security: harden publish pipeline + CI against supply-chain injection#25
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Addresses Sapper M1 findings H1/H2 (field report: reports/fs-packages/field/2026-04-13-sapper-m1-first-security-assessment.md). ## publish.yml — split build from publish (H2) Previously a single job held both `contents: write` and `id-token: write` while running `npm ci` + `npm run build`. A compromised dev dependency (postinstall or build-time code) could exploit the OIDC token to publish malicious packages with legitimate sigstore provenance — blast radius is every consuming territory. Now split into: - `build` (contents: read, no id-token) — installs deps, builds, uploads dist artifacts. - `publish` (needs: build, contents: write, id-token: write) — downloads artifacts, reinstalls minimal deps, runs `changeset publish`. Both jobs install with `--ignore-scripts` to eliminate the postinstall vector at its root. A malicious build-time dep can still poison the build job's output, but it can no longer mint an OIDC token to publish. ## ci.yml — add --ignore-scripts (defense-in-depth) Same postinstall hardening applied to CI. No id-token exposure here, but a malicious postinstall could still exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` or other runner context via logs. Pure TypeScript/Vue deps — no legitimate postinstall needs exist in this dependency tree. ## CLAUDE.md — fix package count drift Packages table said 9, actual count is 10 (fs-router was added without updating the doc). Cross-agent note from the Sapper mission. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Deploying fs-packages with
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oxfmt expects the description column width to match the widest row. Adding fs-router (longer description) requires re-padding the earlier rows. Pure whitespace change; no content difference. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
Addresses the two High-severity findings from the first Sapper security assessment on this repo (field report — lives in the war-room meta-repo, not this one).
Problem:
publish.ymlrunsnpm ci+npm run build+changeset publishin a single job holding bothcontents: writeandid-token: write. Any dev-dependency postinstall or build-time code can exploit the OIDC token to publish malicious packages with valid sigstore provenance. Blast radius: every consuming territory (kendo, BIO, ublgenie, entreezuil, the-laboratory).Changes
publish.yml— split build from publishbuildjob —contents: read, noid-token. Installs deps, builds, uploadspackages/*/dist/as an artifact.publishjob —needs: build,contents: write+id-token: write. Downloads dist artifacts, reinstalls minimal deps, runschangeset publish.Job separation means build-time arbitrary code (compromised tsdown plugin, vite plugin, etc.) cannot mint an OIDC token to publish.
Both jobs — `npm ci --ignore-scripts`
Eliminates the postinstall vector entirely. No dev dep in this tree (pure TypeScript/Vue) has a legitimate postinstall requirement.
`ci.yml` — same flag (defense-in-depth)
CI has no `id-token`, but a malicious postinstall could still exfiltrate `GITHUB_TOKEN` or runner context via logs. Same one-line hardening.
Bonus: `CLAUDE.md` fix
Packages table said 9, actual is 10 — `fs-router` was added without updating the doc. Surfaced by the Sapper as a cross-agent note.
Residual risk (not fixed by this PR)
A compromised build-time dev dep can still alter the uploaded `dist/` artifact before the publish job consumes it — the split removes the OIDC minting path but not the build poisoning path. Harder fix: dependency pinning review, signed lockfile, or a trusted build environment. Out of scope here.
The other H1 finding (no branch protection + 6 admins) is handled outside this PR — branch protection is a repo settings change, not code. Planned for after this merges so the CI `check` job can be required as a status check.
Test plan
🤖 Generated with Claude Code