Merge pull request #3508 from splunk/duplicate_status_in_stats

Removing duplicate group-by field

Author: patel-bhavin

detections/endpoint/windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_from_unsanctioned_location.yml

@@ -1,30 +1,32 @@
 name: Windows AD Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned Location
 id: 50998483-bb15-457b-a870-965080d9e3d3
 version: 11
-date: '2025-05-02'
+date: '2025-05-05'
 author: Dean Luxton
 type: TTP
 status: production
 data_source:
-- Windows Event Log Security 4662
-- Windows Event Log Security 4624
-description: The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication
+  - Windows Event Log Security 4662
+  - Windows Event Log Security 4624
+description:
+  The following analytic identifies unauthorized Active Directory replication
   requests initiated from non-domain controller locations. It leverages EventCode
   4662 to detect when a computer account with replication permissions creates a handle
   to domainDNS, filtering out known domain controller IP addresses. This activity
   is significant as it may indicate a DCSync attack, where an attacker with privileged
   access can request password hashes for any or all users within the domain. If confirmed
   malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information and potential
   full domain compromise.
-search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}",
+search:
+  '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-11d0-afd3-00c04fd930c9}",
   "domainDNS") AND Properties IN ("*Replicating Directory Changes All*", "*{1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*",
   "*{9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2}*","*{1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2}*")
   AND AccessMask="0x100" AND (SubjectUserSid="NT AUT*" OR SubjectUserSid="S-1-5-18"
   OR SubjectDomainName="Window Manager" OR SubjectUserName="*$") | stats min(_time)
   as attack_time, count by SubjectDomainName SubjectUserName Computer Logon_ID ObjectName
   ObjectServer ObjectType OperationType status action app authentication_method dest
   dvc process process_id process_name process_path signature signature_id src src_port
-  status subject user user_group vendor_product | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain,
+  subject user user_group vendor_product | rename SubjectDomainName as Target_Domain,
   SubjectUserName as user, Logon_ID as TargetLogonId | appendpipe [| map search="search
   `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 TargetLogonId=$TargetLogonId$"] | table attack_time,
   AuthenticationPackageName, LogonProcessName, LogonType, TargetUserSid, Target_Domain,
@@ -34,7 +36,8 @@ search: '`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4662 ObjectType IN ("%{19195a5b-6da0-1
   values(Computer) as Computer, values(status) as status, values(src_category) as
   src_category, values(src_ip) as src_ip by TargetLogonId | search NOT src_category="domain_controller"
   | `windows_ad_replication_request_initiated_from_unsanctioned_location_filter`'
-how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
+how_to_implement:
+  To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting
   eventcode `4662`. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings `Audit Directory Services
   Access` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled, as well as the following SACLs applied
   to the domain root and all descendant objects. The principals `everybody`,  `Domain
@@ -44,52 +47,55 @@ how_to_implement: To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingestin
   category of domain_controller added for domain controllers.
 known_false_positives: Genuine DC promotion may trigger this alert.
 references:
-- https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
-- https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer
-- https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0.22-699-g29a5c6278/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcsync.yml
+  - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729
+  - https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/mimikatz-dcsync-event-log-detections-john-dwyer
+  - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/0.22-699-g29a5c6278/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_dcsync.yml
 drilldown_searches:
-- name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
-  search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
-  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
-  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
-- name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
-  search: '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$")
-    starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
-    values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
-    as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
-    as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
-  earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
-  latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+  - name: View the detection results for - "$user$"
+    search: '%original_detection_search% | search  user = "$user$"'
+    earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+    latest_offset: $info_max_time$
+  - name: View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$"
+    search:
+      '| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$")
+      starthoursago=168  | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
+      values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories)
+      as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic)
+      as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
+    earliest_offset: $info_min_time$
+    latest_offset: $info_max_time$
 rba:
-  message: Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned
+  message:
+    Windows Active Directory Replication Request Initiated from Unsanctioned
     Location $src_ip$ by $user$
   risk_objects:
-  - field: user
-    type: user
-    score: 100
-  - field: src_ip
-    type: system
-    score: 100
+    - field: user
+      type: user
+      score: 100
+    - field: src_ip
+      type: system
+      score: 100
   threat_objects: []
 tags:
   analytic_story:
-  - Compromised Windows Host
-  - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
-  - Credential Dumping
+    - Compromised Windows Host
+    - Sneaky Active Directory Persistence Tricks
+    - Credential Dumping
   asset_type: Endpoint
   mitre_attack_id:
-  - T1003.006
+    - T1003.006
   product:
-  - Splunk Enterprise
-  - Splunk Enterprise Security
-  - Splunk Cloud
+    - Splunk Enterprise
+    - Splunk Enterprise Security
+    - Splunk Cloud
   security_domain: endpoint
-  manual_test: This detection runs correctly when run manually and given some time
+  manual_test:
+    This detection runs correctly when run manually and given some time
     is given for data to settle in the splunk index.
 tests:
-- name: True Positive Test
-  attack_data:
-  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.006/impacket/windows-security-xml.log
-    source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
-    sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
+  - name: True Positive Test
+    attack_data:
+      - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1003.006/impacket/windows-security-xml.log
+        source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
+        sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog