Remove drift detection job and permissions

terraform/modules/spack_aws_k8s/eks.tf

@@ -38,24 +38,8 @@ module "eks" {
           }
         }
       }
-    },
-    # Only create github_actions access entry on production cluster, since that's
-    # the only one we run the TF drift detection job on.
-    var.deployment_name == "prod" ? {
-      github_actions_drift_detection = {
-        kubernetes_groups = []
-        principal_arn     = aws_iam_role.github_actions_readonly[0].arn
-
-        policy_associations = {
-          cluster = {
-            policy_arn = "arn:aws:eks::aws:cluster-access-policy/AmazonEKSAdminViewPolicy"
-            access_scope = {
-              type = "cluster"
-            }
-          }
-        }
-      }
-  } : {})
+    }
+  )
 
   # NOTE: Additional configuration of these addons (like in the vpc-cni addon below) won't necessarily
   # take immediate effect, as it is configuring the addon, not anything in the cluster directly.

terraform/modules/spack_aws_k8s/github_actions_iam.tf

@@ -10,72 +10,6 @@ resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github_actions" {
   thumbprint_list = [data.tls_certificate.github_actions.certificates.0.sha1_fingerprint]
 }
 
-resource "aws_iam_role" "github_actions_readonly" {
-  count = var.deployment_name == "prod" ? 1 : 0
-
-  name        = "GitHubActionsReadonlyRole"
-  description = "Managed by Terraform. IAM Role that a GitHub Actions runner can assume to authenticate with AWS."
-
-  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
-    "Version" : "2012-10-17",
-    "Statement" : [
-      {
-        "Effect" : "Allow",
-        "Principal" : {
-          "Federated" : aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github_actions[0].arn
-        },
-        "Action" : "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
-        "Condition" : {
-          "StringLike" : {
-            "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub" : "repo:spack/spack-infrastructure:ref:refs/heads/main",
-            "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud" : "sts.amazonaws.com"
-          }
-        }
-      },
-      {
-        "Action" : "sts:AssumeRole",
-        "Principal" : {
-          # Unfortunately, we need to do this until https://github.com/hashicorp/terraform-provider-aws/issues/27034 is resolved.
-          # This trust statement allows the role to assume itself, which is necessary for the GitHub Actions session user to run terraform plan.
-          "AWS" : "arn:aws:sts::${data.aws_caller_identity.current.account_id}:assumed-role/GitHubActionsReadonlyRole/GitHubActions"
-        },
-        "Effect" : "Allow",
-      },
-    ]
-  })
-}
-
-# The `ReadOnlyAccess` managed policy doesn't include secretsmanager, so we explicitly grant it here.
-resource "aws_iam_role_policy" "github_actions_readonly" {
-  count = var.deployment_name == "prod" ? 1 : 0
-
-  name = "read-secrets"
-  role = aws_iam_role.github_actions_readonly[0].id
-
-  policy = jsonencode({
-    "Version" : "2012-10-17",
-    "Statement" : [
-      {
-        "Effect" : "Allow",
-        "Action" : [
-          "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue"
-        ],
-        "Resource" : "*"
-      }
-    ]
-  })
-}
-
-# This policy grants the GitHub Actions role read-only access to most resources in the AWS account.
-# There are some exceptions, such as secretsmanager (see inline_policy above)
-resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "github_actions_readonly" {
-  count = var.deployment_name == "prod" ? 1 : 0
-
-  role       = aws_iam_role.github_actions_readonly[0].name
-  policy_arn = "arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/ReadOnlyAccess"
-}
-
-
 # Allow github actions run from the develop branch of spack/spack to put objects into the source mirror
 resource "aws_iam_role" "github_actions_put_to_source_mirror" {
   count = var.deployment_name == "prod" ? 1 : 0