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feat(065): Evaluation Foundation (D1+D2) — integration to main (#562)
* docs(065): Evaluation Foundation spec (D1+D2) — measure security & discovery First implementation epic of the H2-2026 roadmap. Move from asserting to measuring: D1 tool-retrieval golden set (Recall@k/MRR/nDCG over a frozen corpus, the prerequisite + GEPA fitness function) and D2 security regression corpus (per-detector precision/recall/F1 + false-positive-rate, the quiet- security metric). Both extend the existing mcp-eval harness; gated in CI. D3/D4/D5/D6 are follow-on specs that compose on these. * docs(065): plan + research + data-model + contracts + quickstart for Evaluation Foundation Phase 0/1 design for D1 (tool-retrieval golden set, Recall@k/MRR/nDCG via REST /api/v1/index/search) and D2 (security regression corpus, per-detector precision/recall/F1/FPR via a cmd/scan-eval JSON bridge). Extends the mcp-eval harness; datasets frozen + versioned; 3 JSON-schema contracts; quickstart. Constitution PASS. D3/D4/D5/D6 remain follow-on specs. * feat(065): add cmd/scan-eval D2 detector bridge (B1) (#550) Bridge the Spec 065 / D2 security corpus to mcpproxy's production sensitive-data detector and emit per-entry, per-detector verdict JSON for the Python SecurityScorer (B3). Offline, deterministic test tooling only — no runtime or REST surface (Security-by-Default, R-03). - cmd/scan-eval: reads a security-corpus.schema.json-conforming file, runs each entry.description through security.NewDetector(nil).Scan, echoes ground-truth id/label/category, emits scan-verdict.schema.json. - Flags: --corpus (required), --out (default stdout), --detectors=sensitive-data (default), --scanners (reserved opt-in extension point for the deferred Docker bundled-scanner pass). - Exit codes: 0 ok, 4 bad/missing corpus or flags, 1 write failure. - contracts/scan-verdict.schema.json: the verdict output contract B3 consumes to derive per-detector TP/FP/TN/FN -> P/R/F1/FPR. - Test-first: TP (embedded AWS key), TN, missing/empty corpus, and deterministic-output coverage; committed minimal corpus fixture. The fixture demonstrates honest measurement (INV-3): the detector is a true positive on a credential-exfil description, a false negative on pure prompt-injection text, and a visible false positive on a benign doc referencing ~/.aws/credentials — i.e. it measures real coverage rather than trivially passing. Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * feat(065): security_corpus_v1.json (D2 security regression dataset) (#551) Add the D2 labeled security corpus the detection scorer measures against, plus a co-located validator test enforcing the contract and cross-entity invariants (INV-3, INV-4 / SC-004). - 43 entries: 20 malicious (tool_poisoning/prompt_injection/shadowing/rug_pull), 15 clean benign, 8 attack-resembling hard negatives (2 per attack category). - Every entry carries label + category + provenance.{source,license} (FR-007). - Sources limited to self-authored + DVMCP (MIT); MCPTox/MCP-AttackBench and the unconfirmed-license mcp-injection-experiments are referenced externally only, never vendored (CN-005, R-07, R-A). The validator fails the build on any non-redistributable license. - corpus_test.go validates against security-corpus.schema.json (santhosh-tekuri jsonschema/v6) and asserts attack coverage + >=1 hard negative per category. Related #739 Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * feat(065): D1 retrieval datasets (renamed for clarity) + merged D1/D2 README (#554) * feat(065): D1 retrieval datasets — frozen corpus, golden set, baseline (A2) Generate and commit the Spec 065 D1 retrieval evaluation artifacts via A1's mcp-eval datasets/retrieval CLI (cb37f84): - corpus_v1.json: frozen 45-tool snapshot over 7 no-auth reference MCP servers (filesystem, git, memory, sqlite, fetch, time, sequential-thinking), via GET /api/v1/tools. Immutable (CN-002); refresh = corpus_v2 (FR-012). - corpus_v1.source.json: secret-free, reproducible mcpproxy source config. - retrieval_golden_v1.json: 47 graded queries (relevance 0|1|2), 11 cross-server hard-negatives (FR-001), R-C compliant (queries never name the tool). Passes schema + INV-1 validation. - baseline_v1.json: reference Recall@k/MRR/nDCG@10/MAP + Recall@5 tolerance 0.05, the CI regression anchor (FR-009). Retrieval metrics top-level (scorer reads them directly); empty security section reserved for D2 (CN-004). - README.md: documented, repeatable regeneration procedure (FR-012). Verified end-to-end against a live BM25 index: validate OK, gate PASS (Recall@5=0.681 >= baseline-0.05). Score reports stay local (CN-003). Related #MCP-740 Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * fix(065): rename D1 dataset files for clarity + merge D1/D2 README Addresses pre-merge review on #552: corpus_v1.source.json (valid config) vs corpus_v1.json (scored snapshot, NOT a config) invited 'serve --config corpus_v1.json' which fails. Renamed: - corpus_v1.source.json -> snapshot-servers.config.json (the servable config) - corpus_v1.json -> corpus_v1.tools.json (the scored snapshot) Updated baseline_v1.json source_config + corpus note refs; merged the D1 and D2 dataset READMEs into one with an explicit servable-vs-dataset cheat sheet. --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * ci(065): eval.yml regression gate — D2 security (blocking) + D1 retrieval (MCP-742) (#561) * ci(065): eval.yml regression gate — D2 security (blocking) + D1 retrieval (MCP-742) Spec 065 / C1 (FR-009, US3/P2). Add `.github/workflows/eval.yml` running both Spec-065 evaluations as a regression gate over the frozen datasets: - security-d2 (blocking): provenance/license guard (FR-007/CN-005) → cmd/scan-eval ×3 → mcp-eval SecurityScorer. Thresholds --fpr-ceiling 0.10 --recall-floor 0.05 (the sensitive-data detector measures recall ≈0.10 on this corpus; scorer defaults of 0.80 would always fail). Sourced in one place pending the MCP-815 baseline `security.gate` block so gate and baseline never drift. - retrieval-d1: boots mcpproxy over snapshot-servers.config.json, waits for index readiness, runs the RetrievalScorer with baseline+tolerance. Report-only on PRs (npx/uvx fetch flake), blocking on the nightly schedule. Shared D2 logic in scripts/eval-ci-smoke.sh (CI == local). Reports upload as artifacts, never committed (CN-003, guarded). mcp-eval checked out at a pinned public ref. Verified locally: full D2 gate PASS (P=0.667 R=0.100 FPR=0.043), actionlint clean. Related #555 datasets; implements MCP-742 (Gate-2 plan rev 2 accepted). Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * ci(065): fix D1 retrieval job — create data_dir + single-step server lifecycle The retrieval-d1 job failed: `mcpproxy serve` exited immediately with "data_dir: directory does not exist" (serve refuses to create a missing data_dir), and the server was backgrounded in a separate step from the readiness poll (a process backgrounded in one step is reaped when that step's shell exits). Fix: mkdir -p the data_dir, and boot + readiness-poll + run the scorer in ONE step (shared shell) with a trap that stops the server however the step ends; also fail fast if the server process dies during startup. D2 gate unaffected. Verified: mcpproxy boots and serves /api/v1/status locally with the created data_dir; actionlint clean. Related #555 datasets; MCP-742. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * ci(065): fix D1 readiness probe — parse data.results from index/search envelope The retrieval-d1 readiness poll never passed: mcpproxy booted and indexed all 7 servers (45 tools), but the probe parsed the index/search response at the top level while results are nested under the `{"success":true,"data":{"results":[…]}}` envelope, so it read 0 every attempt and timed out. Fix: parse `data.results`. Verified locally — index returns 5 results for q=file within ~6s of boot. actionlint clean. Related #555 datasets; MCP-742. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * ci(065): D1 readiness waits for full tool catalog before scoring The retrieval scorer was running against a partially-indexed instance: the readiness probe passed at the first indexed tool (>=1 search result), so scoring started before all 7 reference servers connected -> Recall@5 measured 0.387 vs baseline threshold 0.631 (false regression). Fix: poll /api/v1/tools until the catalog reaches the near-full count (~45 tools across the 7 servers) and add a short settle for the index build, then score. Verified locally end-to-end on a fully-indexed instance: Recall@1/3/5/10 = 0.418/0.560/0.681/0.791, Gate(recall_at_5) PASS (0.681 vs 0.631) — the baseline is exactly reproducible. actionlint clean. Related #555 datasets; MCP-742. Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> * ci(065): trigger eval gate on D1 retrieval system-under-test paths (#563) The eval.yml pull_request.paths filter only matched the D2 security surface (internal/security, cmd/scan-eval) and the harness/datasets, so changes to the D1 retrieval system it gates — BM25 index, MCP tool- discovery routing, the REST search envelope, server/CLI boot — never triggered the workflow. Spec 065 requires CI to catch discovery regressions when search/index/tool-discovery behavior changes. Add internal/index/**, internal/server/**, internal/httpapi/**, and cmd/mcpproxy/** to the trigger paths. Job logic is unchanged, so D2 security and D1 retrieval stay green. Related MCP-833 --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
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.github/workflows/eval.yml

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name: Eval (Spec 065 regression gate)
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# Spec 065 / C1 (FR-009, US3/P2): regression gate over the frozen Spec-065
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# datasets. Two independent jobs so a network flake in D1 (retrieval) never
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# masks or blocks the deterministic D2 (security) gate.
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#
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# security-d2 — Go + Python only, no live upstreams. HARD gate (blocking).
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# retrieval-d1 — needs a live mcpproxy serving 7 reference servers; network
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# dependent. Report-only on PRs, blocking on the nightly
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# schedule (promote to PR-blocking after a green soak — see the
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# plan on MCP-742). Reports are uploaded as artifacts, never
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# committed (CN-003).
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#
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# mcp-eval (smart-mcp-proxy/mcp-eval) is a separate PUBLIC repo, checked out at a
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# pinned ref — no token needed.
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on:
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pull_request:
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paths:
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# D2 (security) system under test
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- "internal/security/**"
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# D1 (retrieval) system under test — BM25 index, MCP tool-discovery
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# routing, the REST search envelope, and server/CLI boot behavior the
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# retrieval eval depends on. Spec 065 requires CI to catch discovery
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# regressions when search/index/tool-discovery behavior changes.
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- "internal/index/**"
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- "internal/server/**"
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- "internal/httpapi/**"
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- "cmd/mcpproxy/**"
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# Eval harness + frozen datasets + this workflow
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- "cmd/scan-eval/**"
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- "specs/065-evaluation-foundation/datasets/**"
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- "scripts/eval-ci-smoke.sh"
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- ".github/workflows/eval.yml"
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workflow_dispatch: {}
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schedule:
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# Nightly soak (02:30 UTC) — exercises D1 against live upstreams.
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- cron: "30 2 * * *"
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permissions:
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contents: read
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env:
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MCP_EVAL_REF: "76df3a47e1480bfde2433b4f19df19312c985963" # SecurityScorer (B3) merge — pin for reproducibility
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PYTHON_VERSION: "3.11.13"
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jobs:
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security-d2:
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name: Security regression gate (D2)
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- name: Checkout mcpproxy-go
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
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- name: Set up Go
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uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.6.0
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with:
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go-version: "1.25"
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cache: true
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- name: Checkout mcp-eval (public, pinned)
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
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with:
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repository: smart-mcp-proxy/mcp-eval
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ref: ${{ env.MCP_EVAL_REF }}
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path: mcp-eval
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- name: Set up uv + Python
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uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0
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with:
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python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
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- name: Sync mcp-eval environment
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working-directory: mcp-eval
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run: uv sync
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- name: Run D2 security gate
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env:
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MCP_EVAL_DIR: ${{ github.workspace }}/mcp-eval
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OUT_DIR: reports/security
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run: bash scripts/eval-ci-smoke.sh
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- name: Upload D2 reports
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if: always()
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
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with:
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name: eval-security-d2
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path: reports/security/
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retention-days: 14
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if-no-files-found: ignore
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- name: Assert reports are not committed (CN-003)
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if: always()
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run: |
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tracked="$(git ls-files reports/ || true)"
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if [ -n "$tracked" ]; then
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echo "::error::Eval reports must never be committed (CN-003). Tracked under reports/:"
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echo "$tracked"
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exit 1
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fi
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echo "OK: no eval reports are tracked by git."
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retrieval-d1:
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name: Retrieval regression gate (D1)
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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# Report-only on PRs (D1 depends on npx/uvx package fetches — a known flake
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# source); blocking on the nightly schedule. Promote to PR-blocking after a
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# green soak (plan on MCP-742).
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continue-on-error: ${{ github.event_name == 'pull_request' }}
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steps:
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- name: Checkout mcpproxy-go
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
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- name: Set up Go
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uses: actions/setup-go@40f1582b2485089dde7abd97c1529aa768e1baff # v5.6.0
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with:
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go-version: "1.25"
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cache: true
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- name: Set up Node.js (npx-launched servers)
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uses: actions/setup-node@48b55a011bda9f5d6aeb4c2d9c7362e8dae4041e # v6.4.0
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with:
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node-version: "22"
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- name: Checkout mcp-eval (public, pinned)
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uses: actions/checkout@34e114876b0b11c390a56381ad16ebd13914f8d5 # v4.3.1
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with:
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repository: smart-mcp-proxy/mcp-eval
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ref: ${{ env.MCP_EVAL_REF }}
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path: mcp-eval
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- name: Set up uv + Python (uvx-launched servers + mcp-eval)
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uses: astral-sh/setup-uv@08807647e7069bb48b6ef5acd8ec9567f424441b # v8.1.0
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with:
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python-version: ${{ env.PYTHON_VERSION }}
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- name: Sync mcp-eval environment
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working-directory: mcp-eval
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run: uv sync
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- name: Build mcpproxy
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run: go build -o mcpproxy ./cmd/mcpproxy
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# Boot, poll and score in ONE step: a server backgrounded in a separate
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# step is reaped when that step's shell exits, so start + wait + run must
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# share a shell. The trap stops the server however this step ends.
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- name: Run D1 retrieval gate (boot mcpproxy + score)
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working-directory: ${{ github.workspace }}
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env:
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DS: ${{ github.workspace }}/specs/065-evaluation-foundation/datasets
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run: |
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set -uo pipefail
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base="http://127.0.0.1:8092"; key="eval-corpus-snapshot"
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# data_dir must exist — `serve` refuses to create a missing one.
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mkdir -p "$RUNNER_TEMP/eval"
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./mcpproxy serve \
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--config "$DS/snapshot-servers.config.json" \
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--data-dir "$RUNNER_TEMP/eval" \
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--listen 127.0.0.1:8092 \
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--log-level info > "$RUNNER_TEMP/mcpproxy.log" 2>&1 &
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server_pid=$!
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trap 'kill "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT
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# Wait for the FULL tool catalog before scoring: the retrieval index is
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# built from the connected servers' tools, and scoring a partially
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# indexed instance tanks recall (a ≥1-result check fires far too early).
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# The 7 reference servers expose ~45 tools; require near-full + a short
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# settle for the index build. /api/v1/tools wraps as
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# {"success":true,"data":{"tools":[...]}}.
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ready=0
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expected=44
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for i in $(seq 1 60); do
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if ! kill -0 "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null; then
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echo "::error::mcpproxy process exited during startup"
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break
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fi
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t="$(curl -fsS -H "X-API-Key: $key" "$base/api/v1/tools" \
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| python3 -c 'import sys,json;d=json.load(sys.stdin);print(len((d.get("data") or {}).get("tools", [])))' 2>/dev/null || echo 0)"
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echo "attempt $i: catalog has $t tool(s)"
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if [ "$t" -ge "$expected" ]; then
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ready=1; echo "Catalog full ($t tools); settling 8s for index build."; sleep 8; break
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fi
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sleep 5
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done
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if [ "$ready" != 1 ]; then
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echo "::error::mcpproxy catalog did not reach ${expected} tools in time"
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echo "----- mcpproxy.log (tail) -----"; tail -80 "$RUNNER_TEMP/mcpproxy.log" || true
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exit 1
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fi
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( cd "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/mcp-eval" && PYTHONPATH=src uv run python -m mcp_eval.cli retrieval \
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--corpus "$DS/corpus_v1.tools.json" \
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--golden "$DS/retrieval_golden_v1.json" \
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--baseline "$DS/baseline_v1.json" \
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--tolerance 0.05 \
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--runs 1 \
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--base-url "$base" \
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--api-key "$key" \
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--out-dir "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE/reports/retrieval" )
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- name: Upload D1 reports
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if: always()
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uses: actions/upload-artifact@ea165f8d65b6e75b540449e92b4886f43607fa02 # v4.6.2
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with:
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name: eval-retrieval-d1
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path: reports/retrieval/
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retention-days: 14
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if-no-files-found: ignore

cmd/scan-eval/eval.go

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package main
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"fmt"
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"os"
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"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/security"
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)
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// detectorSensitiveData is the id of the deterministic, in-process
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// sensitive-data/secret detector bridged in this PR (Gate-2 approved scope).
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// Docker bundled scanners are a deferred opt-in extension point (--scanners).
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const detectorSensitiveData = "sensitive-data"
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// corpusEntry mirrors one item of contracts/security-corpus.schema.json.
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type corpusEntry struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Description string `json:"description"`
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Label string `json:"label"`
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Category string `json:"category"`
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Provenance struct {
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Source string `json:"source"`
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License string `json:"license"`
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} `json:"provenance"`
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}
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// corpus is the D2 security corpus document. corpus_version/version are
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// optional; the schema only mandates entries. Unknown fields are tolerated so
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// the tool stays dataset-agnostic across corpus revisions.
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type corpus struct {
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CorpusVersion string `json:"corpus_version"`
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Version string `json:"version"`
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Entries []corpusEntry `json:"entries"`
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}
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// resolvedVersion returns the corpus version for echoing into the verdict
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// report, preferring corpus_version, then version, else "unknown".
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func (c *corpus) resolvedVersion() string {
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switch {
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case c.CorpusVersion != "":
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return c.CorpusVersion
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case c.Version != "":
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return c.Version
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default:
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return "unknown"
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}
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}
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// detectionView is the per-detection projection emitted in verdicts. It drops
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// detector-internal fields (location, is_likely_example) the scorer does not
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// need, keeping the contract minimal.
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type detectionView struct {
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Type string `json:"type"`
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Category string `json:"category"`
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Severity string `json:"severity"`
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}
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// detectorVerdict is one detector's call on one entry.
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type detectorVerdict struct {
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Detector string `json:"detector"`
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Flagged bool `json:"flagged"`
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MaxSeverity string `json:"max_severity"`
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Detections []detectionView `json:"detections"`
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}
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// verdictEntry echoes ground truth and carries every detector's verdict.
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type verdictEntry struct {
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ID string `json:"id"`
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Label string `json:"label"`
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Category string `json:"category"`
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Verdicts []detectorVerdict `json:"verdicts"`
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}
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// verdictReport is the top-level output (contracts/scan-verdict.schema.json),
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// the contract consumed by the Python SecurityScorer (B3).
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type verdictReport struct {
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CorpusVersion string `json:"corpus_version"`
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Detectors []string `json:"detectors"`
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Entries []verdictEntry `json:"entries"`
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}
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// loadCorpus reads and decodes a D2 security corpus JSON file. A read/parse
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// failure or an empty entry set is a config error (callers map it to exit 4).
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func loadCorpus(path string) (*corpus, error) {
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data, err := os.ReadFile(path)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading corpus %q: %w", path, err)
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}
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var c corpus
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if err := json.Unmarshal(data, &c); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("parsing corpus %q: %w", path, err)
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}
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if len(c.Entries) == 0 {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("corpus %q has no entries", path)
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}
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return &c, nil
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}
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// evaluate runs every corpus entry's description through the detector and
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// projects the result into the verdict contract. Output ordering follows the
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// corpus order and the detector's deterministic pattern order, so repeated
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// runs over an unchanged corpus are byte-identical (INV-5).
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func evaluate(c *corpus, detector *security.Detector) *verdictReport {
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report := &verdictReport{
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CorpusVersion: c.resolvedVersion(),
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Detectors: []string{detectorSensitiveData},
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Entries: make([]verdictEntry, 0, len(c.Entries)),
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}
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for _, e := range c.Entries {
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// The corpus stores the tool description text; scan it as a response
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// payload (the detector treats arguments/response identically).
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res := detector.Scan("", e.Description)
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v := detectorVerdict{
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Detector: detectorSensitiveData,
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Flagged: res.Detected,
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MaxSeverity: res.MaxSeverity(),
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Detections: make([]detectionView, 0, len(res.Detections)),
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}
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for _, d := range res.Detections {
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v.Detections = append(v.Detections, detectionView{
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Type: d.Type,
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Category: d.Category,
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Severity: d.Severity,
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})
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}
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report.Entries = append(report.Entries, verdictEntry{
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ID: e.ID,
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Label: e.Label,
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Category: e.Category,
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Verdicts: []detectorVerdict{v},
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})
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}
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return report
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}

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