fix(scanner): sanitize slash-named servers in temp-dir patterns + decode scan-report jobId

Follow-up to the same MCP-2123 branch: once the sanitizer fix makes the
container actually match, two more defects surface for official-registry
slash-named servers (verified end-to-end by CEO on com.pulsemcp/google-flights):

1. os.MkdirTemp rejects a pattern containing a path separator, so the three
   extraction temp-dir patterns (mcpproxy-scan-%s-, -scan-full-%s-,
   -scan-tools-%s-) failed for '/'-containing names and source fell back to
   'none'. Sanitize the name via dockernaming.SanitizeServerName first.

2. handleGetScanReportByJobID read the raw chi jobId param. Scan ids are
   scan-<serverName>-<ts> and contain '/', arriving percent-encoded, so the
   report endpoint 404'd. Decode via decodePathParam (same pattern the
   /servers subtree uses).

Verified result: source_method=docker_extract, 23 files extracted,
tools_exported=3, report endpoint HTTP 200. Adds regression tests:
TestScanTempDirPatternHandlesSlashNames, TestDecodePathParamScanJobID.

Related #MCP-2123

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

Author: Dumbris

internal/httpapi/scan_jobid_decode_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package httpapi
+
+import "testing"
+
+// TestDecodePathParamScanJobID is the MCP-2123 regression guard for the
+// scan-report-by-job-id route. Scan job IDs are "scan-<serverName>-<ts>", and
+// official-registry server names contain '/', so the id reaches the handler
+// percent-encoded (chi routes on RawPath). handleGetScanReportByJobID must
+// percent-decode it before the exact-match job lookup, otherwise "View Full
+// Report" 404s for slash-named servers even after the SPA route resolves.
+func TestDecodePathParamScanJobID(t *testing.T) {
+	encoded := "scan-com.pulsemcp%2Fgoogle-flights-1781284446323229000"
+	want := "scan-com.pulsemcp/google-flights-1781284446323229000"
+	if got := decodePathParam(encoded); got != want {
+		t.Errorf("decodePathParam(%q) = %q, want %q", encoded, got, want)
+	}
+
+	// A non-encoded id must pass through unchanged.
+	plain := "scan-simple-server-123"
+	if got := decodePathParam(plain); got != plain {
+		t.Errorf("decodePathParam(%q) = %q, want unchanged", plain, got)
+	}
+}

internal/httpapi/security_scanner.go

@@ -663,7 +663,12 @@ func (s *Server) handleGetScanReportByJobID(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Reque
 	if !s.requireSecurity(w, r) {
 		return
 	}
-	jobID := chi.URLParam(r, "jobId")
+	// chi routes on RawPath, so the param arrives percent-encoded. Scan job IDs
+	// embed the server name (scan-<serverName>-<ts>), and official-registry names
+	// contain '/', so the slash reaches us as %2F and must be decoded before the
+	// exact-match job lookup — otherwise the report page 404s for slash-named
+	// servers even after the SPA route resolves (MCP-2123).
+	jobID := decodePathParam(chi.URLParam(r, "jobId"))
 	if jobID == "" {
 		s.writeError(w, r, http.StatusBadRequest, "job ID is required")
 		return

internal/security/scanner/service.go

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import (
 	"sync/atomic"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/dockernaming"
 	"go.uber.org/zap"
 )
 
@@ -679,7 +680,7 @@ func (s *Service) StartScan(ctx context.Context, serverName string, dryRun bool,
 		// If no source dir was resolved (no Docker container, no working_dir),
 		// create a temp dir so Cisco scanner can at least scan tool definitions.
 		if req.SourceDir == "" {
-			tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-tools-%s-", serverName))
+			tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-tools-%s-", dockernaming.SanitizeServerName(serverName)))
 			if err == nil {
 				req.SourceDir = tempDir
 				// For HTTP/URL servers, preserve the "url" source method and path

internal/security/scanner/source_resolver.go

@@ -351,8 +351,11 @@ func (r *SourceResolver) findServerContainer(ctx context.Context, serverName str
 // hoisted into the same shared cache cannot leak into the scan.
 func (r *SourceResolver) extractFromContainer(ctx context.Context, containerID string, info ServerInfo) (string, func(), error) {
 	serverName := info.Name
-	// Create temp directory for extracted source
-	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-%s-", serverName))
+	// Create temp directory for extracted source. The server name can contain
+	// path separators (official-registry names like "com.pulsemcp/google-flights"),
+	// which os.MkdirTemp rejects in the pattern ("contains path separator") — so
+	// sanitize it to the same token used for the container name (MCP-2123).
+	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-%s-", dockernaming.SanitizeServerName(serverName)))
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp dir: %w", err)
 	}
@@ -811,7 +814,8 @@ func (r *SourceResolver) ResolveFullSource(ctx context.Context, info ServerInfo)
 // false positives (e.g. flagging shutil.py or tempfile.py as "malicious").
 func (r *SourceResolver) extractFullFromContainer(ctx context.Context, containerID string, info ServerInfo) (string, func(), error) {
 	serverName := info.Name
-	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-full-%s-", serverName))
+	// Sanitize: server names may contain '/' which os.MkdirTemp rejects (MCP-2123).
+	tempDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-full-%s-", dockernaming.SanitizeServerName(serverName)))
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create temp dir: %w", err)
 	}

internal/security/scanner/tempdir_slashname_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+package scanner
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/smart-mcp-proxy/mcpproxy-go/internal/dockernaming"
+)
+
+// TestScanTempDirPatternHandlesSlashNames is the MCP-2123 regression guard for
+// the extraction temp dirs. Official-registry server names contain '/'
+// (e.g. "com.pulsemcp/google-flights"). os.MkdirTemp rejects a pattern that
+// contains a path separator ("pattern contains path separator"), so the raw
+// interpolation used by extractFromContainer / extractFullFromContainer /
+// StartScan's tool-defs fallback failed and source resolution fell back to
+// "none". The fix sanitizes the name via dockernaming.SanitizeServerName before
+// building the pattern. This test proves the sanitized pattern is MkdirTemp-safe
+// while the raw one is not.
+func TestScanTempDirPatternHandlesSlashNames(t *testing.T) {
+	const slashName = "com.pulsemcp/google-flights"
+
+	// Raw name reproduces the original failure — guards against anyone
+	// reintroducing the un-sanitized interpolation.
+	if _, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf("mcpproxy-scan-%s-", slashName)); err == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("expected os.MkdirTemp to reject raw slash-named pattern, but it succeeded")
+	}
+
+	// Every pattern the scanner uses must succeed once sanitized.
+	sanitized := dockernaming.SanitizeServerName(slashName)
+	for _, prefix := range []string{
+		"mcpproxy-scan-%s-",
+		"mcpproxy-scan-full-%s-",
+		"mcpproxy-scan-tools-%s-",
+	} {
+		dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", fmt.Sprintf(prefix, sanitized))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("os.MkdirTemp with sanitized pattern %q failed: %v", prefix, err)
+		}
+		_ = os.RemoveAll(dir)
+	}
+}