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Security: superbasedapp/observer

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a security vulnerability.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting instead:

  1. Go to the Security tab on this repository.
  2. Click "Report a vulnerability".

This opens a private advisory thread visible only to you and the maintainers, and lets us collaborate on a fix before anything is disclosed publicly.

If you're unable to use GitHub's reporting flow, email contact@superbased.app with as much detail as you can provide (affected version, reproduction steps, impact).

Do not include exploit details, secrets, or sensitive data in a public issue, discussion, or pull request.

Supported versions

Observer ships frequent releases. We support the latest released version on a rolling basis. If you're reporting an issue on an older version, please upgrade and confirm it still reproduces before reporting — if you can't upgrade, tell us why in the report and we'll take that into account.

What to expect

  • Acknowledgement within 72 hours of a report reaching us through either channel above.
  • We'll work with you on a coordinated disclosure timeline. Our default disclosure window is 90 days from acknowledgement, or sooner once a fix ships — extended by mutual agreement if the fix needs more time.
  • We'll credit you in the advisory and release notes when the fix ships, unless you'd prefer to stay anonymous.

Scope

Observer is a local-first tool. Its real attack surface is narrower than a hosted product's, but it's still real:

In scope:

  • The local daemon and dashboard (bound to loopback by default) — auth bypass, injection, path traversal, or anything that lets a local dashboard request act outside its intended scope.
  • The optional API reverse proxy (Anthropic / OpenAI / Gemini provider lanes) — request/response handling, header forwarding, anything that could leak a credential or mishandle a body.
  • Opt-in remote access — device pairing, standing terminal-control grants, per-session leases, and the audit trail. Anything that lets remote control happen without an explicit grant, or that lets a lease outlive its intended scope, is high priority.
  • Hooks that execute in the context of an AI coding tool (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and the rest) — anything that lets hook registration or execution do more than the documented capture path.
  • The MCP server (stdio subprocess) — tool definitions, path-safety gates on file-reading tools, and anything that could be used to exfiltrate data the operator didn't ask for.
  • Org-server deployments (observer-org) — auth, tenant isolation, and the privacy posture around what a node ships versus what it keeps local.
  • The secrets-scrubbing pipeline — cases where scrubbing silently fails to redact something it claims to handle.

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in the third-party AI coding tools themselves (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, etc.) — please report those upstream.
  • Social engineering of maintainers or users.
  • Issues that require an already-compromised machine to exploit (at that point the local database and config are already accessible to the attacker by design — Observer stores everything locally in plain SQLite, as documented in PRIVACY.md).
  • Denial-of-service against your own local instance.

A note on secrets scrubbing

Observer scrubs known secret patterns (API keys, tokens, common credential shapes) from what it captures. That scrubbing is best-effort, not a guarantee — please still review logs, transcripts, or fixtures before pasting them into a public issue or discussion.

There aren't any published security advisories