diff --git a/tests/mesh/test_audit_read_walker_defenses.py b/tests/mesh/test_audit_read_walker_defenses.py
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c00076da2
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+++ b/tests/mesh/test_audit_read_walker_defenses.py
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+"""Forensic-walker defenses for :mod:`strands_robots.mesh.audit`.
+
+``read_audit_log`` is both the operator-facing forensic reader and the
+seed source for ``_load_seq_counters`` when the seq sidecar is corrupt.
+That dual role makes its file-handling discipline security-relevant:
+
+* A rotated log file swapped for a SYMLINK must be refused, not followed
+  (mirrors the O_NOFOLLOW discipline applied to every other open in the
+  module). Following it would let an attacker redirect the forensic read
+  to ``/dev/null`` (fail-open seq reset) or to forged content.
+* ``_audit_log_files_in_order`` must only treat files whose suffix after
+  the active-log name is purely numeric as rotated copies; an unrelated
+  sibling such as ``mesh_audit.jsonl.bak`` must be ignored so its bytes
+  never enter the forensic stream.
+* The ``since=`` cutoff must drop records strictly older than the
+  timestamp (and records with a non-numeric ``ts``) while keeping newer
+  ones, so a time-bounded forensic query returns only the window asked
+  for.
+
+These behaviors had no direct regression coverage; this file pins them.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+
+import pytest
+
+from strands_robots.mesh import audit
+
+
+@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
+def _isolated_audit(monkeypatch, tmp_path):
+    """Fresh audit dir + reset module state for each test."""
+    monkeypatch.setenv("STRANDS_MESH_AUDIT_DIR", str(tmp_path))
+    monkeypatch.delenv("STRANDS_MESH_AUDIT_PSK", raising=False)
+    audit._SEQ_COUNTERS.clear()
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.seq_loaded = False
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.audit_log_seeded = False
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.psk_fingerprint = None
+    yield
+    audit._SEQ_COUNTERS.clear()
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.seq_loaded = False
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.audit_log_seeded = False
+    audit._AUDIT_STATE.psk_fingerprint = None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.skipif(not hasattr(os, "symlink"), reason="platform without symlink support")
+def test_read_audit_log_refuses_symlinked_rotated_file(tmp_path, monkeypatch, caplog):
+    """A rotated log file that is a SYMLINK must be skipped, not followed.
+
+    The active log is read normally; the symlinked rotated copy's target
+    bytes must never appear in the returned records.
+    """
+    # Write a legitimate record to the active log.
+    audit.log_safety_event("real_event", "peer-a", {"index": 1})
+    active = audit.audit_log_path()
+    assert active.exists()
+
+    # Plant attacker-controlled bytes outside the audit dir, then point a
+    # rotated-log path at them via a symlink.
+    secret = tmp_path / "attacker_payload.jsonl"
+    secret.write_text('{"event": "forged", "payload": {"index": 999}}\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    rotated = active.with_suffix(active.suffix + ".1")
+    os.symlink(secret, rotated)
+    assert rotated.is_symlink()
+
+    with caplog.at_level("WARNING"):
+        records = audit.read_audit_log()
+
+    events = [r.get("event") for r in records]
+    assert "real_event" in events, "active log record should still be read"
+    assert "forged" not in events, "symlinked rotated log must not be followed"
+    assert any("refusing to read" in m and "SYMLINK" in m for m in caplog.messages), (
+        f"expected a symlink-refusal warning, got {caplog.messages}"
+    )
+
+
+def test_files_in_order_ignores_non_numeric_suffix_siblings(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """Only ``<active>.<digits>`` siblings count as rotated copies.
+
+    A sibling like ``mesh_audit.jsonl.bak`` must be excluded so its bytes
+    never enter the forensic read stream.
+    """
+    audit.log_safety_event("real_event", "peer-a", {"index": 1})
+    active = audit.audit_log_path()
+
+    # A genuine rotated copy (numeric suffix) and a decoy (non-numeric).
+    rotated = active.with_suffix(active.suffix + ".1")
+    rotated.write_text('{"event": "rotated_event", "payload": {"index": 0}}\n', encoding="utf-8")
+    decoy = active.with_suffix(active.suffix + ".bak")
+    decoy.write_text('{"event": "decoy_event", "payload": {"index": -1}}\n', encoding="utf-8")
+
+    ordered = audit._audit_log_files_in_order()
+    names = [p.name for p in ordered]
+    assert rotated.name in names, "numeric-suffix rotated copy must be included"
+    assert decoy.name not in names, "non-numeric-suffix sibling must be excluded"
+    # Chronological order: oldest rotated copy first, active log last.
+    assert names[-1] == active.name
+
+    events = [r.get("event") for r in audit.read_audit_log()]
+    assert "rotated_event" in events
+    assert "real_event" in events
+    assert "decoy_event" not in events
+
+
+def test_read_audit_log_since_filters_old_and_non_numeric_ts(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """``since=`` keeps records at/after the cutoff and drops older ones.
+
+    A record whose ``ts`` is missing or non-numeric is also dropped, since
+    it cannot be placed in the requested time window.
+    """
+    active = audit.audit_log_path()
+    active.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    active.write_text(
+        "\n".join(
+            [
+                '{"event": "old", "ts": 100.0, "payload": {}}',
+                '{"event": "new", "ts": 200.0, "payload": {}}',
+                '{"event": "no_ts", "payload": {}}',
+                '{"event": "bad_ts", "ts": "not-a-number", "payload": {}}',
+            ]
+        )
+        + "\n",
+        encoding="utf-8",
+    )
+
+    records = audit.read_audit_log(since=150.0)
+    events = [r.get("event") for r in records]
+    assert events == ["new"], f"since= should keep only records at/after the cutoff, got {events}"