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Security Audit Report: Terraphim-AI

Date: 2026-04-07 (Audit Session 19) Status: FAIL - Critical Vulnerabilities Found

Executive Summary

Identical critical security issues persist from prior audits with zero remediation progress in 24+ hours:

  1. CRITICAL CVE: RUSTSEC-2026-0049 (rustls-webpki 0.102.8)
  2. CRITICAL: Port exposure risk documented
  3. WARNINGS: 7 denied warnings including unmaintained crate

Verdict: FAIL — Deployment blocked due to unresolved CRITICAL CVE.


Findings

1. CRITICAL: RUSTSEC-2026-0049 - Certificate Validation Bypass

Severity: CRITICAL Affected Crate: rustls-webpki 0.102.8 CVE Title: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic Published: 2026-03-20 URL: https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0049

Impact: CRL (Certificate Revocation List) matching logic failure allows potentially compromised certificates to bypass revocation checks. This is a cryptographic validation weakness that could allow man-in-the-middle attacks.

Root Cause Chain:

rustls-webpki 0.102.8 (vulnerable)
  └─ rustls 0.22.4
      ├─ tungstenite 0.21.0
      │   └─ tokio-tungstenite 0.21.0
      │       └─ serenity 0.12.5
      │           └─ terraphim_tinyclaw 1.16.9
      └─ tokio-rustls 0.25.0
          └─ tokio-tungstenite 0.21.0

Current Status:

  • Vulnerable version 0.102.8 is actively used
  • Fixed version 0.103.10 exists in Cargo.lock (git source) but NOT applied to active dependency tree
  • Suggests incomplete or abandoned remediation attempt

Remediation Steps:

  1. Upgrade rustls-webpki to >= 0.103.10
  2. Update Cargo.lock to use registry version (not git)
  3. Verify serenity 0.12.5 compatibility with new rustls version
  4. Run full test suite
  5. Re-run cargo audit to confirm fix

Evidence:

$ cargo audit --deny warnings 2>&1
error: 1 vulnerability found!
error: 7 denied warnings found!

Crate:     rustls-webpki
Version:   0.102.8
Title:     CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic
Date:      2026-03-20
ID:        RUSTSEC-2026-0049
Solution:  Upgrade to >=0.103.10

2. Port Exposure Analysis

Finding: No hardcoded port 3456 found in source code Status: NOT A CODE VULNERABILITY

Listening Ports Detected (as of audit time):

  • 127.0.0.1:23094 - terraphim_serve (local process)
  • 127.0.0.1:8080 - local service
  • 127.0.0.1:3000 - local service
  • All critical services bound to localhost (127.0.0.1)
  • Public ports (80, 443): nginx/reverse proxy (outside this codebase scope)

Assessment:

  • Server is correctly bound to localhost
  • No network-exposed terraphim service port
  • Port exposure risk mitigated by localhost binding
  • No port 3456 hardcoded anywhere in codebase

Conclusion: Port exposure is NOT a codebase security issue. May be operational/deployment documentation concern but not code-level vulnerability.


3. Unmaintained Dependency Warning

Severity: HIGH (denied warning) Crate: bincode 1.3.3 Advisory: RUSTSEC-2025-0141 Title: Bincode is unmaintained Published: 2025-12-16 Status: Crate is no longer maintained - no security patches available

Affected Modules (30+ transitive dependents):

  • terraphim_automata (primary)
  • terraphim_persistence
  • terraphim_service
  • terraphim_config
  • terraphim_multi_agent
  • terraphim_sessions
  • terraphim_agent
  • terraphim_automation
  • (and 20+ more transitive dependents)

Alternatives for Migration:

  1. postcard - Lightweight, no_std compatible
  2. rmp-serde - MessagePack format
  3. ciborium - CBOR format
  4. serde_json - Text-based, human-readable

Remediation Effort:

  • Requires migration away from bincode
  • Medium complexity: 8-16 hours
  • Must update Cargo.toml and serialization calls in all affected crates

4. Unsafe Code Analysis

Finding: No unsafe blocks found in audited crates Command: grep -rn "^\s*unsafe" crates/ --include="*.rs" Result: 0 unsafe blocks Status: ✅ PASS - Code is memory-safe

Note: Unsafe code would require security review, but none found.


5. Secrets Scanning

Scan Results:

  • grep -r "sk-" crates/ (OpenAI API key pattern): 0 matches found
  • grep -r "api_key|API_KEY" crates/ (API key patterns): 0 matches found
  • grep -r "secret|password" crates/ (credential patterns): No hardcoded values found

Status: ✅ PASS - No hardcoded secrets detected


6. Recent Commits Security Review

Time Period: Last 24 hours Commits Found: 5

7f0010ef feat(security-sentinel): agent work [auto-commit]
54f16169 feat(spec-validator): agent work [auto-commit]
c5f2746d feat(security-sentinel): agent work [auto-commit]
c6893635 feat(drift-detector): agent work [auto-commit]
20d1119f feat(security-sentinel): agent work [auto-commit]

Observation: Only automated agent commits. No manual security remediation attempts. All commits are routine automated work.

Assessment: No evidence of security remediation work in last 24 hours.


Summary Table

Finding Severity Status Days Unresolved Blocking
RUSTSEC-2026-0049 (CVE) CRITICAL UNRESOLVED 24+ YES
Unmaintained bincode HIGH UNRESOLVED 24+ YES
Port exposure OPERATIONAL MITIGATED N/A NO
Unsafe code N/A CLEAN N/A NO
Hardcoded secrets N/A CLEAN N/A NO

Compliance Gate Status

FAIL - Blocking criteria not met

  • Zero CRITICAL CVEs - FAIL (RUSTSEC-2026-0049 unresolved)
  • Zero unmaintained dependencies - FAIL (bincode 1.3.3 in use)
  • No hardcoded secrets - PASS
  • Safe code patterns (no unsafe) - PASS
  • Port exposure mitigated - PASS

Deployment Status: 🔴 BLOCKED until CRITICAL issues resolved


Required Actions (Ordered by Priority)

IMMEDIATE (Blocking - Must Complete Before Merge)

1. Resolve RUSTSEC-2026-0049: Upgrade rustls-webpki

  • Change Cargo.lock: rustls-webpki 0.102.8 → 0.103.10 (registry)
  • Run: cargo update -p rustls-webpki
  • Verify: cargo audit shows 0 vulnerabilities
  • Test: Full cargo test --workspace passes
  • Estimated time: 2-4 hours
  • Blocker: serenity 0.12.5 compatibility check needed

2. Plan bincode Migration

  • Evaluate alternatives (postcard recommended for embedded use)
  • Create RFC/design document
  • Estimate scope across all affected crates
  • Plan phased migration if necessary
  • Estimated time: 8-16 hours

VALIDATION (After Remediation)

  • cargo audit --deny warnings returns 0 vulnerabilities
  • All unit tests pass: cargo test --workspace
  • All integration tests pass
  • Re-run security audit (Session 20)
  • Security audit passes: PASS verdict required

Audit Methodology

Tools Used:

  • cargo audit --deny warnings (CVE detection)
  • grep scanning (hardcoded secrets)
  • ss (port enumeration)
  • git log (recent changes review)
  • static code inspection (unsafe blocks)

Scope: terraphim-ai codebase on main branch

Conducted By: Vigil, Security Engineer Authority: Principal Security Engineer (SFIA Level 5) Nature: Meta-cortex with Ferrox for security code review Standards: OWASP Top 10, CWE Top 25, Rust Security Guidelines


Precedent and Escalation

Audit History:

  • Session 1-18: Identical findings documented
  • Duration without fix: 24+ hours
  • Remediation attempts: 0
  • Code changes addressing CVE: 0

This represents a pattern of deferred critical security issues. Escalation recommended if not resolved within 4 hours.


Next Steps

  1. User Responsibility: Address CRITICAL CVE before next merge
  2. Vigil Responsibility: Re-audit after remediation (Session 20)
  3. Escalation Path: If unresolved > 4 hours, block all merges via CI/CD
  4. Stakeholder Notification: Posted verdict to Gitea issue #466

Audit Timestamp: 2026-04-07T10:30:00Z Report Location: SECURITY_AUDIT_2026_04_07_SESSION19.md Verdict Destination: Gitea issue #466 (comment posted) Next Audit Trigger: Upon remediation of CRITICAL findings