: residue zeroed on disk; two-crash reseal at segment
level; stale-frame non-resurrection; barrier-failure abort; end-to-end
two-crash ring recovery (torn -> recover -> fill+rotate -> recover).
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